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Ending Cross-Border Aid Is a 'Death Sentence' for the Syrian People, Woodward Tells Asharq Al-Awsat

UK Ambassador to the UN Says 'Iran Is Part of the Problem' and the Houthis Has to Agree on a Ceasefire

Dame Barbara Woodward, UK Ambassador to the United Nations
Dame Barbara Woodward, UK Ambassador to the United Nations
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Ending Cross-Border Aid Is a 'Death Sentence' for the Syrian People, Woodward Tells Asharq Al-Awsat

Dame Barbara Woodward, UK Ambassador to the United Nations
Dame Barbara Woodward, UK Ambassador to the United Nations

What is happening in Syria is “one of the most tragic crises” in the world, the UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations Barbara Woodward told Asharq Al-Awsat. In a wide-ranging interview coinciding with the World Refugee Day, the British diplomat warned against the failure of the UN Security Council to renew the authorization to send aid to 13 million Syrians across the border from Turkey, saying that would be like a "death sentence" for the Syrian people.

Dame Woodward, whose country is a permanent member of the UN Security Council sees Iran as "part of the problem," not only in Syria, but also in Yemen, where it continues to support the Houthis instead of joining the efforts by the UN, US, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UK to reach a settlement. A ceasefire would help move towards a political solution, and to deliver aid to 16 million Yemenis. She also touched on Libya, calling on Russia and Turkey to withdraw their forces and mercenaries from Libyan territories in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 2570 and what was stipulated in the agreements between the Libyans themselves.

Woodward also spoke of “great scope” of cooperation between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, both bilaterally and at the global levels, to tackle major challenges such as COVID-19, climate change, and development.

Here is the full interview with Ambassador Barbara Woodward:

Our region is battered with old and new conflicts, but Syria stands out - still - as one of the worst. The Security Council tried many times to stop this war, and failed. Now there is a new administration in Washington, and of course, the summit between Presidents Biden and Putin, do you see any hope?

- You are right, Syria is one of the world's longest-running conflicts, and as we approach World Refugee Day, one of the world's most tragic refugee crises. It's one that the Security Council discusses three times a month, whether the political situation, the humanitarian crisis, and the use of chemical weapons. But the new administration in Washington has bought, I think, a breath of fresh commitment to trying to find a resolution. I know the US Permanent Representative, Ambassador Linda Thomas Greenfield, has just been to the region to see for herself the situation in Syria, and it remains very disturbing that 13 million Syrians are in urgent need of humanitarian aid, which a UN operation is doing its very best to reach into help. And that's what we'll be discussing in the Security Council next month, how we can in the face of this humanitarian crisis, as a first step, get more humanitarian aid to 13 million Syrian refugees, I mean that's more than the population of Riyadh or London, there are 2 million children in that group of 13 million. So that's why we want to see more crossing points, open for humanitarian aid, why we're calling for a ceasefire, and why we want to work towards a political solution.

But now it is all hanging on whether Russia would accept, or not accept, to keep at least this border line open for the humanitarian aid. Do you have any hints from your Russian colleagues, whether they're going to allow it this time?

- I know that it was something that was raised during the summit between President Putin and President Biden, but I don't have any hints at the moment. To be very frank to close the border now would be a death sentence for the Syrian people. So, a vote to close the border or a veto on the resolution would frankly be playing politics with the lives of Syrians, with the health and security of the region. This is about food aid, humanitarian aid, it's about getting COVID vaccines in to people stuck in northwest Syria. So I very much hope that the Russians will see the importance of not just keeping open the Bab ell Hawa crossing, but actually reopening crossings at Yaroubia at Bab el Salam, because what we've seen over the last year is that one crossing is not enough. And with the conflict continuing there's at least 20% more people, now, in need of humanitarian aid than they were before...So we will be talking very closely with the Russians in the weeks in the run-up to this crucial vote.

Besides the dire humanitarian situation for the Syrians themselves, neighboring countries like Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, have been facing significant challenges with refugees, how would you propose that the international community help with this issue?

- This is a very topical question for World Refugee Day, the neighboring countries are carrying a huge burden of refugees, and that's why we in the UK are so committed to helping the UN humanitarian programs and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Filippo Grandi) who I saw only last week in order to ensure that we can bring immediate aid to refugees and then work towards ceasefires and political solutions that will find a way forward for people out of refugee camps.

Let’s be straightforward, do you see Iran as part of this solution or this problem? So where do you put Iran in this game?

- Iran has huge potential to be part of the solution, not just here, but also in other regional conflicts, but I have to be very frank and say, up until now, Iran has seemed more part of the problem with their support to the Houthis for example, with regional destabilization, with ballistic missile tests. And so we very much hope that Iran could return to playing a constructive role in the region, which would help a great deal, I think.

I’m going to move to Yemen. But before that, when it comes to refugees, what are your thoughts also about Lebanon specifically?

- The neighboring countries are shouldering a huge and enormous burden of refugees and that's of course terrible for the refugees themselves. So I think it's very important to try and work through some of these critical questions that refugees bring, not just in Lebanon, but in the neighboring countries and genuinely around the world at this stage.

As you just mentioned, Yemen is one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world as well. We saw a lot of efforts recently from the United Nations, from the United States, from Saudi Arabia, from the United Kingdom, and others, but nothing bears any fruits. Do you see Iran playing a constructive role in this conflict?

- In Yemen, we see 16 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, a long-standing conflict (...) so Iran, I think, is not contributing to helping find a ceasefire to moving towards a political solution to getting aid into Yemen. And as you say we very much welcome the efforts of Saudi Arabia, the efforts of Oman, to try and find a way forward in this and as Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy said to us. He has tried multiple ways to bring the parties to dialogue to see a ceasefire, to open up the ports of Hodeidah, to open the airport at Sanaa, to find a resolution to the Safer oil tanker which is effectively rusting and could spew out over a million barrels of oil into the sea. So there's a huge number of intersecting problems I think here. And again, it would be very helpful if Iran could play a constructive role but most importantly I think if the Houthis could agree to a ceasefire, and step away from this persistent violence; like the ballistic missile attacks 10 days ago in Maarib, also, the attack on a Saudi school, none of that is helping towards a ceasefire and a solution.

Now, I understand there are three contenders to replace Martin Griffiths, among which there is one British. Are you pushing for a British replacement for Martin Griffiths?

- So we very much welcome the unstinting efforts that Martin Griffiths has played along with so many actors in the region, including the recently appointed US Special Envoy Tim Linderking. I think the most important thing is that the person who succeeds Martin has his patience, his determination, his resilience, and his creative ability to try and find solutions to this. So the most important thing is for the Secretary-General (António Guterres), whose decision this is to appoint someone who has those skills and those qualities.

Should the replacement follow the same approach?

- We’ve seen the arrival of Tim Linderking for example, bringing new ideas (...) we've seen a number of creative advances from both Saudi Arabia, and from Oman. So I think there's, there's always scope for new approaches for the situation that is both evolving and deteriorating. At the same time.

I will move to Libya. This is a country also that the UK is the Penholder for in the Security Council, and are you hopeful now about Berlin 2 conference? And what are the next necessary steps in the political roadmap and the role that the UN has been playing to try to ease the remaining problems?

- We're looking forward to the Berlin Conference on the 23rd of June, I think it will be an important opportunity to take stock. There has been, I think progress in many areas, and we very much welcome the appointment of the new Special Envoy Jan Kubis and the arrival of the UN monitors, all to prepare for the elections in December, but the really critical thing in line with the Security Council resolution 2570, the really critical thing now is to see the foreign forces who remained in Libya, leave Libya. That's in line with what the Libyans have asked for. These foreign forces are destabilizing the situation, so they're not helping move towards peace and stability and move through to the electoral process. So we very much hope that Berlin will be able to discuss this and perhaps find a way forward to see the foreign forces out of Libya.

Again, there is always the Russian role, besides the Turkish role and that of others in providing new mercenaries, arms, and other stuff in this conflict. So do you see any hopes that Russia might cooperate to solve this problem?

- It’s clear that the people of Libya and the Provisional Government of Libya, want the foreign fighters to leave in line with Security Council resolution 2570 (...) so Russian forces must leave, and it's equally important that Turkish forces leave too, so I think that's the critical thing we need.

In Tigray, you said recently that the situation is worsening and probably there's going to be a man-made famine if the international community doesn't do anything. So, what do you think should be done to prevent famine and worsening the crisis there?

- I think you're completely right, the tragedy here is that this is a man-made famine. This is not about drought or locusts. This is a man-made famine, it's created by decisions taken by people in power, and it can be averted by the decisions of people in power. So the critical thing is for the Eritrean forces to withdraw. We agreed that that should happen back in March and we've now got to June, and there's no sign that it has happened so that is the most important thing that we need to see. And then of course, with 350,000 people at high risk of famine, and millions more at risk of food insecurity. The critical thing is to get food aid into the Tigray area (...) And then, what becomes critical is that we can somehow, reverse the lack of planting this year, which means that without it next year there will be famine too. So, the withdrawal of the Eritrean forces, and then the decisions by people in power to allow humanitarian aid I think are the two critical things.

In all the conflicts that you mentioned, we saw grave violations of human rights. Do you think that we can do anything without accountability in these countries?

- I think your point about human rights is very important for my foreign secretary (Dominic Raab). So one of the things that the UK has been doing has been imposing what we call Magnitsky sanctions on individuals who are responsible as we understand it for some of these violations, so we've done that in Myanmar, we've done that with respect to the situation in (Muslim-majority) Xinjiang. So, this accountability question I think is very important. And it's not just bilateral. We've seen this week Karim Khan start as a judge at the International Criminal Court, so we have international bodies to enforce accountability.

How do you see the future of the UK-Saudi relationship?

I think that's probably the area of expertise for our respective ambassadors, but I think we've had some very successful visits recently, as well as very successful high-level dialogues between our two capitals. Also, we've got strong bilateral cooperation, as well as strong multilateral cooperation, so we'll see the G20 foreign ministers meeting shortly next month, as part of our multilateral cooperation. I very much hope that we can continue to work together on tackling COVID, making contributions to Covax, working together on climate change, eliminating fossil fuels, and finding technical solutions to support some developing countries in mitigation and adaptation to climate change, as well as working together in many other areas, including development and financial assistance. I think there's a lot of scope for us to work together.

And last but not least, can you say something about the meetings that happened in the UK, like the G7, NATO and EU in Brussels, and the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva? Do you see a new atmosphere in the international community to take collective action to improve the situation in the world?

Yes, I think there are two very strong positive elements here. The UK was delighted to host the G7 Summit, which was, of course, the first in-person summit that the world has seen for more than a year. To bring together the leaders of countries that represent two-thirds of the global economy, I think, was a very significant achievement, and to see those leaders, to commit, both to aid for COVID to expand the vaccine program, to commit to further developments towards climate change, and commit to open societies and democracy, I think is a very strong statement indeed about the power of the G7 and the role that the UK is playing. Now that we've left the European Union, we remain as permanent five members of the United Nations, as members of NATO leaders of Commonwealth, we remain as we say, global Britain, a force for good in the world. And I think that global Britain force for good comes alongside the new approach of the administration of President Biden, we've heard them say very clearly that the United States is back, and that the United States is back as a multilateral player...

All this, I think, shows the important dynamic that the US is bringing to global affairs.

So I think there are some positive trends, but we need those positive trends because we do have some very big problems to solve. COVID and climate change being the most obvious ones, but there are also underlying ones like economic inequality, development, and lack of progress with the UN Sustainable Development Goals, so we do need to work together, multilaterally in the G7, in the G20 with Saudi Arabia, and in other international fora such as the UN, to try and solve these problems.

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Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.