Extension, Expansion of Cross-Border Aid Delivery Tops Washington’s ‘3’ Goals in Syria

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a presser in Rome (Reuters)
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a presser in Rome (Reuters)
TT
20

Extension, Expansion of Cross-Border Aid Delivery Tops Washington’s ‘3’ Goals in Syria

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a presser in Rome (Reuters)
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a presser in Rome (Reuters)

At a closed session in Rome, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken defined three main goals Washington has for Syria. The most urgent of which is convincing Russia to allow an “extension” and “expansion” on the UN resolution for cross-border humanitarian relief in the war-torn country.

Dovetailing with the Biden administration’s plan, Moscow and Washington decided on holding a private meeting to bring together high-ranking officials from both sides in Geneva next week.

The meeting will likely include the Russian Special Presidential Envoy on Syrian Reconciliation Alexander Lavrentiev and US National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk.

Blinken’s attendance in Rome represents the first high-profile political step taken by Biden’s team since he took office, Western officials who attended the Rome meeting told Asharq Al-Awsat.

They noted the importance of the Rome meeting since the 2015 “Vienna peace talks for Syria,” which saw the participation of over 20 countries, including Russia and Iran, have nearly faded away.

For Washington, the Rome conference presented a unique opportunity to restore its leadership role by coordinating with allies and expanding the “mini-group” that included seven major and Arab countries.

It also restored consultation channels with Qatar and Turkey, which had sided with Russia in the “Astana Talks” or the “Doha Platform,” and bridging gaps with two influential blocs in the Syrian matter, the Arab League and the European Union (EU).

“URGENT RELIEF”

According to available information, Blinken filled in participating ministers in Rome about Washington’s three primary goals in Syria today:

The first goal, which is “urgent,” concerns an appeal for extending and expanding the scope of an international resolution for cross-border humanitarian delivery in Syria. During a meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Geneva on May 16, US President Joe Biden had raised the issue of extending the special international resolution, whose period of operation is set to expire on July 10.

Indeed, the Biden administration’s opinion on the matter was made clear. It set the premise that the Russian position on this issue will be decisive and affect Washington’s positions in the next stage.

“The US message is: If Russia responds to Washington’s desire, bilateral dialogue on Syria can be resumed and expanded, and other positive measures can be taken,” a western diplomat told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“But if Moscow votes against reauthorizing and expanding the resolution (from one to three crossings), a stalemate on the Syrian issis fated, especially amid calls in Washington to escalate pressure and resume the imposition of sanctions,” the diplomat explained.

The US-Russian dialogue in Geneva is slated for a few days later and will be the first of its kind under the Biden administration.

It is noteworthy that the last meeting a Russian official held with a US counterpart on Syria was with former US envoy James Jeffrey in Vienna last July. Infected with the coronavirus, Jeffery was unable to attend the subsequent US-Russian meeting in Geneva last August.

The impromptu US-Russia track and consultations on Syria were launched by McGurk and the Kremlin’s Sergei Vershinin.

“I think that we see here an opportunity to work constructively with Russia on this issue of getting humanitarian assistance to Syrians all across the country, especially now that we have the Covid-19 pandemic to deal with and there has been virtually no assistance to battle Covid-19 that’s gotten into the northeast in particular,” said the Acting Assistant Secretary Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood.

“So, it’s a growing humanitarian problem and one that I don’t think anyone wants to see exacerbated,” added Hood.

Meanwhile, in Rome, Biden reaffirmed that the matter is of utmost significance to Washington.

“ISIS & TRUCE”

Washington’s second goal in Syria is to focus on eliminating ISIS, the only reason it is present east of Syria’s Euphrates Region.

“Together, we must stay as committed to our stabilization goals (in the east of the Euphrates Region) as we did to our military campaign that resulted in victory on the battlefield,” Blinken told reporters.

He pointed out the pressing need to resolve the issue of tens of thousands of ISIS captives in prisons operated by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

“This situation is simply untenable. It just can’t persist indefinitely. The US continues to urge countries of origin, including coalition partners, to repatriate, rehabilitate, and, where applicable, prosecute their citizens,” said Blinken.

Similarly, a joint communique by the ministerial meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS said reaffirmed that “the Coalition stands with the Syrian people in support of a lasting political settlement in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.”

“The Coalition must continue to be vigilant against the threat of terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, to build on the success it has achieved and continue to act together against any threats to this outcome and to avoid security vacuums that ISIS may exploit,” the joint statement added.

As for Washington’s third goal, it is related to the necessity of “continuing the implementation of the ceasefire in Syria” despite Blinken having recognized that the armistice on the ground did not prevent human rights violations, stop arrests or end the displacement of refugees.

“FUTURE GOALS”

On top of these core goals, which no longer include broader objectives such as “taking out Iran,” as was the case during the Trump administration, Blinken set a long-term goal, which is reaching a “political settlement” as the only way for reconciliation, peace and the reconstruction of Syria.

At this point, it must be noted that an expanded paragraph was added to the final statement of the Rome meeting. In it, ministers recalled the importance of a political solution to the Syria crisis in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. They expressed strong support for UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen.

Participants also strongly insisted on the need to renew and expand the UN Security Council’s authorization for cross border deliveries to Syria as an essential humanitarian lifeline for millions of Syrians, as well as continuing support for a nationwide ceasefire, fighting all forms of terrorism, and backing the work of the Constitutional Committee.

“We welcomed UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen’s briefing and reaffirmed strong support for UN-led efforts to implement all aspects of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, including continued support for an immediate nationwide ceasefire, the unimpeded and safe delivery of aid, and the Constitutional Committee, as well as fighting against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,” said the statement.

“Reaffirming the unity and territorial integrity of Syria, we remain committed to continue working actively to reach a credible, sustainable, and inclusive political solution based on Resolution 2254. This is the only solution that will bring an end to Syria’s decade-long conflict and guarantee the security of the Syrian people and fulfill their aspirations.” It added.

Arab ministers who partook in the Rome meeting found consensus on supporting a political settlement according to the parameters of Resolution 2254 and other relevant resolutions.

However, they warned that the absence of an effective international will to resolve the crisis had allowed some parties to implement expansionist, sectarian, and demographic change projects to change Syria’s identity.

This, according to the Arab ministers, protracted the Syrian crisis and its regional and international effects.

Arab ministers also reviewed the need to achieve stability and combat terrorism in southern Syria and the importance of removing Iran-affiliated militias affiliated there.

They highlighted the need to restore the role played by Arab countries in Syria. Still, They reminded that the consensus needed for Damascus returning to its seat at the Arab League does not currently exist.

Moreover, Washington’s “Caesar Act” limits the possibilities of Arab states contributing to reconstruction in Syria. Any help needs to remain limited to humanitarian and medical affairs.

For now, the US position is to hold out on Pedersen’s “step for step” proposal, which stipulates forming an international-regional contact group for Syria. It is also centered around urging Arab countries to wait on the “normalization of ties” with Damascus by reminding them of the imposed sanctions and the need for accountability.

Any move by Washington will be pending the results of the US-Russia meeting in Geneva, the outcomes of the “Astana Talks” slotted for July 7, and the UN Security Council’s vote on cross-border aid delivery before July 10.



Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
TT
20

Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Lebanese former President Amine Gemayel’s term (1982–1988) was difficult and turbulent. The Lebanese people were divided, and regional and international conflicts over Lebanon intensified. His presidency began amid the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Beirut and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel. The difficult developments followed swiftly.

In the year following the 1982 invasion, Moscow and Damascus supported Walid Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, sparking the “Mountain War,” which deeply fractured the Druze–Maronite coexistence in the region. In 1984, Damascus backed Nabih Berri, head of the Amal Movement, leading to the “February 6 Intifada,” which shifted the sectarian power balance in Lebanon, which was in the throes of its 1975-1990 civil war.

Another significant event occurred in 1983 when suicide bombers attacked the barracks of the US Marines and French troops in the multinational peacekeeping force, killing hundreds and prompting Western withdrawal. Amid those explosions, Hezbollah was born—a force that would later become the most dominant player in Lebanon, particularly after inheriting Syria’s role there. During Gemayel’s term, Syria attempted to broker a “militia peace,” but the so-called “Tripartite Agreement” collapsed, paving the way for more wars and negotiation rounds.

Gemayel did not surrender to efforts aimed at controlling or isolating his presidency. He worked to maintain Lebanon’s relations with the West, strengthened ties with moderate Arab countries, and built relationships with leaders such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Moammar al-Gaddafi, as he recounts in the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amine Gemayel sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Close relationship with Saudi Arabia and its kings

Asked about his relationship with Saudi Arabia, beginning with his visit alongside his father, Pierre, to meet King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, Gemayel said: “I’m proud of that relationship. I’m proud to have met all the kings—from King Faisal to King Salman. There isn’t one of them with whom I didn’t have a close personal relationship, and I take pride in that. Most of them had a special affection for me.”

He added: “At this time in Lebanon’s history, Saudi Arabia is the elder brother. Saudi Arabia never stabbed Lebanon in the back. It was always by Lebanon’s side through good times and bad, offering moral, social, and humanitarian support. You can’t deny that. You have to appreciate and respect those who stood by you in tough times.”

He also recounted a fond memory involving King Salman: “May God prolong his life. When he was governor of Riyadh, I used to visit him regularly. The Riyadh office knew me well. Every time I came to the Kingdom, it was expected that I’d visit the governorate.”

“Once, when I had an appointment with him, he took me to the desert to a camp of his—traditional tents, but inside one of them was a high-tech office with internet and modern communications. He told me he could contact anyone from there at any time. I asked if I could call home. He replied, ‘No.’ I was surprised. Then he said, ‘You can’t call home because your home is here.’ That’s how warm the atmosphere was. I truly appreciated his gesture.”

He continued: “In Lebanon’s difficult days, the Kingdom was always by our side. Even today—despite frustration with Lebanon’s ingratitude or Iranian influence—Saudi Arabia still has Lebanon in its heart. It waited for the first opportunity to return and help. Today’s hope in Lebanon is due to the Kingdom’s full weight and influence, working to restore Lebanon’s institutions and stability.”

Saddam’s armored car

Regarding his relationship with Saddam, Gemayel said: “It was a very warm relationship. I visited him several times in Baghdad. Once, during my presidency, there was an assassination attempt against me. He called and asked, ‘What are you doing about your security? They say you need better protection.’ I told him we were doing our best and relying on God. He said, ‘That’s not good enough—I’ll send you my car.’ The next day, his armored car arrived by plane—fully fortified inside and out.”

That relationship lasted until Saddam’s final days in power. Gemayel recalled: “On the eve of the (American) war, he sent word asking to meet. I went to Baghdad. He told me, ‘Things aren’t going well with the Americans. You have good relations with them—can you help us understand their intentions?’ I told him the issue was bigger than me. I had good contacts, but not at the presidential level anymore. He asked me to try anyway. So I went to the US, met with some people, but avoided senior officials to avoid media attention.”

Gemayel’s cousin, a top US lawyer with ties to James Baker, helped arrange a meeting: “We met Baker, who was almost retired but still influential. After a few days, he said he saw a glimmer of hope. He jokingly pulled out a stack of one-dollar bills and asked when I was born. I said December 1942. He found a bill with a serial number matching my birthdate, signed it, and gave it to me for luck. I still have it.”

Saddam Hussein welcomes Gemayel in Baghdad. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

“Sadly, it didn’t work. The Americans had made up their minds. Many tried—including the Vatican—but nothing succeeded. Still, it was an effort made at Saddam’s request.”

Gemayel added: “My ties with Saddam and his team, especially Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, remained very good. Saddam wanted to help Lebanon. But his relationship with (Syrian President) Hafez al-Assad was bad. They had mutual hatred. I still have the armored Mercedes he sent me—top-level protection, still in excellent condition.”

Asked about Saddam’s personal demeanor, Gemayel said: “Very approachable. One-on-one, there was no protocol. He was warm and engaging—you forget he’s this powerful figure. But reaching him was a maze—multiple layers of security and misdirection. You’d think you were meeting Saddam, only to find it was a lookalike. Eventually, you’d be taken to a modest house far from the airport, where the real Saddam would be waiting.”

On Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, he said: “Kuwait’s issue with Iraq is old, like Lebanon’s issue with Syria. But historical claims don’t justify violating sovereignty or erasing borders. Despite my personal ties with Saddam, we strongly opposed the invasion of Kuwait—a country with excellent relations with Lebanon. Just as we rejected Assad’s plans to annex Lebanon to Syria, we rejected Saddam’s attempt to annex Kuwait.”

Gemayel and Gaddafi: From estrangement to friendship

Gemayel’s relationship with Gaddafi began with tension but later transformed into friendship. He recalled: “When I became president, Libya, without coordination, sent military forces to Lebanon. That was illegal and against Arab League protocols. I sent Gaddafi a message demanding their withdrawal. He refused and took a hostile media stance. So I cut diplomatic ties with Libya early in my presidency.”

Later, Moroccan King Hassan II helped mediate: “I had a close relationship with King Hassan II. He invited me to a private dinner in Morocco. During the meal, he left twice—unusual for him. The second time, he returned smiling and said, ‘Gaddafi is on the phone—he wants to meet you.’ I was surprised and hesitant, especially with the issue of Imam Moussa al-Sadr still unresolved. But the king reassured me, saying Gaddafi had promised a new page. He offered his own plane and a senior minister to accompany me to guarantee safety.”

Amine Gemayel had a frosty relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi that turned to friendship. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

They traveled secretly, landed at a military airport in Libya, and met Gaddafi. Gemayel recounted: “He was extremely courteous and warm. We had a long conversation and agreed to reset relations. He asked how Libya could support Lebanon internationally. I thanked him, and flew back to Beirut.”

“But during our flight, Israeli radio reported that my plane had disappeared en route from Morocco. Panic erupted in Beirut—emergency meetings, calls to the US, plans to file complaints at the UN and Arab League. My wife was informed. She calmly said, ‘I’m not worried. Amine does these things—there must be good behind it.’ Eventually, the king reassured everyone I was fine.”

After that, Gemayel and Gaddafi maintained a cordial relationship: “He would often insist I visit. During the Arab Summit in Algiers, our seats were side by side. Gaddafi wanted a statement condemning the US raid on Tripoli that killed his adopted daughter. I proposed he draft a statement to be added to the final communiqué. I wrote it for him. He loved it.”

“There was also an issue with his tent. He refused to stay in a hotel and insisted on his tent. Algerian security and President Chadli Benjedid objected. Gaddafi threatened to leave. I mediated, and in the end, he sent the tent as a gift to my plane.”

Gaddafi never discussed the disappearance of al-Sadr with Gemayel. Gemayel said Syrian intelligence had reportedly played a role in the disappearance, as it controlled Libyan airports at the time. The mass popularity of al-Sadr was said to have disturbed the Syrian regime because his vision for Lebanon’s Shiites conflicted with Syria’s agenda.

Despite all the hardships of his presidency, Gemayel said he harbors no bitterness: “I have peace of mind knowing I stayed true to national principles and did my best.”

He expressed satisfaction with his son Sami Gemayel’s political path as a lawmaker and head of the Kataeb Party, and praised President Joseph Aoun’s guidance of the army and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s professional record—wishing success for the current leadership in Lebanon.