Extension, Expansion of Cross-Border Aid Delivery Tops Washington’s ‘3’ Goals in Syria

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a presser in Rome (Reuters)
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a presser in Rome (Reuters)
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Extension, Expansion of Cross-Border Aid Delivery Tops Washington’s ‘3’ Goals in Syria

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a presser in Rome (Reuters)
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at a presser in Rome (Reuters)

At a closed session in Rome, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken defined three main goals Washington has for Syria. The most urgent of which is convincing Russia to allow an “extension” and “expansion” on the UN resolution for cross-border humanitarian relief in the war-torn country.

Dovetailing with the Biden administration’s plan, Moscow and Washington decided on holding a private meeting to bring together high-ranking officials from both sides in Geneva next week.

The meeting will likely include the Russian Special Presidential Envoy on Syrian Reconciliation Alexander Lavrentiev and US National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk.

Blinken’s attendance in Rome represents the first high-profile political step taken by Biden’s team since he took office, Western officials who attended the Rome meeting told Asharq Al-Awsat.

They noted the importance of the Rome meeting since the 2015 “Vienna peace talks for Syria,” which saw the participation of over 20 countries, including Russia and Iran, have nearly faded away.

For Washington, the Rome conference presented a unique opportunity to restore its leadership role by coordinating with allies and expanding the “mini-group” that included seven major and Arab countries.

It also restored consultation channels with Qatar and Turkey, which had sided with Russia in the “Astana Talks” or the “Doha Platform,” and bridging gaps with two influential blocs in the Syrian matter, the Arab League and the European Union (EU).

“URGENT RELIEF”

According to available information, Blinken filled in participating ministers in Rome about Washington’s three primary goals in Syria today:

The first goal, which is “urgent,” concerns an appeal for extending and expanding the scope of an international resolution for cross-border humanitarian delivery in Syria. During a meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Geneva on May 16, US President Joe Biden had raised the issue of extending the special international resolution, whose period of operation is set to expire on July 10.

Indeed, the Biden administration’s opinion on the matter was made clear. It set the premise that the Russian position on this issue will be decisive and affect Washington’s positions in the next stage.

“The US message is: If Russia responds to Washington’s desire, bilateral dialogue on Syria can be resumed and expanded, and other positive measures can be taken,” a western diplomat told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“But if Moscow votes against reauthorizing and expanding the resolution (from one to three crossings), a stalemate on the Syrian issis fated, especially amid calls in Washington to escalate pressure and resume the imposition of sanctions,” the diplomat explained.

The US-Russian dialogue in Geneva is slated for a few days later and will be the first of its kind under the Biden administration.

It is noteworthy that the last meeting a Russian official held with a US counterpart on Syria was with former US envoy James Jeffrey in Vienna last July. Infected with the coronavirus, Jeffery was unable to attend the subsequent US-Russian meeting in Geneva last August.

The impromptu US-Russia track and consultations on Syria were launched by McGurk and the Kremlin’s Sergei Vershinin.

“I think that we see here an opportunity to work constructively with Russia on this issue of getting humanitarian assistance to Syrians all across the country, especially now that we have the Covid-19 pandemic to deal with and there has been virtually no assistance to battle Covid-19 that’s gotten into the northeast in particular,” said the Acting Assistant Secretary Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Joey Hood.

“So, it’s a growing humanitarian problem and one that I don’t think anyone wants to see exacerbated,” added Hood.

Meanwhile, in Rome, Biden reaffirmed that the matter is of utmost significance to Washington.

“ISIS & TRUCE”

Washington’s second goal in Syria is to focus on eliminating ISIS, the only reason it is present east of Syria’s Euphrates Region.

“Together, we must stay as committed to our stabilization goals (in the east of the Euphrates Region) as we did to our military campaign that resulted in victory on the battlefield,” Blinken told reporters.

He pointed out the pressing need to resolve the issue of tens of thousands of ISIS captives in prisons operated by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

“This situation is simply untenable. It just can’t persist indefinitely. The US continues to urge countries of origin, including coalition partners, to repatriate, rehabilitate, and, where applicable, prosecute their citizens,” said Blinken.

Similarly, a joint communique by the ministerial meeting of the Global Coalition against ISIS said reaffirmed that “the Coalition stands with the Syrian people in support of a lasting political settlement in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.”

“The Coalition must continue to be vigilant against the threat of terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, to build on the success it has achieved and continue to act together against any threats to this outcome and to avoid security vacuums that ISIS may exploit,” the joint statement added.

As for Washington’s third goal, it is related to the necessity of “continuing the implementation of the ceasefire in Syria” despite Blinken having recognized that the armistice on the ground did not prevent human rights violations, stop arrests or end the displacement of refugees.

“FUTURE GOALS”

On top of these core goals, which no longer include broader objectives such as “taking out Iran,” as was the case during the Trump administration, Blinken set a long-term goal, which is reaching a “political settlement” as the only way for reconciliation, peace and the reconstruction of Syria.

At this point, it must be noted that an expanded paragraph was added to the final statement of the Rome meeting. In it, ministers recalled the importance of a political solution to the Syria crisis in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. They expressed strong support for UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen.

Participants also strongly insisted on the need to renew and expand the UN Security Council’s authorization for cross border deliveries to Syria as an essential humanitarian lifeline for millions of Syrians, as well as continuing support for a nationwide ceasefire, fighting all forms of terrorism, and backing the work of the Constitutional Committee.

“We welcomed UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen’s briefing and reaffirmed strong support for UN-led efforts to implement all aspects of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, including continued support for an immediate nationwide ceasefire, the unimpeded and safe delivery of aid, and the Constitutional Committee, as well as fighting against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,” said the statement.

“Reaffirming the unity and territorial integrity of Syria, we remain committed to continue working actively to reach a credible, sustainable, and inclusive political solution based on Resolution 2254. This is the only solution that will bring an end to Syria’s decade-long conflict and guarantee the security of the Syrian people and fulfill their aspirations.” It added.

Arab ministers who partook in the Rome meeting found consensus on supporting a political settlement according to the parameters of Resolution 2254 and other relevant resolutions.

However, they warned that the absence of an effective international will to resolve the crisis had allowed some parties to implement expansionist, sectarian, and demographic change projects to change Syria’s identity.

This, according to the Arab ministers, protracted the Syrian crisis and its regional and international effects.

Arab ministers also reviewed the need to achieve stability and combat terrorism in southern Syria and the importance of removing Iran-affiliated militias affiliated there.

They highlighted the need to restore the role played by Arab countries in Syria. Still, They reminded that the consensus needed for Damascus returning to its seat at the Arab League does not currently exist.

Moreover, Washington’s “Caesar Act” limits the possibilities of Arab states contributing to reconstruction in Syria. Any help needs to remain limited to humanitarian and medical affairs.

For now, the US position is to hold out on Pedersen’s “step for step” proposal, which stipulates forming an international-regional contact group for Syria. It is also centered around urging Arab countries to wait on the “normalization of ties” with Damascus by reminding them of the imposed sanctions and the need for accountability.

Any move by Washington will be pending the results of the US-Russia meeting in Geneva, the outcomes of the “Astana Talks” slotted for July 7, and the UN Security Council’s vote on cross-border aid delivery before July 10.



Türkiye’s Gas Shift Threatens Russia and Iran’s Last Big European Market

A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)
A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)
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Türkiye’s Gas Shift Threatens Russia and Iran’s Last Big European Market

A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)
A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)

Türkiye could meet more than half of its gas needs by the end of 2028 by ramping up production and increasing US imports, in a shift that threatens to shrink the last major European market for Russian and Iranian suppliers.

Washington has publicly pressured allies, including NATO member Türkiye, to cut energy ties with Moscow and Tehran. At their White House meeting on September 25, US President Donald Trump pressed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to cut Russian energy purchases.

Diversifying supply would also strengthen Türkiye’s energy security and support its ambitions to become a regional gas hub. Ankara aims to re-export imported liquefied natural gas and its own gas production to Europe while burning Russian and Iranian gas domestically, analysts said.

" Türkiye has been signaling that it will take advantage of the (global) LNG abundance," said Sohbet Karbuz, from the Paris-based Mediterranean Organization for Energy and Climate.

Russia remains Türkiye’s largest gas supplier, but its share of the market has fallen from more than 60% two decades ago to 37% in the first half of 2025. Most European countries halted imports following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

RUSSIA'S PIPELINE CONTRACTS NEAR EXPIRY

Russia's long-term pipeline contracts with Türkiye to supply 22 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually via the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines are close to expiry. Iran's 10 bcm contract expires in the middle of next year, while Azerbaijan’s contracts, totaling 9.5 bcm, run until 2030 and 2033.

While Türkiye is likely to extend some of these contracts, it is likely to seek more flexible terms and smaller volumes to increase the diversity of its supply, Karbuz said.

At the same time, Türkiye is rapidly expanding alternative sources. State-owned TPAO is boosting output from local gas fields, while state and private companies have expanded LNG import terminals to bring gas in from the US and Algeria.

Domestic production and contracted LNG imports are set to exceed 26 bcm annually from 2028 from 15 bcm this year, according to Reuters calculations.

US LNG IMPORTS SET TO DOUBLE

That would cover more than half of Türkiye’s gas demand of around 53 bcm, reducing the gap for pipeline imports to around 26 bcm - well below the 41 bcm of current contracted supplies from Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan combined.

To support this shift, Türkiye has signed a series of LNG deals with US suppliers worth $43 billion, including a 20-year agreement with Mercuria in September.

The country has built 58 bcm annual LNG import capacity, enough to cover its entire demand, according to Türkiye’s energy exchange.

Despite this, Russian gas continues to flow at full capacity, and the Kremlin has said cooperation with Ankara remains strong.

Since Türkiye needs less Russian gas, BOTAS could, in theory, stop imports from Moscow in two to three years, said Alexey Belogoryev of the Moscow-based Institute for Energy and Finance.

"However, it won't do so, because Russian gas is price-competitive and creates a surplus that BOTAS can use to pressure other suppliers," Belogoryev said.

Türkiye’s energy minister Alparslan Bayraktar said in a TV interview in October that Türkiye must source gas from all available suppliers, including Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan, but noted that US LNG offers cheaper alternatives.

The energy ministry declined to comment on future supply deals and pricing. Russian gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom did not reply to a request for comment.

Türkiye could burn Russian and Iranian gas at home, export its own production and re-export imported LNG after Europe bans Russian energy imports by 2028, said Karbuz.

Türkiye’s BOTAS has already signed deals to supply Hungary and Romania with small volumes of gas in its bid to become a regional gas trading hub.

Beyond gas, Ankara has deep ties with Moscow. Russia's Rosatom is building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant and Moscow is also the country's top crude and diesel supplier.


Tehran Losing Rounds in Iraq, but Not the War Yet

Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)
Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)
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Tehran Losing Rounds in Iraq, but Not the War Yet

Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)
Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)

Two years ago, Iraq’s armed factions were eager to make their presence felt in the “Al-Aqsa Flood” scenes. That enthusiasm faded in the months after October 2023 amid what officials described as highly complex negotiations between the government and those groups to keep Iraq out of the war.

There is no evidence that Iran has lost Iraq entirely, as it did in Syria. But it has begun to lose round after round to the Americans in Baghdad’s arena, while its proxies have grown accustomed to living peacefully alongside “the two most dangerous men in the world these days, Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu,” as a former Iraqi minister put it.

Politicians in Baghdad cite three “boxing rounds” that the Americans have won over the Iranians: the release of Israeli researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov from Kataib Hezbollah custody without a deal; the withdrawal of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law that was ready for a parliamentary vote; and, before that, a long truce with US forces even during the 12-day US-Israeli attacks on Iran.

Two years after the “Unity of Fronts” declaration and following Hamas’s Oct. 7 operation, Iraq’s factions were missing from the closing scenes of the “Flood.” For many, that is good news — for now.

Searching for “Plan B”

A Shiite politician who recently visited Tehran returned to Baghdad with a vague outlook ahead of campaign season for the November 2025 parliamentary elections.

The politician, who officially launched his campaign on Oct. 3, said Tehran is looking for a “Plan B” to avoid a knockout blow. “It may surprise many with what it has in store,” he said, suggesting Iran might “make up for Syria elsewhere.”

Shiite politicians in Baghdad, he added, have a habit of “reading the election book in a language the Iranians understand.”

But how accurate is such a forecast? There is no clear metric to measure Iranian influence in Iraq. Analysts remain divided over whether it has diminished to the point that, after Syria’s “domino” fell, its allied groups in Iraq have also tumbled.

In reality, Iraqi public opinion — and the partisan instruments that shape it — often revolve around narratives that are constructed, improvised, or deliberately ambiguous.

Factions Ask, Iran Doesn’t Answer

Reports of a possible war against Iran have put Baghdad’s factions under pressure. According to sources, leaders of several groups met in late September 2025 and sent a consultation request to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seeking guidance on what to expect if war breaks out.

A senior member of a faction recently added to a US terrorism list said Tehran has yet to respond.

At the same time, an IRGC team tasked with managing Shiite electoral alliances in Iraq has been holding meetings with figures in the Coordination Framework coalition. Cross-cutting sources described the team as “Iran’s election committee,” overseeing the distribution of Shiite parties across competing lists — a group that previously engineered influential coalitions in past parliaments.

But this “expert” committee failed to convince Shiite party leaders to implement Tehran’s proposed blueprint to merge lists or reshuffle candidates in key constituencies across central and southern Iraq.

Some Shiite figures accused of defying Iranian directives belong to resistance factions that briefly joined the “Al-Aqsa Flood” front before retreating to the “backyard,” seeking new sources of leverage.

Empty Spaces

In cities liberated from ISIS, Sunni parties are running relatively stable campaigns. Many sense that the loosening of Iran’s grip has allowed them to move more freely — though few dare say so aloud. There are visible efforts to remain cautious and avoid provoking the “Axis of Resistance.”

Former parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi — ousted in 2023 by a Tehran-aligned coalition — is now staging a strong comeback. His associates attribute that to “personal skill and precise calculation,” though it also reflects his use of spaces left vacant by waning Iranian influence, whether by design or under US pressure.

Still, Sunni rivals seeking to counter Halbousi need alliances with Shiite power brokers to secure political “horses to bet on.” In Nineveh, Salahuddin, and Kirkuk, several Sunni figures are shaping their lists in coordination with factions loyal to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

For that reason, Iraq’s “empty” spaces may be little more than a mirage.

According to a Shiite politician, powerful factions recently received Iranian requests to help relocate activities of allied groups from other “resistance” countries to Baghdad — and that has already begun.

Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ali Larijani, secretary-general of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, is overseeing arrangements to assist Tehran’s war-strained proxies. Larijani was recently in Beirut, where he said before departing: “Hezbollah is quickly regaining strength and will shift the balance.”

“Bin Laden’s Fate Is Not Inevitable”

Four Iraqi factions — Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Imam Ali, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada — were recently added to the US State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, bringing Iraq’s total to six.

A few years ago, that same list included al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq was designated in 2020, while Kataib Hezbollah has been listed since 2009. Both groups still hold seats and cabinet posts in parliament and government.

“You don’t have to share bin Laden’s fate just because you’re on that list,” said a former Iraqi minister who served in Adel Abdul Mahdi’s 2018–2019 government. “Iran-backed groups are now learning to coexist with the world’s two most dangerous men — Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu.”

In Baghdad, voices within Shiite parties have begun to ask whether the US president is deliberately delaying Israeli strikes in Iraq, leveraging American pressure on the government and decision-makers to sever ties with Tehran.

“Will Trump Protect Us from Netanyahu?”

The same former minister, who asked not to be named, said Washington has won battles inside Tehran because Iraqis responded to pressure at a moment of Iranian confusion. “For months,” he added, “Shiite factions have been asking: Will Trump really protect us from Netanyahu? It appears so.”

He sees signs of the “Plan B” Iran is developing: “New Shiite political players who stayed out of the Al-Aqsa Flood fallout are now trying to rebrand themselves — updating their radical image with a civilian face to escape the danger zone.”

It’s like a man standing in a sniper’s sights, a laser dot fixed on his chest. He cannot move right or left — any motion could be fatal. The sniper will not tire as long as the target remains frozen.

“What if the target changes his face, name, and behavior?” the former minister asked. “Some militia leaders are now toying with the idea of returning weapons to storage and shaving their beards — which could make them very useful to both Washington and Tehran.”

A Shiite politician close to the scene agrees: “A militia commander thinking that far ahead will be valuable to Iran once the storm calms.” He added that “four years with Trump is a long time — and even longer with Netanyahu. Survival demands change.”

Autumn nights are settling over Baghdad amid a blazing election summer. Even as talk grows of a new Iran-Israel war, militia leaders who once spread out maps of Tel Aviv to plan rocket strikes are now opening their offices to liberal and secular elites — for long conversations about elections whose intrigue has already begun.


Gaza Babies Forced to Share Oxygen Masks as Israel Blocks Equipment, UNICEF Says

A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj
A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj
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Gaza Babies Forced to Share Oxygen Masks as Israel Blocks Equipment, UNICEF Says

A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj
A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj

Israel has repeatedly denied permission to transfer incubators from an evacuated hospital in North Gaza, a UN children's agency official said on Tuesday, adding to strain on overcrowded hospitals further south where newborn babies are now sharing oxygen masks.

Two years of war between Israel and Hamas has increased stress and malnourishment among pregnant mothers, leading to a rise in premature and underweight babies who the World Health Organization says now account for a fifth of all Gaza newborns.

Over the past month an Israeli assault on Gaza City in northern Gaza has shut hospitals in that area, worsening overcrowding in hospitals that remain open in the south.

James Elder, UNICEF spokesperson, described mothers and babies lining the corridor floors of Nasser Hospital in southern Gaza, and said that premature babies were being forced to share oxygen masks and beds. Meanwhile, vital equipment is stranded in hospitals that have been shut in the north.

"We've been trying to recover incubators from a hospital that was evacuated in the north, and we've had four missions denied simply to get those incubators," he told Reuters by video link from Gaza, referring to supplies now stuck at the damaged Al-Rantissi Children's Hospital in Gaza City.

At a hospital Elder visited in the south, meanwhile, "in one of the paediatric rooms, there were three babies and three mums on a single bed, one source of oxygen, and the mothers would rotate the oxygen 20 minutes to each child," he said. "This is the level of desperation mums have now got to."

Israel's COGAT, a military branch overseeing aid flows, did not immediately respond to a request for comment on UNICEF's remarks. Israel says it is committed to allowing aid deliveries in Gaza but must control it to prevent it being stolen by Hamas, which it blames for the crisis.

The UN humanitarian office said on Tuesday that Israel had either denied or impeded 45% of its 8,000 requested humanitarian missions within Gaza since Oct. 7, 2023.

UNICEF has called for the evacuation of ill and premature babies remaining in northern Gaza hospitals. The WHO transferred three of them last week to a hospital further south, but said one died before the mission. Only 14 of Gaza's 36 hospitals are currently even partially functional, the WHO says.