Syria: Rami Makhlouf Attacks War Profiteers

A screenshot of Rami Makhlouf from his Facebook page (Reuters)
A screenshot of Rami Makhlouf from his Facebook page (Reuters)
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Syria: Rami Makhlouf Attacks War Profiteers

A screenshot of Rami Makhlouf from his Facebook page (Reuters)
A screenshot of Rami Makhlouf from his Facebook page (Reuters)

Syrian businessman and cousin of President Bashar al-Assad Rami Makhlouf attacked war profiteers, saying they are devising “diabolical plans” to take over everything in Syria.

Makhlouf plans to attend the meeting to elect the new board of directors of Syriatel Mobile Telecom, of which he owned most of the shares. He indicated that he would publish a new video if he wasn’t arrested after attending the meeting.

In the newly released video on his Facebook page, Makhlouf explained that the judicial custody currently controlling Syriatel wants to sue the former management of the company and elect a new board of directors.

Makhlouf accused “war profiteers” who took control over the mobile company of “stealing subscribers' money”, adding that Syriatel employees were fired because they belong to or have ties with the opposition. A number of employees were also let go because they are from areas that aren't under the regime’s control, according to Makhlouf.

The video came in response to released information that Syriatel increased its revenues after Rami Makhlouf was dismissed.

The company announced its revenues for the first five months of 2021 which amounted to about 145 billion, compared to 77 billion in previous years.

Makhlouf said that the new management believes this to be “a matter of returning the people’s looted money,” noting that the increase in revenues happens in two ways, either through offers or raising prices, neither of which happened during the last period.

He indicated that only experts could reveal how people's money was looted, however, anyone who audits Syriatel will be arrested.

Makhlouf also hinted at Iran's unwillingness to contribute to the financing of the third telecom operator in Syria, which the Ministry of Communications intends to launch.

The Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection announced at the end of May its decision to ratify the statute of Wafa Telecom to be the third operator of mobile phones in Syria, but the Ministry of Communications quickly denied that it had obtained the license.

Cellular communications in Syria are monopolized by the two companies Syriatel, which was owned by Makhlouf, and MTN, which has joint Lebanese and Syrian owners.



Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
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Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 

Following a series of intensified Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and the airports in Homs and Hama, as well as a ground incursion into the city of Nawa near Daraa, Israeli officials on Thursday escalated their rhetoric, issuing fresh threats to the Syrian leadership and warning of further military action—this time citing concerns over Turkish military activity in the region.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar voiced particular alarm over Türkiye’s growing role in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in Paris, he said: “They are doing everything they can to turn Syria into a Turkish protectorate. That is clearly their intention.”

Defense Minister Israel Katz echoed this sentiment, stating that Israel “will not allow Damascus to become a security threat” to Israel.

Rising Concern Over Türkiye’s Military Footprint in Syria

Military officials in Tel Aviv confirm that Israel sees Türkiye’s growing military presence in Syria as a serious concern. Their fear stems from two key issues: first, Ankara’s reported efforts to rebuild the Syrian army along the lines of its own modernized military model; and second, its apparent goal of establishing a long-term military foothold inside Syrian territory.

Israeli defense sources point out that Türkiye’s armed forces operate based on a traditional ground warfare doctrine, featuring large-scale armored divisions and well-equipped infantry units—similar in style to the Russian military. This stands in contrast to the Israeli military, which relies heavily on air superiority and has long underinvested in ground forces.

Given this disparity, any significant Turkish deployment in Syria could pose a direct challenge to Israeli operations and raise the risk of confrontation.

While the recent Israeli airstrikes targeted mostly long-defunct Syrian military sites—many of which have been hit repeatedly over the years—the attacks signal a broader strategic shift.

In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel, the Israeli military has moved away from a defensive posture of deterrence and containment. In its place, the army has embraced a more aggressive doctrine built around preemptive action.

This shift was further underscored by the appointment of a new chief of staff from the Armored Corps—the first in three decades—signaling a renewed emphasis on ground operations and offensive initiatives.

Not Just a Message to Türkiye

Despite the messaging around Türkiye’s presence, analysts say the recent wave of Israeli military action also serves broader geopolitical aims.

After failing to persuade Washington to pressure Ankara to scale back its involvement in Syria, Israel now appears determined to assert its own red lines militarily. The airstrike on the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus—a facility already destroyed multiple times since 2018—was widely viewed as symbolic.

Israeli officials say the intended audience for that particular strike was Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, whom Israeli intelligence continues to refer to by his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. By launching the attack during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, Israel aimed to send a clear message: there will be no return to normalcy in Syria without accounting for Israeli interests.

Among those interests is normalization. Last month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his desire to see Syria and Lebanon join the Abraham Accords and establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel.

Hardline figures within Netanyahu’s coalition believe Israel currently holds a strategic upper hand. As right-wing think tank head Meir Ben-Shabbat recently wrote: “Israel is in its strongest position ever. It is transforming the Middle East, expanding its military capabilities, and pushing back the Iranian axis—while Syria is at its weakest.”

For many in Israel’s ruling right, this is an ideal moment to push for a peace agreement with Syria, possibly even one involving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.

The Real Audience: Domestic Israel

Still, perhaps the most significant message behind the military campaign is directed not at Ankara, Damascus, or even Tehran—but at Tel Aviv.

As protests against Netanyahu’s leadership have grown louder in recent months, military escalation has served as a convenient political shield. The wars in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon dominate public attention and have largely sidelined anti-government demonstrations.

“Netanyahu’s government must go, but we won’t take to the streets while our sons are fighting,” has become a common refrain among many Israelis who oppose his leadership but remain reluctant to protest during wartime.

By maintaining a state of conflict, Netanyahu is not only securing his coalition’s survival but also enabling his allies to advance a hardline agenda—particularly on the Palestinian issue—that would have faced greater resistance in peacetime.

Critics warn that this strategy, while politically expedient, comes at a steep cost to Israel’s democratic institutions, its judiciary, and the long-term stability of the region.