عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Features

Episode 4: Assad Opened the Border with Iraq, Advised Saddam to ‘Remove The Pretexts’ to Avoid a US Strike

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Secret Letters between the Syrian, Iraqi Presidents in the mid-1990s

An undated archive photo of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Damascus (AFP)
An undated archive photo of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Damascus (AFP)
TT
20
TT

Episode 4: Assad Opened the Border with Iraq, Advised Saddam to ‘Remove The Pretexts’ to Avoid a US Strike

An undated archive photo of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Damascus (AFP)
An undated archive photo of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Damascus (AFP)

In the second half of 1996, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s objective was “to stop the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.” He focused his contacts for this purpose and reopened the Syrian-Iraqi borders, which were closed since 1982.

The correspondence between Assad and then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein - which Asharq Al-Awsat obtained from the documents of Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam and Iraqi ambassador to Qatar Anwar Sabri Abdel Razzaq – revealed a convergence in the priorities of the two Arab leaders.

Assad was patient and suspicious, while Saddam was rushing to cooperate, to the extent that he suggested a return to the National Action Charter and the “union” between the two countries.

Upon his return from Paris, where he met with President Jacques Chirac, Khaddam conveyed the French position to the Syrian president. He requested a meeting with the participation of Chief of Staff General Hikmat al-Shihabi and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa, to discuss Iraqi. According to an official Syrian document, the conferees agreed on the following proposals:

1- Working to stop the overthrow of the Iraqi regime by the Americans, the Israelis and Jordan;
2- Creating a suitable atmosphere for communication between the party apparatus that guarantees a continuous basis for work between Syria and Iraq;
3- Conveying a message to the Americans and Israel about the ability to create new conditions in the region;
4- Promoting a reassuring atmosphere for the Arab population;
5- Securing Syria’s interests in Iraq and elsewhere.

It was agreed that the Iraqi ambassador to Qatar, Anwar Sabri, be summoned and informed that the Syrian leadership would issue a statement declaring the opening of the international borders with Iraq, which were closed in 1982, in a manner that does not contradict Security Council resolutions. The diplomat would also be informed of a proposal to hold a political meeting to discuss the means to organize the bilateral relations in their various aspects, in a way that does not further complicate the Arab situation.

On August 21, 1996, Khaddam received Anwar Sabri.

He recounted in the minutes of the meeting: “I informed [Sabri] that during this period we were subjected to great pressures from various sides, which did not change our position. We spoke with a number of Arab countries and we were able to convince them of the rightness of our approach.”

Khaddam continued: “We suggest that the Syrian government issues a statement declaring the opening of the international borders in line with Security Council resolutions, and that officials from the two countries gather to organize this step. We also propose that a committee meet to discuss, in a gradual way, matters that are in the interests of the two countries and do not provoke the others.”

On August 28, Khaddam received the Iraqi envoy, who said: “Iraq’s leadership believes that the best move would be to hold a meeting at a political level to discuss what steps can be taken. There are many issues and challenges facing the two brotherly countries and the Arab nation that require review and evaluation.”

Anwar Sabri tried to set a date to visit Damascus, because he had “important matters” to raise, including a return to the National Action Charter signed between the two countries in 1978, but there was always a delay.

In one of his documents, the Syrian vice-president said he received Sabri on February 21, 1997, and “a general discussion took place, in which I explained the sensitivity of the Arab situation.”

The Iraqi envoy, for his part, presented Saddam’s proposed agenda for the expected meeting between the two countries:

“1- Discussing diplomatic ties as an important step to restore normal relations;
2- Reviewing trade exchange and opening oil pipelines in light of the willingness of the Syrian leadership to re-open the borders;
3- Forming an auxiliary committee for the Higher Leadership Committee, to follow up on the implementation of the agreed steps;
4- Any other topics that the Syrian brothers would like to discuss.”

“President Saddam told me that if our brothers want to discuss the National Action Charter, we agree. Now the relations are good, and we have overcome the past,” Sabri was quoted as telling Khaddam.

He also stressed that his leader “will make basic changes in the party and the state, but he is waiting for the relations with Syria; these changes will affect key positions.”

On February 26, 1997, the Syrian Vice President received Saddam’s envoy and told him: “We are preparing an Arab initiative to correct the situation and set new methods that would define commitments and guarantees, reassure the different sides and pave the way for serious cooperation based on sound rules.”

Then he read the following message: “Greetings from the President and my greetings to President Saddam Hussein. Since we began exchanging ideas through Ambassador Anwar about the Arab situation and the dangers facing the Arab nation, especially the Israeli dangers […] and foreign domination, progress has been achieved, and we have moved from the stage of stalemate and hostility to the common understanding of a number of major issues of concern. Syria’s response to conspiracies targeting Iraq’s unity and national security is a clear example […]. Syria obviously desires to cooperate with Iraq in the face of dangers, and within an objective vision, away from the formalities of diplomatic relations that could provoke reactions, which will not serve Syria, Iraq or our efforts to improve the Arab climate.”

Two years after the beginning of the talks, the Syrian government took a decision - under the directives of Assad - to reopen the borders on June 2, 1997. This move helped create a positive atmosphere, and Syrian and Iraqi trade delegations began exchanging visits.

As the Iraqi crisis worsened in October and November 1997, a Syrian statement was issued rejecting the US threats, and calling on the Arabs to adopt the same stance.
In mid-November, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz requested a visit to Damascus to brief its officials on the developments. On November 22, Khaddam received him in the presence of Al-Sharaa.

The Iraqi envoy asked what could Iraq do for Syria, and Khaddam replied: “We told you that our goal is to improve the Arab climate, and we do not want to take a step of an official nature that would complicate the situation and be harmful to us and to you and to all Arab parties that are sensitive to foreign pressures, especially the American pressure. We deal with the Iraqi issue with a national responsibility, and there are channels of communication between us.”

Aziz responded: “We have made good steps; the relations between us are relaxed and we have started business relations […]. We want the practical side. The economic aspect requires regulating the relationship between merchants and individuals on a regular basis, and this necessitates the presence of diplomatic missions between the two countries, in order to obtain a visa and even serve our citizens. We don’t pressure you, but we ask that for thought.”

Khaddam recounted that as American pressure on Iraq increased, [Iraqi Minister Mohammed] Al-Sahhaf requested a visit to Damascus. Sharaa met with him on February 9, 1998.

On the following day, Assad received the Iraqi minister, who conveyed a message from his president, in which he presented the situation and the causes of the crisis. According to the minutes of the meeting, the Syrian president replied:

“1- Syria is aware of the objectives of the crisis, and it deals with the entire Arab situation. We cannot stop at passing circumstances between the two countries, because the foreign goal is bigger; it is primarily an Israeli goal, so our position was clear.
2- What is happening has nothing to do with Kuwait, but rather with Israeli and American interests, and it targets the entire region. Therefore, I made contacts with some brothers warning of the consequences of the aggression against Iraq.
3- We believe that Iraq should remove the excuses and avert the opportunity they are trying to exploit, because the important thing now is to avoid a military strike. If this happens, a large part of the plan will be disrupted, even if only temporarily.”

Most Viewed

 
Features

Angry Groups Emerge and Fade in Syria, Terror Cells or Shadows?

Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
TT
20
TT

Angry Groups Emerge and Fade in Syria, Terror Cells or Shadows?

Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)
Nusra fighters train in Syria’s Idlib Province – August 16, 2024 (AFP)

When Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa met US President Donald Trump in Riyadh on May 14, the encounter marked a striking departure from Syria’s political norm, and one that sent ripples of surprise through both allies and adversaries.

While many Syrians expressed enthusiasm over the unexpected meeting, the reaction was far from unanimous.

For extremist circles, the image of al-Sharaa seated beside a US president, long portrayed in their rhetoric as the embodiment of a hostile international order, triggered deep unease and, in some cases, fury.

The backlash was swift and fragmented. Although not centrally coordinated, it was visible across encrypted Telegram channels - the platform of choice for many extremist groups - as well as in private gatherings and scattered posts on the social media platform X.

Reactions ranged from suspicion and ideological denunciation to outright accusations of apostasy. The criticism largely targeted al-Sharaa’s growing openness to the West, particularly Israel, and debated the legitimacy of such outreach under Islamic law.

Despite the noise, these objections appear to carry little political weight inside Syria’s emerging state institutions. Analysts and insiders say the dissent does not reflect the views of the security and military apparatus that has taken shape following the collapse of the former regime.

At the heart of this new order is a coalition of former factions, notably those once aligned with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which now forms the backbone of Syria’s restructured army and civil institutions. These groups have largely rallied around al-Sharaa, endorsing his foreign policy moves and viewing his leadership as best suited for steering the country through a fragile transition.

The new Syrian army, drawn from multiple factions that once formed the joint operations room which toppled the Assad government in Damascus, has since consolidated under state command.

Most of its components now back al-Sharaa, even as he pushes for diplomatic normalization, including tentative overtures to Israel - a shift they see as necessary for post-conflict stability.

While Syria’s new institutions rally around al-Sharaa’s push for reconciliation and international engagement, a defiant voice has emerged from outside the state structure - one that rejects his overtures and threatens to reignite instability.

The group calling itself Saraya Ansar al-Sunna has so far been the only actor to publicly oppose al-Sharaa’s trajectory. Shrouded in secrecy, the group is among the newest armed movements to surface following the collapse of the Assad regime.

Its presence remains confined to encrypted Telegram channels, where it has adopted a hardline tone steeped in religious denunciation and threats of violence. It has yet to establish a visible presence on the ground or disclose a clear organizational identity.

In a recent statement circulated online, the group vowed to escalate attacks across Syrian provinces and in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli - where it previously claimed activity.

The message marked a sharp warning from a faction that, despite its limited footprint, could stir trouble through lone-wolf operations, a method favored in such ideological circles.

Saraya Ansar al-Sunna first claimed responsibility for an attack in February in the village of Arzeh in Hama province, which killed more than ten civilians.

The group’s founding statement framed the assault as part of a campaign of “sectarian revenge” targeting Alawites and Shiites, whom it referred to using derogatory sectarian terms. The communiqué also described the group as “decentralized” and reliant on autonomous cells with no identifiable leadership or headquarters.

Although Syria’s Interior Ministry declined to provide details on the group, officials confirmed they are closely monitoring its activity – a sign that authorities consider the threat credible, despite the group's lack of formal structure.

Who are Saraya Ansar al-Sunna?

Sources in northern Syria told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has claimed responsibility for a series of assassinations in rural Hama and Homs, targeting Alawite civilians.

The group framed the killings as “retribution” against alleged Assad loyalists, or “shabiha”, whom they accuse the state of failing to prosecute. The sources said growing frustration over the lack of transitional justice has fueled accusations that the state is delivering “selective justice,” a phrase increasingly used to mock what some see as a stalled reconciliation process.

Despite fiery rhetoric and threats, the shadowy group has yet to establish a tangible presence on the ground.

So far, its activities remain confined to anonymous, closed Telegram channels, where it disseminates sharply worded statements steeped in religious condemnation and anti-government sentiment.

According to sources familiar with extremist activity in central Syria, the group relies entirely on text-based messaging and has shown no visual evidence of leadership or organized operations.

Two names have emerged frequently in connection with the group: “Abu Aisha al-Shami” and “Abu al-Fath al-Shami” - likely pseudonyms. Both are believed to be former members of Hurras al-Din, an offshoot of al-Qaeda. Intelligence suggests they have since reemerged in small clandestine cells operating quietly in parts of rural Homs and Hama.

In one statement posted on a Telegram channel, Abu al-Fath al-Shami - introduced as the group's “religious authority” - launched a scathing attack on President Ahmad al-Sharaa, accusing him of apostasy and betrayal.

His message, couched in harsh ideological language, cast the new Syrian government not merely as a political adversary but as a theological enemy - a marked escalation in tone.

Still, the group has so far refrained from direct armed confrontation with the Syrian state. Instead, it appears to be focused on retaliatory attacks against what it calls the “social incubators” of the former regime - a reference to Alawite civilian communities historically aligned with Bashar al-Assad.

This approach, emphasizing ideological hostility over direct conflict, reflects a broader, long-standing rift within the extremist landscape in Syria.

It mirrors the old divide between al-Qaeda’s traditionalist wing and the more localized, pragmatic faction led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Sharaa. Though this internal split had faded from prominence, al-Sharaa’s high-profile meeting with Trump in Riyadh appears to have reignited it, sparking renewed debate among radical ideologues.

Prominent extremist figures have stepped up criticism of al-Sharaa, accusing him of betraying ideological principles in pursuit of political gains, particularly following his unprecedented outreach to the US and Israel.

Among the loudest voices was Khaled Abu Qatada al-Ansari, a former senior figure in Hurras al-Din, who denounced the Syrian state as “treasonous” and accused it of deviating from the “true path.”

His comments were echoed by Samer al-Ali, also known as Abu Ubaida, a former religious authority in Jabhat al-Nusra, who charged al-Sharaa with abandoning the core tenets of the original project for political pragmatism.

Outside Syria, criticism followed a similar pattern. Abu Abdullah al-Shami, a well-known ideologue based in Iraq, described al-Sharaa’s foreign policy pivot as a “fundamental betrayal of doctrine.”

Meanwhile, a stark split emerged among veteran thinkers: cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi reaffirmed his staunch opposition to al-Sharaa, framing his overtures to Washington and Israel as a departure from religious “constants.”

In contrast, Abu Qatada struck a more nuanced tone, suggesting that such shifts might be necessary in the post-Assad era to safeguard the revolution’s gains.

The debate underscores a widening rift between two ideological camps - one branding al-Sharaa an apostate, the other viewing his actions as a pragmatic response to evolving realities and branding him as the “man of the moment.”

No Organized Opposition Within the State

Despite the heated rhetoric, former military commander Adham Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that there is no significant extremist bloc within Syria’s government or its security institutions challenging al-Sharaa’s policies.

“This is the policy of a state, not just one man - even if al-Sharaa is the architect,” he said.

“While there is still public and religious discomfort around peace with Israel, it's no longer as emotionally charged as it once was. Over time, these sentiments may coalesce into various forms of opposition, but they won’t be exclusively religious – they could be nationalist or political as well.”

He added that even radical factions, especially foreign fighters who once resisted integration, are now gradually shifting their focus.

“Most of them are moving toward reintegration, prioritizing daily life and stability. They may not fully endorse the new government, but they’re adapting - I’ve seen this happen in multiple cases,” Abdulrahman said.

Extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda are attempting to exploit discontent within Syria’s shifting political landscape, but analysts say al-Sharaa’s government – forged through years of conflict – is proving far from vulnerable.

“ISIS is actively seeking to regroup and recruit from disillusioned or marginalized segments, relying on its familiar slogans,” said former military commander Adham Abdulrahman.

“But this new government, born from an authentic organizational experience and equipped with deep security and military know-how, is not an easy target.”

Diverging Currents in HTS

According to Ahmad Sultan, a researcher specializing in Islamist movements, internal divisions are emerging within the HTS, the backbone of the new Syrian state.

“Some factions within HTS still cling to hardline ideology and remain visibly frustrated with al-Sharaa’s policy shifts,” Sultan told Asharq Al-Awsat. “They lack a coherent vision for governance beyond regime collapse and still regard any contact with perceived enemies as tantamount to apostasy.”

By contrast, other elements within HTS advocate a more pragmatic approach. “They view political openness as a tactical necessity for this phase,” Sultan said. “al-Sharaa’s administration is walking a fine line between these factions to preserve cohesion amid Syria’s complex reality.”

Sultan emphasized that the pro-al-Sharaa bloc remains dominant. “The opposition within HTS doesn’t represent the majority. The leading current supports Sharaa and wields greater power,” he said.

“The administration has made it clear that it won’t align with anti-engagement elements, though it may seek to pacify them to avoid destabilization - especially as al-Sharaa’s international legitimacy hinges on curbing extremism.”

Fears of Splits, Push for Consolidation

The researcher warned that any significant rift within HTS - the central pillar of the state - could destabilize the entire administration and potentially spark internal conflict.

“Al-Sharaa’s government is preparing to tackle critical files: the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, the presence of foreign fighters, border control, and consolidating central authority,” Sultan explained. “To do that, it must neutralize ultra-hardline elements within.”

He added that al-Sharaa is relying on practical methods to prevent extremist drift inside his administration, including religious education and theological persuasion aimed at preserving unity.

“Some clerics close to al-Sharaa command real influence among hardline circles,” Sultan said. “If tensions escalate, these figures could play a key role in diffusing conflict through religious argumentation and appeals to collective responsibility.”

Al-Sharaa is prepared to take tough measures - including arrests and even eliminations - against hardline elements within the state who reject moderation and persist in incitement.

“Containment through religious dialogue is the preferred option,” said Sultan.

“But when that fails, the alternative may be surgical removal of factions that prove resistant to integration.”

Sultan warned that the government will not tolerate extremist mindsets if they shift toward agitation and destabilization. “If a radical current chooses confrontation, al-Sharaa will not hesitate to resort to decisive tools, including imprisonment or targeted action,” he said.

Strained Popular Base

Despite the state’s assertive posture, some observers caution that the strategy carries risks, particularly if it alienates the broader revolutionary base that once fueled Syria’s rebellion.

“The Syrian landscape remains fluid and unpredictable,” said Mohamed Ibrahim, also known as Abu Yahya al-Shami, a former military commander within an Islamist faction. “If the government wants long-term stability, it cannot afford to lose the core support of former revolutionaries.”

Al-Shami, who remains closely connected to Islamic movements, drew a clear line between constructive dissent and extremist rhetoric.

“Takfir- branding others as apostates - is the weapon of extremists and ISIS sympathizers. It’s unacceptable to many of us within the Islamist current,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He stressed that criticism of al-Sharaa’s government should be expressed through informed, balanced discourse.

“There is no such thing as ‘legitimate chaos.’ Sharia is the standard by which actions are judged. Disagreements must be addressed scientifically and socially, not through disorder.”

Al-Shami also warned that hardline rhetoric by extremist groups risks influencing disillusioned youth and fueling radicalization in Syria’s fragile post-war landscape.

“There is concern that some enthusiastic or overly zealous youth may be swayed by extremist narratives,” al-Shami told Asharq Al-Awsat, adding that “those with experience and awareness are working to contain these tendencies, which only aggravate problems rather than solve them.”

He also cautioned that ISIS remains a looming threat, capable of exploiting simmering discontent in Salafi circles and drawing in defectors from factions opposed to Syria’s new leadership under al-Sharaa.

“ISIS thrives in environments where ignorance and extremism take root,” he said.

“The group could recruit from those who once fought under revolutionary banners, only to find themselves later disillusioned with a political reality that doesn’t match the slogans they lived by,” explained al-Shami.

As al-Sharaa’s administration pushes ahead with normalization and international outreach, including controversial overtures to former foes, observers say the ability to manage backlash from former allies and militant hardliners will be key to preserving security and cohesion.