Episode 4: Assad Opened the Border with Iraq, Advised Saddam to ‘Remove The Pretexts’ to Avoid a US Strike

In the second half of 1996, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s objective was “to stop the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.” He focused his contacts for this purpose and reopened the Syrian-Iraqi borders, which were closed since 1982.

The correspondence between Assad and then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein - which Asharq Al-Awsat obtained from the documents of Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam and Iraqi ambassador to Qatar Anwar Sabri Abdel Razzaq – revealed a convergence in the priorities of the two Arab leaders.

Assad was patient and suspicious, while Saddam was rushing to cooperate, to the extent that he suggested a return to the National Action Charter and the “union” between the two countries.

Upon his return from Paris, where he met with President Jacques Chirac, Khaddam conveyed the French position to the Syrian president. He requested a meeting with the participation of Chief of Staff General Hikmat al-Shihabi and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa, to discuss Iraqi. According to an official Syrian document, the conferees agreed on the following proposals:

1- Working to stop the overthrow of the Iraqi regime by the Americans, the Israelis and Jordan;
2- Creating a suitable atmosphere for communication between the party apparatus that guarantees a continuous basis for work between Syria and Iraq;
3- Conveying a message to the Americans and Israel about the ability to create new conditions in the region;
4- Promoting a reassuring atmosphere for the Arab population;
5- Securing Syria’s interests in Iraq and elsewhere.

It was agreed that the Iraqi ambassador to Qatar, Anwar Sabri, be summoned and informed that the Syrian leadership would issue a statement declaring the opening of the international borders with Iraq, which were closed in 1982, in a manner that does not contradict Security Council resolutions. The diplomat would also be informed of a proposal to hold a political meeting to discuss the means to organize the bilateral relations in their various aspects, in a way that does not further complicate the Arab situation.

On August 21, 1996, Khaddam received Anwar Sabri.

He recounted in the minutes of the meeting: “I informed [Sabri] that during this period we were subjected to great pressures from various sides, which did not change our position. We spoke with a number of Arab countries and we were able to convince them of the rightness of our approach.”

Khaddam continued: “We suggest that the Syrian government issues a statement declaring the opening of the international borders in line with Security Council resolutions, and that officials from the two countries gather to organize this step. We also propose that a committee meet to discuss, in a gradual way, matters that are in the interests of the two countries and do not provoke the others.”

On August 28, Khaddam received the Iraqi envoy, who said: “Iraq’s leadership believes that the best move would be to hold a meeting at a political level to discuss what steps can be taken. There are many issues and challenges facing the two brotherly countries and the Arab nation that require review and evaluation.”

Anwar Sabri tried to set a date to visit Damascus, because he had “important matters” to raise, including a return to the National Action Charter signed between the two countries in 1978, but there was always a delay.

In one of his documents, the Syrian vice-president said he received Sabri on February 21, 1997, and “a general discussion took place, in which I explained the sensitivity of the Arab situation.”

The Iraqi envoy, for his part, presented Saddam’s proposed agenda for the expected meeting between the two countries:

“1- Discussing diplomatic ties as an important step to restore normal relations;
2- Reviewing trade exchange and opening oil pipelines in light of the willingness of the Syrian leadership to re-open the borders;
3- Forming an auxiliary committee for the Higher Leadership Committee, to follow up on the implementation of the agreed steps;
4- Any other topics that the Syrian brothers would like to discuss.”

“President Saddam told me that if our brothers want to discuss the National Action Charter, we agree. Now the relations are good, and we have overcome the past,” Sabri was quoted as telling Khaddam.

He also stressed that his leader “will make basic changes in the party and the state, but he is waiting for the relations with Syria; these changes will affect key positions.”

On February 26, 1997, the Syrian Vice President received Saddam’s envoy and told him: “We are preparing an Arab initiative to correct the situation and set new methods that would define commitments and guarantees, reassure the different sides and pave the way for serious cooperation based on sound rules.”

Then he read the following message: “Greetings from the President and my greetings to President Saddam Hussein. Since we began exchanging ideas through Ambassador Anwar about the Arab situation and the dangers facing the Arab nation, especially the Israeli dangers […] and foreign domination, progress has been achieved, and we have moved from the stage of stalemate and hostility to the common understanding of a number of major issues of concern. Syria’s response to conspiracies targeting Iraq’s unity and national security is a clear example […]. Syria obviously desires to cooperate with Iraq in the face of dangers, and within an objective vision, away from the formalities of diplomatic relations that could provoke reactions, which will not serve Syria, Iraq or our efforts to improve the Arab climate.”

Two years after the beginning of the talks, the Syrian government took a decision - under the directives of Assad - to reopen the borders on June 2, 1997. This move helped create a positive atmosphere, and Syrian and Iraqi trade delegations began exchanging visits.

As the Iraqi crisis worsened in October and November 1997, a Syrian statement was issued rejecting the US threats, and calling on the Arabs to adopt the same stance.
In mid-November, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz requested a visit to Damascus to brief its officials on the developments. On November 22, Khaddam received him in the presence of Al-Sharaa.

The Iraqi envoy asked what could Iraq do for Syria, and Khaddam replied: “We told you that our goal is to improve the Arab climate, and we do not want to take a step of an official nature that would complicate the situation and be harmful to us and to you and to all Arab parties that are sensitive to foreign pressures, especially the American pressure. We deal with the Iraqi issue with a national responsibility, and there are channels of communication between us.”

Aziz responded: “We have made good steps; the relations between us are relaxed and we have started business relations […]. We want the practical side. The economic aspect requires regulating the relationship between merchants and individuals on a regular basis, and this necessitates the presence of diplomatic missions between the two countries, in order to obtain a visa and even serve our citizens. We don’t pressure you, but we ask that for thought.”

Khaddam recounted that as American pressure on Iraq increased, [Iraqi Minister Mohammed] Al-Sahhaf requested a visit to Damascus. Sharaa met with him on February 9, 1998.

On the following day, Assad received the Iraqi minister, who conveyed a message from his president, in which he presented the situation and the causes of the crisis. According to the minutes of the meeting, the Syrian president replied:

“1- Syria is aware of the objectives of the crisis, and it deals with the entire Arab situation. We cannot stop at passing circumstances between the two countries, because the foreign goal is bigger; it is primarily an Israeli goal, so our position was clear.
2- What is happening has nothing to do with Kuwait, but rather with Israeli and American interests, and it targets the entire region. Therefore, I made contacts with some brothers warning of the consequences of the aggression against Iraq.
3- We believe that Iraq should remove the excuses and avert the opportunity they are trying to exploit, because the important thing now is to avoid a military strike. If this happens, a large part of the plan will be disrupted, even if only temporarily.”

Palestinians in Gaza are confronting an apocalyptic landscape of devastation after a ceasefire paused more than 15 months of fighting between Israel and Hamas.

Across the tiny coastal enclave, where built-up refugee camps are interspersed between cities, drone footage captured by The Associated Press shows mounds of rubble stretching as far as the eye can see — remnants of the longest and deadliest war between Israel and Hamas in their blood-ridden history.

"As you can see, it became a ghost town," said Hussein Barakat, 38, whose home in the southern city of Rafah was flattened. "There is nothing," he said, as he sat drinking coffee on a brown armchair perched on the rubble of his three-story home, in a surreal scene.

Critics say Israel has waged a campaign of scorched earth to destroy the fabric of life in Gaza, accusations that are being considered in two global courts, including the crime of genocide. Israel denies those charges and says its military has been fighting a complex battle in dense urban areas and that it tries to avoid causing undue harm to civilians and their infrastructure.

Military experts say the reality is complicated.

"For a campaign of this duration, which is a year’s worth of fighting in a heavily urban environment where you have an adversary that is hiding in amongst that environment, then you would expect an extremely high level of damage," said Matthew Savill, director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, a British think-tank.

Savill said that it was difficult to draw a broad conclusion about the nature of Israel's campaign. To do so, he said, would require each strike and operation to be assessed to determine whether they adhered to the laws of armed conflict and whether all were proportional, but he did not think the scorched earth description was accurate.

International rights groups, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, view the vast destruction as part of a broader pattern of extermination and genocide directed at Palestinians in Gaza, a charge Israel denies. The groups dispute Israel's stance that the destruction was a result of military activity.

Human Rights Watch, in a November report accusing Israel of crimes against humanity, said "the destruction is so substantial that it indicates the intention to permanently displace many people."

From a fierce air campaign during the first weeks of the war, to a ground invasion that sent thousands of troops in on tanks, the Israeli response to a Hamas-led attack on Oct. 7, 2023, has ground down much of the civilian infrastructure of the Gaza Strip, displacing 90% of its population. The brilliant color of pre-war life has faded into a monotone cement gray that dominates the territory. It could take decades, if not more, to rebuild.

Airstrikes throughout the war toppled buildings and other structures said to be housing fighters. But the destruction intensified with the ground forces, who fought Hamas fighters in close combat in dense areas.

If fighters were seen firing from an apartment building near a troop maneuver, forces might take the entire building down to thwart the threat. Tank tracks chewed up paved roads, leaving dusty stretches of earth in their wake.

The military’s engineering corps was tasked with using bulldozers to clear routes, downing buildings seen as threats, and blowing up Hamas’ underground tunnel network.

Experts say the operations to neutralize tunnels were extremely destructive to surface infrastructure. For example, if a 1.5-kilometer (1-mile) long tunnel was blown up by Israeli forces, it would not spare homes or buildings above, said Michael Milshtein, a former Israeli army intelligence officer.

"If (the tunnel) passes under an urban area, it all gets destroyed," he said. "There’s no other way to destroy a tunnel."

Cemeteries, schools, hospitals and more were targeted and destroyed, he said, because Hamas was using these for military purposes. Secondary blasts from Hamas explosives inside these buildings could worsen the damage.

The way Israel has repeatedly returned to areas it said were under its control, only to have fighters overrun it again, has exacerbated the destruction, Savill said.

That’s evident especially in northern Gaza, where Israel launched a new campaign in early October that almost obliterated Jabaliya, a built up, urban refugee camp. Jabaliya is home to the descendants of Palestinians who fled, or were forced to flee, during the war that led to Israel‘s creation in 1948. Milshtein said Israel's dismantling of the tunnel network is also to blame for the destruction there.

But the destruction was not only caused from strikes on targets. Israel also carved out a buffer zone about a kilometer inside Gaza from its border with Israel, as well as within the Netzarim corridor that bisects north Gaza from the south, and along the Philadelphi Corridor, a stretch of land along Gaza’s border with Egypt. Vast swaths in these areas were leveled.

Amir Avivi, a retired Israeli general, said the buffer zones were an operational necessity meant to carve out secure plots of land for Israeli forces. He denied Israel had cleared civilian areas indiscriminately.

The destruction, like the civilian death toll in Gaza, has raised accusations that Israel committed war crimes, which it denies. The decisions the military made in choosing what to topple, and why, are an important factor in that debate.

"The second fighters move into a building and start using it to fire on you, you start making a calculation about whether or not you can strike," Savill said. Downing the building, he said, "it still needs to be necessary."

Episode 4: Assad Opened the Border with Iraq, Advised Saddam to ‘Remove The Pretexts’ to Avoid a US Strike

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Secret Letters between the Syrian, Iraqi Presidents in the mid-1990s