Episode 4: Assad Opened the Border with Iraq, Advised Saddam to ‘Remove The Pretexts’ to Avoid a US Strike

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Secret Letters between the Syrian, Iraqi Presidents in the mid-1990s

An undated archive photo of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Damascus (AFP)
An undated archive photo of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Damascus (AFP)
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Episode 4: Assad Opened the Border with Iraq, Advised Saddam to ‘Remove The Pretexts’ to Avoid a US Strike

An undated archive photo of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Damascus (AFP)
An undated archive photo of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Damascus (AFP)

In the second half of 1996, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s objective was “to stop the overthrow of the Iraqi regime.” He focused his contacts for this purpose and reopened the Syrian-Iraqi borders, which were closed since 1982.

The correspondence between Assad and then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein - which Asharq Al-Awsat obtained from the documents of Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam and Iraqi ambassador to Qatar Anwar Sabri Abdel Razzaq – revealed a convergence in the priorities of the two Arab leaders.

Assad was patient and suspicious, while Saddam was rushing to cooperate, to the extent that he suggested a return to the National Action Charter and the “union” between the two countries.

Upon his return from Paris, where he met with President Jacques Chirac, Khaddam conveyed the French position to the Syrian president. He requested a meeting with the participation of Chief of Staff General Hikmat al-Shihabi and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa, to discuss Iraqi. According to an official Syrian document, the conferees agreed on the following proposals:

1- Working to stop the overthrow of the Iraqi regime by the Americans, the Israelis and Jordan;
2- Creating a suitable atmosphere for communication between the party apparatus that guarantees a continuous basis for work between Syria and Iraq;
3- Conveying a message to the Americans and Israel about the ability to create new conditions in the region;
4- Promoting a reassuring atmosphere for the Arab population;
5- Securing Syria’s interests in Iraq and elsewhere.

It was agreed that the Iraqi ambassador to Qatar, Anwar Sabri, be summoned and informed that the Syrian leadership would issue a statement declaring the opening of the international borders with Iraq, which were closed in 1982, in a manner that does not contradict Security Council resolutions. The diplomat would also be informed of a proposal to hold a political meeting to discuss the means to organize the bilateral relations in their various aspects, in a way that does not further complicate the Arab situation.

On August 21, 1996, Khaddam received Anwar Sabri.

He recounted in the minutes of the meeting: “I informed [Sabri] that during this period we were subjected to great pressures from various sides, which did not change our position. We spoke with a number of Arab countries and we were able to convince them of the rightness of our approach.”

Khaddam continued: “We suggest that the Syrian government issues a statement declaring the opening of the international borders in line with Security Council resolutions, and that officials from the two countries gather to organize this step. We also propose that a committee meet to discuss, in a gradual way, matters that are in the interests of the two countries and do not provoke the others.”

On August 28, Khaddam received the Iraqi envoy, who said: “Iraq’s leadership believes that the best move would be to hold a meeting at a political level to discuss what steps can be taken. There are many issues and challenges facing the two brotherly countries and the Arab nation that require review and evaluation.”

Anwar Sabri tried to set a date to visit Damascus, because he had “important matters” to raise, including a return to the National Action Charter signed between the two countries in 1978, but there was always a delay.

In one of his documents, the Syrian vice-president said he received Sabri on February 21, 1997, and “a general discussion took place, in which I explained the sensitivity of the Arab situation.”

The Iraqi envoy, for his part, presented Saddam’s proposed agenda for the expected meeting between the two countries:

“1- Discussing diplomatic ties as an important step to restore normal relations;
2- Reviewing trade exchange and opening oil pipelines in light of the willingness of the Syrian leadership to re-open the borders;
3- Forming an auxiliary committee for the Higher Leadership Committee, to follow up on the implementation of the agreed steps;
4- Any other topics that the Syrian brothers would like to discuss.”

“President Saddam told me that if our brothers want to discuss the National Action Charter, we agree. Now the relations are good, and we have overcome the past,” Sabri was quoted as telling Khaddam.

He also stressed that his leader “will make basic changes in the party and the state, but he is waiting for the relations with Syria; these changes will affect key positions.”

On February 26, 1997, the Syrian Vice President received Saddam’s envoy and told him: “We are preparing an Arab initiative to correct the situation and set new methods that would define commitments and guarantees, reassure the different sides and pave the way for serious cooperation based on sound rules.”

Then he read the following message: “Greetings from the President and my greetings to President Saddam Hussein. Since we began exchanging ideas through Ambassador Anwar about the Arab situation and the dangers facing the Arab nation, especially the Israeli dangers […] and foreign domination, progress has been achieved, and we have moved from the stage of stalemate and hostility to the common understanding of a number of major issues of concern. Syria’s response to conspiracies targeting Iraq’s unity and national security is a clear example […]. Syria obviously desires to cooperate with Iraq in the face of dangers, and within an objective vision, away from the formalities of diplomatic relations that could provoke reactions, which will not serve Syria, Iraq or our efforts to improve the Arab climate.”

Two years after the beginning of the talks, the Syrian government took a decision - under the directives of Assad - to reopen the borders on June 2, 1997. This move helped create a positive atmosphere, and Syrian and Iraqi trade delegations began exchanging visits.

As the Iraqi crisis worsened in October and November 1997, a Syrian statement was issued rejecting the US threats, and calling on the Arabs to adopt the same stance.
In mid-November, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz requested a visit to Damascus to brief its officials on the developments. On November 22, Khaddam received him in the presence of Al-Sharaa.

The Iraqi envoy asked what could Iraq do for Syria, and Khaddam replied: “We told you that our goal is to improve the Arab climate, and we do not want to take a step of an official nature that would complicate the situation and be harmful to us and to you and to all Arab parties that are sensitive to foreign pressures, especially the American pressure. We deal with the Iraqi issue with a national responsibility, and there are channels of communication between us.”

Aziz responded: “We have made good steps; the relations between us are relaxed and we have started business relations […]. We want the practical side. The economic aspect requires regulating the relationship between merchants and individuals on a regular basis, and this necessitates the presence of diplomatic missions between the two countries, in order to obtain a visa and even serve our citizens. We don’t pressure you, but we ask that for thought.”

Khaddam recounted that as American pressure on Iraq increased, [Iraqi Minister Mohammed] Al-Sahhaf requested a visit to Damascus. Sharaa met with him on February 9, 1998.

On the following day, Assad received the Iraqi minister, who conveyed a message from his president, in which he presented the situation and the causes of the crisis. According to the minutes of the meeting, the Syrian president replied:

“1- Syria is aware of the objectives of the crisis, and it deals with the entire Arab situation. We cannot stop at passing circumstances between the two countries, because the foreign goal is bigger; it is primarily an Israeli goal, so our position was clear.
2- What is happening has nothing to do with Kuwait, but rather with Israeli and American interests, and it targets the entire region. Therefore, I made contacts with some brothers warning of the consequences of the aggression against Iraq.
3- We believe that Iraq should remove the excuses and avert the opportunity they are trying to exploit, because the important thing now is to avoid a military strike. If this happens, a large part of the plan will be disrupted, even if only temporarily.”



Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
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Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)

Israel has a world-leading missile interception system but its bank of interceptors is finite. Now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them.

On Thursday, The New York Times reporters spoke to current and former Israeli officials about the strengths and weaknesses of Israeli air defense.

Aside from a potentially game-changing US intervention that shapes the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, two factors will help decide the length of the Israel-Iran war: Israel’s reserve of missile interceptors and Iran’s stock of long-range missiles.

Since Iran started retaliating against Israel’s fire last week, Israel’s world-leading air defense system has intercepted most incoming Iranian ballistic missiles, giving the Israeli Air Force more time to strike Iran without incurring major losses at home.

But now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them. That has raised questions within the Israeli security establishment about whether the country will run low on air defense missiles before Iran uses up its ballistic arsenal, according to eight current and former officials.

Already, Israel’s military has had to conserve its use of interceptors and is giving greater priority to the defense of densely populated areas and strategic infrastructure, according to the officials. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak more freely.

Interceptors are “not grains of rice,” said Brig. Gen. Ran Kochav, who commanded Israel’s air defense system until 2021 and still serves in the military reserve. “The number is finite.”

“If a missile is supposed to hit refineries in Haifa, it’s clear that it’s more important to intercept that missile than one that will hit the Negev desert,” General Kochav said.

Conserving Israel’s interceptors is “a challenge,” he added. “We can make it, but it’s a challenge.”

Asked for comment on the limits of its interceptor arsenal, the Israeli military said in a brief statement that it “is prepared and ready to handle any scenario and is operating defensively and offensively to remove threats to Israeli civilians.”

No Israeli official would divulge the number of interceptors left at Israel’s disposal; the revelation of such a closely guarded secret could give Iran a military advantage.

The answer will affect Israel’s ability to sustain a long-term, attritional war. The nature of the war will partly be decided by whether Trump decides to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear enrichment site at Fordo, in northern Iran, or whether Iran decides to give up its enrichment program to prevent such an intervention.

But the war’s endgame will also be shaped by how long both sides can sustain the damage to their economies, as well as the damage to national morale caused by a growing civilian death toll.

Israel relies on at least seven kinds of air defense. Most of them involve automated systems that use radar to detect incoming missiles and then provide officers with suggestions of how to intercept them.

Military officials have seconds to react to some short-range fire, but minutes to judge the response to long-range attacks. At times, the automated systems do not offer recommendations, leaving officers to make decisions on their own, General Kochav said.

The Arrow system intercepts long-range missiles at higher altitudes; the David’s Sling system intercepts them at lower altitudes; while the Iron Dome takes out shorter-range rockets, usually fired from Gaza, or the fragments of missiles already intercepted by other defense systems.

The United States has supplied at least two more defense systems, some of them fired from ships in the Mediterranean, and Israel is also trying out a new and relatively untested laser beam. Finally, fighter jets are deployed to shoot down slow-moving drones.

Some Israelis feel it is time to wrap up the war before Israel’s defenses are tested too severely.

At least 24 civilians have been killed by Iran’s strikes, and more than 800 have been injured. Some key infrastructure, including oil refineries in northern Israel, has been hit, along with civilian homes. A hospital in southern Israel was struck on Thursday morning.

Already high by Israeli standards, the death toll could rise sharply if the Israeli military is forced to limit its general use of interceptors in order to guarantee the long-term protection of a few strategic sites like the Dimona nuclear reactor in southern Israel or the military headquarters in Tel Aviv.

“Now that Israel has succeeded in striking most of its nuclear targets in Iran, Israel has a window of two or three days to declare the victory and end the war,” said Zohar Palti, a former senior officer in the Mossad, Israel’s spy agency.

“When planning how to defend Israel in future wars, no one envisaged a scenario in which we would be fighting on so many fronts and defending against so many rounds of ballistic missiles,” said Palti, who was for years involved in Israel’s defensive planning.

Others are confident that Israel will be able to solve the problem by destroying most of Iran’s missile launchers, preventing the Iranian military from using the stocks that it still has.

Iran has both fixed and mobile launchers, scattered across its territory, according to two Israeli officials. Some of its missiles are stored underground, where they are harder to destroy, while others are in aboveground caches, the officials said.

The Israeli military says it has destroyed more than a third of the launchers. Officials and experts say that has already limited the number of missiles that Iran can fire in a single attack.

US officials said Israel’s strikes against the launchers have decimated Iran’s ability to fire its missiles and hurt its ability to create large-scale barrages.

“The real issue is the number of launchers, more than the number of missiles,” said Asaf Cohen, a former Israeli commander who led the Iran department in Israel’s military intelligence directorate.

“The more of them that are hit, the harder it will be for them to launch barrages,” Cohen added. “If they realize they have a problem with launch capacity, they’ll shift to harassment: one or two missiles every so often, aimed at two different areas simultaneously.”

The New York Times