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Tunisia's Political Scene is about to Change

A file photo shows Tunisia’s President Kais Saied. (Fethi Belaid/AFP)
A file photo shows Tunisia’s President Kais Saied. (Fethi Belaid/AFP)
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Tunisia's Political Scene is about to Change

A file photo shows Tunisia’s President Kais Saied. (Fethi Belaid/AFP)
A file photo shows Tunisia’s President Kais Saied. (Fethi Belaid/AFP)

The political scene in Tunisia is heading towards many shifts and the indicators on that are many. The announcement of a "positive development" in the president's connection with both the parliament and the government is expected to accelerate these shifts and put an end to over two years of tension and exchange of accusations.

Although Abir Moussi, president of the Free Destourian Party and some of her allies in the opposition, have ascended their criticism of the parliamentary and political ruling majority, the behind-the-scene actions suggest "new agreements" that could lead to a "political government" more open on the opposition, syndicates, and independent experts. The first indicators on the "upcoming change" surfaced when the fighting political parties and syndicates ascended their verbal attack against the president, speaker, and prime minister, in conjunction with "high profile" meetings that discussed possible solutions for the crisis. These solutions start with the formation of a government that replaces the current one including 11 ministers rejected by Kais Saied.

Perhaps the most serious escalation since Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was toppled, in early 2011, is that the labor syndicates, mainly the Tunisian General Labor Union, which plays a major political role in the country, has called for early presidential and parliamentary elections, removal of the president, speaker, and prime minister, and "to return the rule to the people."

The three presidencies didn't comment on these calls despite the campaign launched by local and international media outlets covering what they considered "a first" in the history of syndicates calling for the resignation of the president and the speaker.

Meanwhile, many political parties have warned from clashes among the syndical leadership and the three presidents following the intense criticisms launched by top figures in the Tunisian General Labor Union.

On the other hand, leaders of opposition parties, including the People's Movement, Destourian, Constitutional Liberal, and the Democratic Current, have welcomed the calls for "early elections."

Fathi al-Ayadi, spokesperson to Ennahda Movement (Islamic party) said his party is "ready for early elections."

Popular Referendum

Many constitutional law experts like Academic Kamal bin Massoud and former law school dean Rafe' bin Ashour ruled out the option of the early election without "political consensus" that amends the constitution and electoral law. According to the two experts, the current Tunisian constitution does not allow any political authority, including the president or the parliament, to cancel the results of the 2019 elections and call for early ones.

For her part, legal expert Mona Karim said the constitution allows the president to suspend the parliament, and call for early elections in "rare cases like when the prime minister-designate fails to win the support of the parliamentary majority two times in a row."

Former minister and official at the People's Movement opposition party Fathi Belhaj, and Spokesperson to Ennahda Movement, MP Fathi al-Ayadi saw that "organizing early elections before amending the electoral law would lead to the same political scene."

Therefore, a number of political activists including former ministers Mohsen Marzouk, Kamel Jendoubi, and former head of the bar association Shawki Taieb have called for "a popular referendum" to change the political system from parliamentary to presidential. Some former left-wing activists have also launched the "Resistance" initiative aimed at collecting tens of thousands of signatures supporting the "popular referendum."

- Presidency for life?

Most of the ruling and opposing figures, including the leader of the Popular Front Hamma Hammami, and former minister Rafiq Abdul- Salam have clearly opposed a proposal attributed to the president and his supporters to organize a "popular referendum" on suspending the "revolution constitution 2014" and readopting the constitution of 1959, which was criticized by most politicians since 2011. They also accused him of "legitimizing tyranny, one-man rule, and the presidency for life."

Secretary-General of the General Labor Union Noureddine Taboubi revealed that Saied is considering "preparing a referendum to readopt the constitution of 1959," because, according to the president, the new constitution "limited the powers of the president and emphasized authority overlap with the prime minister and the parliament."

The official presidency site posted photos and videos of Kais Saied's meeting with former MP and activist Mubarka Brahmi, showing him holding pages from the ruling party's Labor newspaper in 1959 that praise statements by President Habib Bourguiba on the constitution of June 1959. These photos and news stirred more criticisms of the president and some of his advisors, accusing them of "waiving the democratic achievements in the 2014 constitution."

However, some constitutional law experts, including Academic and International Law expert Haikal bin Mahfouz called for "saving the country from its political crisis, and power conflict through an advisory referendum."

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Bin Mahfouz said: "The constitution of 2014 allows popular referendums in cases related to human rights, but doesn't prohibit the president from calling for an advisory referendum on a partial adjustment of the political system [...] the advisory referendum is not binding but can help decision-makers address problems, and save the country from this useless political circle."

- Powers of the president

On the other hand, many have recently called for expanding the president's powers over the parliament and the government.

These calls were launched before 2011 by Al-Sadiq Sha'ban and Béchir Tekkari, ministers of justice and education back then, who believed that the current constitution allows the president to announce emergency measures when the national security is in danger. These measures include exceptional legal procedures that expand his powers and limit the role of the parliament and the government affected by political conflicts, and partisan and personal disputes.

He recently met with the President in Carthage Palace, and called for "respecting the presidency and expanding its powers to save the country."

Zeitoun had also announced a similar position when conflicts erupted between late President Beji Caid Essebsi and Prime Minister Youssef Chahed, who allied with Ennahda Movement at the time. Zeitoun was among few members in Ennahda to support the presidential palace in its dispute with Chahed and his government.

- Mediations…and a Deal

In line with the fiery statements and calls in the syndical and political speeches, official sources from several parties and decision-making circles confirmed that Tunisia is approaching a new phase of "political agreement" that starts by ending the disputes between the presidency and the parliament, and between the President and Rached Ghannouchi.

The change path has kicked off after revealing the dialogue and political negotiations the president carried out with several diplomatic and political figures including Lotfi Zeitoun, and his old friend and former left leader Ridha Chiheb el-Mekki known as "Reda Lenin." Few days after the announcement, Saied had a first-of-its-kind, one hour and a half meeting with Speaker Rached Ghannouchi, the historic leader of the Ennahda Movement.

Many sources confirmed that this meeting led to a "comprehensive agreement" on addressing the current political crisis, which might include the announcement of a major government modification that excludes the ministers objected by Saied because of "corruption suspicions" six months ago."

- Collapse of "Political Belt?"

Meanwhile, two leaders from the Heart of Tunisia party, including MP Osama al-Khalifi criticized the approach between the speaker and the President and his allies, members of the Democratic Block in the parliament.

MPs from the "political and parliamentary belt" warned the government that the ruling coalition could weaken in case Ghannouchi and Ennahda leadership "imply" they might dismiss current PM Hichem Mechichi, who is supported by tens of MPs from the parties that formed the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally in 2011.

Following the release of Businessman Nabil al-Qarawi, leader of Heart of Tunisia party who rivaled Kais Saied in the final round of the 2019 elections, calls have risen to form a "new political coalition" that includes the so-called "modernists and liberals" facing "Islamist" opponents, MPs of Ennahda and Al Karama coalition. If formed, this "coalition" could lead to a government headed by Mechichi and supported by Abir Moussi's Destourian Party, and may even win the support of the Presidential Palace. This government could pledge to close the financial and judicial cases that led to the arrest of Qarawi and temporarily seized his properties and assets in 2019 and 2020.

However, optimistic remarks stated by figures known as "extremists" like former health minister and Ennahda VP Abdellatif Mekki, came in line with the resumptions of political discussions. Again, Tunisia has found itself in "a closed circle" with no progress, said journalist and Academic Mounji Mabrouki. The situation is about to get more complicated, after political groups supported by the "extreme left" joined the clash, and resumed their accusations of the Ennahda Movement of partaking in violence and terrorism acts, including the assassination of the left opposition members Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013.

In a recent press conference, Lawyer Reda Radawi, member of the board defending Belaïd and Brahmi, implied that he and his colleagues "would reveal names of judges and high-profile officials who were involved in cases of violence and terrorism in the 10 past years," including many figures in Ennahda government presided by Hamadi Jebali and Ali al-Arid in 2012-2013.

Meanwhile, feminist and legal associations supporting the left parties have launched a media campaign against what they call "fundamentalists," and "extremists," accusing them of violating women's rights, and harassing Leader of the Destourian Party Abir Moussi and her colleagues.

Other associations and parties have organized movements that call to topple Meshishi's government, the parliament, and the whole ruling class brought by the 2019 elections. They have encouraged "youth demonstrations," and "manifestations in popular areas," against the increase of prices, inflation, unemployment, poverty, and crimes. According to those groups, the current crises are the results of "politicians' failures," social and economic effects of the pandemic, in addition to the government's emergency decision to close the borders, and the lockdown that affected many sectors such as tourism, traditional industries, and services.

In all cases, the political scene in Tunisia is active these days; some parties push towards supporting the current parliamentary political coalition through conciliation with the Carthage Palace (the president) and some with opposition parties. Others seek to cause a "shock" inside this coalition to pave the road for new coalitions that could shake the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, whether organized on time in 2024 or earlier during 2022.

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Baghdad Emerges as Next Arena in US-Iran Confrontation

Iraqi factions that fought alongside Iran in the recent war with the United States. (Popular Mobilization Forces media)
Iraqi factions that fought alongside Iran in the recent war with the United States. (Popular Mobilization Forces media)
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Baghdad Emerges as Next Arena in US-Iran Confrontation

Iraqi factions that fought alongside Iran in the recent war with the United States. (Popular Mobilization Forces media)
Iraqi factions that fought alongside Iran in the recent war with the United States. (Popular Mobilization Forces media)

More than a month after winning parliament’s confidence on May 14, 2026, Ali al-Zaidi’s government remains unfinished. Nearly 10 ministerial portfolios are still unresolved, including two central pillars of the Iraqi state: interior and defense.

In Iraq, where governments often emerge only after long bargaining among parties, parliamentary blocs, influence networks and regional powers, the delay may look familiar. But that reading only goes so far.

The incomplete cabinet does not just reflect the usual struggle over posts. It shows, above all, that the deals that brought al-Zaidi to power have not yet produced a real governing balance.

Al-Zaidi has parliamentary legitimacy, but not full command of his executive branch. His government stands legally, but remains politically incomplete.

The central issue is no longer simply whether he can complete the formation of a cabinet. It is how much room he will have to carry out his political, economic and security program.

Will al-Zaidi be merely the manager of a settlement struck by the main forces inside the Shiite camp? Or can he gradually turn that settlement into a real tool for political action and recover even a limited measure of the Iraqi state’s ability to take initiative?

That is why al-Zaidi’s expected visit to Washington in mid-July matters. It is more than a conventional diplomatic trip. Alongside the economic, energy and security files announced for discussion, the visit will be the first real test of his premiership.

It will show whether he can strengthen his international legitimacy, widen his independence from the political forces that brought him to power and define his relationship with the US administration at a time when Washington’s priorities in Iraq appear to be shifting.

Iraq in a new regional equation

Many were struck by the strategic surprise Tehran unleashed, which altered some regional balances. The move disrupted navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and introduced a troubling shift in international law through what Tehran called its “right to control.”

The interim agreement reached by Washington and Tehran allowed for a ceasefire and opened the way for a new phase of negotiations. It is likely to reduce the chances of direct military confrontation in the short term.

But it resolves none of the core disputes that still divide the United States and Iran in the Middle East. On the contrary, their rivalry appears set to move toward arenas where their interests continue to overlap. Iraq comes first among them.

For Baghdad, the shift carries a clear paradox. Relative easing between Washington and Tehran could give Ali Falih al-Zaidi’s government more space to pursue reforms without directly absorbing the costs of regional escalation.

But the same easing could also move the competition between the two powers into Iraqi institutions, turning the Iraqi state into the main arena of conflict.

The Washington-Tehran agreement also reopens the Iraqi file on other geopolitical fronts.

Gulf states are expected to accelerate strategies aimed at consolidating their regional interests, especially in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Türkiye, through its geopolitical strategy in energy and logistical connectivity, will seek to strengthen its position in Iraq. China and Russia, in turn, will try to entrench their presence in what they regard as the “southern front” of the US, and broader Western, offensive in the Eurasian space: Iran, alongside the western front in Ukraine and the eastern front in Taiwan, and the surrounding spaces of connection and influence.

In principle, Iraq should be able to benefit from this renewed competition for regional influence, particularly by attracting economic investment and securing stronger support for normalization and regional integration.

This geopolitical shift will inevitably affect Iraq’s place in the rivalry between Washington and Tehran. For nearly two decades, Iraq’s political system has rested on an ambiguous balance.

It is neither a US protectorate nor an absolute subordinate of Iran. It is an open space for constant negotiation among outside powers, local elites, sectarian parties, armed factions, fragile institutions and a rentier economy.

Despite its fragility, that model delivered a measure of relative stability for years. But current signs suggest it is entering a new phase; one expected to move toward consolidating the state and its institutions.

A shift in US policy

The Trump administration no longer appears fully prepared to accept the implicit logic that governed Iraq in recent years: a form of direct or indirect joint management between Washington and Tehran.

The signals so far point to a US approach built on long-term influence by strengthening Iraqi state institutions. The aim is to use technocratic tools and, perhaps, a greater degree of ideological neutrality to tilt the balance toward Iraqi national interests, especially economic ones, and away from Iranian influence.

Several officials inside the US administration appear to support this view. They argue that Iraq can gradually free itself from reliance on Iranian support if Iraqi state institutions regain credibility and effectiveness.

As the scheduled US military withdrawal in September 2026 approaches, a purely security-driven approach looks insufficient. Repeated operations targeting armed faction leaders and their organizational structures since 2020 have not produced a real shift in the balance of power.

One of the most prominent defenders of this approach is Tom Barrack, who occupies a special place in it. Barrack is the US ambassador to Türkiye and a close associate of Donald Trump.

He is also known for his close relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and for being one of the leading defenders of the effectiveness of centralized, even authoritarian, systems in producing transitions. Today, he is one of the key actors in the Syrian and Iraqi files.

Barrack belongs to a classical school that sees no sustainable influence in the Middle East without central states that possess at least a minimum of political and institutional credibility.

In Syria, this translates into support for a pragmatic path toward normalizing relations with the new authority in Damascus. In Iraq, there appears to be a focus on strengthening Baghdad’s role, without overlooking the importance and status of Erbil.

This is how the recent reactivation of several files should be understood. Efforts to ease tension between Baghdad and Erbil, the push for closer coordination between Baghdad and Damascus, and renewed interest in some regional projects are not merely diplomatic moves.

They all serve one logic: gradually strengthening the Iraqi state’s ability to reclaim its role as the central actor in regional balances.

A settlement of the chronic disputes between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region, whether over the budget, oil exports, energy management or the distribution of powers, would strengthen Baghdad. It would also strengthen al-Zaidi himself.

The same logic applies to Baghdad’s relations with Damascus. US authorities, under Barrack’s influence, now appear to favor pragmatic coordination between the two capitals. This is not so much because Washington supports the new Syrian authority, but because it wants to stabilize a border area that has become vital to regional security.

The Iraqi-Syrian border remains a major strategic challenge in the fight against armed groups, smuggling and illegal transit networks. At the same time, it could again become a space for economic exchange and energy movement if the right political conditions emerge.

In this context, the idea of restarting the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline regains special importance. The project is not only economic. It also carries deep geopolitical meaning. It would give Iraq an additional outlet for oil exports via the Mediterranean, reducing, at least in part, its reliance on existing routes through the Gulf or Türkiye.

More importantly, it would mark Iraq’s return to its historical role as a link between the Gulf, the Arab Levant and the Mediterranean. The project alone would not solve Iraq’s economic crisis. But it would signal a desire to reposition Iraq at the center of regional dynamics rather than leave it as a stage for regional and international competition.

Governing under financial constraints

That horizon remains extremely fragile because of Iraq’s internal economic situation. Al-Zaidi’s government inherited deteriorating financial conditions. The state’s room for maneuver has narrowed sharply because of obligations accumulated in recent years, particularly under Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s government.

Public-sector wages, social spending, domestic debt, and other financial commitments now consume a large share of state resources.

Oil exports add another strain. Negotiations with Türkiye on resuming exports through the port of Ceyhan have not yet been settled, depriving Iraq of an important share of oil revenue. Before the crisis, exports through that route reached hundreds of thousands of barrels per day.

The current crisis is therefore not a passing economic problem or a temporary financial squeeze. It exposes the structural limits of the political and economic model built in Iraq after 2003.

The Iraqi state has gradually become a vast machine for redistributing oil rent. Public salaries, pensions, social assistance, government contracts, public companies and subcontracting networks have become the main tools for organizing political and social balances.

Under this equation, the regular payment of salaries is no longer just a matter of financial management or the state budget. It has become central to the stability of the political system itself. Nearly 5 million government employees depend directly on public finances, along with millions of retirees and social welfare beneficiaries.

Any prolonged disruption could quickly trigger broad social tensions and deepen the fragility of a government already facing several political challenges at once.

The executive’s options remain limited. Government bonds could provide temporary liquidity, but they would not fix deep structural imbalances. Domestic borrowing also remains constrained by weak liquidity inside the Iraqi economy.

Turning to the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund remains possible, but it would come with strict conditions. These could include reforming public companies, rationalizing government spending, improving public financial management, and gradually reducing some forms of state support.

Such measures could reassure international partners. But they also risk feeding social anger in a country where the state remains the largest employer and the main safety net against economic crises.

Factions between institutionalization and reconfiguration

Iraq’s economic crisis is tightly linked to the security question. The state is no longer just a rentier state distributing oil revenues. It has become a space where state institutions overlap with political, administrative, economic and military networks, all of which feed, to varying degrees, on public revenues.

Armed factions no longer draw their power from military capacity alone. They also draw it from a long process of institutionalization over the past two decades.

They now have extensions inside parliament and the executive, a presence in public administration, financial resources, economic networks and offices, protection offices dealing with oil companies, media outlets, social organizations and a measure of “legitimacy” acquired by some of them during the war against ISIS.

Seeing these factions as mere armed groups outside the state no longer reflects Iraq’s reality since 2003. The overlap between the state and the factions is no longer simply an infiltration of state institutions. It has become part of how those institutions function.

This reality also requires moving beyond another simplification often repeated in Western analysis: reducing these factions to “Iranian proxies.” They are not all equally close to Tehran, nor do they all have the same political or military relationship with it. Some have a considerable margin of independence and put Iraqi calculations first.

Others remain more deeply integrated into Tehran’s regional networks. It is therefore more accurate to speak of “Iraqi factions close to Iran” than to reduce them to direct Iranian extensions. That reduction obscures the transformations these groups have undergone inside Iraqi society and the Iraqi state.

The distinction is crucial to understanding current debates over the factions’ future. Part of this network now appears ready to discuss a gradual reorganization of its status.

Negotiations with the government are not centered on immediate disarmament so much as on deeper integration into the Popular Mobilization Forces and a clearer separation between political activity and military command.

Other groups, especially Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, are more cautious about any process that could narrow their independence or redefine their relationship with the state.

The real question, however, is not whether political and military wings can realistically be separated. It is what kind of state Iraq has become. Can politics and weapons truly be separated when both operate inside the same institutional structure? Can traditional models of disarmament and reintegration be applied to groups that no longer stand outside the state?

Today, the factions are not defending their arsenals as much as they are defending their positions inside the state, their share of public resources, their economic networks and a social base that now depends, directly or indirectly, on the jobs, salaries, services and patronage they provide.

Estimates put their membership at between 200,000 and 300,000. Including their families, millions of Iraqis are linked to this system in varying degrees.

Any attempt to restructure the factions or reduce their role will therefore face a highly complex equation: US pressure to confine arms to the state, Iranian influence seeking to preserve part of the regional deterrence system, and broad local interests that view the factions’ survival as a guarantee of their economic and political positions.

Amid this overlap, the question is no longer how to disarm the factions. It is how to rebuild a state.

Time as a factor in the balance of power

This institutional complexity is compounded by another often-overlooked dimension: time.

The United States usually thinks within a relatively short political horizon, shaped by presidential terms, the search for quick results and near-term diplomatic deadlines.

Iraqi factions close to Iran, like Tehran itself, operate on a very different timeline. They know how to wait, postpone decisions, absorb pressure, multiply mediation efforts and turn time into a political resource.

In Iraq, time itself is part of the balance of power. The most entrenched actors are those that can withstand changes of government, international sanctions, shifting political balances and regional crises.

This ability to work according to the logic of the long term explains why repeated attempts to restructure the security sphere have produced limited results. Local forces know that international balances change far faster than Iraq’s internal balances.

These different timelines also help explain how the recent war between Iran, the United States and Israel was received by an important part of Iraq’s political scene.

A belief has gradually taken hold among a broad segment of political actors that Iran emerged from the confrontation politically stronger. This does not mean Tehran suffered no losses or faced no serious pressure.

It simply means the Iranian system did not fall and was not pushed to the margins of the regional equation. For many of its allies, its ability to endure was itself a form of “political victory.”

That reading directly shapes the behavior of Iraqi factions closest to Tehran. Many now ask a simple question: If Iran itself preserved its regional capabilities, why should the factions in Iraq make concessions?

Is there a new US doctrine?

At this stage, it is still too early to say a clear new US doctrine toward Iraq has taken shape. But several indicators suggest that part of the US administration now believes that limiting Iranian influence does not require direct confrontation with Tehran. It runs through the gradual strengthening of the Iraqi state’s credibility and capacity to act.

This approach, however, collides with the Iraqi reality described above. The United States, Iran and Iraq also move according to different clocks.

Al-Zaidi will have to confront several challenges at once. He must restore balance to public finances, preserve existing political settlements, redefine the relationship between the state and the factions, balance Baghdad’s relations with Erbil and Damascus, and maintain a constructive dialogue with Washington without reproducing internal polarization.

The challenge facing the new government is therefore not simply whether it can manage the country’s affairs. It is whether Iraq can rebuild a more credible state within the existing political balances that have provided a measure of relative stability.

In that space between reform and continuity, between state authority and the authority of influence networks, and between different national and regional rhythms, Iraq’s political future will most likely be decided in the years ahead.

Features

Mojtaba Khamenei: Iran’s Unseen Leader Shadowed by Late Father

A bird flies near an Iranian flag and a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
A bird flies near an Iranian flag and a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
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Mojtaba Khamenei: Iran’s Unseen Leader Shadowed by Late Father

A bird flies near an Iranian flag and a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
A bird flies near an Iranian flag and a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters

Mojtaba Khamenei, who has spent his career behind the scenes and is yet to appear in public as Iran's new supreme leader, faces the formidable challenge of occupying the role held by his father for most of the regime's existence.

Iranians knew little about the younger Khamenei when he was named to the lifetime post shortly after a US-Israeli airstrike killed his father Ali Khamenei, supreme leader since 1989, at the start of the Middle East war.

Said to have been wounded himself, Mojtaba Khamenei has issued over dozen written messages as leader that have carried on his father's confrontational ideology, taking aim at Israel and the United States.

In one of his most significant recent interventions, released on June 18, Mojtaba Khamenei said he had given his blessing to talks with the US to end the war despite having a "different view", likely an attempt to stay above the domestic political fray.

Despite the messages and activity on social media channels, there has been no concrete proof that Mojtaba Khamenei is even alive after the February 28 attack that also killed his wife Zahra Haddad Adel and other members of the Khamenei family.

But several Iranian officials have said he was wounded, sparking speculation he could be waiting to recover fully before appearing in public, as well as being mindful of his own security.

With Ali Khamenei's funeral starting Saturday, there will be intense scrutiny for signs of Mojtaba Khamenei emerging, and questions will mount if he fails to appear.

-'Radical' agenda -

Unlike Ali Khamenei, a prominent opponent of the shah who was president in the first decade of the republic from 1981-1989 before becoming supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei has never held a government position before.

But observers believe he was second-in-command at the office of the supreme leader under the veteran chief gatekeeper Mohammad Golpayegani.

He is also seen as close to the leadership of the powerful Revolutionary Guards, a connection that may have proved crucial in his selection by the Assembly of Experts clerical body.

One of the few official insights into the importance of Mojtaba Khamenei came in November 2019 when the US Treasury announced sanctions against him and other senior Iranian officials, including Golpayegani, on the grounds they were pushing Iran's "radical" agenda around the world.

The US said he was designated for representing Ali Khamenei "in an official capacity despite never being elected or appointed to a government position aside from work in the office of his father".

"The Supreme Leader has delegated a part of his leadership responsibilities to Mojtaba Khamenei," the US said, adding that he had "worked closely" with the commanders of the Quds Force -- the Guards branch responsible for operations outside Iran -- and the Basij militia "to advance his father's destabilizing regional ambitions and oppressive domestic objectives".

A sign of his potential sway came during the 2005 presidential elections when former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi wrote a letter to the supreme leader complaining that Mojtaba Khamenei had been intervening on behalf of his ultra-conservative rival Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Ahmadinejad went on to cause a sensation by defeating former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. Mojtaba was again seen by some commentators as coordinating the crackdown on protests that followed Ahmadinejad's disputed 2009 election victory.

A leaked US diplomatic cable from 2008 published by Wikileaks said that Mojtaba was "seen by many second only to Golpayegani within the office of the supreme leader".

- 'Unlikely' to have father's influence -

According to an investigation by Bloomberg, which cited anonymous sources and Western intelligence agency reports, Mojtaba Khamenei has amassed wealth estimated at more than $100 million.

It reported he has earned money from oil sales channeled into investments in luxury British real estate, hotels in Europe and property through shell companies in tax havens.

Born in his father's home city of Mashhad in northeastern Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei studied theology in the clerical hub of Qom where he also taught.

"The role of Mojtaba Khamenei is unclear," said Thomas Juneau, professor at the University of Ottawa.

"It is very unlikely at this point that he has the degree of influence that his father used to have."

Features

Iran’s New Leaders Post-Ali Khamenei

People ride past a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
People ride past a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
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Iran’s New Leaders Post-Ali Khamenei

People ride past a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
People ride past a banner with a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters

A group of military, theocratic and civilian figures, rather than a single individual, have led decision-making in Iran since the killing of longstanding supreme leader Ali Khamenei in a US-Israeli airstrike at the start of the war.

Khamenei's son Mojtaba was named supreme leader after his death but it is unclear what power he wields and he has yet to be seen in public.

US President Donald Trump said last month that the war had removed a "first set" and "second set" of leaders but maintained that the "third set" was "smart", "very rational" and "not radicalized".

Here AFP looks at the Iranian system's key figures, whose presence at the funeral ceremonies for Ali Khamenei starting Saturday will be closely watched.

- Supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei -

After succeeding his father as supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei in theory sits at the top of Iran's theocratic system in a post-for-life with the final say on all significant policy matters.

But he has yet to be seen in public since being named, with officials saying he was wounded. He has issued numerous written statements on policy matters but is far from replicating the one-man rule of his father.

- Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf -

The most prominent public face of the leadership in the absence of Mojtaba Khamenei, Ghalibaf led Iran's negotiating team in talks with the United States, first in Pakistan and then in Switzerland last month.

During three decades at the center of the Iranian system he has held posts straddling civilian and military life, as commander of the aerospace forces of the Revolutionary Guards, Tehran police chief, Tehran mayor and now parliament speaker.

During the intense negotiating process with the US, he carefully avoided any joint photo with US Vice President JD Vance, possibly out of concern for possible hardline criticism at home.

- President Masoud Pezeshkian -

President since 2024 following the death of his predecessor Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash, Pezeshkian is seen as belonging to the more moderate wing of politics in Iran.

However, his position as president in no way makes him Iran's number one, and presidents throughout recent Iranian politics have often struggled to impose their will.

But it was Pezeshkian who signed the accord last month with the US that ended the war.

- Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi -

A veteran diplomat, Araghchi has held the post since 2024 following the death of former foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in the same crash that killed Raisi.

He accompanied Ghalibaf to the talks in Pakistan and Switzerland and also took part in talks in Oman in February with US envoys.

Araghchi, who holds a doctorate in political thought from the University of Kent in England, has vigorously defended Iran's position in TV interviews with foreign media and posts on X.

- Revolutionary Guards Commander-in-Chief Ahmad Vahidi -

A former interior and defense minister, Vahidi is the third commander-in-chief of Iran's ideological army in less than a year after his predecessor Mohammad Pakpour was killed on the first day of the war and Hossein Salami was killed during Israel's 12-day war against Iran in June 2025.

Possibly for this reason, Vahidi has kept a very low profile in the war, making no public appearance. Yet his position gives him immense political and military authority.

- Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr -

Another official who has kept the lowest of profiles but may wield immense power, Zolghadr was named to the key security position after the killing of his predecessor and veteran negotiator Ali Larijani in March in an Israeli airstrike.

Zolghadr's career has been embedded in the Guards and his appointment was seen as further bolstering the role of the ideological army.

- Judiciary chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei -

Ejei has, by contrast, been a familiar presence on Iranian television over the last months, on one occasion urging officials to speed up issuing execution verdicts as hangings surged against the backdrop of war.

A softly-spoken cleric and former intelligence minister, he has long been targeted by rights groups who accuse him of presiding over a situation of mass violations.

- Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani -

A shadowy figure, Qaani became commander of the force responsible for the external operations of the Guards after the killing of his predecessor Qassem Soleimani, a man described by Trump as a "mad genius", in a US strike in Iraq in 2020.

Qaani was reported to have been killed in the 12-day war but then later re-emerged in public.

Intense speculation has surrounded his standing after intelligence lapses. But in a rare appearance on state TV, he backed the talks with the US and said Araghchi and Ghalibaf should be "praised".