‘Guardian of the Republic’s Tomb’: Aoun Returned to Baabda Onboard an Iranian Train as a Guard, Not a President

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from a new book by Lebanese Writer Fayez Azzi (Part 1/2).

Michel Aoun is sworn in as president as Speaker Nabih Berri (right) looks on. (AFP)
Michel Aoun is sworn in as president as Speaker Nabih Berri (right) looks on. (AFP)
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‘Guardian of the Republic’s Tomb’: Aoun Returned to Baabda Onboard an Iranian Train as a Guard, Not a President

Michel Aoun is sworn in as president as Speaker Nabih Berri (right) looks on. (AFP)
Michel Aoun is sworn in as president as Speaker Nabih Berri (right) looks on. (AFP)

In his new book titled, “Guardian of the Republic’s Tomb”, Lebanese writer Fayez Azzi reviews President Michel Aoun’s term in office and presents documents and analyses that show that he placed the country in Iran’s clutches, instead of achieving his long-touted slogan of “freedom, sovereignty and independence” that he used to address the “great people of Lebanon.”

Azzi was very close to Aoun when the latter acted as army chief and then head of the military government in 1988. But he distanced himself from the general in 2006 after he signed the memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah – an agreement that Azzi saw as a breach of Lebanon’s sovereignty and a change in the values that Aoun had long touted.

Asharq Al-Awsat is publishing two episodes of excerpts from the book, which will soon be published by Dar Saer Al-Mashreq in Beirut. This is the fifth book by Azzi, who had played a role in Aoun’s communication with the Syrians before his return from Parisian exile in 2005.

On the choice of the title of his book, Azzi said: “I hesitated a lot, and disregarded the advice of my friend (former information minister) Melhem Riachy, whom I visited a few days after he assumed the media portfolio in the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri…”

“I have a new book. But I am taking my time to publish it. Because it is related to Michel Aoun,” Azzi told Riachy, who replied: “What is its title and what is it about?”

He said: “Aoun... the Republic.”

“Why three dots?” Riachy asked.

“I don’t want to rush in judging the man’s tenure, after I have accompanied him sincerely and with conviction for more than twenty years. So I’ll wait a year into his tenure, at least, to fill in the blanks in the title. I am torn between two words: guardian or protector; knowing that I am inclined towards my first choice: ‘Aoun, the guardian of the republic’s tomb,’ instead of: ‘Aoun, the protector of the Republic Palace,’”Azzi told his interlocutor.

The information minister responded: “Without hesitation, I advise you not to wait, just choose the first option.”

In his book, Azzi says that Aoun was able more than anyone else to fulfill an urgent need to protect the return of the displaced to their villages after they were forced to flee in 1985 during Lebanon’s civil war.

“This was my first concern and the only project that took me on a new political adventure called the Aounist experiment, to which I committed to the point of intoxication.

“This clarification has become necessary and obligatory. Without it, the reader will not be able to understand my long relationship with General Aoun, especially when they discover how close the ties were at times […] until he surprised me on February 6, 2006, by signing a memorandum of understanding between the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah at the Mar Mikhael Church. I then dropped my understanding with him, turning it completely into a doctrinal enmity.”

Azzi recounts: “I knew Michel Aoun closely […]. He was practical and succinct and had convictions based on the purposes and intentions of reform and change. Here lies the secret of his strength and the fear that worried his allies before his opponents, especially if they (his allies) did not react to the general’s born or promised convictions.

“But this duality between the ‘rebellious’ general and the inconsistent president posed a great danger to the republic, specifically to the complex and almost impossible equation between a leader of the liberation battle and a president who was eager to satisfy the electorate.

“Therefore, I complete in this book a truth born of my conviction that the ‘former general’ who was elevated to the presidency, buried the dream of the republic, even before becoming an agent of the occupier and allied with the state’s rapists.”

On the general’s return from his exile in Paris, Azzi says: “Aoun’s visit to Syria was completed in a figurative sense. I was witness to the matter, on December 27, 2004, when Aoun and the Syrians agreed on his return to Lebanon […]. Gaby Issa (an official in the Free Patriotic Movement) visited Damascus and met with then-Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam.”

Azzi recalls: “After his conditional return from Paris, he agreed with the Syrians, who, after [former Prime Minister Rafik] Hariri’s martyrdom, added two conditions to the agreement with Aoun: the first is to support [President] Emile Lahoud until the end of his term, and the second is to reach an understanding with Hezbollah.”

However, Aoun’s presidential ambitions collided with the endorsement of Hariri’s movement and Hezbollah of the election of Army Commander Michel Suleiman.

Thus, the Mar Mikhael understanding of 2006 did not fulfill the promise of Aoun becoming president.

Azzi said that at the end of Suleiman’s term, “the presidential elections turned into a theater for which two candidates initially competed: [Lebanese Forces leader Samir] Geagea and Aoun.”

“Michel Aoun, his team and his main allies did not spare any maneuver to disrupt the elections and maintain the presidential vacuum, as long as victory was not guaranteed […]. The speaker of parliament joined the scheme to disrupt the election in order to exploit the vacuum […].”

Azzi explained how Speaker Nabih Berri and Aoun both manipulated the constitution to hold the parliamentary session that saw the election of Aoun.

He says: “Aoun played an active role in disrupting the constitution, in letter and spirit, to reach the presidency.

“It was the end of the maneuver and the beginning of humiliation and surrender. Everyone welcomed [the elections] - some of them against their will – while failing to notice that the Lebanese politicians had abandoned the principle of free democratic elections, and submitted to the nomination of a biased president, who was increasingly submissive to the Iranian ruler. General Aoun repeated his old and constant phrase: ‘There is an empty chair, either they will invite me to it, or I will take it by force.’”

Episode 2/2: Geagea: We were unable to break Aoun’s position.



To Get Their Own Cash, People in Gaza Must Pay Middlemen a 40% Cut

A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)
A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)
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To Get Their Own Cash, People in Gaza Must Pay Middlemen a 40% Cut

A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)
A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)

Cash is the lifeblood of the Gaza Strip’s shattered economy, and like all other necessities in this war-torn territory — food, fuel, medicine — it is in extremely short supply.

With nearly every bank branch and ATM inoperable, people have become reliant on an unrestrained network of powerful cash brokers to get money for daily expenses and commissions on those transactions have soared to about 40%.

"The people are crying blood because of this," said Ayman al-Dahdouh, a school director living in Gaza City. "It’s suffocating us, starving us."

At a time of surging inflation, high unemployment and dwindling savings, the scarcity of cash has magnified the financial squeeze on families — some of whom have begun to sell their possessions to buy essential goods.

The cash that is available has even lost some of its luster. Palestinians use the Israeli currency, the shekel, for most transactions. Yet with Israel no longer resupplying the territory with newly printed bank notes, merchants are increasingly reluctant to accept frayed bills.

Gaza’s punishing cash crunch has several root causes, experts say.

To curtail Hamas’ ability to purchase weapons and pay its fighters, Israel stopped allowing cash to enter Gaza at the start of the war. Around the same time, many wealthy families in Gaza withdrew their money from banks and then fled the territory. And rising fears about Gaza’s financial system prompted foreign businesses selling goods into the territory to demand cash payments.

As Gaza’s money supply dwindled and civilians’ desperation mounted, cash brokers' commissions — around 5% at the start of the war — skyrocketed.

Someone needing cash transfers money electronically to a broker and moments later is handed a fraction of that amount in bills. Many brokers openly advertise their services, while others are more secretive. Some grocers and retailers have also begun exchanging cash for their customers.

"If I need $60, I need to transfer $100," said Mohammed Basheer al-Farra, who lives in southern Gaza after being displaced from Khan Younis. "This is the only way we can buy essentials, like flour and sugar. We lose nearly half of our money just to be able to spend it."

In 2024, inflation in Gaza surged by 230%, according to the World Bank. It dropped slightly during the ceasefire that began in January, only to shoot up again after Israel backed out of the truce in March.

Cash touches every aspect of life in Gaza

About 80% of people in Gaza were unemployed at the end of 2024, according to the World Bank, and the figure is likely higher now. Those with jobs are mostly paid by direct deposits into their bank accounts.

But "when you want to buy vegetables, food, water, medication -- if you want to take transportation, or you need a blanket, or anything — you must use cash," al-Dahdouh said.

Shahid Ajjour’s family has been living off of savings for two years after the pharmacy and another business they owned were ruined by the war.

"We had to sell everything just to get cash," said Ajjour, who sold her gold to buy flour and canned beans. The family of eight spends the equivalent of $12 every two days on flour; before the war, that cost less than $4.

Sugar is very expensive, costing the equivalent of $80-$100 per kilogram (2.2 pounds), multiple people said; before the war, that cost less than $2.

Gasoline is about $25 a liter, or roughly $95 a gallon, when paying the lower, cash price.

Bills are worn and unusable

The bills in Gaza are tattered after 21 months of war.

Money is so fragile, it feels as if it is going to melt in your hands, said Mohammed al-Awini, who lives in a tent camp in southern Gaza.

Small business owners said they were under pressure to ask customers for undamaged cash because their suppliers demand pristine bills from them.

Thaeir Suhwayl, a flour merchant in Deir al-Balah, said his suppliers recently demanded he pay them only with brand new 200-shekel ($60) bank notes, which he said are rare. Most civilians pay him with 20-shekel ($6) notes that are often in poor condition.

On a recent visit to the market, Ajjour transferred the shekel equivalent of around $100 to a cash broker and received around $50 in return. But when she tried to buy some household supplies from a merchant, she was turned away because the bills weren’t in good condition.

"So the worth of your $50 is zero in the end," she said.

This problem has given rise to a new business in Gaza: money repair. It costs between 3 and 10 shekels ($1-$3) to mend old bank notes. But even cash repaired with tape or other means is sometimes rejected.

People are at the mercy of cash brokers

After most of the banks closed in the early days of the war, those with large reserves of cash suddenly had immense power.

"People are at their mercy," said Mahmoud Aqel, who has been displaced from his home in southern Gaza. "No one can stop them."

The war makes it impossible to regulate market prices and exchange rates, said Dalia Alazzeh, an expert in finance and accounting at the University of the West of Scotland. "Nobody can physically monitor what’s happening," Alazzeh said.

A year ago, the Palestine Monetary Authority, the equivalent of a central bank for Gaza and the West Bank, sought to ease the crisis by introducing a digital payment system known as Iburaq. It attracted half a million users, or a quarter of the population, according to the World Bank, but was ultimately undermined by merchants insisting on cash.

Israel sought to ramp up financial pressure on Hamas earlier this year by tightening the distribution of humanitarian aid, which it said was routinely siphoned off by militants and then resold.

Experts said it is unclear if the cash brokers’ activities benefit Hamas, as some Israeli analysts claim.

The war has made it more difficult to determine who is behind all sorts of economic activity in the territory, said Omar Shabaan, director of Palthink for Strategic Studies, a Gaza-based think tank.

"It's a dark place now. You don't know who is bringing cigarettes into Gaza," he said, giving just one example. "It's like a mafia."

These same deep-pocketed traders are likely the ones running cash brokerages, and selling basic foodstuffs, he said. "They benefit by imposing these commissions," he said.

Once families run out of cash, they are forced to turn to humanitarian aid.

Al-Farra said that is what prompted him to begin seeking food at an aid distribution center, where it is common for Palestinians to jostle over one other for sacks of flour and boxes of pasta.

"This is the only way I can feed my family," he said.