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Greek Foreign Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Are Not Accrediting Our Chargé d'Affaires to the Assad Regime

Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias. Greek Foreign Ministry
Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias. Greek Foreign Ministry
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Greek Foreign Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Are Not Accrediting Our Chargé d'Affaires to the Assad Regime

Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias. Greek Foreign Ministry
Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias. Greek Foreign Ministry

Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias told Asharq Al-Awsat in an interview published Saturday that his country does not want Syria to be a “failed state,” and that it decided to send a diplomat to Damascus “to help normalize the situation,” adding, however, that Athens is “not accrediting” him to the regime of Bashar Assad.

In response to a question, Dendias said that Greece remains committed to a European Union decision on seeing genuine steps from the Assad regime in order to provide funds for Syria’s reconstruction.

“We don’t accept the result of the elections,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat, adding: “I am not bringing news to you saying that democratization, the full respect of human rights, and accountability for crimes of war is what the European Union would expect.”

“We are interested to see how the Assad regime sees the future,” Dendias told his interviewer, adding: “The Constitutional Committee is a great forum in which, if the Assad regime wishes, it could present some sort of steps. But I am not sure that we will see that happening.”

The Minister also lauded relations with Saudi Arabia, saying the Kingdom “is a very important country” for the world, European and Greek economies.

“Safety of the Saudi Kingdom is of the essence for us. That is why we have signed an agreement with them,” he added.

Dendias referred to the importance of consultations with the Arab League and said: “Telling me where we see eye to eye with Egypt, there are plenty of issues.

“International law of the sea, sovereignty, rule of law, good relations with the European Union, and migration issues. Egypt does not instrumentalize migration issues in an effort to blackmail Greece or blackmail the European Union.”

He also expressed satisfaction with the US decision to expand its naval military base in Greece, saying: “We are negotiating a new defense agreement with the United States. I hope we will be able to conclude these negotiations by the autumn of 2021.”

Here is the full text of the interview that was carried out with Asharq Al-Awsat by video link:

• Thank you so much for your time. I have been following up on your trips to the region for ages. I will start from your visit yesterday to Cairo. What can you tell me about your visit? Why did you make it, and what is your interpretation of the agreement that you have signed with the Head of the Arab League Ahmed Abul Gheit?

- Well, first of all, if I may be allowed to say so, it was long overdue. We have a historic relation with the Arab countries that goes back centuries. We tried to calculate it with the Secretary-General of the Arab League, we arrived to something like 25-26 centuries, something like that.

So, having an institutionalized relation with the Arab League was something absolutely important for us. We see that as one step towards coming to a closer understanding with most of the Arab countries, especially, if I may be allowed to say, the Arab countries that share our way of dealing with the international order, which means the rules-based order.

• What was interesting is that you have signed an agreement with Abul Gheit for consultations, I mean, between Greece and the Arab League.
So, what is the political meaning of this agreement?

- You consider consultations as diplomatic jargon, but in a way, Sir, it is not. If you want to come to a common understanding, you have to discuss things. You have to express your views, and also appreciate how the other side sees things.

If that does not happen, then it is just parallel monologues from one side or from the other side. And if by coincidence we have the same interest, fine, if not, we arrive to nothing; it is just parallel lines to nowhere.

So, for us, consultation is something very meaningful. We would like the Arab League and the Arab nations to understand our way of seeing things and the problems we are facing in the region, but also our dreams, our aspirations, our ambitions for the region.

And also, we would like to know theirs. It is a very complex region. History touches upon today’s challenges, so this needs a lot of understanding between us. But also, it is a huge opportunity.

• But, your Excellency, I am asking this question because there is this perception in the Arab world - amongst some analysts, some journalists like myself - that some other regional countries like Turkey or Iran, always try to undermine the Arab League and the Arab role, at the time you have decided to institutionalize this relationship between Athens and the Arab League.

- For Turkey, I have seen it happening, let me be frank, and I will not quote which country, but colleagues of mine, from a number of Arab countries, have given me solid proof of the way Turkey sees the Arab nations and also the dreams that Turkey has. Some sort of neo-Ottoman aspiration, believing that this caliphate could be recreated.

For Greece, we have no imperialistic aspirations in the region. The only thing we would like is to understand and align our interest with the interest of our friends.

And we believe that, in that context, and in the context of international law of the sea, with which most of the countries that we have close relations with, have subscribed to, could create a better future for all of us.

And, let me say, as a final touch on this, we would wish Turkey to become a part of this understanding, but unfortunately, I am afraid this has a long way to go.

• You have visited Cairo around 5 times in 18 months?

- I really cannot say. I am coming from Corfu, I have been more times to Cairo than I have been to Corfu while I am Minister of Foreign Affairs. I really step out of the car and I feel I am at home, I know the doors, I know where the elevator is, I know the corridors.

But, again, I have a personal relationship with Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry and I have to say, I have respect for President (Abdel Fattah) el-Sissi and what he is doing for Egypt and what he is trying to do with Egypt. They are trying hard.

• Could you please, Sir, name the mutual interest that you share with Egypt regarding bilateral issues, regional issues, and other relevant issues you might think of?

- It would be very difficult if you asked me to name our differences with Egypt. Then I would have to start thinking and scratching my head. But telling me where we see eye to eye with Egypt, there are plenty of issues.

International law of the sea, sovereignty, rule of law, good relations with the European Union, and migration issues. Egypt does not instrumentalize migration issues in an effort to blackmail Greece or blackmail the European Union.

After 2017, there are no migratory flows from Egypt towards Europe. The overall stability of the region, Libya, I mean, whatever I think, I see that with Egypt, we have a very, very good understanding.

• Yes, part of it, Sir, is the gas in the Mediterranean, or the maritime? If I’m not mistaken?

- You are not mistaken at all. Creating a corridor of energy supply from Egypt to the European Union, the Gas Forum, the pipelines, and also the interconnector, are part of our effort to create a common economic future.

And I have to say, energy in Greece - and I am taking Greece as an example - is rather expensive. The energy that we can bring from Egypt to Greece is much cheaper, which will help us create sustainable growth in our economy.

So, there is an endless catalogue of common interests with Egypt.

• But when it comes to the gas in the Mediterranean, you have established this block of the 6 nations, 6 countries. Could you please tell me more about what are the aims, what are the goals of this block? Is it just purely economic, or is it more geopolitical?

- Well, the only thing I would put in order is we do not consider ourselves a block. We consider ourselves an understanding because we share a common vision, a common future, and a common interest. And I am openly saying to you, if Turkey subscribes to the rules, Turkey is welcome to join in; or any other country, by the way, not just Turkey.

Now, no, it is not only an economic interest. It is clearly an economic interest. It is based on economic interest, it is based on the need to have energy sources at a reasonable cost, but it is more than that, it is sharing the acceptance of the rules-based society, and a rules-based international order.

That combined us against other approaches, which are clearly imperialistic, in the 19th or 18th-century sense of the word, and which have nothing to do with the 21st century, but it is easier said than done for some countries to understand that this is not a way forward.

• But in parallel to this platform that you have established, the 6 countries, there is another platform, I think with Cyprus and Israel about electricity, is that correct?

- Of course. With Cyprus, I am stating the obvious, with Israel, again, we have a very close relation. We started from a very low point. Greece was the last country probably in Europe that recognized the State of Israel in 1990.

But I have to say, we have worked very hard with our Israeli friends to arrive to a common understanding on the region, and I have to say that even the Israelis share our opinion that the stability of Egypt as a country is of cardinal importance for the stability and the prosperity of the region.

And of course, we cooperate with Israel in many fields, energy being one of them.

• I was wondering why we have two platforms, one for gas, another for electricity, and why Egypt is not part of this electricity platform.

- Well, it is not in my capacity to answer this, there is another Ministry that deals with that, but if I may be allowed to say so, in energy, I think all of us will come to a common understanding, and sharing our common vision for the future. It is something that will happen, and I have to say, sooner rather than later.

• A follow-up question on the relation with Turkey. I think the Prime Minister of Greece has met the President of Turkey in June, and I keep hearing some words that the 20th of July is the time when we will see where the relation between Ankara and Athens is heading. Why?

- Okay, I will start first from the meeting of my Prime Minister, Prime Minister (Kyriakos) Mitsotakis with President (Recep Tayyip) Erdogan. The meeting went quite well. In the sense that on a personal level, it was a good meeting, the ice has melted, but yet again, we have to see if Turkey has really changed its ways.

And on the 20th of July, President Erdogan will visit the occupied part of Cyprus and for us, it is very important to hear what he is going to say and see what he is going to do.

Because, if the rhetoric in the occupied part of Cyprus is contrary to international law, is contrary to United Nations Security Council Resolutions, then the behavior of President Erdogan makes no sense at all.

• Which means you are against a two-state solution?

- It is not me or Greece or Cyprus, it is the International Law and the United Nations Security Council that are against any idea of a "two-state solution".

And allow me to say, there is no "two-state solution". There is a two-state proposal by the Turks which does not constitute the solution to the Cyprus problem.

The solution to the Cyprus problem is to unify the island. Everything else is not a solution; it is something contrary to international law.

• Greece, and you personally, are very interested in keeping ties with the whole region, I mean part of it. I think in April you have visited Saudi Arabia, and you have signed an agreement with your Saudi counterpart.

So, what is your vision of relations between Greece and Saudi Arabia?

- First of all, Saudi Arabia is a very important country. It is of huge importance for the Muslim world, and they are the custodians of the two most sacred places of the Muslim religion. They are one of the biggest energy producers in the world.

Having said that, the fact that they are one of the biggest energy producers makes them very important for the world economy, and if I may say so, even for the European economy, and for the Greek economy.

So, safety of the Saudi Kingdom is of the essence for us. That is why we have signed an agreement with them, which is why we have dispatched a Patriot missile battery to Saudi Arabia, which is a defensive weapon, it is not an offensive weapon; we have given weapons to Saudi Arabia to defend itself against unnamed aggressors, not to attack anybody.

And, also, generally, with the Muslim world, we share a common past. I said to the Secretary-General of the Arab League - and I am always repeating - that ancient Greek writers would not be as known to us today if not for the Arab world, who copied their books and gave them back to the Christian world.

So, we owe the Arab world a lot. And on a person to person, level, we are getting along very well, and that you know it already. And it is not only Saudi Arabia.

We have an excellent strategic relation with the UAE, we have a great relation with Kuwait, we have a great relation with Bahrain, and we have a very good relation with Jordan. We are establishing a very cordial relation with Iraq.

And with all these countries I am mentioning, I cannot name even one difference between us. So, based on the fact that we don’t have any differences, based on our common interests and our common vision of prosperity and stability in the region, we try to build a common future.

We are looking to India, we would like to bring India, the biggest democracy in the world, a growing economic power, into this context.

The Indian Foreign Minister, Dr. (Subrahmanyam) Jaishankar was in Athens just two weeks ago.

We are trying to build a bridge between India, the Arab world, and the European Union with Greece as the entry point.

• And, your Excellency, as you may know, the Saudis are very interested in the Yemen crisis. What is your vision regarding the best solution for the Yemen crisis?

- One thing is clear: unless there is a ceasefire there and as long as the Houthis continue trying to take over Maarib, the situation cannot continue like that.

First of all, we need to have a ceasefire, and having a ceasefire we will try to find a way out of this situation.

And if Greece can help in any way, we are there to help our friends. But that is as far as I can go. I cannot pretend that Greece has a very big institutional knowledge of Yemen as a country.

• Speaking about countries in crisis, one of them is Syria, and I am from Syria. In the last few weeks and months, as you may have heard, some Syrian officials, or some officials in Damascus, were saying that Greece has decided to reopen its embassy in Damascus.
What is your comment on that?

- First of all, Syria is our close neighbor. And a failed state in the Mediterranean is not in our interest.
Already there are huge migratory flows from Syria towards Europe and we are very sorry because, again with Syria we have historic relations, one of the Orthodox Patriarchates is in Syria, we are sorry to see Syria in such a state.

Having said that, it is not us who can forget and forgive the Assad regime. What we are doing is we recognize that there is a situation on the ground and the Greek Chargé d'affaires should be there to help normalize the situation on the ground, help the Greek citizens, and help the European citizens. But we are not accrediting our Chargé d'affaires to the Assad regime. On that, we have to consult with our European friends and partners, and the Council of the European Union will take a decision on how we will deal with the Assad regime. It is not us to decide alone.

• So, you have not already decided to reopen the Embassy and send an Ambassador to Damascus?

- No. We are having a Chargé d’Affaires in Damascus, not an Ambassador. It is a high-ranking and experienced personality because the situation on the ground needs experience, but he is not the Ambassador to the Assad regime.

• And how would the Embassy function?

- He is in Beirut now, trying to see how the Embassy could function.

• The EU Council on Foreign Relations decided, almost two to three years ago, the conditional re-engagement to the region. They said there is no contribution to the reconstruction unless there is “genuine” progress in the political process.

- You are right. We tried to combine these things. I am talking again to the UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen very often, I see him in Geneva very often, and we have a good relation. I have offered him our good services in any way for the situation, but the decision in the European Union is just as you said.

We have to see steps from the Assad regime in order to provide funds for the reconstruction scheme. And I am very sorry that these steps are not there because, for example, we don’t accept the result of the elections, we don’t take them seriously; because the Syrian people really need our help and they need it urgently.

You know much better than I, 1/3 of the Syrian population is out of Syria. This is unacceptable. We live in the 21st century.

• What are the steps you are expecting from the regime in Damascus to engage or to normalize?

- Well, again, I am not bringing news to you saying that democratization, the full respect of human rights, and accountability for crimes of war is what the European Union would expect. These are the terms and the conditionality under which the European Union operates. The EU is a set of nations and it is also a set of values.

• Because it is a major story, that is very important for many Syrians. Allow me to understand. As of now, are you committed to EU conditions regarding normalization, and reconstruction?

- Let me again be frank. As things are in Syria right now, the obvious thing we would like for example is opening corridors in which we could provide humanitarian help.

As you know, there is only one open corridor from Turkey to Syria now, from which humanitarian help could be provided. We need more. If that happens, which is what we are waiting to see, then we are interested to see how the Assad regime sees the future. How it can present to the European Union with a sort of proof that it is willing to create a democratic future for the Syrian people, the ability of the Syrian people to express their opinions.

The Constitutional Committee is a great forum in which, if the Assad regime wishes, it could present some sort of steps. But I am not sure that we will see that happening.

• As you mentioned, the Russians and the Americans have reached an agreement at the UN Security Council to renew cross-border assistance.
What is your comment on this? Also, do you think that could be a start for the Americans and the Russians to work together, to reach a settlement?

- Well, it would be great if they could reach an understanding. An understanding between the Americans and the Russians would be a first step towards a better future for Syria. But let us see if that happens.

• I have a few more questions. One is about NATO. Greece and Turkey are NATO members. How do you describe the relations with NATO in terms of the complicated ties between the two countries?

-Well, both us and Turkey are among the oldest members of NATO. And I have to say we are proud of this membership. Yet, having said that, NATO sometimes keeps equal distances between the member states.

I would like NATO to remember more, that apart from an Alliance, it is not only an Alliance of countries, it is an Alliance based on certain values. And that would have made it necessary for NATO when one of its members is at fault, to say so clearly. It has not done that up to now.

It is understandable, again I am saying, because we are speaking about a member state. But yet again, NATO is an Alliance of values. And I have to say that we are doing a full revision on NATO’s future: the 2030 policy for NATO. It would be interesting to see how this element of NATO values is being described in that policy paper.

• In that regard, the Americans have decided already, I think, some time ago, to expand their naval military base in Alexandroupolis. So what is the meaning of this move, Mr. Dendias?

- The Greek-American relations, I have to say, are at an all times high, and the Americans in the last years have always said the right things when there is a Greek-Turkish crisis.

And I have to say, for example, I was extremely happy because 3 or 4 weeks ago, Secretary (Antony) Blinken openly came out and advised all the countries of the world to subscribe to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, the UNCLOS, taking into account that even the United States has not subscribed to UNCLOS up to now. So, for us, this is music to our ears, because that is what we believe.

So, I have to say the United States is a very positive force in our region, and especially in the Aegean and in the context of the Greek-Turkish relations. And I would be happy if there is more American presence in Greece, more American presence in the region. I consider that as absolutely positive.

We are negotiating a new defense agreement with the United States. I hope we will be able to conclude these negotiations by the autumn of 2021 and sign this new agreement before the end of this year, but that remains to be seen. All negotiations are rather complex, but that is our aspiration.

And I have to say, I am quite positive about the role the United States has played in our region.

• This is the last one. Is this related to the Incirlik military base, in south of Turkey? Does that mean for Turkey, the US is trying to expand its relationship with Greece at the expense of…?

- I do not see our relationship with the United States as something that is opposing Turkey in any way. Again, as I told you, I would wish Turkey to normalize its behavior, to aspire to become a modern, western-values country, a democratic country, a partner of the community of democratic, law-abiding states.

So, our liaison with the United States has a value per se for us. Having said that, what the Americans do with their Turkish friends is none of our business.

• Great, I know, I took much of your time.

- Not at all, it was a great pleasure. I hope to see you in person sometime. Thank you so much.

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Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.