Alexander Zorin, Putin’s Man for Difficult Missions, in Syria

Alexander Zorin hands out pizza to journalists in Geneva in 2016. (AFP)
Alexander Zorin hands out pizza to journalists in Geneva in 2016. (AFP)
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Alexander Zorin, Putin’s Man for Difficult Missions, in Syria

Alexander Zorin hands out pizza to journalists in Geneva in 2016. (AFP)
Alexander Zorin hands out pizza to journalists in Geneva in 2016. (AFP)

Alexander Zorin is a Russian officer known as the man to turn to for difficult tasks. He is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s envoy to Syria. While deployed at the Hmeimim air base in recent years, he managed to forge relations with various warring parties. The Russian and Syrian air forces may have used their air power to impose settlements in various parts of Syria, but Zorin also presented a “humanitarian” façade, taking part in funerals and offering assistance and reconciliation.

When dealing with the opposition, he often adopts their rhetoric, surprising politicians and civil society figures. This approach even led him to approve the suggestions over the formation of a joint council between the Syrian army, factions, Kurds and defectors. Politically, he was among the “architects” of the national dialogue conference in 2018 and arranged the travel of opposition figures onboard a military jet from Geneva to Sochi.

Behind closed doors, Zorin often complains of the regime’s stances and stubbornness. Openly, he animatedly explains the Russian position, while also presenting a more congenial image of Moscow. In 2016, he famously offered journalists in Geneva pizza as they awaited the announcement of a ceasefire agreement.

Years ago, Damascus informed Moscow that it was no longer capable of “protecting” Zorin as he moves about in Syria, warning that his “life was in danger” from terrorists and gunmen. The Russian Defense Ministry consequently returned Zorin back to the command center in Moscow where he was promoted to oversee the Syrian file on behalf of Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu.

Just days ago, Zorin landed in Damascus with a new mission. He arranged a brief visit to the headquarters of the Eighth Brigade of the Fifth Corps, commanded by Ahmed al-Audeh, in Busra al-Sham in the Daraa countryside. Audeh is credited with facilitating the implementation of the 2018 agreement on southern Syria. The agreement, between the United States, Russia, Jordan and Israel, called for the return of government forces to the South, deployment of Russian patrols and Washington’s abandoning of factions that were demanded to lay down their heavy weapons. In return, Iranian militias would be withdrawn from the border with Jordan and the Golan Heights.

Audeh had dispatched a military convoy to Damascus to transport his “friend” to Busra al-Sham. Zorin informed his host that Damascus was not listening to Russia’s advice over the need to reach a settlement and abandon the military solution in order to enter Daraa al-Balad, the main opposition stronghold in the city. He informed Audeh that Russia will not dispatch its jets to support any army operation in the area that also includes 50,000 civilians.

Zorin’s position is in line with his superior, Shoigu, who believes that the solution to the conflict in Syria lies in consolidating the zones of influence with military arrangements. This view is in contrast to that of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who still believes in the possibility that the country can be united through the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2254, according to Russia’s interpretation.

The Russian military view currently believes that Syrian forces are unable to control all parts of the country, citing a lack of human resources, the economic crises and intervention of foreign armies. Therefore, the “temporary solution” lies in the zones of influence: Reaching an agreement with Turkey over the northwest, an agreement with the US over the northeast, one with former fighters in the Free Syrian Army over the southwest and one with the government forces, Russia and Iran over the central-western regions.

The talk here is over four zones of influence, not three as had been the case. Damascus, however, has different calculations. The Syrian leadership is content with the turnout in the recent presidential elections that were held in regions it controls. It has taken in the statements of Jordanian officials and their decision to open the border with Syria soon after the return of King Abdullah II from a visit to Washington. It has also perceived signs of Arab openness to normalize relations with Damascus. The leadership is now, therefore, seeking victory after the elections. This is unlikely to happen as the situation in the northwest remains thorny due to the understanding between Ankara and Moscow.

So, the leadership set its sights on the “cradle of the revolution” – Daraa. It is seeking to persuade Moscow to support its position. Indeed, on Thursday the Fourth Division, headed by Maher Assad, President Bashar Assad’s brother, began striking Daraa al-Balad ahead of storming it.

Iran, which has been accused of recruiting local fighters to compensate for its withdrawal in 2018 and of flying drones over neighboring Jordan, was not openly fighting in the attack. It is believed, however, that it is present on the ground given the lack of Russian air cover.

The surprise came from the residents of Daraa and its factions. The Fifth Corps expanded its deployment in the eastern Daraa countryside after Zorin’s visit. In the western countryside, opposition fighters captured regime security checkpoints and detained some 500 Damascus loyalists. “New defections” were reported among individuals who had joined the army and security forces in wake of the 2018 agreement.

After a bloody day, the Russians intervened and arranged meetings between Daraa representatives and the army in search of a new settlement. The new agreement would call for keeping some fighters away from the area, resolving the issue of light weapons, setting up checkpoints and opening the Amman-Damascus highway. The Fifth Corps would play a role in the agreement as all sides await a new round of fighting between opposition factions that want to preserve Daraa’s liberties and the regime that wants military victory.



On Lebanon Border, Israel and Hezbollah’s Deadly Game of Patience

Smoke is seen as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is intercepted following its launch from Lebanon, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, at Kibbutz Eilon in northern Israel, July 23, 2024. (Reuters)
Smoke is seen as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is intercepted following its launch from Lebanon, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, at Kibbutz Eilon in northern Israel, July 23, 2024. (Reuters)
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On Lebanon Border, Israel and Hezbollah’s Deadly Game of Patience

Smoke is seen as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is intercepted following its launch from Lebanon, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, at Kibbutz Eilon in northern Israel, July 23, 2024. (Reuters)
Smoke is seen as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is intercepted following its launch from Lebanon, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, at Kibbutz Eilon in northern Israel, July 23, 2024. (Reuters)

In deserted villages and communities near the southern Lebanon border, Israeli troops and Hezbollah fighters have watched each other for months, shifting and adapting in a battle for the upper hand while they wait to see if a full scale war will come.

Ever since the start of the Gaza war last October, the two sides have exchanged daily barrages of rockets, artillery, missile fire and air strikes in a standoff that has just stopped short of full-scale war.

Tens of thousands have been evacuated from both sides of the border, and hopes that children may be able to return for the start of the new school year in September appear to have been dashed following an announcement by Israeli Education Minister Yoav Kisch on Tuesday that conditions would not allow it.

"The war is almost the same for the past nine months," Lieutenant Colonel Dotan, an Israeli officer, who could only be identified by his first name. "We have good days of hitting Hezbollah and bad days where they hit us. It's almost the same, all year, all the nine months."

As the summer approaches its peak, the smoke trails of drones and rockets in the sky have become a daily sight, with missiles regularly setting off brush fires in the thickly wooded hills along the border.

Israeli strikes have killed nearly 350 Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon and more than 100 civilians, including medics, children and journalists, while 10 Israeli civilians, a foreign agricultural worker and 20 Israeli soldiers have been killed.

Even so, as the cross border firing has continued, Israeli forces have been training for a possible offensive in Lebanon which would dramatically increase the risk of a wider regional war, potentially involving Iran and the United States.

That risk was underlined at the weekend when the Yemen-based Houthis, a militia which like Hezbollah is backed by Iran, sent a drone to Tel Aviv where it caused a blast that killed a man and prompted Israel to launch a retaliatory raid the next day.

Standing in his home kibbutz of Eilon, where only about 150 farmers and security guards remain from a normal population of 1,100, Lt. Colonet Dotan said the two sides have been testing each other for months, in a constantly evolving tactical battle.

"This war taught us patience," said Dotan. "In the Middle East, you need patience."

He said Israeli troops had seen an increasing use of Iranian drones, of a type frequently seen in Ukraine, as well as Russian-made Kornet anti tank missiles which were increasingly targeting houses as Israeli tank forces adapted their own tactics in response.

"Hezbollah is a fast-learning organization and they understood that UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) are the next big thing and so they went and bought and got trained in UAVs," he said.

Israel had responded by adapting its Iron Dome air defense system and focusing its own operations on weakening Hezbollah's organizational structure by attacking its experienced commanders, such as Ali Jaafar Maatuk, a field commander in the elite Radwan forces unit who was killed last week.

"So that's another weak point we found. We target them and we look for them on a daily basis," he said.

Even so, as the months have passed, the wait has not been easy for Israeli troops brought up in a doctrine of maneuver and rapid offensive operations.

"When you're on defense, you can't defeat the enemy. We understand that, we have no expectations," he said, "So we have to wait. It's a patience game."