عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Features

Damascus ‘Thwarts’ Settlement as it Eyes Reconstruction

UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen holds a press conference at the United Nations Offices in Geneva. (AFP)
UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen holds a press conference at the United Nations Offices in Geneva. (AFP)
TT
TT

Damascus ‘Thwarts’ Settlement as it Eyes Reconstruction

UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen holds a press conference at the United Nations Offices in Geneva. (AFP)
UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen holds a press conference at the United Nations Offices in Geneva. (AFP)

Damascus is set to host in the coming hours United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Martin Griffiths.

UN special envoy, Geir Pedersen, meanwhile, is being made to wait for an invitation to visit the Syrian capital as it mulls its priorities for the coming phase. Damascus will welcome international aid and push forward the implementation of the UN resolution on cross-border aid with its new phrasing. The resolution was extended in early July.

Damascus is setting its sights on the reconstruction and relief funds, while delaying negotiations over a political settlement and the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva related to the constitutional committee.

In July, the United States and Russia reached a “historic settlement” that was extension of the cross-border aid resolution. Washington was forced to make concessions over the duration of the resolution and the finer details an accept Moscow’s introduction of new phrasing to the resolution.

The resolution now speaks of “early recovery”. The resolution reads: “The Security Council welcomes all efforts and initiatives to broaden the humanitarian activities in Syria, including water, sanitation, health, education, and shelter early recovery projects, undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organizations, and calls upon other international humanitarian agencies and relevant parties to support them.”

“The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to brief the Council monthly and (…) to include in his reports overall trends in United Nations cross-line operations, in particular on the implementation of the above mentioned activities on improving all modalities of humanitarian deliveries inside Syria and early recovery projects, and detailed information on the humanitarian assistance delivered through United Nations humanitarian cross-border operations, including the distribution mechanism, the number of beneficiaries, operating partners, locations of aid deliveries at district-level and the volume and nature of items delivered.”

Griffiths’ meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad in the coming hours will be an opportunity for Damascus to offer its interpretation of the resolution and its priorities in regards to “cross-line” operations between the three zones of influence inside Syria and the contributions to the “early recovery projects” that take the country closer to reconstructions.

Damascus will likely also pressure Griffiths to take a clearer position on the “unilateral” western sanctions and Ankara’s closure of a water pumping station east of the Euphrates River.

Damascus’ stances are pushing it closer from those of Moscow and Tehran that stand in contrast to Washington and the West that are prioritizing cross-border aid. The US and western countries view the aid as a matter of life or death and have accused Damascus of obstructing deliveries of aid to northeastern regions that are held by Washington’s allies.

Furthermore, western countries refuse to take part in any reconstruction project in Syria before making sure that irreversible progress is achieved in the political process. This position implicitly agrees that sanctions, isolation and pledges to contribute in reconstruction are “means to pressure” Damascus to make internal and geopolitical concessions.

The clash in positions between Damascus and the West over aid will not extend to the political arena as the government continues to refuse to welcome Pedersen despite Russia’s intervention to facilitate such a visit.

Damascus is “angry” with the envoy for helping mediate a meeting between Daraa representatives and his issuing of a statement expressing his concern over the deteriorating situation there. It is also upset with the way negotiations have been held with the head of the government delegation to the constitutional committee talks in Geneva. The negotiations have focused on the agreement on the working mechanism of the committee and working paper that the envoy had presented at the beginning of the year.

Pedersen, meanwhile, wants to head to Damascus to “negotiate” over the UN constitutional mechanism. In April, he had sent a document to government delegation head, Ahmed al-Kuzbari, and opposition “negotiations committee” delegation head, Hadi al-Bahra, tackling the steps to kick off the committee’s work in drafting the constitution. Bahra agreed to the document despite his reservations, while Kuzbari had instead proposed discussing the constitution rather than draft it.

President Bashar Assad had made his position clear over the drafting of the constitution during his swearing in ceremony in July. He said: “You have proven once again the unity of the battle of the constitution and nation. You have proven that the constitution is a priority that is not open to debate or compromise.”

He said that efforts to draft the new constitution aim to put the country “at the mercy of foreign forces”, citing “Turkish agents” at the committee talks – a reference to the opposition negotiations committee delegation.

Moscow will be pleased with Damascus’ presentation to Griffiths of its interpretation of the aid resolution extension.

Sights are now set on Moscow to act to persuade Damascus to welcome Pedersen, who had recently met with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Russia. Perhaps he would meet with Miqdad on the sidelines on the UN General Assembly in New York in September.

Most Viewed

 
 
Features

Iran Faces Tough Choices in Deciding How to Respond to Israeli Strikes

This satellite photo from Planet Labs PBC shows damaged buildings at Iran's Khojir military base outside of Tehran, Iran, Oct. 8, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
This satellite photo from Planet Labs PBC shows damaged buildings at Iran's Khojir military base outside of Tehran, Iran, Oct. 8, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
TT
TT

Iran Faces Tough Choices in Deciding How to Respond to Israeli Strikes

This satellite photo from Planet Labs PBC shows damaged buildings at Iran's Khojir military base outside of Tehran, Iran, Oct. 8, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)
This satellite photo from Planet Labs PBC shows damaged buildings at Iran's Khojir military base outside of Tehran, Iran, Oct. 8, 2024. (Planet Labs PBC via AP)

It's Iran's move now.
How Iran chooses to respond to the unusually public Israeli aerial assault on its homeland could determine whether the region spirals further toward all-out war or holds steady at an already devastating and destabilizing level of violence.
In the coldly calculating realm of Middle East geopolitics, a strike of the magnitude that Israel delivered Saturday would typically be met with a forceful response. A likely option would be another round of the ballistic missile barrages that Iran has already launched twice this year, The Associated Press said.
Retaliating militarily would allow Iran's clerical leadership to show strength not only to its own citizens but also to Hamas in Gaza and Lebanon's Hezbollah, the militant groups battling Israel that are the vanguard of Tehran's so-called Axis of Resistance.
It is too soon to say whether Iran's leadership will follow that path.
Tehran may decide against forcefully retaliating directly for now, not least because doing so might reveal its weaknesses and invite a more potent Israeli response, analysts say.
“Iran will play down the impact of the strikes, which are in fact quite serious,” said Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the London-based think tank Chatham House.
She said Iran is “boxed in" by military and economic constraints, and the uncertainty caused by the US election and its impact on American policy in the region.
Even while the Mideast wars rage, Iran's reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian has been signaling his nation wants a new nuclear deal with the US to ease crushing international sanctions.
A carefully worded statement from Iran’s military Saturday night appeared to offer some wiggle room for Iran to back away from further escalation. It suggested that a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon was more important than any retaliation against Israel.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran's ultimate decision-maker, was also measured in his first comments on the strike Sunday. He said the attack “should not be exaggerated nor downplayed,” and he stopped short of calling for an immediate military response.
Saturday's strikes targeted Iranian air defense missile batteries and missile production facilities, according to the Israeli military.
With that, Israel has exposed vulnerabilities in Iran’s air defenses and can now more easily step up its attacks, analysts say.
Satellite photos analyzed by The Associated Press indicate Israel's raid damaged facilities at the Parchin military base southeast of Tehran that experts previously linked to Iran's onetime nuclear weapons program and another base tied to its ballistic missile program.
Current nuclear sites were not struck, however. Rafael Mariano Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirmed that on X, saying “Iran’s nuclear facilities have not been impacted.”
Israel has been aggressively bringing the fight to the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah, killing its leader and targeting operatives in an audacious exploding pager attack.
“Any Iranian attempt to retaliate will have to contend with the fact that Hezbollah, its most important ally against Israel, has been significantly degraded and its conventional weapons systems have twice been largely repelled,” said Ali Vaez, the Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, who expects Iran to hold its fire for now.
That's true even if Israel held back, as appears to be the case. Some prominent figures in Israel, such as opposition leader Yair Lapid, are already saying the attacks didn't go far enough.
Regional experts suggested that Israel's relatively limited target list was intentionally calibrated to make it easier for Iran to back away from escalation.
As Yoel Guzansky, who formerly worked for Israel’s National Security Council and is now a researcher at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies, put it: Israel's decision to focus on purely military targets allows Iran "to save face.”
Israel's target choices may also be a reflection at least in part of its capabilities. It is unlikely to be able to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities on its own and would require help from the United States, Guzansky said.
Besides, Israel still has leverage to go after higher-value targets should Iran retaliate — particularly now that nodes in its air defenses have been destroyed.
“You preserve for yourself all kinds of contingency plans,” Guzansky said.
Thomas Juneau, a University of Ottawa professor focused on Iran and the wider Middle East, wrote on X that the fact Iranian media initially downplayed the strikes suggests Tehran may want to avoid further escalation. Yet it's caught in a tough spot.
“If it retaliates, it risks an escalation in which its weakness means it loses more,” he wrote. “If it does not retaliate, it projects a signal of weakness.”
Vakil agreed that Iran's response was likely to be muted and that the strikes were designed to minimize the potential for escalation.
“Israel has yet again shown its military precision and capabilities are far superior to that of Iran,” she said.
One thing is certain: The Mideast is in uncharted territory.
For decades, leaders and strategists in the region have speculated about whether and how Israel might one day openly strike Iran, just as they wondered what direct attacks by Iran, rather than by its proxy militant groups, would look like.
Today, it's a reality. Yet the playbook on either side isn't clear, and may still be being written.
“There appears to be a major mismatch both in terms of the sword each side wields and the shield it can deploy,” Vaez said.
“While both sides have calibrated and calculated how quickly they climb the escalation ladder, they are in an entirely new territory now, where the new red lines are nebulous and the old ones have turned pink,” he said.