Drying Euphrates Threatens Disaster in Syria

Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war. AFP
Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war. AFP
TT

Drying Euphrates Threatens Disaster in Syria

Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war. AFP
Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war. AFP

Syria's longest river used to flow by his olive grove, but today Khaled al-Khamees says it has receded into the distance, parching his trees and leaving his family with hardly a drop to drink.

"It's as if we were in the desert," said the 50-year-old farmer, standing on what last year was the Euphrates riverbed.

"We're thinking of leaving because there's no water left to drink or irrigate the trees."

Aid groups and engineers are warning of a looming humanitarian disaster in northeast Syria, where waning river flow is compounding woes after a decade of war.

They say plummeting water levels at hydroelectric dams since January are threatening water and power cutoffs for up to five million Syrians, in the middle of a coronavirus pandemic and economic crisis.

As drought grips the Mediterranean region, many in the Kurdish-held area are accusing neighbor and archfoe Turkey of weaponizing water by tightening the tap upstream, though a Turkish source denied this.

Outside the village of Rumayleh where Khamees lives, black irrigation hoses lay in dusty coils after the river receded so far it became too expensive to operate the water pumps.

Instead, much closer to the water's edge, Khamees and neighbors were busy planting corn and beans in soil just last year submerged under the current.

The father of 12 said he had not seen the river so far away from the village in decades.

"The women have to walk seven kilometers just to get a bucket of water for their children to drink," he said.

Reputed to have once flown through the biblical Garden of Eden, the Euphrates runs for almost 2,800 kilometers across Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

In times of rain, it gushes into northern Syria through the Turkish border, and flows diagonally across the war-torn country towards Iraq.

Along its way, it irrigates swathes of land in Syria's breadbasket, and runs through three hydroelectric dams that provide power and drinking water to millions.

But over the past eight months the river has contracted to a sliver, sucking precious water out of reservoirs and increasing the risk of dam turbines grinding to a halt.

At the Tishrin Dam, the first into which the river falls inside Syria, director Hammoud al-Hadiyyeen described an "alarming" drop in water levels not seen since the dam's completion in 1999.
"It's a humanitarian catastrophe," he said.

Since January, the water level has plummeted by five meters, and now hovers just dozens of centimeters above "dead level" when turbines are supposed to completely stop producing electricity.

Across northeast Syria, already power generation has fallen by 70 percent since last year, the head of the energy authority Welat Darwish says.

Two out of three of all potable water stations along the river are pumping less water or have stopped working, humanitarian groups say.

Almost 90 percent of the Euphrates flow comes from Turkey, the United Nations says.

To ensure Syria's fair share, Turkey in 1987 agreed to allow an annual average of 500 cubic meters per second of water across its border.

But that has dropped to as low as 200 in recent months, engineers claim.

Inside Syria, the Euphrates flows mostly along territory controlled by semi-autonomous Kurdish authorities, whose US-backed fighters have over the years wrested its dams and towns from ISIS.

Turkey however regards those Kurdish fighters as linked to its outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and has grabbed land from them during Syria's war.

Syria's Kurds have accused Ankara of holding back more water than necessary in its dams, and Damascus in June urged Turkey to increase the flow immediately.

But a Turkish diplomatic source told AFP Turkey had "never reduced the amount of water it releases from its trans-boundary rivers for political or other purposes".

"Our region is facing one of the worst drought periods due to climate change," and rainfall in southern Turkey was "the lowest in the last 30 years", this source said.

Analyst Nicholas Heras said Turkey did hold leverage over Syria and Iraq with the huge Ataturk Dam just 80 kilometers from the Syrian border, but it was debatable whether Ankara wanted to use it.

That would mean "international complications for Ankara, both with the United States and Russia", a key Damascus ally across the table in Syria peace talks.

"The easier, and more frequently utilized, water weapon that Ankara uses is the Alouk plant" that it seized from the Kurds in 2019, Heras said.

Fresh water supply from the station on another river has been disrupted at least 24 times since 2019, affecting 460,000 people, the United Nations says.

But Syria analyst Fabrice Balanche said the drought did serve Ankara's long-term goal of "asphyxiating northeast Syria economically".

"In periods of drought, Turkey helps itself and leaves the rest for the Kurds, in defiance and in full knowledge of the consequences," he said.

Wim Zwijnenburg, of the PAX peace organization, said Turkey was struggling to provide enough water for "megalomanic" agricultural projects set up in the 1990s, a challenge now complicated by climate change.

"The big picture is drought is coming," he said.

"We already see a rapid decline in healthy vegetation growth on satellite analysis" in both Syria and Turkey.

A UN climate change report this month found human influence had almost definitely increased the frequency of simultaneous heatwaves and droughts worldwide.

These dry spells are to become longer and more severe around the Mediterranean, the United Nations has warned, with Syria most at risk, according to the 2019 Global Crisis Risk Index.
Downstream from the Tishrin Dam, the Euphrates pools in the depths of Lake Assad.

But today Syria's largest fresh water reservoir too has withdrawn inwards.

On its banks, men with tar-stained hands worked to repair generators exhausted from pumping water across much further distances than in previous years.

Agricultural worker Hussein Saleh, 56, was desperate.

"We can no longer afford the hoses or the generators," said the father of 12.

"The olive trees are thirsty and the animals are hungry."

At home, in the village of Twihiniyyeh, power cuts had increased from nine to 19 hours a day, he said.

At the country's largest dam of Tabqa to the south, veteran engineer Khaled Shaheen was worried.

"We're trying to diminish how much water we send through," he said.

But "if it continues like this, we could stop electricity production for all except... bakeries, flour mills and hospitals."

Meanwhile, among five million people depending on the Euphrates for drinking water, more and more families are ingesting liquid that is unsafe.

Those cut off from the network instead pay for deliveries from private water trucks.

But these tankers most often draw water directly from the river -- where wastewater concentration is high due to low flow -- and these supplies are not filtered.

Waterborne disease outbreaks are on the rise, and contaminated ice has caused diarrhea in displacement camps, according to the NES Forum, an NGO coordination body for the region.

Marwa Daoudy, a Syrian scholar of environmental security, said the decreasing flow of the Euphrates was "very alarming".

"These levels threaten whole rural communities in the Euphrates Basin whose livelihood depends on agriculture and irrigation," she said.

Aid groups say drought conditions have already destroyed large swathes of rain-fed crops in Syria, a country where 60 percent of people already struggle to put food on the table.

In some communities, animals have started to die, the NES Forum has said.

The United Nations says barley production could drop by 1.2 million tons this year, making animal feed more scarce.

Balanche said Syria was likely facing a years-long drought not seen since one from 2005 to 2010, before the civil war.

"The northeast, but also all of Syria, will be short on food, and will need to import massive quantities of cereals."

Downstream in Iraq, seven million more people risked losing access to water from the river, the Norwegian Refugee Council's Karl Schembri said.

"Climate doesn't look at borders," he said.



Majid Khademi: Brief Tenure at Helm of Embattled IRGC Intelligence Ends in Assassination

A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 
A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 
TT

Majid Khademi: Brief Tenure at Helm of Embattled IRGC Intelligence Ends in Assassination

A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 
A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 

Majid Khademi’s rise to the top of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence apparatus was as abrupt as his fall.

During the 12-day war in June 2025, Khademi was appointed head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization following the killing of his predecessor, Mohammad Kazemi, at a time when Iran’s security establishment was under intense pressure from external strikes, internal unrest and mounting concerns over infiltration.

Less than a year later, on April 6, 2026, Israel announced it had assassinated Khademi in an air strike. The IRGC later confirmed his death.

His killing marked the second time in under a year that the head of one of Iran’s most sensitive intelligence bodies had been eliminated in a targeted strike, underscoring both the exposure of the apparatus and the strain on its ranks.

Khademi, a career security officer, was not among the IRGC’s publicly prominent figures. Unlike commanders known for battlefield roles or political visibility, he emerged from the opaque world of internal protection and counterintelligence, a domain focused on safeguarding the system from within.

His appointment reflected that background and came at a moment when the IRGC was grappling with assassinations, intelligence breaches, and operational setbacks that raised questions about its internal cohesion.

A parallel apparatus

To understand Khademi’s role, it is necessary to situate the body he led within Iran’s broader intelligence architecture. Iran operates two major intelligence services with overlapping mandates.

The Ministry of Intelligence is the state’s official civilian agency, while the IRGC Intelligence Organization has evolved into a powerful parallel structure, particularly since 2009. More closely aligned with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the ideological core of the system, the IRGC’s intelligence arm operates with a mandate that blends security, political oversight and military intelligence.

Within this ecosystem, the IRGC’s Intelligence Protection Organization, where Khademi spent much of his career, plays a critical internal role. It is tasked with counterintelligence inside the corps, including preventing leaks, monitoring discipline and loyalty among personnel, and detecting infiltration before it develops into a broader crisis.

In recent years, the IRGC intelligence apparatus has expanded beyond its traditional military remit to include monitoring protests, cyberspace operations, influence campaigns and surveillance of political and social actors, alongside pursuing external adversaries.

This expansion has effectively transformed it into a hybrid political-security institution, requiring its leadership to possess detailed knowledge of the IRGC’s internal networks of loyalty and control. Khademi’s career trajectory, rooted in protection and internal oversight, aligned closely with these demands.

A closed biography

Information about Khademi remains limited, reflecting the nature of his roles. His name appears in various forms in Iranian sources, including Majid Khademi, Majid Khademi Hosseini and Majid Hosseini. He is reported to have been born in the village of Amir Hajilu, in Fasa county in the southern province of Fars. He belonged to an early generation of IRGC cadres who rose through internal security structures, particularly within the protection apparatus.

By at least 2014, Khademi was serving as a deputy to Hossein Taeb, then head of IRGC intelligence. He later held senior positions within the Intelligence Protection Organization. In May 2018, he was appointed head of intelligence protection at the Ministry of Defense.

He returned to the IRGC’s protection apparatus in 2022 as its chief, succeeding Mohammad Kazemi, who had been promoted to lead IRGC intelligence after Taeb’s removal. Following Kazemi’s killing in June 2025, Khademi was elevated to head the IRGC Intelligence Organization.

“Security contamination”: the post-Taeb phase

Khademi’s rise was closely tied to a broader reshuffle within Iran’s security establishment. In 2022, Hossein Taeb was removed from his post after a period marked by a string of security breaches, assassinations, and reported intelligence failures. His replacement, Kazemi, was drawn from the protection apparatus, signaling a shift toward tightening internal control. Khademi’s appointment to head intelligence protection formed part of this restructuring, which also affected other security bodies close to the core of power.

The changes took place amid growing concern among officials over what was described in Iranian discourse as “security contamination”, referring to infiltration, leaks and compromised networks within sensitive institutions. Statements by senior political and security figures indicated that these concerns had moved from theoretical risk to a central element of the security crisis.

Between 2022 and 2025, Khademi oversaw one of the most sensitive portfolios in the IRGC at a time when fears of infiltration were intensifying within the organization itself. Some Iranian analysts associated his rise with the camp of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a senior security figure later appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

While the precise alignments remain unclear, the reshuffle was widely seen as part of an internal rebalancing within the IRGC’s conservative security current. Khademi’s advancement came during a period of shifting trust and authority within the apparatus rather than institutional stability.

His career placed him at the core of the IRGC’s internal control mechanisms, overseeing secrecy, discipline, and loyalty. His tenure at the Ministry of Defense between 2018 and 2022 added another dimension. The ministry sits at the nexus of military industries, sensitive programs and technical infrastructure, as well as the complex relationship between the IRGC, the regular army and other agencies. Its intelligence protection arm is regarded as a key component of Iran’s security system, responsible not only for personnel oversight but also for safeguarding strategic projects and documentation.

During this period, the IRGC, through networks associated with Khademi, consolidated its role in protecting institutions linked to Iran’s nuclear program. This included expanded responsibilities for securing nuclear facilities and affiliated centers, as well as protecting nuclear officials and scientists, an area long targeted by foreign intelligence operations.

His security discourse

Khademi’s public statements offer insight into his approach. In an interview published on February 18, 2026, on the official website of the Supreme Leader’s office, he framed recent unrest in Iran in explicitly security terms. He argued that the disturbances in January were not simply protests driven by economic or social grievances, but rather an organized project involving foreign intelligence services, domestic networks and coordinated mobilization through digital platforms.

He described the events as closer to a “coup attempt” than a protest movement, a characterization consistent with the narrative advanced by Iran’s leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khademi spoke of infiltration at the level of individuals and factions and alleged the involvement of at least 10 foreign intelligence agencies. He outlined what he described as staged phases of unrest, including “cognitive warfare” and digital mobilization.

He cited figures to illustrate the scale of the response by his apparatus, including the summoning of 2,735 individuals, the “advising” of around 13,000 others, and the seizure of 1,173 weapons. Central to his analysis was the role of cyberspace. He linked what he termed “cognitive warfare” to weaknesses in internet governance, which he said created vulnerabilities exploited for organization, mobilization and incitement.

He also referred to a meeting with Ali Khamenei prior to the unrest, saying the leader had stressed the importance of intelligence work and vigilance against infiltration, drawing parallels with the early years following Iran’s 1979 revolution.


Report: Europe’s Options in the Strait of Hormuz Are Few and Risky

A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
TT

Report: Europe’s Options in the Strait of Hormuz Are Few and Risky

A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)

When senior officials from 40 countries met virtually this week to discuss how to bring shipping traffic back to the Strait of Hormuz, Italy’s foreign minister had a proposal. He urged them to establish a “humanitarian corridor” allowing safe passage for fertilizer and other crucial goods headed to impoverished nations.

The plan, described after the meeting by Italian officials, was one of several competing proposals from Europe and beyond that were meant to prevent the Iran war from causing widespread hunger. But it was not endorsed by the envoys on the call, and the meeting ended with no concrete plan to reopen the strait, militarily or otherwise, reported the New York Times.

European leaders are under pressure from US President Donald Trump to commit military assets, immediately, to end Iran’s blockage of the strait and tame a growing global energy and economic crisis. They have refused to meet his demands by sending warships now. Instead, they are hotly debating what to do to help unclog the vital shipping lane once the war ends.

But they are struggling to rally around a plan of action.

That partly reflects the slow gears of diplomacy in Europe and the sheer number of nations, including Gulf states, that are invested in safeguarding the strait once the war ends. Many nations involved in the talks, including Italy and Germany, have insisted that any international effort be blessed by the United Nations, which could slow action further. Military leaders will take up the issue in discussions next week.

More than anything, the struggle reflects how difficult it could be to actually secure the strait under a fragile peace — for Europe or for anyone else. None of the options available to Europe, the Gulf states and other countries look foolproof, even under the assumption that the major fighting will have stopped.

Naval escorts

French officials, including President Emmanuel Macron, have repeatedly raised the possibility that French naval vessels could help escort merchant ships through the strait after the war ends.

American officials have pushed for Europeans and other allies, like Japan, to escort ships sailing under their own countries’ flags.

Naval escorts are expensive. Also, their air defense systems alone might not be sufficient to stop some types of attacks, like drone strikes, should Iran choose to start firing again.

“What does the world expect, what does Donald Trump expect, from let’s say a handful or two handfuls of European frigates there in the Strait of Hormuz,” Defense Minister Boris Pistorius of Germany said last month, “to achieve what the powerful American Navy cannot manage there alone?”

Sweep for mines

German and Belgian officials, among others, say they are prepared to send minesweepers to clear the strait of explosives after the war.

Western military leaders aren’t convinced that Iran has actually mined the strait, in part because some Iranian ships still pass through it. So while minesweepers might be deployed as part of a naval escort, they might not have much to do.

Help from above

Another option is sending fighter jets and drones to intercept any Iranian air assaults on ships. American officials have pushed Europe to do this.

It is quite expensive and still not guaranteed to work. Iran can attack ships with a single soldier in a speedboat, and if just a few attempts succeed, that could be enough to spook insurers and shipowners out of attempting passage.

Diplomacy

Another option are negotiations and economic leverage to pressure Iran to refrain from future attacks, and deploy a variety of military means to enforce that. This effort would go beyond Europe. On Thursday, the German foreign ministry called on China to use its influence with Iran “constructively” to help end the hostilities.

This option is expensive and still not guaranteed. Negotiations seem to have done little to stop the fighting. But this may be Europe’s best bet, for lack of a better one.

What if none of that works?

Iranian officials said this week that they would continue to control traffic through the strait after the war. They have already made plans to make ships pay tolls for passing through the strait, which is supposed to be an unfettered waterway under international law.

A continued blockage risks global economic disaster. Countries around the world rely on shipments through the strait for fuel and fertilizer, among other necessities.

In some regions, shortages loom. In others, like Europe, high oil, gas and fertilizer prices have raised the specter of spiking inflation and cratering economic growth.

“The big threat right now is stagflation,” said Hanns Koenig, a managing director at Aurora Energy Research, a Berlin consultancy. “You’ve got higher prices, and they strangle the tiny growth we would have seen this year.”

*Jim Tankersley for the New York Times


US Military Jets Hit in Iran War Are the First Shot Down by Enemy Fire in Over 20 Years

An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)
An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)
TT

US Military Jets Hit in Iran War Are the First Shot Down by Enemy Fire in Over 20 Years

An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)
An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)

Iran shooting down two American military jets marks an exceedingly rare assault for the US that has not happened in more than 20 years and shows Iran’s continued ability to hit back despite President Donald Trump asserting it has been “completely decimated.”

The attacks came five weeks after US and Israeli strikes first pounded Iran, with Trump saying earlier this week that Tehran's “ability to launch missiles and drones is dramatically curtailed."

Iran shot down a US F15-E Strike Eagle fighter jet Friday, with one service member getting rescued and the search still underway for a second, US officials say. Iranian state media also said a US A-10 attack aircraft crashed after being hit by Iranian defense forces.

The last time a US warplane was shot down by enemy fire in combat was an A-10 Thunderbolt II during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, said retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Houston Cantwell, a former F-16 fighter pilot.

But, he said, that’s because the US had largely been fighting insurgents who didn’t have the same anti-aircraft capabilities. The fact that there have not been more fighter jets lost in Iran, Cantwell said, is a testament to the capabilities of US forces.

"The fact that this hasn’t happened until now is an absolute miracle,” said Cantwell, who served four combat tours and is now a senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “We’re flying combat missions here, they are being shot at every day.”

Shoulder-fired missile likely used, experts say

US Central Command said in a statement Wednesday that American forces have flown more than 13,000 missions in the Iran war while striking more than 12,300 targets.

After more than a month of punishing US-Israeli airstrikes, a degraded Iranian military nonetheless remains a stubborn foe. Its steady stream of strikes against Israel and Gulf Arab neighbors have been causing regional upheaval and global economic shock.

When it comes to American dominance over Iran's airspace, there’s still a distinction between air superiority and air supremacy, said Behnam Ben Taleblu, Iran program senior director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a hawkish Washington think tank.

“A disabled air defense system is not a destroyed air defense system,” he said. “We shouldn’t be shocked that they’re still fighting.”

American planes have been flying missions at lower altitudes, which makes them more vulnerable to Iran's missiles, Taleblu said. It’s possible that Iran fired at the F-15 with a surface-to-air missile, but it's more likely that a portable, shoulder-fired missile was used, he said. Those are much harder to detect and reflect how Iran is “weak but still lethal.”

“This is a regime that is fighting for its life,” he said.

Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and a senior defense adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agreed that a shoulder-fired missile was likely used against the fighter jet.

Nonetheless, the American air war against Iran has been a “tremendous success” so far, he said.

To put things in perspective, he said the loss rate for American warplanes flying over Germany during World War II was 3% at one point, which would equal about 350 warplanes in the US war against Iran.

“But then there’s the political side — you have an American public that is accustomed to fighting bloodless wars,” Cancian said. “Then a large part of the country doesn’t support the war. So to them, any loss is unacceptable.”

Pilots are trained on what to do if their plane is hit

The last US jet shot down in combat was struck by an Iraqi surface-to-air missile over Baghdad on April 8, 2003. The pilot safely ejected and was rescued, according to the Air Force.

In high-threat environments like missions over Iran, Cantwell, the retired general, said an aviator's blood pressure goes up and they become highly alert to incoming missiles. Those are typically either infrared- or radar-guided missiles, he said, requiring different evasive tactics.

If they are hit and need to eject from their aircraft, they are trained on what to do next, he said.

Pilots learn to check for wounds after a violent ejection and the shock of a missile explosion and, most crucially, how they are going to communicate their location so rescuers can find them.

At the same time, he said, the enemy is likely working to intercept the communications or even spoof the location.

Helicopters are more at risk than other aircraft

The planes that went down Friday were not the first crewed American aircraft to be lost overall in Iran.

A military helicopter and airplane exploded in 1980 during an aborted mission to rescue several dozen American hostages at the US embassy in Tehran, according to the Air Force Historical Support Division.

After a series of setbacks, including severe dust storms and mechanical failures, the mission was called off. As the aircraft took off, the rotor blades of one of the RH-53 helicopters collided with an EC-130 aircraft full of fuel and both exploded, killing eight.

More US helicopters have been shot down in recent decades, including a MH-47 Army Chinook helicopter that was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade in Afghanistan in 2005, killing 16. Helicopters are more dangerous because “the lower and the slower, the more susceptible you are,” Cantwell said.

That’s why those who went out on this week's rescue missions, likely in helicopters, he said, did “such a brave and honorable act.”