Divided, Besieged Syria Presents ‘Conditions’ for Normalization
Soldiers near the Syrian and Russian flags in Daraa, Syria (Reuters)
Damascus wants to and is trying to impose its conditions.
Despite Syria being divided into three main spheres of influence with five different armies operating, Damascus believes it can submit normalization requests. This feeling ran even higher after the “Afghan slap.”
Problems and crises have not changed and may have even increased, exacerbated, and deepened. But Damascus believes that it is in a “stronger negotiating position,” and that time is in its favor so long that Washington has abandoned its principles of “nation-building” and “regime change.”
For Damascus, Moscow’s support makes it believe it is capable of objecting. Whenever the Syrian capital is in doubt, Russia lends a helping hand.
Examples corroborating that analogy are ample, especially when reviewing the course of developments over the last few days. Damascus had hesitated in receiving UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen ever since the start of 2021. But what started with strong rejection was mellowed out by a Russian intervention that got Damascus to say yes to Pedersen’s visit.
Pedersen is scheduled to meet with Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mekdad on Saturday.
This visit, for Damascus, comes post regime forces entering the governorate of Daraa. Ten years ago, the southwestern governorate and its capital of the same name were the cradle for Syria’s uprising.
Keen to return to the area through peace or war, Damascus claims that “the conspiracy started in Daraa and that it is where it should be buried.” Syrian rebels, however, believe that their revolution had sprung out of Daraa and that it will not be quelled to the regime’s content.
Moscow doesn’t mind pacing its work according to Damascus’ timing and wishes. It even sent the deputy Russian defense minister to confirm that the regime and its allies would enter Daraa either under truce or by force.
Nevertheless, Damascus is oblivious to the enigmas behind why Russia is in a rush to enter Daraa. For Moscow, how fast it closes in on capturing Daraa is tied to three key dates.
The first date is marked by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s meeting with his Israeli counterpart, Yair Lapid, to prepare for Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s visit to Moscow in October.
In a foreign ministry statement that preceded Lapid’s arrival, Moscow openly expressed its desire to prevent Syria from becoming a theater for military confrontation between other states, stressing that such wars threaten to spill over across the whole region.
In other words, Moscow does not want Israeli airstrikes in Syria to evolve to a full-fledged military battle between Damascus and Tel Aviv or between Tel Aviv and Tehran.
The second date involves a meeting of the Syrian, Jordanian, Egyptian, and Lebanese oil ministers in Amman to discuss the transfer of Egyptian gas to Lebanon via Syria.
Washington had agreed to this and that the Biden administration even approved a Jordanian request to waive any penalties pertaining to the Caesar Act.
Regarding this process, Damascus put in place several conditions.
The first of these conditions was resuming political visits to Syria, and this is what happened with the arrival of a Lebanese ministerial delegation for the first time since 2011. The second was holding an Arab ministerial meeting with the participation of Syria in Amman.
The third and final condition was an implicit acknowledgment of accepting the regime’s official return to Daraa’s provincial capital, where tens of kilometers of gas pipelines need repairing and security is required to control Jordan’s borders.
As for the third key date, it anticipates the Syrian-US dialogue. It has already been agreed that the White House National Security Council's Middle East policy coordinator, Brett McGurk, will meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin and the Kremlin’s special envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev in Geneva on September 14 and 15.
So far, the Russia-West dispute in Syria remains on the premise of “whoever blinks first loses.”
A few days ago, in a closed session, Lavrov told European officials that they needed to help rebuild Syria and talk to President Bashar al-Assad there. Still, they insisted that the regime needs to change its behavior first.
The reality of the situation is that while the Syrians are waiting on the embers of ruin for foreign players to make their move, Russia continues to advance its own conditions and undermine Western references and policies.
Lebanon-Israel Deal May Entrench Stalemate Rather Than End War, Analysts Sayhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5290048-lebanon-israel-deal-may-entrench-stalemate-rather-end-war-analysts-say
An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
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Lebanon-Israel Deal May Entrench Stalemate Rather Than End War, Analysts Say
An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
A security deal between Lebanon and Israel risks entrenching a stalemate rather than resolving Israel's underlying conflict with Hezbollah by tying Israel's pullout from southern Lebanon to the Iran-aligned group's disarmament, a condition regional analysts and politicians say is unattainable.
At its core is a bargain few see as workable: Hezbollah has flatly rejected disarmament, and no Lebanese government has the power to enforce it.
With Hezbollah unlikely to disarm, analysts say Israel has political cover to keep an open-ended military presence in southern Lebanon, which it invaded after Hezbollah fired at Israel on March 2 in solidarity with Tehran over the war in Iran.
The deal leaves the Lebanese state trapped between obligations it cannot meet and sovereignty it cannot fully reclaim, the analysts say.
The framework deal also collides with Lebanon’s political realities, asking a fragile sectarian state to confront the most powerful armed faction in the country despite a post–civil war system built on power-sharing rather than coercion.
"This is not an agreement, it is an imposed settlement," said a senior Lebanese politician who declined to be named, according to Reuters.
The Lebanese army, he said, was neither structured nor equipped to disarm Hezbollah, and expecting it to do so ignored both the group’s entrenched military capacity and the fragile sectarian balance on which Lebanon's stability rests.
'BURDEN' PLACED ON LEBANON
Political analysts say the imbalance is built into the agreement’s design, with sweeping obligations placed on Lebanon but no reciprocal guarantee of Israeli withdrawal.
"This agreement has put all the burden on Lebanon," said Michael Young, a Beirut-based analyst, adding that it "creates a structure that allows the Israelis to remain (in southern Lebanon) indefinitely."
Fawaz Gerges, a Lebanese scholar at the London School of Economics and Political Science, said the deal was "born dead" and is structurally flawed, hinging on a condition that is impossible to meet in practice.
Gerges said Israel had already occupied a buffer zone in southern Lebanon about eight to 10 km (five to six miles) deep while tying any future withdrawal to Hezbollah’s disarmament.
The terms of the deal risk the buffer zone becoming long-term and giving it diplomatic legitimacy, he said, describing it as a political "gift" to Israel.
The conflict in Lebanon has been a central part of diplomacy towards ending the wider US-Iran war.
Gerges said Washington’s deliberate decoupling of the conflicts gave Israel greater freedom of action in Lebanon.
FEAR OF CIVIL CONFLICT
The framework agreement signed in Washington affirms that Israel has no claim to Lebanese territory and makes Lebanese army authority in the south contingent on the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, including Hezbollah.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu portrays the deal as a historic achievement that could lead to broader peace, while Israeli troops remain deployed in a so-called security zone which Israel says is designed to protect its north from potential attack.
"We will continue to hold it (territory in the security zone) until Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations are disarmed, and until no further threat to Israel is posed from Lebanon," Netanyahu said on Saturday.
Three senior Israeli officials said Israel has little faith in Lebanon's ability to disarm Hezbollah but sees the deal as a vital diplomatic step towards building peace with Lebanon in the long run.
About 4,000 people have been killed in Lebanon and a million displaced during Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed the agreement as a first step towards restoring Lebanon's sovereignty, saying it should allow Lebanese people to return to fully liberated land.
Parliament Speaker and key Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri said it amounted to an "agreement of dictates, not one that preserves Lebanon's rights" and said it would not be implemented.
Hezbollah chief Naim Qassem declared the deal "null and void" and a "surrender" and said his group would keep fighting until Israel is forced to leave. Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah warned of "internal conflict" in Lebanon.
Any attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah would risk deepening sectarian tensions.
Young said the deal "won't lead us anywhere except to civil conflict, and maybe an insurrection by the Shiite community."
DEAL'S IMPLEMENTATION IN QUESTION
Danny Citrinowicz, a regional analyst and former Israeli military intelligence officer, said Hezbollah's dismantlement was "something that would never happen" and the deal in effect legitimized an open-ended Israeli military presence.
"Nothing will happen. Israel won't withdraw, and Hezbollah won't dismantle," he said.
Citrinowicz said no Israeli prime minister has the domestic political space to withdraw while Hezbollah is still armed and northern Israeli communities remain displaced.
A narrower pact focused on Hezbollah's pullout from south of the Litani River, an expanded Lebanese army deployment and an extension of state authority, would have stood a better chance of success, he said.
Pro-Hezbollah analyst Mohammed Obeid also said the deal was unlikely to be implemented, adding that its provisions were "like explosives", capable of detonating Lebanon's internal stability, as they hinge on state action to disarm Hezbollah.
13 Years Since 'June 30' in Egypt... The Muslim Brotherhood Has Suffered Severe Setbackshttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5289851-13-years-june-30-egypt-muslim-brotherhood-has-suffered-severe-setbacks
13 Years Since 'June 30' in Egypt... The Muslim Brotherhood Has Suffered Severe Setbacks
The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
Thirteen years after the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood's rule in Egypt during the events of "June 30" 2013, the group has suffered major setbacks locally and internationally.
The group, whose rule lasted for one year since its member Mohamed Morsi ascended to the presidency in 2012, is now experiencing a domestic blow amidst judicial and security prosecutions.
Its international presence has also shrunk due to decisions by Western countries to pursue and label it as terrorist, with observers and analysts predicting that "the organization and its ideology will soon disappear.”
A Pivotal Day
June 30, 2013, is considered a pivotal day in modern Egyptian history. One year after Morsi assumed the presidency, massive demonstrations erupted across Egypt's governorates demanding the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power and Morsi's ouster. On July 3 of that year, his removal was announced in response to these demands.
In the same year, Egyptian authorities banned the Muslim Brotherhood and placed it on the list of "terrorist entities." Now, hundreds of its leaders and supporters are imprisoned, headed by its Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie.
Some have received sentences of execution, harsh imprisonment, and life in prison. The group's presence is now only known in cyberspace through platforms abroad, mainly in Türkiye and the United Kingdom.
Disappearance Domestically
Egyptian researcher specializing in extremist groups Munir Adib states that when discussing the disappearance of the Muslim Brotherhood on the thirteenth anniversary of the June 30 events, "it is necessary to differentiate between two things: the disappearance of the organization and the disappearance of the ideology."
"In both cases, the Egyptian state and its security agencies have succeeded over 13 years in dismantling, neutralizing the organization, and refuting many of its ideas to the extent that it no longer has the influence it had before 2013 or even before 2011,” he adds in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat.
He predicted that the organization would disappear soon, saying: "The organization, which is now 98 years old, has only two more years left, for its hundredth year to be its last... to become merely a line in history books."
Ahmed Ban, an analyst specializing in religious and extremist groups, states that the group has shifted from a tangible existence to a mere presence on media platforms, specifically non-traditional media such as social media platforms, digital platforms, and artificial intelligence technologies to spread messages of frustration and chaos.
International Moves
Internationally, the organization's situation is no different than in Egypt, with official movements in Austria, Germany, France, and the Netherlands witnessing radical shifts in their stances over the past years, moving from a phase of monitoring and caution to prosecution.
In May 2026, the administration of US President Donald Trump unveiled a new national counter-terrorism strategy, which at its core focused on the Muslim Brotherhood as the ideological source of modern "militant terrorism."
This was preceded last January by Washington's designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as its branches in Jordan and Lebanon, as "terrorist organizations." This was followed in March by placing its Sudanese branch on the same list.
Moreover, a majority in the French Parliament agreed last January to call on the European Commission to add the Brotherhood and its leaders to the list of terrorist organizations. This was followed in March by the Dutch Parliament's approval of a proposal calling for a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated organizations, though it has not yet been implemented.
Adib believes that these international moves are "an essential part of the confrontation that will lead to the disappearance of the organization, especially since the international community, Europe, and the United States represented the lifeline it breathed from."
He noted that the situation has now changed with the European move to re-evaluate the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its institutions, which has tightened the noose on the group, contributed to its neutralization, and consolidated predictions of its complete disappearance, along with its ideology, within the coming years.
US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’https://english.aawsat.com/features/5289169-us-sees-lebanon-and-israel-framework-agreement-step-toward-%E2%80%98lasting-peace%E2%80%99
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
US Sees Lebanon and Israel Framework Agreement as a Step Toward ‘Lasting Peace’
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C, back) looks on as (L/R, front row) Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, State Department Chief of Staff Daniel Holler, and Lebanese Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh sign a framework agreement at the US Department of State in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2026. (AFP)
The fifth round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations ended in Washington on Friday with the signing of a framework agreement that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said could help lay the foundation for “lasting peace and security” between the two countries.
At a ceremony where the flags of the United States, Lebanon and Israel stood side by side, Rubio announced a framework agreement between the sovereign government of Lebanon and the government of Israel, mediated and supported by Washington.
The US-sponsored talks shifted the discussion from a ceasefire to a field-based model under which Israel would gradually withdraw from areas it occupies in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army would then take control of those areas and prevent the return of Hezbollah’s military presence.
Behind closed doors, and despite talk from Tehran and its allies about “victories” and “resistance,” leaks from negotiating rooms in Washington and Switzerland point to a different picture: firm US pressure, Israeli efforts to secure substantial security gains, and Iranian concessions that could reshape Tehran’s regional influence from Beirut to Baghdad.
Before the agreement was announced, Rubio said Israel and Lebanon had made progress and were close to a “declaration of intentions.” Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the talks focused on security measures needed to restore stability and extend state authority to Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders. Israeli and Lebanese officials, however, denied US claims that Israel had withdrawn from part of the “buffer zone” as a goodwill gesture.
What emerged on Friday was an initial understanding on direction, not an agreement on implementation. The talks therefore appear to mark the start of a new political and security track rather than the end of the current military phase.
The Lebanese track has also become connected, though not fully merged, with US negotiations with Iran. Washington insists Lebanon’s future is being discussed with its government, while also holding Tehran responsible for restraining Hezbollah and ending its funding and armament. The round has thus become part of a broader test of a regional order that did not exist before the war.
Israeli military APCs parked in northern Israel, near the border with Lebanon, Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)
Army deployment
The main outcome was preliminary acceptance of “pilot zones.” The plan calls for selecting a defined area from which Israeli forces would withdraw after Hezbollah’s military infrastructure is removed. Lebanese Army units would then deploy and secure the area before the model is repeated elsewhere.
The formula combines Lebanon’s demand for withdrawal and restored sovereignty with Israel’s demand that evacuated territory not become a platform for Hezbollah to rebuild its capabilities.
But Rubio’s phrase “commitment of intentions” also reveals the limits of the achievement. It signals agreement on the broad goal, not on maps, timetables or monitoring rules.
Disagreement also remains over the location of the first zone: whether it begins north of the Litani River, as Lebanese information suggests, or inside the buffer zone established by Israel.
Another unresolved question is whether withdrawal would be part of a comprehensive roadmap or decided case by case according to Israeli security assessments.
The confusion over withdrawal underscored that these questions remain unsettled.
A US official said Israel had pulled forces from part of the area without specifying where. An Israeli security official noted that the army had not withdrawn, while a senior Lebanese official stressed that Beirut knew nothing about such a step.
This may mean Washington announced Israeli political approval before implementation, or that a limited redeployment took place that Israel does not consider a withdrawal and that Lebanon has no information about.
Either way, Washington appears to be trying to prevent the talks from collapsing under the pressure of skirmishes and strikes.
Southern Lebanon remains, in practice, a war zone for tens of thousands of displaced residents unable to return because of Israeli forces or widespread destruction. The success of the agreement will be measured by whether it produces the first clear, documented handover of land to the Lebanese army.
A security wall in northern Israel on the border with Lebanon , Saturday, June 27, 2026 after Israel and Lebanon sign a framework agreement, described as a first step toward peace following months of conflict between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. (AP)
‘Pilot zones’
The plan means different things to each side. For Lebanon, a pilot zone should be the first step toward full Israeli withdrawal, an end to strikes and assassinations, the return of residents, and the deployment of the state up to the international border.
For Israel, it is a test of the Lebanese army’s ability to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure, control supply routes and prevent the group’s fighters from returning under civilian cover.
Israel is therefore insisting on a “zone-by-zone” approach. It does not want to commit in advance to a comprehensive withdrawal before seeing the results of the first phase.
It is also linking any pullback to Hezbollah’s disarmament, or at least to clearing the relevant area of military infrastructure and weapons capable of threatening northern Israeli communities.
Beirut fears the plan could yield another form of the occupation: withdrawal from secondary positions while Israel keeps a narrower security strip.
This leaves a central question unanswered: what does Hezbollah’s disarmament actually mean? Does the first phase only require removing weapons and fighters from areas where the state deploys, or does it include Hezbollah’s arsenal across Lebanon? Which weapons come first: precision and long-range missiles, drones, air defenses, anti-tank missiles, tunnels or command centers?
Nothing announced so far proves there is a final agreement on the type of weapons to be collected or the timetable.
Washington appears to be trying to break the problem into stages: first establishing areas free of military presence, then moving to heavy and strategic weapons, while leaving small arms and organizational structures to a longer Lebanese process.
Israel fears this approach will give Hezbollah time to regroup. Lebanon fears a domestic confrontation the army cannot contain.
The US guarantee
This is where the US guarantee becomes essential. The model requires a verification mechanism that determines who decides an area is weapons-free, how violations are monitored, what happens if Hezbollah tries to return, and what limits are placed on Israel’s right to act.
Without agreement on these rules, every violation could become a pretext for renewed Israeli strikes, and every strike could trigger a return to fighting.
Separating Lebanon from Iran’s influence
At first glance, US policy toward Lebanon appears dual-track. Rubio says Lebanon-Israel negotiations are separate from talks with Iran because Lebanon is a sovereign state with a government Washington deals with directly.
In parallel, Vice President JD Vance is leading talks with Tehran that include ending the fighting in Lebanon, while President Donald Trump has threatened to strike Iran again if it fails to stop Hezbollah from “causing trouble.”
Rubio’s track identifies the legitimate decision-maker: the Lebanese government, not Iran or Hezbollah. Vance’s track deals with the actor capable of obstructing the US efforts.
In that sense, Washington is negotiating Lebanon’s future with Beirut, while negotiating with Tehran over support for the force that could derail any arrangement. It is using Iran’s need to stabilize the ceasefire and ease sanctions to pressure it on Hezbollah without granting it guardianship over Lebanon.
Trump’s warnings are therefore more than just threats. They shift responsibility for Hezbollah’s actions to its sponsor, Iran, suggesting that continued violence in Lebanon could carry a direct cost for Tehran.
The strategy is risky. Including Lebanon in a US-Iran understanding could allow Tehran to claim that any Israeli withdrawal resulted from its pressure, not from the Lebanese track.
It also raises fears in Beirut and Tel Aviv that Lebanese security details could become bargaining chips in talks over the nuclear file, sanctions and the Strait of Hormuz.
That is why Rubio insists publicly on separation, even as he acknowledges that Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah cannot be ignored.
Washington may be unable to separate the two tracks completely, but it is trying to prevent their political merger.
Its success depends on using Iranian influence to restrain Hezbollah without turning Iran into a partner in shaping the Lebanese state or its arrangements with Israel.
Israeli tank maneuvers as United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convoy drive between destroyed houses in the south Lebanon village of Mais al-Jabal, as seen from the Israeli side of the border in the upper Galilee, 26 June 2026. (EPA)
Israeli concerns
Israel’s concern is that a US-Iran understanding could save Hezbollah from the consequences of the war. Israeli officials fear Washington’s priority may shift from dismantling the group and reducing Iranian influence to simply preserving a ceasefire and preventing conflict, while pressuring Israel to withdraw before durable security guarantees are in place.
Israel therefore is insisting on freedom to act against what it sees as rearmament or imminent threats and has not offered an unconditional commitment to return to the border. The buffer zone has become both a negotiating card and a security guarantee. Giving it up without disarmament would expose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to domestic criticism.
The Lebanese army, meanwhile, faces a test that goes beyond entering territory vacated by Israel. It must prove it can remain there, control it, prevent Hezbollah’s return, deal with weapons depots and tunnels, and avoid being dragged into civil strife.
It also needs manpower, equipment, funding and political cover, all of which remain uncertain, especially amid widespread destruction and the need to protect returning residents and secure the border.
The United States is studying training for Lebanese units and ways to verify their readiness and reliability. Reports have suggested a possible role for US Central Command, or CENTCOM, in supervision or monitoring, but no final announcement has clarified whether CENTCOM would directly vet personnel or limit itself to support and coordination.
Analysts say the deeper problem is that army deployment is not the same as disarmament.
The army may be able to control a specific area after an Israeli withdrawal if it receives enough support. But dismantling Hezbollah’s network across Lebanon requires a national political decision, a gradual mechanism, guarantees for the Shiite community and steps to prevent Iran from rebuilding funding and weapons channels.
If Washington burdens the army with more than it can carry, the model may turn from a test of state sovereignty into a test that exposes the limits of the state.
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