Turkey-Russia Relations: Friend or Foe or Just Pragmatism

Turkish-Russian relations have historical depth, marked mostly by conflict. Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia fought a dozen wars. During the First World War, they were on opposite sides. The two enjoyed fair to good relations during the Turkish War of Independence but even then, things were not as good as they looked. After the Second World War, the Soviets claimed some Turkish territories in eastern Anatolia and questioned Turkish sovereignty over the Turkish Straits. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 serving as the Alliance’s southern flank nation throughout the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia were in competition for what some like to call the new great game over the Caucasus and Central Asia.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Crimean Tatars, Circassians, Nogais ( Turkish ethnic group who live in the North Caucasus region), and many others of a shrinking Ottoman Empire had to flee their ancestral homes due to Russian advances. These people who found their new homes in Anatolia have also been a factor in Turkey-Russia relations.

Against this background, within the framework of the new strategic environment and developments in the international arena, Turkish-Russian relations gained a new momentum in the 2000s.

Presidents Erdoğan and Putin are regarded by many, as look-alike in their way of doing politics in general. They may not be the best of friends, (friendship defined by common ideals, lifestyles and pleasures) but they have established a kind of working relationship, based on mutual interest and benefit. This relationship plays a major and even central role in the present-day conduct of Turkey-Russia relations.

Bilateral relations between the two countries are quite active.

Trade volume is at an average of 25 billion dollars. At one point it was around 30 billion dollars. Despite a decline in its share, Russia is still Turkey’s main energy supplier, providing 34 per cent of its natural gas and 11 per cent of its oil. On the other side, Turkey’s exports to Russia are mainly agricultural products, machinery, land vehicles and textiles. All in all, around 80 per cent of bilateral trade volume is in favor of Russia.

But Turkey makes up for this deficit in the fields of services and construction. Turkey continues to be the major destination for Russians who adore its moderately priced all-inclusive five star resorts. The record was in 2019 with seven million Russian visitors. As to construction sector, up-to date, Turkey has completed around 1980 projects in Russia with a total value of around 75 billion dollars.

Turkey also serves as the transit carrier of Russian natural gas. The most recent joint project in this area is the TurkStream which has been officially inaugurated in 2020. This project connects Russia and Turkey with two 930 kilometers long offshore pipelines running under the Blacksea, one of which brings natural gas to Turkey. The other one is for gas destined for Europe.

Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, with a total project cost estimated at 20 billion dollars, is another strategic value cooperation. Its first reactor is planned to be operational in 2023.

On the world stage, Russia and Turkey keep running into each other in different theaters, such as Syria, Ukraine, Libya, south Caucasus, They are mostly on opposing sides and occasionally, they physically hurt each other. But on the whole, the two countries have managed to establish some sort of a dialogue and cooperation module in all these theaters.

Russia is a major actor in Syria and militarily active in the field. Astana Process has paved the way for cooperation between Turkey and Russia. But the potential for a rift is still very much present, especially in Idlib. Despite a 2018 agreement, half of the province has been captured by the regime and Russia. In the opposition-held and frequently targeted by the regime part of Idlib, thousands of armed militants of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other mostly radical groups are present.

At a press conference in Moscow on September 9 with Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid, in response to a question Minister Lavrov said: “Turkish colleagues need to fulfill the agreements reached by Presidents of Russia and Turkey in September 2018. These agreements provide for the separation of the normal, reasonable opposition from the terrorists, primarily from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This work is underway but, unfortunately, it is far from complete”. In the context of recent developments in Deraa, Lavrov stated that “in Deraa and on a broader plane, in Syria, no territories should be controlled by armed units other than the Syrian army.” What Lavrov said can be taken as a message as to what can be expected in the future.

What happens in Idlib and with its 3.4 million inhabitants in case of an all-out military campaign by the Assad regime and Russians, carries a potential for confrontation. In that regard, the attack on a Turkish patrol in Idlib on Saturday, killing two Turkish soldiers and wounding three, came at a critical time.

The 24 November 2015 incident, when Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 military aircraft in Syria, was a clear example of how things could turn very sour between the two countries. Russia halted almost everything from Turkish businesses on its territories, to Russians visiting Turkey. Turkish military activities in Syria were also seriously affected. Russia enforced its position in Syria with sophisticated military hardware including air defense systems. It took a lot of effort and almost a year to straighten out relations.

In Libya, Turkey and Russia have faced each other with various fighting elements. Turkish involvement on behalf of the Government of National Accord changed the course of the war. Russia and its side did not end up on top. But neither seems discontent with the turn of events, at least for now.

In 2020, Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, was able to liberate its territories under Armenian occupation. Turkey carved its mark in the Caucasus demonstrating that it is a force that counts. Turkey also further solidified its alliance with Azerbaijan and won points with its kin in the Caucasus and Central Asia. On part of Russia, not-so-Russia-friendly Prime Minister Pashinyan learned a lesson. Russia managed to engineer a ceasefire and under the terms of the ceasefire agreement, was back on the Azeri soil for the first time since 1990. In any case, both Turkey and Russia played it well in preventing things from taking a different shape and turn into a conflict between themselves.

Turkey and Russia are also on opposite sides on Ukraine. Turkey’s openly declared position is that it does not recognize the annexation of Crimea. Russia does not seem to mind this, as long as political positions are not turned into some sort of action. But the Russians follow with dissatisfaction and some concern, recent defense cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine, in particular, transfer of Turkish killer drones.

Afghanistan may become another file either for cooperation or confrontation between the two countries, depending on how things develop over there. The reasons are not entirely clear for everyone, but Turkey seems keen to assume a role in new Afghanistan. Russia regards Afghanistan basically from a security point of view, with particular reference to Central Asian countries. This region is crucial for Russia in terms of its strategic value, near abroad concept and the Russian-led Collective Security Organization.

One other issue of particular importance and with a strong NATO angle is the Black Sea and the Montreux Convention. Russia does not want NATO vessels in the Black Sea and is adamant about preserving the Convention as it is, which regulates the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits and limits their presence. The Turkish President’s most favored and politically advertised Canal Istanbul Project has raised some questions as to whether the Convention will have to be altered or not. Turkey’s position does not seem to be in contradiction to Russia’s.

The most important development in bilateral relations with far-reaching implications has been Turkey’s acquisition of S-400 air defense systems from Russia. The US and some other NATO Allies reacted strongly. The US went so far as imposing CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) sanctions on Turkey. Many in the West continue to present the S-400 issue as yet another proof of Turkey drifting away from NATO and the West.

Turkey’s side of the story is quite different. For some time now, Turkey has felt very unfairly treated by the EU or the West in general. It felt left out in the cold by its Allies on a number of occasions. Turkey’s EU accession negotiations are in deep freeze. Arms sales from many Allied countries including the USA, Canada, France and Germany are either restricted or in some cases, banned altogether. Turkey has argued that it had attempted to purchase air defense systems from the US and other western nations but was turned down. Russia, on the other hand, was more than ready to sell and Turkey opted for where it was possible to purchase the much-needed system.

Turks of different political convictions which rarely agree on anything, are of the same opinion that Turkey’s moves are not out of love for Russia but a consequence of the negative treatment of its Western Allies and partners.

In any case, Russia is happy. It managed to sell one of its multi-billion dollars weapons system, created a rift within NATO and further troubled the already strained relations between Turkey and the West.

Turkey is a member of an Alliance which identifies Russia as the main threat in a deteriorating security environment. But there is nothing to prevent Turkey, or any other member country for that matter, to engage with Russia in various fields, based on mutual benefit and respect, without contradicting NATO commitments and obligations. In any case, it is equally true that Turkey which enjoys good relations with its western allies and partners will be much better positioned in its dealings with Russia, compared to Turkey which is left alone by its allies and partners.

In conclusion, Turkey and Russia may have diverging positions on a number of issues, some with a potential for direct or indirect confrontation. But, for now, their relations seem to be governed by pragmatism. Even though a lot of patience and some occasional looking the other way may be needed in these relations, both countries seem to realize that dialogue and cooperation are better than confrontation; so long as it is possible.

For months, Aziza Abrahim fled from one village in Sudan to the next as people were slaughtered. Yet the killing of relatives and her husband's disappearance aren't what forced the 23-year-old to leave the country for good. It was hunger, she said.
“We don’t have anything to eat because of the war,” Abrahim said, cradling her 1-year-old daughter under the sheet where she now shelters, days after crossing into Chad, The Associated Press reported.
The war in Sudan has created vast hunger, including famine. It has pushed people off their farms. Food in the markets is sparse, prices have spiked and aid groups say they’re struggling to reach the most vulnerable as warring parties limit access.
Some 24,000 people have been killed and millions displaced during the war that erupted in April 2023, sparked by tensions between the military and the Rapid Support Forces. Global experts confirmed famine in the Zamzam displacement camp in July. They warn that some 25 million people — more than half of Sudan’s population — are expected to face acute hunger this year.
“People are starving to death at the moment ... It’s man-made. It’s these men with guns and power who deny women and children food,” Jan Egeland, head of the Norwegian Refugee Council, told AP. Warring parties on both sides are blocking assistance and delaying authorization for aid groups, he said.
Between May and September, there were seven malnutrition-related deaths among children in one hospital at a displacement site in Chad run by Doctors Without Borders, known by its French acronym MSF. Such deaths can be from disease in hunger-weakened bodies.
In September, MSF was forced to stop caring for 5,000 malnourished children in North Darfur for several weeks, citing repeated, deliberate obstructions and blockades. US President Joe Biden has called on both sides to allow unhindered access and stop killing civilians.
But the fighting shows no signs of slowing. More than 2,600 people were killed across the country in October, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, which called it the bloodiest month of the war.
Violence is intensifying around North Darfur's capital, El Fasher, the only capital in the vast western Darfur region that the RSF doesn't hold. Darfur has experienced some of the war's worst atrocities, and the International Criminal Court prosecutor has said there are grounds to believe both sides may be committing war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.
Abrahim escaped her village in West Darfur and sought refuge for more than a year in nearby towns with friends and relatives. Her husband had left home to find work before the war, and she hasn’t heard from him since.
She struggled to eat and feed their daughter. Unable to farm, she cut wood and sold it in Chad, traveling eight hours by donkey there and back every few days, earning enough to buy grain. But after a few months the wood ran out, forcing her to leave for good.
Others who have fled to Chad described food prices spiking three-fold and stocks dwindling in the market. There were no vegetables, just grains and nuts.
Awatif Adam came to Chad in October. Her husband wasn't making enough transporting people with his donkey cart, and it was too risky to farm, she said. Her 6-year-old twin girls and 3-year-old son lost weight and were always hungry.
“My children were saying all the time, ‘Mom, give us food’,” she said. Their cries drove her to leave.
As more people stream into Chad, aid groups worry about supporting them.
Some 700,000 Sudanese have entered since the war began. Many live in squalid refugee camps or shelter at the border in makeshift displacement sites. And the number of arrivals at the Adre crossing between August and October jumped from 6,100 to 14,800, according to government and UN data., though it was not clear whether some people entered multiple times.
Earlier this year, the World Food Program cut rations by roughly half in Chad, citing a lack of funding.
While there's now enough money to return to full rations until the start of next year, more arrivals will strain the system and more hunger will result if funding doesn't keep pace, said Ramazani Karabaye, head of the World Food Program's operations in Adre.
During an AP visit to Adre in October, some people who fled Sudan at the start of the war said they were still struggling.
Khadiga Omer Adam said she doesn't have enough aid or money to eat regularly, which has complicated breastfeeding her already malnourished daughter, Salma Issa. The 35-year-old gave birth during the war's initial days, delivering alone in West Darfur. It was too dangerous for a midwife to reach her.
Adam had clutched the baby as she fled through villages, begging for food. More than a year later, she sat on a hospital bed holding a bag of fluid above her daughter, who was fed through a tube in her nose.
“I have confidence in the doctors ... I believe she'll improve, I don't think she'll die," she said.
The MSF-run clinic in the Aboutengue camp admitted more than 340 cases of severely malnourished children in August and September. Staff fear that number could rise. The arid climate in Chad south of the Sahara Desert means it's hard to farm, and there's little food variety, health workers said.
People are fleeing Sudan into difficult conditions, said Dr. Oula Dramane Ouattara, head of MSF's medical activities in the camp.
”If things go on like this, I’m afraid the situation will get out of control," he said.

Turkey-Russia Relations: Friend or Foe or Just Pragmatism