In Iraq, Iran Faces Growing Backlash

A street vendor displays clothes next to graffiti with Arabic that reads, "Baghdad is free and Iran out," in Tahrir Square, Baghdad, Iraq, January 8, 2020. (AP)
A street vendor displays clothes next to graffiti with Arabic that reads, "Baghdad is free and Iran out," in Tahrir Square, Baghdad, Iraq, January 8, 2020. (AP)
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In Iraq, Iran Faces Growing Backlash

A street vendor displays clothes next to graffiti with Arabic that reads, "Baghdad is free and Iran out," in Tahrir Square, Baghdad, Iraq, January 8, 2020. (AP)
A street vendor displays clothes next to graffiti with Arabic that reads, "Baghdad is free and Iran out," in Tahrir Square, Baghdad, Iraq, January 8, 2020. (AP)

As Iraq heads to the polls on October 10, a spotlight has fallen on the outsized influence neighboring Iran wields -- but also on the growing popular backlash against it.

The parliamentary vote is being held early as a concession to a pro-democracy movement that railed against an Iraqi political system it decried as inept, corrupt and beholden to Iran.

“One of the more alarming things for Iran in Iraq right now is the huge sense of public dissatisfaction towards Iran,” said political scientist Marsin Alshamary.

“That’s one of the things Iran wasn’t expecting and something it has to grapple with,” said the Harvard Kennedy School researcher, according to AFP.

At the height of unprecedented protests in November 2019, furious demonstrators attacked and torched Iran’s consulate in the southern city of Najaf, shouting “Get out of Iraq!”

When many protesters were killed by gunmen, activists accused pro-Iranian factions that play a major role in Iraq and which the United States blames for attacks on its interests there.

The paramilitary network known as Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) -- formed in 2014 to defeat the ISIS group -- includes many pro-Iranian Shiite groups. It has since been integrated into Iraq’s state security apparatus.

In Iraq’s parliament too, political parties with deep ties to Tehran have formed powerful blocs with major influence in past governments.

Iran has also become one of Iraq’s largest trading partners, a major boost for Tehran, which has been battered by sanctions over its disputed nuclear program.

Iraq imports Iranian electricity as well as food, textiles, furniture and cars.

But many Iraqis worry that Iranian influence is now too strong.

Anti-Iranian anger has flared in recent years, even in what is known as Iraq’s southern Shiite heartland.

“Iran has lost a lot of the base in the south and the center of Iraq, the Shiite base, which it assumed for a long time would be a loyal base,” said Renad Mansour of the Chatham House think tank.

“Many of the parties that are aligned with Iran find it more difficult to maintain popularity.”

The 2018 election, marked by record abstentions, allowed PMF candidates to enter parliament for the first time, after the victory against ISIS.

Today, they aim to gain strength in the chamber, but experts are skeptical.

For pro-Iranian MPs, the relationship with Tehran is nothing to shy away from.

One of the leading figures of the PMF bloc, Baghdad lawmaker Ahmed Assadi, said in a recent TV interview that “our relationship with the republic is not a new one, it is a strategic one”.

“There is no submission or alignment,” he said. “It is a relationship based on the balance between the interests of Iraq and the interests of” Iran.

Mohammed Mohie, spokesman for the Kataib Hezbollah, a powerful PMF faction, told AFP that “relations with Iran are in the interest of the Iraqi people and must be strengthened.

“We have never seen any negative interference from Iran in Iraqi affairs.”

Looking at the protesters’ demands, he said that improving public services and infrastructure must be one top priority, but he also stressed another: the withdrawal of US troops.

Iraqi political scientist Ali al-Baidar said the pro-Iran factions are seeking to “consolidate their presence in politics and government”.

They want “to be present on several levels -- diplomacy, culture, sport -- to change their image with the general public” which associates them with the security apparatus.

Lahib Higel of the International Crisis Group said she expects the pro-Iran parties in parliament “to retain approximately the same portion of seats. I don’t see that there is going to be a significant increase for them”.

Tehran, she said, will hope for “a prime minister they can work with, that is acceptable to their agenda”.

Mansour said that while the election is important, “the key is the backroom deals that are made as part of forming a government”.

“In that process, Iran has historically had a big role,” he said. “Iran has proven to be the most capable external actor when it comes to government formation.”



How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
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How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)

Hamas is facing major challenges in its efforts to reorganize after Israel assassinated several high-ranking figures from its political bureau, both in and outside the Gaza Strip, including key figures in the political, military, and governance wings of the movement.

During the 58-day truce—collapsed in March—Hamas leaders in Gaza had begun restructuring the organization by appointing new officials to key positions. There was a move to quickly hold internal elections to confirm Khalil al-Hayya as head of the political bureau in Gaza, a decision that was agreed upon due to his previous role as deputy to Yahya Sinwar, who was killed in clashes with Israeli forces in Rafah in October 2024.

Administrative Vacuum

Al-Hayya, based in Qatar and shuttling between Egypt, Türkiye, and other countries as he leads Hamas’ delegation in ceasefire talks, tried to work closely with figures in Gaza such as political bureau members Mohammed al-Jamassi, Yasser Harb, Ismail Barhoum, and Issam al-Daalis to reorganize the movement’s internal operations. However, many of these individuals were later assassinated by Israel following the resumption of its military campaign.

As a result, Hamas is now grappling with a leadership vacuum inside Gaza, particularly as Israel continues targeting its on-ground operatives. This leadership disruption has contributed to delays in salary disbursement for government employees, although some political and military members received partial payments—up to 60%—on the second day of Eid al-Fitr.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the salary delays are partly due to the leadership void and the difficulties in decision-making, as many of those responsible for finances and internal affairs have been assassinated. The sources confirmed that the wave of assassinations has significantly impacted the group’s internal administration in Gaza.

How Hamas Operates Now

Leadership in Gaza traditionally handled central and strategic files within Hamas’ political bureau, meaning that the assassinations in the Strip had a ripple effect across the broader organization. With the deaths of top leaders like Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and his successor Yahya Sinwar in Gaza three months later, Hamas formed a temporary governing body known as the “Leadership Council” to oversee the movement’s affairs.

Due to the inability to hold internal elections to select a new political bureau chief and deputy, the Leadership Council—comprising regional heads—was empowered to make collective decisions. While the traditional structure relied on consensus among bureau members with deference to the president, vice president, and heads of the West Bank and external wings, the council now makes urgent decisions, consulting other bureau members only when necessary.

The council includes political bureau members from Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad, with decisions taken by consensus among those who can be reached—communication challenges within Gaza often complicate this.

The de facto head of the Leadership Council is Mohammed Darwish, chair of Hamas’ Shura Council, following the assassination of Osama al-Muzaini in an Israeli airstrike on his Gaza City apartment in October 2023. The precise number of council members remains unclear, but sources estimate it includes between 5 and 7 individuals, while the political bureau consists of over 20 positions. Israel has assassinated around 15 Hamas political bureau members in Gaza alone, in addition to leaders abroad like Saleh al-Arouri and Haniyeh.

Decision-Making Process

According to Hamas sources, for security reasons and the ongoing threat of Israeli targeting, decisions are now made through the Leadership Council without reverting to the Gaza leadership unless in urgent cases.

The sources noted that the council briefly assumed this role during the war, particularly just before the last ceasefire in late January. While some normalcy returned during the lull, renewed assassinations and resumed fighting pushed Hamas back into emergency decision-making mode.

Nevertheless, the sources stress that there are “clear red lines”—such as ceasefire negotiations—that require consulting all political bureau members, especially those still in Gaza, and military leaders from the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing. Among these is Mohammed Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, who now leads Qassam after Israel assassinated Mohammed Deif and his deputy Marwan Issa.

Hamas sources say Mohammed Sinwar plays a central role in strategic decision-making, especially in military operations and negotiations over Israeli hostages. Still, neither he, nor al-Hayya, nor Darwish can make critical decisions unilaterally; all major moves require consensus between the council, political bureau, and Qassam’s military command.

The sources acknowledge communication difficulties between Gaza and the outside world due to ongoing security threats and Israeli surveillance, sometimes delaying responses to mediators and stalling negotiations.

However, they emphasized that these delays have had limited impact lately, as Israel continues to reject international proposals, diminishing the effect of Hamas’ internal constraints on the overall diplomatic process.