Azerbaijan-Iran; Tension That Should Not Turn Into a Bigger Problem

Military tanks are seen during an Iranian Army exercise in the northwestern parts of Iran, in this picture obtained on October 1, 2021 - REUTERS
Military tanks are seen during an Iranian Army exercise in the northwestern parts of Iran, in this picture obtained on October 1, 2021 - REUTERS
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Azerbaijan-Iran; Tension That Should Not Turn Into a Bigger Problem

Military tanks are seen during an Iranian Army exercise in the northwestern parts of Iran, in this picture obtained on October 1, 2021 - REUTERS
Military tanks are seen during an Iranian Army exercise in the northwestern parts of Iran, in this picture obtained on October 1, 2021 - REUTERS

Azerbaijan and Iran have deep historical, cultural relations. They share a border of about 760 kilometers. Since Azerbaijan gained its independence in 1991, ties between Baku and Tehran have been neighborly but at times difficult.

War in 1992 and the consequent Armenian occupation of its territories preoccupied Azerbaijan for almost 30 years. Occupation of the territories of a fellow Muslim country did not disturb Iran, which seemed to stand closer to Armenia. Iran’s stance throughout this period was not well received by Azerbaijan.

In the autumn of 2020 when large-scale fighting broke out, Azerbaijan inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Armenian side and took back the majority of its territories. Iran remained silent. Only towards the end of the conflict, it took a more visible stance, stating that the territories over which fighting was taking place belonged to Azerbaijan.

This war brought to the surface, once again, several issues of irritation for Iran.

-Victory of Azerbaijan over Armenia was overjoyed by ethnic Azeris in Iran. They demonstrated their support in city centers. They also staged protests demanding the closure of the Iran-Armenia borders.

Estimates of Azeris in Iran vary from 15 to 25 million, out of a total population of around 85 million. They mostly live in northwestern parts, with Tabriz and Urumiya being major Azeri cities. Some refer to this area not as north of Iran but south of Azerbaijan. Within this scope, the rise of nationalist sentiment among its Azeri population did not appeal to Iranian authorities.

-Turkey’s contribution to Azerbaijan’s war effort was a major factor in its victory. Very close ties between the two Turkic countries, which are popularly referred to as “one nation, two states”, were even further consolidated.

Victory parades in Baku, with the participation of Turkish army units and the leaders of the two countries standing next to each other on the podium, must have been not so pleasant sights for Iran.

Another actor who also contributed to the Azerbaijan war effort was Israel. These two countries have developed close relations over the years. At one point in the past, President Aliyev stated that relations with Israel are very diverse and especially strong in the field of the defense industry. These ties have been disturbing Iran for some time.

On top of all that, the outcome of the war had a bearing on Iranian trade activities. Throughout the occupation of Karabakh, Iran used to transport food, fuel, and other items to Karabakh and Armenia and also to other parts of West Asia, unhindered and through occupied Azeri land.

This all changed when Azerbaijan took back its territories. Iran’s transport routes were affected. They wanted to continue as if nothing had changed. Azerbaijan reminded the Iranians of the new circumstances. Iranians did not pay attention and it is said that they even attempted to cheat their way by putting Armenian plates on Iranian trucks.

Azerbaijan, as a sovereign state, continued its controls and imposed a “road tax” on Iranian trucks moving through its territory. In the process, some Iranian lorry drivers were detained. There was a case of a heroin seizure. Azerbaijani authorities also expressed concern about the possible transport of military equipment.

Iran must have felt under pressure on a number of fronts, especially in its home territory and what it considers as its “backyard”. Iran revealed its dismay and demonstrated its readiness.
Foreign Minister Abdullahian stated Iran’s objection to the presence of the “Zionist regime” near its borders.

In reference to a Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan trilateral military exercise (Three Brothers 2021) which was held in September in Baku, Foreign Ministry of Iran stated that “these military exercises violated international conventions banning the military presence of countries other than the five states which border the Caspian Sea”.

In October, Iran started military exercises along its borders with Azerbaijan. The Iranian commander of Land Forces also voiced Iran’s stance against the “Zionist State” near its borders. In addition, he expressed concern about the presence of fighters (from Syria) that he claimed were brought in to Azerbaijan during the fighting over Karabakh.

Azerbaijan reacted in a cool manner. In an interview with Turkey's Anadolu Agency, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev expressed his surprise about Iran’s reactions and steps.

Other major regional actors, Turkey and Russia, have kept silent. They are observing and probably expecting the flare-up to die out.

It seems that things are blown out of proportion and we may be following a case of being lost in translation.

In the case of the transport issue, it is a matter of adapting to changed circumstances and respecting the decisions of a sovereign state. Iran’s perceptions of threat on home ground and vicinities may be more complicated but again, diplomacy, goodwill, and cooperation are the remedies.

These recent developments have once again served as a reminder of the relevance and importance of regional cooperation.

Up until recently, Karabakh was an obstacle for most multinational cooperation efforts in the region. Now, this obstacle has been removed and the political environment is ripe for this kind of cooperation.
For many years, Turkey has been desirous to create regional cooperation platforms.

One such mechanism, Turkey-Iran-Azerbaijan Trilateral Meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers was established in 2010. Even though dates have not been set yet, the next meeting will be in Tehran. It would be a good opportunity to take up issues of contention.

Recently, Turkey came up with the idea of a six-party cooperation format, which included Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Iran. There is no progress on that yet, but the proposal has been made.

In any case, such inclusive and cooperation-oriented initiatives should be encouraged as they offer countries a good opportunity to exchange views on bilateral and regional issues and explore possibilities of cooperation in various fields. Regional mechanisms could also complement and support bilateral efforts to overcome problems as in the case of the recent Azeri-Iranian situation.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.