Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
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Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)

The Syria that Rifaat al-Assad left when he was vice president to Hafez al-Assad decades ago is not the same one that he returned to after his nephew, President Bashar al-Assad, allowed him to return to as a “citizen.” The country has changed with its foreign alliances and role in the region. Its composition has changed and it is now “home” to five armies.

Accompanied by his wives, children and grandchildren, his first glimpses of Damascus, with its streets, checkpoints, officials and his former residence, may have rekindled memories of when he was at the height of his power. He may have recalled a time back in the 1980s when he orchestrated a “coup” against his brother and surrounded the capital.

Damascus, which 21 years ago ordered his arrest should he return from exile, rose above the wounds and received him so he can avoid imprisonment in France where he was sentenced to serve for five years. Days alone will decipher the “code” that was headlined by al-Watan newspaper last week and that said that Rifaat, 84, had returned “with no political or social role”. Days will tell the extent to which this “decree” will be implemented in Damascus and Latakia.

The brothers and the Brotherhood
When he was young, Rifaat had always been overshadowed by his stronger older brother, Hafez, who was seven years his senior. In 1952, he followed in his brother’s ideological footsteps and joined the Baath party. He also followed him in joining the military and later the interior ministry.

In March 1963, the Baath military committee, which his brother was a member of, seized power. Rifaat soon joined the military academy in Homs. After graduating, he served alongside his brother, who at the time was an air force commander.

His first military “tours” took place with Salim Hatoum and the raid of President Amin al-Hafez’s residence in February 1966. The raid was aimed at toppling the first Baath government. Under President Nureddin al-Atassi, Rifaat was tasked with commanding a special unit that was formed by the military committee to “defend the regime”.

Historians say that during the late 1960s, Syria witnessed two major conflicts. The first pitted Hafez and Rifaat against Salah Jadid and his chief of intelligence Abdulkarim al-Jundi. Between February 25 and 28, 1969, the Assad brothers launched a military operation in Damascus. Tanks moved in the capital against Jundi and Jadid loyalists. The former committed suicide on March 2, 1969, to avoid arrest. On November 17, 1970, Assad carried out the “comprehensive movement”, arresting Atassi and Jadid. Rifaat was then tasked with securing Damascus.

Rifaat became commander of the Defense Companies, which boasted some 40,000 soldiers and acted almost like an independent army that was not affiliated with the official military. Rifaat rose up the ranks in the party and he expanded his activities among students, the youth and the media.

The second conflict erupted in 1979. It pitted the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood. In December 1979, Rifaat declared it was time to “respond with force” against the movement, calling on everyone to pledge their absolute loyalty. He was quoted as saying: “Stalin sacrificed 10 million people to protect the Bolshevik revolution. Syria must do the same to protect the Baath revolution.” He threatened to wage a “hundred wars, destroy a million forts and sacrifice a million lives” to preserve the state-regime. He let loose in suppressing the uprising between 1979 and 1982. The situation reached its peak when he struck Hama in February 1982.

In 1983, he sent his paratroopers to Damascus with the command to remove the hijab off women on the streets. The move was met with widespread criticism, even his brother openly condemned him.

Edge of danger
When Hafez fell ill in November 1983, it appeared that the moment Rifaat had long awaited had arrived. He began to act as though he were the “legitimate heir”, seeing himself as the only heir. He began to rally the support of his generals, drawing the extreme ire of the president.

Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam recalled the tense situation in his memoirs, which were seen by Asharq Al-Awsat. He said he met with Hafez in March 1978 to address the extreme campaign against Rifaat among the Syrians. “This campaign weakens the regime,” Khaddam told Hafez. “You must address the situation with Rifaat.”

Indeed, Rifaat was meddling in the affairs of state and ordering around Prime Minster Mohammed Ali Halabi, who did not dare speak out.

Khaddam added: “The president wanted his brother to succeed him, but Rifaat committed a major sin when he tried to revolt against him when he had fallen ill in November 1983.”

He recalled that Hafez had at one point in 1980 told him that he wanted to appoint a vice president for the sake of “continuity, because no one knows when their time will come.” Khaddam, who was foreign minister at the time, understood that he was referring to Rifaat. His attempted coup, however, made his brother change his mind.

Remembering the failed coup, Khaddam said that when Hafez fell ill in November 1983, commander of the republican guard, Adnan Makhlouf, informed him that the president wanted to see him at hospital. “I believed that he was a victim of an assassination attempt,” said Khaddam. “I asked: ‘Was he shot or targeted by a bomb?’ to which Makhlouf replied: ‘He was struck by a heart attack.’ I headed to the hospital immediately.”

The next day, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel was scheduled to visit Syria. Hafez asked Khaddam to postpone the visit and to cite “his preoccupation with internal matters”. When Hafez left the ICU, Khaddam contacted army commander Hikmat al-Shihabi and asked him to come to the hospital. “We agreed to take measures that would avert attempts to blow up the situation in Syria, because I was fearful of Rifaat.”

Khaddam recalled how at one point he was on the phone with the Syrian ambassador to London to request that a doctor be flown over immediately. He demanded that the best doctor be sent to Syria. He had made a similar request to the envoy in Washington. Rifaat walked in at that moment and asked why should doctors be brought from abroad? Syria has doctors, he declared. Should doctors be brought in from abroad whenever anyone falls ill? Khaddam replied: “Your brother is called Hafez al-Assad, not Hafez Khaddam. It is my responsibility to provide all conditions for his recovery because I know what sort of chaos will happen if he is gone.”

Later, Khaddam said the American ambassador revealed to him that an American envoy was coming to Damascus to meet with Rifaat. He responded: “We won’t allow him to come. Syria has a state. If the United States wanted to contact us, then it should do so through the state that I represent as foreign minister.”

The next day, the Defense Companies paraded through the streets of Damascus and Rifaat declared to the people: “I am coming.” Soon after, Khaddam met with the military, Shihabi and Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. “We agreed to bring in two units from outside Damascus. They surrounded the city and the situation became tense. When senior officers who had pledged allegiance to Rifaat found out that Hafez was out of danger, they abandoned his brother. Rifaat became isolated.”

Tense meeting
At the time, the Central Command held a meeting. Everyone was shocked at the large numbers of Defense Companies members. Addressing the meeting, Rifaat said: “The Central Command must expel from the party Ali Duba (chief of military intelligence), Ibrahim Safi (commander of Syrian forces in Lebanon), Ali Haidar (commander of the special forces) and Mohammed Khawli (director of air force intelligence) because they are insulting me. I am the brother of the president. I should be treated like the president. If you don’t take a decision, then my forces will immediately occupy Damascus.”

Some of the members of the Central Command appeared hesitant. General Mustafa then addressed the gatherers: “These are your brothers. The problem can be solved if you meet together.” Khaddam then interjected, addressing Rifaat, he said: “You want to launch a coup? Go ahead. If every officer with a tank and soldiers wants to ride on our shoulders, then that is a dangerous thing. You have the tanks. Go ahead, make your move.” Rifaat was gradually becoming angrier. “I never said such a thing,” he retorted. Khaddam replied knowingly: “The discussion was recorded.”

After the meeting, Khaddam contacted Hafez to inform him of what happened. The president said he will check with Zuhair Masharqa, who was a member of the Central Command. Minutes later, Hafez told Khaddam that Masharqa had informed him that Rifaat did not make any threatening remarks. Khaddam told Hafez to check with the minister of defense and commander of the army because Masharqa was loyal to Rifaat. After around a quarter of an hour, Hafez contacted Khaddam again. “What you said was right. Zuhair is a coward and he lied to me,” said Hafez.

‘I am the regime’
In February 1984, Hafez carried out his retaliation. He ordered the arrest of Salim Barakat, Rifaat’s security aide. He also sent a message through their other brother, Jamil, to Rifaat, saying: “I am your older brother, whom you must obey. Do not forget that I am the one who made you.”

In March 1984, Hafez appointed Rifaat as vice president but with no official duties. In fact, this was not a form of promotion, but an attempt to curb Rifaat’s power through appointing him to a purely political role, one that would be under the constant watchful eye of the president. His security duties, as commander of the Defense Companies, were referred to Mohammed Ghanem.

Khaddam recalled how Rifaat’s appointment was announced. He said Hafez called the Central Command to meet in early March 1984. He informed the leadership that he had decided to appoint three vice presidents. He said he alone has the right to make such an order and name the officials, who were Rifaat Assad, Zuhair Masharqa and Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“I immediately told him that I didn’t want to be vice president or serve in any government or party position,” said Khaddam. “Hafez ended the meeting and then called me to his office. He asked me: ‘Why did you object?’ I replied: ‘How can you put Rifaat and Zuhair above me? Rifaat should be in jail, not act as first deputy to the president. I have worked tirelessly to serve my country. I will not practice any state or partisan work.’ He told: ‘Then take over the position of secretary of the Central Command.’ I rejected his offer and went home.”

“After about an hour, he called me back to his office. He welcomed me back with a laugh: ‘You are stubborn.’ He informed me that he issued a decree naming me as first vice president, followed by Rifaat and then Zuhair. I asked him what a vice president does. He replied that he is in charge of foreign policy. Soon after the decree was announced and I accepted.”

On March 30, 1984, Rifaat responded to the move. His soldiers entered Damascus with clear orders to seize power. They took over strategic positions throughout the capital and its surroundings. Rifaat’s forces clashes with Hafezloyalists, such as Ali Haidar of the special forces and Adnan Makhlouf of the republican guard.

Patrick Seale, author of Assad’s biography, “Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East,” wrote that had the two sides struck each other in the capital, the destruction would have been massive and the image of the regime would have been irreparably damaged. Hafez left the noose dangling enough for Rifaat to hang himself.

Hafez was in full military uniform, accompanied by his oldest son Bassel, who was to become his father’s right-hand man until his death in a car accident in 1994.

Hafez drove his car alone without any guards to confront Rifaat at the headquarters of his military command. Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass recalled the developments in a book, “Three months that shook Syria”. “Adnan Makhlouf, commander of the republican guard, informed me that Mr. president has headed alone to his brother’s headquarters in Mazzeh. He said the president had told him that if he was not back in an hour, then Tlass must carry out the plan (of confronting Rifaat’s forces),” wrote Tlass.

“Do you want to overthrow the regime?” Hafez asked Rifaat. “Here I am. I am the regime!” They argued and then Hafez offered Rifaat a way out, vowing to respect his dignity and interests and provide him with a safe exit to exile of his choosing. He promised that he would not arrest him.

In late April 1984, Rifaat sensed that the balance of power had started to lean in his brother’s favor to an extent that he could no longer move. He contacted his brother Jamil so that he could mediate a reconciliation and to say that he was ready to do anything the president wanted. Hafez was impatiently waiting for Rifaat to collapse and resign himself to the authority. He won the waiting game. Then the difficult negotiations began.

They agreed that the Defense Companies would come under the authority of the operations command in the armed forces. Rifaat would remain as vice president tasked with security affairs. They agreed that senior officers would travel with him to Moscow. On May 28, 1984, a plane carrying Rifaat and his senior officers flew to Moscow to cool down. They were summoned one by one back to Syria and Rifaat alone remained in exile.

‘My brother doesn’t love me’
It was said that prior to leaving Syria, Rifaat had thrown a huge banquet for his friends. “It appears as though my brother no longer loves me. When he sees me, he frowns. I am not an American agent. I did not conspire against my country,” he told them. “If I were a fool, I would have destroyed the entire city, but I love this place. My men have been here for 18 years, the people are used to us and they love us. Now the commandos want to kick us out.”

Rifaat returned to Syria in 1992 at the wishes of his mother, who died later that year. In 1994, he extended his condolences to Hafez when his son Bassel died. Later that year, he was discharged from his position in the army and kept his post as vice president before later being relieved of his duties.

In 1999, his supporters clashed in a gunfight with government forces in Latakia. He set up a satellite channel in London in September 1997. He established his own party in Europe that is headed by his son, Sumer. The party had called for political change and was met with criticism by loyalists and the opposition.

When Hafez died on June 10, 2000, he issued a statement to elegize him. He claimed to be his heir, but his calls fell on deaf ears. Khaddam ordered Rifaat’s arrest should he attempt to attend his brother’s funeral.

After the eruption of the 2011 protests in Syria, Rifaat stood against the regime. His son, Ribal, is openly involved in politics. Rifaat’s presence in the media gradually faded. He appeared during the presidential elections this year when he voted for his nephew at the Syrian consulate in Paris. He then sent a cable of congratulation to Bashar on his reelection. On Thursday, he returned to Syria.



Iran’s Khamenei Faces Gravest Crisis of His Rule as US Strike Force Gathers

A handout picture made available by Iran's Supreme Leader Office shows Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addressing a ceremony in Tehran, Iran, 17 February 2026, amid heightened regional tensions following an increased US military presence in the Middle East. (EPA/Iran’s Supreme Leader Office Handout)
A handout picture made available by Iran's Supreme Leader Office shows Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addressing a ceremony in Tehran, Iran, 17 February 2026, amid heightened regional tensions following an increased US military presence in the Middle East. (EPA/Iran’s Supreme Leader Office Handout)
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Iran’s Khamenei Faces Gravest Crisis of His Rule as US Strike Force Gathers

A handout picture made available by Iran's Supreme Leader Office shows Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addressing a ceremony in Tehran, Iran, 17 February 2026, amid heightened regional tensions following an increased US military presence in the Middle East. (EPA/Iran’s Supreme Leader Office Handout)
A handout picture made available by Iran's Supreme Leader Office shows Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei addressing a ceremony in Tehran, Iran, 17 February 2026, amid heightened regional tensions following an increased US military presence in the Middle East. (EPA/Iran’s Supreme Leader Office Handout)

Ali Khamenei has crushed unrest and survived foreign pressure before but, with his envoys racing to avert threatened American airstrikes through ongoing talks, Iran's Supreme Leader faces the gravest crisis of his 36-year rule.

An embittered population toils under a sanctions-hit economy. Huge protests in January were crushed at a cost of thousands of lives. Israeli and US. strikes last year smashed prized nuclear and missile facilities. Iran's regional policy lies in tatters, with old allies and proxies weakened or gone.

With the risk of war hanging over the Middle East, the 86-year-old's fierce devotion to the Islamic Republic, his implacable hostility to the West and his record of guile in spinning out negotiations will shape the fate of the region.

PRESERVING IRAN'S ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AT ALL COSTS

Already this year, he has ordered the deadliest crackdown since the 1979 revolution, saying protesters "should be put in their place" before security forces opened fire on demonstrators chanting "Death to the dictator!".

US President Donald Trump's threats to bomb Iran again come only months after Khamenei was forced into hiding last June by strikes that killed several close associates and Revolutionary Guard commanders.

That assault was among the many indirect results of the attack on Israel by the Iran-backed Palestinian group Hamas on October 7, 2023, which not only triggered the war in Gaza but also spurred Israel to hammer Tehran's other ‌regional proxies.

With Hezbollah weakened ‌in Lebanon and Syria's Bashar al-Assad toppled, Khamenei's reach across the Middle East has been stunted. Now he faces ‌US demands ⁠to abandon Iran's ⁠best remaining strategic lever, its arsenal of ballistic missiles.

Iran has even offered apparent concessions on its nuclear program, which it says is purely civilian but is seen by the West and Israel as a path to an atomic bomb.

But Khamenei refuses to even discuss giving up missiles, which Iran sees as its only remaining deterrent to Israeli attack, a display of intransigence that may itself invite US airstrikes.

As the US military buildup intensifies, Khamenei's calculations will draw on a character molded by revolution, years of turmoil and war with Iraq, decades of sparring with the United States, and a ruthless accumulation of power.

Khamenei has ruled since 1989 and holds ultimate authority over all branches of government, the military and the judiciary.

While elected officials manage day-to-day affairs, no major policy - especially one concerning the United States - proceeds without his explicit approval; Khamenei's mastery of Iran's complex system of clerical rule combined with limited democracy ensures that no ⁠other group can challenge his decisions.

AS LEADER, KHAMENEI WAS ONCE FAR FROM SUPREME

Early in his rule, Khamenei was ‌often dismissed as weak and an unlikely successor to the Islamic Republic's late founder, the charismatic Khomeini.

When he was appointed Supreme Leader, Khamenei had difficulty wielding power through religious authority, as the theocratic system foresaw. After struggling for a long time to ‌emerge from the shadow of his mentor, it was by forging a formidable security apparatus devoted solely to him that he finally imposed himself.

Khamenei distrusts the West, ‌particularly the US, which he accuses of seeking to topple him.

In a typically pugnacious speech after January's protests, he blamed Trump for the unrest, saying: "We consider the US president criminal for the casualties, damages and slander he inflicted on the Iranian nation." Yet despite his ideological rigidity, he has shown a willingness to bend when the survival of the republic is at stake.

The concept of "heroic flexibility", first mentioned by Khamenei in 2013, permits tactical compromises to advance his goals, mirroring Khomeini's choice in 1988 to embrace a ceasefire after eight years of war with Iraq.

Khamenei’s guarded ‌endorsement of Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with six world powers was another such moment, as he calculated that sanctions relief was necessary to stabilize the economy and buttress his grip on power.

Trump quit the 2015 pact during his first ⁠term in 2018 and reimposed crippling sanctions on ⁠Iran. Tehran reacted by gradually violating all agreed curbs on its nuclear program.

LOYAL SECURITY STRUCTURE KEY TO KHAMENEI'S POWER

At times of increasing pressure, Khamenei has repeatedly turned to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij, a paramilitary force numbering hundreds of thousands of volunteers, to snuff out dissent.

It was they who crushed the protests that exploded after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election as president in 2009 amid allegations of vote fraud.

In 2022, Khamenei was just as ruthless in arresting, imprisoning or executing protesters enraged by the death in custody of the young Iranian-Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini.

And it was again the Guards and Basij who crushed the latest round of protests in January.

His power also owes much to the parastatal financial empire known as Setad, which is under Khamenei's direct control. Worth tens of billions of dollars, it has grown hugely during his rule, investing billions in the Revolutionary Guards.

Scholars outside Iran paint a picture of a secretive ideologue fearful of betrayal - an anxiety fueled by an assassination attempt in June 1981 with a bomb hidden in a tape recorder that paralyzed his right arm.

Khamenei himself suffered severe torture, according to his official biography, in 1963, when at 24 he served the first of many terms in prison for political activities under the rule of the shah.

After the revolution, as deputy defense minister, Khamenei became close to the Guards during the 1980-88 war with Iraq, which claimed a million lives from both sides.

He won the presidency with Khomeini's support but was a surprise choice as successor when the supreme leader died, lacking both his popular appeal and his superior clerical credentials.

Karim Sadjadpour at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said that "accident of history" had transformed a "weak president to an initially weak supreme leader to one of the five most powerful Iranians of the last 100 years".


US Strikes on Iran Could Target Individual Leaders, Officials Say

 People walk at Tajrish traditional bazaar in northern Tehran, Iran, Thursday, Feb. 19, 2026. (AP)
People walk at Tajrish traditional bazaar in northern Tehran, Iran, Thursday, Feb. 19, 2026. (AP)
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US Strikes on Iran Could Target Individual Leaders, Officials Say

 People walk at Tajrish traditional bazaar in northern Tehran, Iran, Thursday, Feb. 19, 2026. (AP)
People walk at Tajrish traditional bazaar in northern Tehran, Iran, Thursday, Feb. 19, 2026. (AP)

US military planning on Iran has reached an advanced stage with options including targeting individuals as part of an attack and even pursuing regime change in Tehran, if ordered by President Donald Trump, two US officials told Reuters.

The military options are the latest signs that the United States is preparing for a serious conflict with Iran should diplomatic efforts fail. Reuters first reported last week that the US military is preparing for a sustained, weeks-long operation against Iran that could include striking Iranian security facilities as well as nuclear infrastructure.

The latest revelations suggest more granular, ambitious planning ahead of a decision by Trump, who has in recent days publicly floated the idea of regime change in the country.

The US officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the planning, did not offer further details on which individuals could be targeted or how the US military could attempt to carry out regime change without a large ground force.

Pursuing regime change would mark another shift away from Trump's vows during the presidential campaign to abandon what he has called the failed policies of past administrations, which included military efforts to topple governments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Trump has assembled a massive amount of firepower in the Middle East, but most of the combat ‌capabilities are aboard warships ‌and fighter aircraft. Any major bombing campaign could also count on support from US-based bombers.

In his first term, ‌Trump ⁠showed a willingness ⁠to carry out targeted killings by approving a 2020 attack on Iran's top general, Qassem Soleimani, who led the foreign espionage and paramilitary arm of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, known as the Quds Force.

The Trump administration formally labeled the IRGC a foreign terrorist organization in 2019, the first time Washington had applied the designation to another nation’s military.

One of the US officials noted Israel's success targeting Iranian leaders during its 12-day war with Iran last year. At the time, regional sources told Reuters at least 20 senior commanders were killed, including the armed forces chief of staff, Major General Mohammad Bagheri.

"The 12-day war and Israeli strikes against individual targets really showed the utility of that approach," the US official said, adding that the focus was on those involved in command and control of IRGC forces.

Still, the official cautioned that targeting individuals requires additional intelligence ⁠resources. Killing a particular military commander would mean knowing their exact location and understanding who else might be harmed in ‌the operation.

It was unclear to the officials who spoke with Reuters what intelligence the US has ‌on Iranian leaders who could potentially be targeted by the United States.

The White House and Pentagon did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

REGIME CHANGE AS A POSSIBLE GOAL

Trump ‌has openly floated the possibility of changing the government in Iran, saying last week it "seems like that would be the best thing that could happen." ‌He declined to say who he wanted to take over Iran, but said, "there are people."

While regime change operations have traditionally involved major movement of US ground forces, Trump turned to special operations forces to oust Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro, sending them to grab him from his Caracas compound last month in an audacious raid.

At the same time, the US president has also held out hope for diplomacy, saying on Thursday that "really bad things" would happen if no deal were reached. He appeared to set a deadline of no more than ‌10 to 15 days before the US might take action.

Iran's Revolutionary Guard has warned it could retaliate against US military bases in the region if the US strikes Iranian territory.

In a letter on Thursday to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Tehran said it would not start any war but that "in the event that it is subjected to military aggression, Iran will respond decisively and proportionately" in its exercise of the right of self-defense.

US officials have told Reuters they fully expect Iran to fight back in the event of an attack, raising the risk of US casualties and a regional conflict, given the number of countries that could come under fire from Iran's missile arsenal.

Trump's threats to bomb Iran have pushed up oil prices, and on Thursday a Russian warship joined planned Iranian naval drills in the Gulf of Oman, a vital sea route for global energy shipments.

THREATS TO SHUT STRAIT OF HORMUZ

Tehran has in the past threatened to shut down the Strait of Hormuz if it is attacked, a move that would choke off a fifth of global oil flows.

Iranian and US negotiators met on Tuesday and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said they had agreed on "guiding principles." White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said on Wednesday, however, that the two sides remained far apart on some issues.

Iran has resisted making major concessions on its nuclear program, though insisting it is for peaceful purposes. The US and Israel have in the past accused Tehran of trying to develop a nuclear bomb.

A senior US official said Iran would make a written proposal on how to address US concerns.

Trump called on Tehran on Wednesday to join the US on the "path to peace."

"They can't have a nuclear weapon, it's very simple," he said. "You can't have peace in the Middle East if they have a nuclear weapon."


First Ramadan After Truce Brings Flicker of Joy in Devastated Gaza 

Worshippers perform evening Tarawih prayer on the first night of the holy fasting month of Ramadan at the Al-Kanz Mosque, which was damaged during the Israel-Hamas war, in Gaza City, Tuesday, Feb. 17, 2026. (AP)
Worshippers perform evening Tarawih prayer on the first night of the holy fasting month of Ramadan at the Al-Kanz Mosque, which was damaged during the Israel-Hamas war, in Gaza City, Tuesday, Feb. 17, 2026. (AP)
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First Ramadan After Truce Brings Flicker of Joy in Devastated Gaza 

Worshippers perform evening Tarawih prayer on the first night of the holy fasting month of Ramadan at the Al-Kanz Mosque, which was damaged during the Israel-Hamas war, in Gaza City, Tuesday, Feb. 17, 2026. (AP)
Worshippers perform evening Tarawih prayer on the first night of the holy fasting month of Ramadan at the Al-Kanz Mosque, which was damaged during the Israel-Hamas war, in Gaza City, Tuesday, Feb. 17, 2026. (AP)

Little Ramadan lanterns and string lights appeared on streets lined with collapsed buildings and piles of rubble in Gaza City, bringing joy and respite as Islam's holiest month began -- the first since October's ceasefire.

In the Omari mosque, dozens of worshippers performed the first Ramadan morning prayer, fajr, bare feet on the carpet but donning heavy jackets to stave off the winter cold.

"Despite the occupation, the destruction of mosques and schools, and the demolition of our homes... we came in spite of these harsh conditions," Abu Adam, a resident of Gaza City who came to pray, told AFP.

"Even last night, when the area was targeted, we remained determined to head to the mosque to worship God," he said.

A security source in Gaza told AFP Wednesday that artillery shelling targeted the eastern parts of Gaza City that morning.

The source added that artillery shelling also targeted a refugee camp in central Gaza.

Israel does not allow international journalists to enter the Gaza Strip, preventing AFP and other news organizations from independently verifying casualty figures.

A Palestinian vendor sells food in a market ahead of the holy month of Ramadan in Gaza City, 17 February 2026. (EPA)

- 'Stifled joy' -

In Gaza's south, tens of thousands of people still live in tents and makeshift shelters as they wait for the territory's reconstruction after a US-brokered ceasefire took hold in October.

Nivin Ahmed, who lives in a tent in the area known as Al-Mawasi, told AFP this first Ramadan without war brought "mixed and varied feelings".

"The joy is stifled. We miss people who were martyred, are still missing, detained, or even travelled," he said.

"The Ramadan table used to be full of the most delicious dishes and bring together all our loved ones," the 50-year-old said.

"Today, I can barely prepare a main dish and a side dish. Everything is expensive. I can't invite anyone for Iftar or suhoor," he said, referring to the meals eaten before and after the daily fast of Ramadan.

Despite the ceasefire, shortages remain in Gaza, whose battered economy and material damage have rendered most residents at least partly dependent on humanitarian aid for their basic needs.

But with all entries into the tiny territory under Israeli control, not enough goods are able to enter to bring prices down, according to the United Nations and aid groups.

A sand sculpture bearing the phrase "Welcome, Ramadan," created by Palestinian artist Yazeed Abu Jarad, on a beach in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, 17 February 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. (EPA)

- 'Still special' -

Maha Fathi, 37, was displaced from Gaza City and lives in a tent west of the city.

"Despite all the destruction and suffering in Gaza, Ramadan is still special," she told AFP.

"People have begun to empathize with each other's suffering again after everyone was preoccupied with themselves during the war."

She said that her family and neighbors were able to share moments of joy as they prepared food for suhoor and set up Ramadan decorations.

"Everyone longs for the atmosphere of Ramadan. Seeing the decorations and the activity in the markets fills us with hope for a return to stability," she added.

On the beach at central Gaza's Deir al-Balah, Palestinian artist Yazeed Abu Jarad contributed to the holiday spirit with his art.

In the sand near the Mediterranean Sea, he sculpted "Welcome Ramadan" in ornate Arabic calligraphy, under the curious eye of children from a nearby tent camp.

Nearly all of Gaza's 2.2 million residents were displaced at least once during the more than two years of war between Israel and Hamas, sparked by the latter's unprecedented October 7 attack on Israel.

Mohammed al-Madhoun, 43, also lives in a tent west of Gaza City, and hoped for brighter days ahead.

"I hope this is the last Ramadan we spend in tents. I feel helpless in front of my children when they ask me to buy lanterns and dream of an Iftar table with all their favorite foods."

"We try to find joy despite everything", he said, describing his first Ramadan night out with the neighbors, eating the pre-fast meal and praying.