Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
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Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)

The Syria that Rifaat al-Assad left when he was vice president to Hafez al-Assad decades ago is not the same one that he returned to after his nephew, President Bashar al-Assad, allowed him to return to as a “citizen.” The country has changed with its foreign alliances and role in the region. Its composition has changed and it is now “home” to five armies.

Accompanied by his wives, children and grandchildren, his first glimpses of Damascus, with its streets, checkpoints, officials and his former residence, may have rekindled memories of when he was at the height of his power. He may have recalled a time back in the 1980s when he orchestrated a “coup” against his brother and surrounded the capital.

Damascus, which 21 years ago ordered his arrest should he return from exile, rose above the wounds and received him so he can avoid imprisonment in France where he was sentenced to serve for five years. Days alone will decipher the “code” that was headlined by al-Watan newspaper last week and that said that Rifaat, 84, had returned “with no political or social role”. Days will tell the extent to which this “decree” will be implemented in Damascus and Latakia.

The brothers and the Brotherhood
When he was young, Rifaat had always been overshadowed by his stronger older brother, Hafez, who was seven years his senior. In 1952, he followed in his brother’s ideological footsteps and joined the Baath party. He also followed him in joining the military and later the interior ministry.

In March 1963, the Baath military committee, which his brother was a member of, seized power. Rifaat soon joined the military academy in Homs. After graduating, he served alongside his brother, who at the time was an air force commander.

His first military “tours” took place with Salim Hatoum and the raid of President Amin al-Hafez’s residence in February 1966. The raid was aimed at toppling the first Baath government. Under President Nureddin al-Atassi, Rifaat was tasked with commanding a special unit that was formed by the military committee to “defend the regime”.

Historians say that during the late 1960s, Syria witnessed two major conflicts. The first pitted Hafez and Rifaat against Salah Jadid and his chief of intelligence Abdulkarim al-Jundi. Between February 25 and 28, 1969, the Assad brothers launched a military operation in Damascus. Tanks moved in the capital against Jundi and Jadid loyalists. The former committed suicide on March 2, 1969, to avoid arrest. On November 17, 1970, Assad carried out the “comprehensive movement”, arresting Atassi and Jadid. Rifaat was then tasked with securing Damascus.

Rifaat became commander of the Defense Companies, which boasted some 40,000 soldiers and acted almost like an independent army that was not affiliated with the official military. Rifaat rose up the ranks in the party and he expanded his activities among students, the youth and the media.

The second conflict erupted in 1979. It pitted the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood. In December 1979, Rifaat declared it was time to “respond with force” against the movement, calling on everyone to pledge their absolute loyalty. He was quoted as saying: “Stalin sacrificed 10 million people to protect the Bolshevik revolution. Syria must do the same to protect the Baath revolution.” He threatened to wage a “hundred wars, destroy a million forts and sacrifice a million lives” to preserve the state-regime. He let loose in suppressing the uprising between 1979 and 1982. The situation reached its peak when he struck Hama in February 1982.

In 1983, he sent his paratroopers to Damascus with the command to remove the hijab off women on the streets. The move was met with widespread criticism, even his brother openly condemned him.

Edge of danger
When Hafez fell ill in November 1983, it appeared that the moment Rifaat had long awaited had arrived. He began to act as though he were the “legitimate heir”, seeing himself as the only heir. He began to rally the support of his generals, drawing the extreme ire of the president.

Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam recalled the tense situation in his memoirs, which were seen by Asharq Al-Awsat. He said he met with Hafez in March 1978 to address the extreme campaign against Rifaat among the Syrians. “This campaign weakens the regime,” Khaddam told Hafez. “You must address the situation with Rifaat.”

Indeed, Rifaat was meddling in the affairs of state and ordering around Prime Minster Mohammed Ali Halabi, who did not dare speak out.

Khaddam added: “The president wanted his brother to succeed him, but Rifaat committed a major sin when he tried to revolt against him when he had fallen ill in November 1983.”

He recalled that Hafez had at one point in 1980 told him that he wanted to appoint a vice president for the sake of “continuity, because no one knows when their time will come.” Khaddam, who was foreign minister at the time, understood that he was referring to Rifaat. His attempted coup, however, made his brother change his mind.

Remembering the failed coup, Khaddam said that when Hafez fell ill in November 1983, commander of the republican guard, Adnan Makhlouf, informed him that the president wanted to see him at hospital. “I believed that he was a victim of an assassination attempt,” said Khaddam. “I asked: ‘Was he shot or targeted by a bomb?’ to which Makhlouf replied: ‘He was struck by a heart attack.’ I headed to the hospital immediately.”

The next day, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel was scheduled to visit Syria. Hafez asked Khaddam to postpone the visit and to cite “his preoccupation with internal matters”. When Hafez left the ICU, Khaddam contacted army commander Hikmat al-Shihabi and asked him to come to the hospital. “We agreed to take measures that would avert attempts to blow up the situation in Syria, because I was fearful of Rifaat.”

Khaddam recalled how at one point he was on the phone with the Syrian ambassador to London to request that a doctor be flown over immediately. He demanded that the best doctor be sent to Syria. He had made a similar request to the envoy in Washington. Rifaat walked in at that moment and asked why should doctors be brought from abroad? Syria has doctors, he declared. Should doctors be brought in from abroad whenever anyone falls ill? Khaddam replied: “Your brother is called Hafez al-Assad, not Hafez Khaddam. It is my responsibility to provide all conditions for his recovery because I know what sort of chaos will happen if he is gone.”

Later, Khaddam said the American ambassador revealed to him that an American envoy was coming to Damascus to meet with Rifaat. He responded: “We won’t allow him to come. Syria has a state. If the United States wanted to contact us, then it should do so through the state that I represent as foreign minister.”

The next day, the Defense Companies paraded through the streets of Damascus and Rifaat declared to the people: “I am coming.” Soon after, Khaddam met with the military, Shihabi and Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. “We agreed to bring in two units from outside Damascus. They surrounded the city and the situation became tense. When senior officers who had pledged allegiance to Rifaat found out that Hafez was out of danger, they abandoned his brother. Rifaat became isolated.”

Tense meeting
At the time, the Central Command held a meeting. Everyone was shocked at the large numbers of Defense Companies members. Addressing the meeting, Rifaat said: “The Central Command must expel from the party Ali Duba (chief of military intelligence), Ibrahim Safi (commander of Syrian forces in Lebanon), Ali Haidar (commander of the special forces) and Mohammed Khawli (director of air force intelligence) because they are insulting me. I am the brother of the president. I should be treated like the president. If you don’t take a decision, then my forces will immediately occupy Damascus.”

Some of the members of the Central Command appeared hesitant. General Mustafa then addressed the gatherers: “These are your brothers. The problem can be solved if you meet together.” Khaddam then interjected, addressing Rifaat, he said: “You want to launch a coup? Go ahead. If every officer with a tank and soldiers wants to ride on our shoulders, then that is a dangerous thing. You have the tanks. Go ahead, make your move.” Rifaat was gradually becoming angrier. “I never said such a thing,” he retorted. Khaddam replied knowingly: “The discussion was recorded.”

After the meeting, Khaddam contacted Hafez to inform him of what happened. The president said he will check with Zuhair Masharqa, who was a member of the Central Command. Minutes later, Hafez told Khaddam that Masharqa had informed him that Rifaat did not make any threatening remarks. Khaddam told Hafez to check with the minister of defense and commander of the army because Masharqa was loyal to Rifaat. After around a quarter of an hour, Hafez contacted Khaddam again. “What you said was right. Zuhair is a coward and he lied to me,” said Hafez.

‘I am the regime’
In February 1984, Hafez carried out his retaliation. He ordered the arrest of Salim Barakat, Rifaat’s security aide. He also sent a message through their other brother, Jamil, to Rifaat, saying: “I am your older brother, whom you must obey. Do not forget that I am the one who made you.”

In March 1984, Hafez appointed Rifaat as vice president but with no official duties. In fact, this was not a form of promotion, but an attempt to curb Rifaat’s power through appointing him to a purely political role, one that would be under the constant watchful eye of the president. His security duties, as commander of the Defense Companies, were referred to Mohammed Ghanem.

Khaddam recalled how Rifaat’s appointment was announced. He said Hafez called the Central Command to meet in early March 1984. He informed the leadership that he had decided to appoint three vice presidents. He said he alone has the right to make such an order and name the officials, who were Rifaat Assad, Zuhair Masharqa and Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“I immediately told him that I didn’t want to be vice president or serve in any government or party position,” said Khaddam. “Hafez ended the meeting and then called me to his office. He asked me: ‘Why did you object?’ I replied: ‘How can you put Rifaat and Zuhair above me? Rifaat should be in jail, not act as first deputy to the president. I have worked tirelessly to serve my country. I will not practice any state or partisan work.’ He told: ‘Then take over the position of secretary of the Central Command.’ I rejected his offer and went home.”

“After about an hour, he called me back to his office. He welcomed me back with a laugh: ‘You are stubborn.’ He informed me that he issued a decree naming me as first vice president, followed by Rifaat and then Zuhair. I asked him what a vice president does. He replied that he is in charge of foreign policy. Soon after the decree was announced and I accepted.”

On March 30, 1984, Rifaat responded to the move. His soldiers entered Damascus with clear orders to seize power. They took over strategic positions throughout the capital and its surroundings. Rifaat’s forces clashes with Hafezloyalists, such as Ali Haidar of the special forces and Adnan Makhlouf of the republican guard.

Patrick Seale, author of Assad’s biography, “Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East,” wrote that had the two sides struck each other in the capital, the destruction would have been massive and the image of the regime would have been irreparably damaged. Hafez left the noose dangling enough for Rifaat to hang himself.

Hafez was in full military uniform, accompanied by his oldest son Bassel, who was to become his father’s right-hand man until his death in a car accident in 1994.

Hafez drove his car alone without any guards to confront Rifaat at the headquarters of his military command. Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass recalled the developments in a book, “Three months that shook Syria”. “Adnan Makhlouf, commander of the republican guard, informed me that Mr. president has headed alone to his brother’s headquarters in Mazzeh. He said the president had told him that if he was not back in an hour, then Tlass must carry out the plan (of confronting Rifaat’s forces),” wrote Tlass.

“Do you want to overthrow the regime?” Hafez asked Rifaat. “Here I am. I am the regime!” They argued and then Hafez offered Rifaat a way out, vowing to respect his dignity and interests and provide him with a safe exit to exile of his choosing. He promised that he would not arrest him.

In late April 1984, Rifaat sensed that the balance of power had started to lean in his brother’s favor to an extent that he could no longer move. He contacted his brother Jamil so that he could mediate a reconciliation and to say that he was ready to do anything the president wanted. Hafez was impatiently waiting for Rifaat to collapse and resign himself to the authority. He won the waiting game. Then the difficult negotiations began.

They agreed that the Defense Companies would come under the authority of the operations command in the armed forces. Rifaat would remain as vice president tasked with security affairs. They agreed that senior officers would travel with him to Moscow. On May 28, 1984, a plane carrying Rifaat and his senior officers flew to Moscow to cool down. They were summoned one by one back to Syria and Rifaat alone remained in exile.

‘My brother doesn’t love me’
It was said that prior to leaving Syria, Rifaat had thrown a huge banquet for his friends. “It appears as though my brother no longer loves me. When he sees me, he frowns. I am not an American agent. I did not conspire against my country,” he told them. “If I were a fool, I would have destroyed the entire city, but I love this place. My men have been here for 18 years, the people are used to us and they love us. Now the commandos want to kick us out.”

Rifaat returned to Syria in 1992 at the wishes of his mother, who died later that year. In 1994, he extended his condolences to Hafez when his son Bassel died. Later that year, he was discharged from his position in the army and kept his post as vice president before later being relieved of his duties.

In 1999, his supporters clashed in a gunfight with government forces in Latakia. He set up a satellite channel in London in September 1997. He established his own party in Europe that is headed by his son, Sumer. The party had called for political change and was met with criticism by loyalists and the opposition.

When Hafez died on June 10, 2000, he issued a statement to elegize him. He claimed to be his heir, but his calls fell on deaf ears. Khaddam ordered Rifaat’s arrest should he attempt to attend his brother’s funeral.

After the eruption of the 2011 protests in Syria, Rifaat stood against the regime. His son, Ribal, is openly involved in politics. Rifaat’s presence in the media gradually faded. He appeared during the presidential elections this year when he voted for his nephew at the Syrian consulate in Paris. He then sent a cable of congratulation to Bashar on his reelection. On Thursday, he returned to Syria.



What Lies Ahead for Ukraine’s Contested Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

A Russian service member stands guard at a checkpoint near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant before the arrival of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert mission in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict outside Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian-controlled Ukraine, June 15, 2023. (Reuters)
A Russian service member stands guard at a checkpoint near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant before the arrival of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert mission in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict outside Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian-controlled Ukraine, June 15, 2023. (Reuters)
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What Lies Ahead for Ukraine’s Contested Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

A Russian service member stands guard at a checkpoint near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant before the arrival of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert mission in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict outside Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian-controlled Ukraine, June 15, 2023. (Reuters)
A Russian service member stands guard at a checkpoint near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant before the arrival of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert mission in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict outside Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian-controlled Ukraine, June 15, 2023. (Reuters)

The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Europe's largest, is one of the main sticking points in US President Donald Trump's peace plan to end the nearly four-year war between Russia and Ukraine. The issue is one of 20 points laid out by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in a framework peace proposal.

Here are some of the issues regarding the facility:

WHAT ROLE MAY THE US PLAY?

Russia took control of the plant in March 2022 and announced plans to connect it to its power grid. Almost all countries consider that it belongs to Ukraine but Russia says it is owned by Russia and a unit of Russia's state-owned Rosatom nuclear corporation runs the plant.

Zelenskiy stated at the end of December that the US side had proposed joint trilateral operation of the nuclear power plant with an American chief manager.

Zelenskiy said the Ukrainian proposal envisages Ukrainian-American use of the plant, with the US itself determining how to use 50% of the energy produced.

Russia has considered joint Russian-US use of the plant, according to the Kommersant newspaper.

WHAT IS ITS CURRENT STATUS?

The plant is located in Enerhodar on the banks ‌of the Dnipro River and ‌the Kakhovka Reservoir, 550 km (342 miles) southeast of the capital Kyiv.

The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has ‌six ⁠Soviet-designed reactors. They were ‌all built in the 1980s, although the sixth only came online in the mid-1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has a total capacity of 5.7 gigawatts, according to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) database.

Four of the six reactors no longer use Russian nuclear fuel, having switched to fuel produced by then-US nuclear equipment supplier Westinghouse.

After Russia took control of the station, it shut down five of its six reactors and the last reactor ceased to produce electricity in September 2022. Rosatom said in 2025 that it was ready to return the US fuel to the United States.

According to the Russian management of the plant, all six reactors are in "cold shutdown."

Both Russia and Ukraine have accused each other of striking the nuclear plant and of severing power lines to the plant.

The plant's equipment is powered by ⁠electricity supplied from Ukraine. Over the past four years these supplies have been interrupted at least eleven times due to breaks in power lines, forcing the plant to switch to emergency diesel generators.

Emergency generators ‌on site can supply electricity to keep the reactors cool if external power lines are cut.

IAEA ‍Director General Rafael Grossi says that fighting a war around a nuclear ‍plant has put nuclear safety and security in constant jeopardy.

WHY DOES RUSSIA WANT ZAPORIZHZHIA PLANT?

Russia has been preparing to restart the station but ‍says that doing so will depend on the situation in the area. Rosatom chief Alexei Likhachev has not ruled out the supply of electricity produced there to parts of Ukraine.

Oleksandr Kharchenko, director of the Energy Research Center in Kyiv, said Moscow intended to use the plant to cover a significant energy deficit in Russia's south.

"That's why they are fighting so hard for this station," he said.

In December 2025, Russia's Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision issued a license for the operation of reactor No. 1, a key step towards restarting the reactor.

Ukraine's energy ministry called the move illegal and irresponsible, risking a nuclear accident.

WHY DOES UKRAINE NEED THE PLANT?

Russia has been pummeling Ukraine's energy infrastructure for months and some areas have had blackouts during winter.

In recent ⁠months, Russia has sharply increased both the scale and intensity of its attacks on Ukraine's energy sector, plunging entire regions into darkness.

Analysts say Ukraine's generation capacity deficit is about 4 gigawatts, or the equivalent of four Zaporizhzhia reactors.

Kharchenko says it would take Ukraine five to seven years to build the generating capacity to compensate for the loss of the Zaporizhzhia plant.

Kharchenko said that if Kyiv regained control of the plant, it would take at least two to three years to understand what condition it was in and another three years to restore the equipment and return it to full operations.

Both Ukrainian state nuclear operator Energoatom and Kharchenko said that Ukraine did not know the real condition of the nuclear power plant today.

WHAT ABOUT COOLING FUEL AT THE PLANT?

In the long term, there is the unresolved problem of the lack of water resources to cool the reactors after the vast Kakhovka hydro-electric dam was blown up in 2023, destroying the reservoir that supplied water to the plant.

Besides the reactors, there are also spent fuel pools at each reactor site used to cool down used nuclear fuel. Without water supply to the pools, the water evaporates and the temperatures increase, risking fire.

An emission of hydrogen from a spent fuel pool caused an explosion in Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster in ‌2011.

Energoatom said the level of the Zaporizhzhia power plant cooling pond had dropped by more than 15%, or 3 meters, since the destruction of the dam, and continued to fall.

Ukrainian officials previously said the available water reserves may be sufficient to operate one or, at most, two nuclear reactors.


Egypt, Trump Reaffirm Strategic Alliance in 2025 amid Regional Turmoil

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
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Egypt, Trump Reaffirm Strategic Alliance in 2025 amid Regional Turmoil

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)

After months of speculation over the trajectory of Egyptian-US relations, fueled by persistent talk of strain and an impending rift, a high-level meeting between President Donald Trump and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh reaffirmed the resilience of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Washington, even as the region remains in turmoil.

The meeting followed a turbulent period marked by Trump’s adoption of a proposal to relocate Gaza’s population, an idea firmly rejected by Sisi and one that prompted warnings of a diplomatic crisis between the two longtime allies.

The subsequent signing of a Gaza peace agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh sent a clear signal that, despite sharp disagreements over policy, the foundations of the bilateral relationship remain intact.

Early in Trump’s second term, media reports said Sisi had scrapped plans to visit Washington. As the year draws to a close, speculation has said that the visit may happen. Trump has acknowledged Sisi as a friend and said he would be happy to meet him as well.

Trump’s election victory late last year raised Egyptian hopes of strengthening the strategic partnership. Sisi voiced that expectation in a congratulatory post on X, stating that he looked forward to working together with Trump to achieve peace, preserve regional peace and stability, and strengthen the strategic partnership.

Those hopes were tested when Trump floated a plan to “clean out Gaza” and relocate its residents to Egypt and Jordan. Cairo rejected the idea outright, mobilized international opposition, unveiled an alternative plan for Gaza’s reconstruction and hosted an emergency summit on the issue in March.

Limited public engagement

David Butter, a research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, noted that the striking feature of Egypt-US ties over the past year has been their low public profile.

Aside from Trump’s appearance in Sharm el-Sheikh, there was not much happening in the open, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amr Hamzawy, an Egyptian political scientist and director of the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described the first year of Trump’s second term as difficult for bilateral relations.

He said it began with talk of displacement and a “Middle East Riviera” in Gaza, but Egyptian diplomacy succeeded in shifting the trajectory.

Trump’s peace plan, he said, ultimately signaled rejection of displacement and spoke of security and political tracks for Gaza and a broader political process for the Palestinian issue, though details remain unclear.

Hamzawy added that the year opened from a tough starting point that followed what he called President Joe Biden’s hesitant stance on Gaza, when displacement was first discussed.

After nearly a year of Egyptian political and diplomatic effort, he said, displacement dropped from Washington’s agenda, even if it remains a risk that cannot be ignored.

Historically, Egypt has been a pivotal state for US national security, given its geography, demographic weight and diplomatic role, according to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service.

Gaza, the main test

The Gaza war shaped Egyptian-US relations during Trump’s first year back in office. Washington backed Egyptian-Qatari mediation to halt the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio thanked Cairo after a truce was reached between Israel and Hamas in January.

When hostilities resumed, however, Egypt faced complex diplomatic choices with both Washington and Israel. It rejected Trump’s call to resettle Gaza’s population, while its reconstruction plan failed to gain US or Israeli acceptance.

Cairo also drew criticism from Trump for declining to join US strikes against Yemen’s Houthis, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) revealed.

Butter noted that ties with the Trump administration were strained over Gaza after Sisi canceled a Washington visit early in the year, following Trump’s “Middle East Riviera” remarks, which left contacts at a minimum.

He said Trump’s Sharm el-Sheikh visit, the signing of the Gaza agreement and the celebration of his plan’s success offered a chance to reset relations. Egypt, he added, has become indispensable to Trump’s administration in Gaza.

Hamzawy said Gaza dominated the first year of Trump’s term, giving Egypt a chance to restore its standing with US and European decision-makers as a key mediator. Cairo put its vision on the table, he said, shifting US thinking toward parallel security and political tracks and from talk of disarmament to limiting weapons.

Throughout the year, Egypt publicly counted on Trump to end the Gaza war. In July, Sisi urged him in a televised address to press for a halt, saying Trump was capable of doing so.

Analysts Daniel Byman and Jon Alterman wrote in Foreign Policy that Egypt is indispensable to international responses to the Gaza war, even if it remains a difficult partner for Washington and Israel. The conflict, they said, restored diplomatic focus on Egypt and strengthened its leverage.

Sara Kira, director of the European North African Center for Research, said relations in Trump’s second term differ from his first. The earlier term saw broad alignment and personal warmth from Trump, particularly on counterterrorism, she said. The second term has been marked by divergence.

That surfaced in April when Trump called for free passage for US commercial and military vessels through the Suez Canal in exchange for US efforts to protect the waterway.

Positive signals despite differences

Despite disagreements over Gaza, there were positive signs elsewhere. Early in the year, the US State Department froze new funding for most aid programs worldwide, exempting humanitarian food programs and military aid to Israel and Egypt.

Washington did not include Egypt on a travel ban list issued in June. Trump said Egypt was a country with which the United States dealt closely and that things there were under control. Egypt was also spared higher US tariffs. Cairo has repeatedly stressed the depth and resilience of the strategic relationship.

Kira said Egypt exerted maximum pressure to achieve peace and stop the Gaza war, eventually convincing Washington of its approach and reaching a peace agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh. She said Egypt acted pragmatically and astutely, reading Trump’s personality and US interests.

As talks on the second phase of the Gaza agreement stall, Egypt continues to rely on the Trump administration to advance its plan. Cairo remains in contact with Washington and is working with it to prepare a donor conference for Gaza’s reconstruction, which has yet to receive sufficient momentum from the Trump administration.

The dialogue extends beyond Gaza to Libya, Sudan, Lebanon and Iran, as well as water security, led by Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt fears could affect its Nile water share.

GERD

In mid-June, Trump stirred controversy in Egypt when he wrote on Truth Social that the United States had “stupidly” funded the dam Ethiopia built on the Blue Nile, triggering a severe diplomatic crisis with Egypt.

In August, the White House released a list of Trump’s foreign policy achievements, which included a purported agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia over the dam.

Trump has repeatedly spoken of his administration’s efforts to resolve the dispute, but those claims have yet to translate into concrete action.

Hamzawy said there is an opportunity for Washington to mediate and revive an agreement reached near the end of Trump’s first term.

Charles Dunne of the Arab Center Washington DC wrote recently that Trump’s stance may please Cairo but could also produce adverse outcomes if Washington does not assume a mediation role.

The United States hosted talks with the World Bank in 2020 during Trump’s first term, but they failed after Ethiopia refused to sign the draft agreement.

Military ties endure

Military cooperation continued largely as usual. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with about $90 billion in aid, with a sharp increase after 1979, which successive administrations have framed as an investment in regional stability, according to the CRS.

For more than a decade, Congress has imposed human rights conditions on part of Egypt’s aid.

Between fiscal years 2020 and 2023, the Biden administration and Congress withheld approximately $750 million in military funding. Trump’s technical annex to the proposed fiscal 2026 budget seeks $1.3 billion in military assistance for Egypt without conditions, the CRS said.

Hamzawy said the administration is far from imposing conditionality, noting that relations rest on mutual interests between a major power and a positively influential middle power.

Since the Gaza war, the Biden and Trump administrations have accelerated US arms sales to Egypt. The State Department notified Congress of military sales totaling $7.3 billion. In July, the Pentagon announced that the State Department had approved the sale of an advanced air defense missile system to Egypt, valued at approximately $4.67 billion. Egypt also hosted the Bright Star military exercises in September.

Kira said ties with Washington are driven by interests and that Cairo has positioned itself as a core regional player.

Hamzawy said Egypt occupies a central place in US Middle East thinking, as Washington needs a spectrum of allies, with Egypt at the heart of that network.


Why Metal Prices are Soaring to Record Highs

A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
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Why Metal Prices are Soaring to Record Highs

A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP

Precious and industrial metals are surging to record highs as the year ends, driven by economic and geopolitical uncertainty, robust industrial demand and, in some cases, tight supply.

Below AFP examines the reasons for the surge in demand.

- Safe havens -

Gold and silver are traditionally seen as safe-haven assets, and demand has soared amid mounting geopolitical tensions, from US President Donald Trump's tariffs onslaught to wars in Ukraine and Gaza, as well as recent pressure by Washington on Caracas.

Investors are also uneasy about rising public debt in major economies and the risk of a bubble in the artificial intelligence sector.

These uncertainties are driving up gold and silver, with other metals now starting to see the impact as investors seek to diversify their portfolios, explained John Plassard, an analyst at Cite Gestion Private Bank.

"Metal is once again becoming insurance rather than just a speculative asset," he told AFP.

- A weak dollar -

Traditional safe havens like the dollar and US Treasuries have become less attractive this year.

Uncertainty around Trump's presidency and the prospect of further Federal Reserve interest rate cuts, have weakened the dollar, reducing its appeal to investors.

As a result, many investors are turning to gold and silver.

Gold has climbed more than 70 percent this year and passed $4,500 an ounce for the first time on Wednesday, while silver reached a record high of $72 an ounce, with prices up about 2.5 times since January.

A weak dollar is also boosting industrial metals, since commodities priced in dollars become cheaper for buyers when the currency falls.

- Fresh demand -

Industrial demand has surged in recent months, driven by the rise of artificial intelligence and the energy transition.

Copper, used for solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicle batteries and data centers, has seen strong gains as a result.

Prices hit a record on Wednesday, topping $12,000 a ton, helped further by China, the world's largest copper consumer, announcing new measures to boost demand.

Aluminium, a cheaper alternative to copper, and silver are also benefiting from the AI boom and the shift to renewable energy.

Platinum and palladium, used in car catalytic converters, have also risen, reaching a record high and a three-year high respectively, after the European Union decided to allow sales of new internal combustion vehicles beyond 2035.

- Tight supply -

Copper prices have been lifted this year by fears of US tariffs, prompting companies to stockpile ahead of their introduction, with duties imposed on semi-finished products and potentially extending to refined copper.

Supply risks from disruptions at mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile and Indonesia have added to the price surge.

Physical markets for silver, platinum, and aluminium are also tight.

According to Ole Hansen, an analyst at Saxo Bank, thin holiday trading, which increases volatility, and investor fear of missing out have further amplified the rise at the end of the year.