Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
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Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)

The Syria that Rifaat al-Assad left when he was vice president to Hafez al-Assad decades ago is not the same one that he returned to after his nephew, President Bashar al-Assad, allowed him to return to as a “citizen.” The country has changed with its foreign alliances and role in the region. Its composition has changed and it is now “home” to five armies.

Accompanied by his wives, children and grandchildren, his first glimpses of Damascus, with its streets, checkpoints, officials and his former residence, may have rekindled memories of when he was at the height of his power. He may have recalled a time back in the 1980s when he orchestrated a “coup” against his brother and surrounded the capital.

Damascus, which 21 years ago ordered his arrest should he return from exile, rose above the wounds and received him so he can avoid imprisonment in France where he was sentenced to serve for five years. Days alone will decipher the “code” that was headlined by al-Watan newspaper last week and that said that Rifaat, 84, had returned “with no political or social role”. Days will tell the extent to which this “decree” will be implemented in Damascus and Latakia.

The brothers and the Brotherhood
When he was young, Rifaat had always been overshadowed by his stronger older brother, Hafez, who was seven years his senior. In 1952, he followed in his brother’s ideological footsteps and joined the Baath party. He also followed him in joining the military and later the interior ministry.

In March 1963, the Baath military committee, which his brother was a member of, seized power. Rifaat soon joined the military academy in Homs. After graduating, he served alongside his brother, who at the time was an air force commander.

His first military “tours” took place with Salim Hatoum and the raid of President Amin al-Hafez’s residence in February 1966. The raid was aimed at toppling the first Baath government. Under President Nureddin al-Atassi, Rifaat was tasked with commanding a special unit that was formed by the military committee to “defend the regime”.

Historians say that during the late 1960s, Syria witnessed two major conflicts. The first pitted Hafez and Rifaat against Salah Jadid and his chief of intelligence Abdulkarim al-Jundi. Between February 25 and 28, 1969, the Assad brothers launched a military operation in Damascus. Tanks moved in the capital against Jundi and Jadid loyalists. The former committed suicide on March 2, 1969, to avoid arrest. On November 17, 1970, Assad carried out the “comprehensive movement”, arresting Atassi and Jadid. Rifaat was then tasked with securing Damascus.

Rifaat became commander of the Defense Companies, which boasted some 40,000 soldiers and acted almost like an independent army that was not affiliated with the official military. Rifaat rose up the ranks in the party and he expanded his activities among students, the youth and the media.

The second conflict erupted in 1979. It pitted the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood. In December 1979, Rifaat declared it was time to “respond with force” against the movement, calling on everyone to pledge their absolute loyalty. He was quoted as saying: “Stalin sacrificed 10 million people to protect the Bolshevik revolution. Syria must do the same to protect the Baath revolution.” He threatened to wage a “hundred wars, destroy a million forts and sacrifice a million lives” to preserve the state-regime. He let loose in suppressing the uprising between 1979 and 1982. The situation reached its peak when he struck Hama in February 1982.

In 1983, he sent his paratroopers to Damascus with the command to remove the hijab off women on the streets. The move was met with widespread criticism, even his brother openly condemned him.

Edge of danger
When Hafez fell ill in November 1983, it appeared that the moment Rifaat had long awaited had arrived. He began to act as though he were the “legitimate heir”, seeing himself as the only heir. He began to rally the support of his generals, drawing the extreme ire of the president.

Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam recalled the tense situation in his memoirs, which were seen by Asharq Al-Awsat. He said he met with Hafez in March 1978 to address the extreme campaign against Rifaat among the Syrians. “This campaign weakens the regime,” Khaddam told Hafez. “You must address the situation with Rifaat.”

Indeed, Rifaat was meddling in the affairs of state and ordering around Prime Minster Mohammed Ali Halabi, who did not dare speak out.

Khaddam added: “The president wanted his brother to succeed him, but Rifaat committed a major sin when he tried to revolt against him when he had fallen ill in November 1983.”

He recalled that Hafez had at one point in 1980 told him that he wanted to appoint a vice president for the sake of “continuity, because no one knows when their time will come.” Khaddam, who was foreign minister at the time, understood that he was referring to Rifaat. His attempted coup, however, made his brother change his mind.

Remembering the failed coup, Khaddam said that when Hafez fell ill in November 1983, commander of the republican guard, Adnan Makhlouf, informed him that the president wanted to see him at hospital. “I believed that he was a victim of an assassination attempt,” said Khaddam. “I asked: ‘Was he shot or targeted by a bomb?’ to which Makhlouf replied: ‘He was struck by a heart attack.’ I headed to the hospital immediately.”

The next day, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel was scheduled to visit Syria. Hafez asked Khaddam to postpone the visit and to cite “his preoccupation with internal matters”. When Hafez left the ICU, Khaddam contacted army commander Hikmat al-Shihabi and asked him to come to the hospital. “We agreed to take measures that would avert attempts to blow up the situation in Syria, because I was fearful of Rifaat.”

Khaddam recalled how at one point he was on the phone with the Syrian ambassador to London to request that a doctor be flown over immediately. He demanded that the best doctor be sent to Syria. He had made a similar request to the envoy in Washington. Rifaat walked in at that moment and asked why should doctors be brought from abroad? Syria has doctors, he declared. Should doctors be brought in from abroad whenever anyone falls ill? Khaddam replied: “Your brother is called Hafez al-Assad, not Hafez Khaddam. It is my responsibility to provide all conditions for his recovery because I know what sort of chaos will happen if he is gone.”

Later, Khaddam said the American ambassador revealed to him that an American envoy was coming to Damascus to meet with Rifaat. He responded: “We won’t allow him to come. Syria has a state. If the United States wanted to contact us, then it should do so through the state that I represent as foreign minister.”

The next day, the Defense Companies paraded through the streets of Damascus and Rifaat declared to the people: “I am coming.” Soon after, Khaddam met with the military, Shihabi and Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. “We agreed to bring in two units from outside Damascus. They surrounded the city and the situation became tense. When senior officers who had pledged allegiance to Rifaat found out that Hafez was out of danger, they abandoned his brother. Rifaat became isolated.”

Tense meeting
At the time, the Central Command held a meeting. Everyone was shocked at the large numbers of Defense Companies members. Addressing the meeting, Rifaat said: “The Central Command must expel from the party Ali Duba (chief of military intelligence), Ibrahim Safi (commander of Syrian forces in Lebanon), Ali Haidar (commander of the special forces) and Mohammed Khawli (director of air force intelligence) because they are insulting me. I am the brother of the president. I should be treated like the president. If you don’t take a decision, then my forces will immediately occupy Damascus.”

Some of the members of the Central Command appeared hesitant. General Mustafa then addressed the gatherers: “These are your brothers. The problem can be solved if you meet together.” Khaddam then interjected, addressing Rifaat, he said: “You want to launch a coup? Go ahead. If every officer with a tank and soldiers wants to ride on our shoulders, then that is a dangerous thing. You have the tanks. Go ahead, make your move.” Rifaat was gradually becoming angrier. “I never said such a thing,” he retorted. Khaddam replied knowingly: “The discussion was recorded.”

After the meeting, Khaddam contacted Hafez to inform him of what happened. The president said he will check with Zuhair Masharqa, who was a member of the Central Command. Minutes later, Hafez told Khaddam that Masharqa had informed him that Rifaat did not make any threatening remarks. Khaddam told Hafez to check with the minister of defense and commander of the army because Masharqa was loyal to Rifaat. After around a quarter of an hour, Hafez contacted Khaddam again. “What you said was right. Zuhair is a coward and he lied to me,” said Hafez.

‘I am the regime’
In February 1984, Hafez carried out his retaliation. He ordered the arrest of Salim Barakat, Rifaat’s security aide. He also sent a message through their other brother, Jamil, to Rifaat, saying: “I am your older brother, whom you must obey. Do not forget that I am the one who made you.”

In March 1984, Hafez appointed Rifaat as vice president but with no official duties. In fact, this was not a form of promotion, but an attempt to curb Rifaat’s power through appointing him to a purely political role, one that would be under the constant watchful eye of the president. His security duties, as commander of the Defense Companies, were referred to Mohammed Ghanem.

Khaddam recalled how Rifaat’s appointment was announced. He said Hafez called the Central Command to meet in early March 1984. He informed the leadership that he had decided to appoint three vice presidents. He said he alone has the right to make such an order and name the officials, who were Rifaat Assad, Zuhair Masharqa and Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“I immediately told him that I didn’t want to be vice president or serve in any government or party position,” said Khaddam. “Hafez ended the meeting and then called me to his office. He asked me: ‘Why did you object?’ I replied: ‘How can you put Rifaat and Zuhair above me? Rifaat should be in jail, not act as first deputy to the president. I have worked tirelessly to serve my country. I will not practice any state or partisan work.’ He told: ‘Then take over the position of secretary of the Central Command.’ I rejected his offer and went home.”

“After about an hour, he called me back to his office. He welcomed me back with a laugh: ‘You are stubborn.’ He informed me that he issued a decree naming me as first vice president, followed by Rifaat and then Zuhair. I asked him what a vice president does. He replied that he is in charge of foreign policy. Soon after the decree was announced and I accepted.”

On March 30, 1984, Rifaat responded to the move. His soldiers entered Damascus with clear orders to seize power. They took over strategic positions throughout the capital and its surroundings. Rifaat’s forces clashes with Hafezloyalists, such as Ali Haidar of the special forces and Adnan Makhlouf of the republican guard.

Patrick Seale, author of Assad’s biography, “Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East,” wrote that had the two sides struck each other in the capital, the destruction would have been massive and the image of the regime would have been irreparably damaged. Hafez left the noose dangling enough for Rifaat to hang himself.

Hafez was in full military uniform, accompanied by his oldest son Bassel, who was to become his father’s right-hand man until his death in a car accident in 1994.

Hafez drove his car alone without any guards to confront Rifaat at the headquarters of his military command. Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass recalled the developments in a book, “Three months that shook Syria”. “Adnan Makhlouf, commander of the republican guard, informed me that Mr. president has headed alone to his brother’s headquarters in Mazzeh. He said the president had told him that if he was not back in an hour, then Tlass must carry out the plan (of confronting Rifaat’s forces),” wrote Tlass.

“Do you want to overthrow the regime?” Hafez asked Rifaat. “Here I am. I am the regime!” They argued and then Hafez offered Rifaat a way out, vowing to respect his dignity and interests and provide him with a safe exit to exile of his choosing. He promised that he would not arrest him.

In late April 1984, Rifaat sensed that the balance of power had started to lean in his brother’s favor to an extent that he could no longer move. He contacted his brother Jamil so that he could mediate a reconciliation and to say that he was ready to do anything the president wanted. Hafez was impatiently waiting for Rifaat to collapse and resign himself to the authority. He won the waiting game. Then the difficult negotiations began.

They agreed that the Defense Companies would come under the authority of the operations command in the armed forces. Rifaat would remain as vice president tasked with security affairs. They agreed that senior officers would travel with him to Moscow. On May 28, 1984, a plane carrying Rifaat and his senior officers flew to Moscow to cool down. They were summoned one by one back to Syria and Rifaat alone remained in exile.

‘My brother doesn’t love me’
It was said that prior to leaving Syria, Rifaat had thrown a huge banquet for his friends. “It appears as though my brother no longer loves me. When he sees me, he frowns. I am not an American agent. I did not conspire against my country,” he told them. “If I were a fool, I would have destroyed the entire city, but I love this place. My men have been here for 18 years, the people are used to us and they love us. Now the commandos want to kick us out.”

Rifaat returned to Syria in 1992 at the wishes of his mother, who died later that year. In 1994, he extended his condolences to Hafez when his son Bassel died. Later that year, he was discharged from his position in the army and kept his post as vice president before later being relieved of his duties.

In 1999, his supporters clashed in a gunfight with government forces in Latakia. He set up a satellite channel in London in September 1997. He established his own party in Europe that is headed by his son, Sumer. The party had called for political change and was met with criticism by loyalists and the opposition.

When Hafez died on June 10, 2000, he issued a statement to elegize him. He claimed to be his heir, but his calls fell on deaf ears. Khaddam ordered Rifaat’s arrest should he attempt to attend his brother’s funeral.

After the eruption of the 2011 protests in Syria, Rifaat stood against the regime. His son, Ribal, is openly involved in politics. Rifaat’s presence in the media gradually faded. He appeared during the presidential elections this year when he voted for his nephew at the Syrian consulate in Paris. He then sent a cable of congratulation to Bashar on his reelection. On Thursday, he returned to Syria.



Nepal Floods Expose Risks to Hydropower in a Warming Himalayas

An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)
An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)
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Nepal Floods Expose Risks to Hydropower in a Warming Himalayas

An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)
An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)

Workers shoveled thick mud from a flood-ravaged power station in central Nepal this week, trying to restore electricity to more than 20,000 people.

The floods that swept through Nepal and China, killing hundreds and leaving thousands missing, have also overrun hydropower facilities, knocking out about 10% of Nepal’s power capacity.

Once the immediate aftermath of the disaster is dealt with, the question will be how to restore power plants, roads, bridges, schools and health facilities without exposing them to the same vulnerabilities, disaster experts said.

“Authorities have to take a hard look in the mirror now and ask how they will be rebuilding in these places. They will also have to take a close look at other projects in Nepal that have not been built yet, whether they’ll be approved after this event,” said Jakob Steiner, a geoscientist at the University of Graz in Austria, who is currently based in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Rebuilding for resilience, not just replacement Hydropower projects that were operating or under construction were fully or partly destroyed across Rasuwa, Nuwakot and Dhading, among the worst-hit districts.

Hundreds of workers in Nepal are unaccounted for from a dozen hydropower projects, according to the Independent Power Producers’ Association, Nepal. Many had taken shelter in the tunnels but are stuck, waiting to be rescued, according to officials.

“The tunnels are built to access hydropower infrastructure and to divert water,” Steiner said, describing the tunnels as big enough for trucks to pass through.

Apart from the hydropower projects, tens of kilometers of roads, multiple bridges and essential buildings like schools and hospitals have been destroyed.

Ramraj Narasimhan, a senior director with the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, said rebuilding should focus on continuity of services rather than trying to make every structure indestructible.

“If it gets damaged, let it get damaged, but can we build in redundancy in the system?” he said.

That can mean choosing a better location for construction, alternate routes, backup power, improved early warning and financial tools such as insurance to speed recovery, Narasimhan said. Risk assessments should examine where a river bends, where slopes are unstable and where a single failure could cut off several communities.

Narasimhan’s organization estimates that $124 billion worth of Nepal’s infrastructure is exposed to climate-driven disasters, creating the potential for hundreds of millions of dollars in losses each year. A report by the coalition earlier this year found that Nepal’s average annual losses are nearly $760 million from various disasters, while the country’s national disaster funds is only a fraction of this amount.

Climate risks grow for Himalayan hydropower

Climate scientists said the Himalayan region, which is warming faster than many other parts of the world, is particularly at risk from increasing global warming as a result of human-caused climate change.

Climate experts said the flooding adds to evidence that infrastructure planning in the Himalayas should account for disasters that are increasing as the climate warms. Glaciers across the Hindu Kush Himalaya are losing ice at an accelerating rate, while permafrost degradation, unstable slopes, glacial lakes and increasingly erratic rainfall are raising the risks of floods, landslides and debris flows, according to reports by Kathmandu-based climate research group International Center for Integrated Mountain Development.

The stakes are particularly high for Nepal because hydropower is both a foundation of its electricity grid and an important source of economic growth and export revenue. Much of the country’s potential is run-of-river hydropower, Narasimhan said, meaning facilities are closely tied to steep river corridors where land is limited and hazards can cascade quickly.

Steiner said smaller floods can sometimes be managed with diversions that keep debris and high flows away from expensive infrastructure and tunnels. But for events as large as the latest flood, he said, physical defenses may be overwhelmed. In those cases, early warning becomes the critical protection for people.

He said the flood was detected at the China-Nepal border after moving rapidly from its source, leaving little warning time upstream. But there was still time as the flood traveled downstream toward hydropower sites, raising questions about whether warnings could have reached workers sooner.

The disaster is also likely to intensify scrutiny of where future projects are approved. Himanshu Thakkar, coordinator of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, said environmental, social and disaster-risk assessments need to reflect the specific landscape and past hazards of each valley, backed by land-use rules and stronger accountability.

Hydropower projects can themselves become “force multipliers” when large structures, debris and altered river channels add to downstream damage, Thakkar said. He argued that Nepal should also consider more decentralized solar power as part of a broader energy mix.

Thakkar said the question now is not only how fast Nepal can rebuild, but what it chooses to put back in the path of the next flood.


72 Hours that Arranged the Succession: Khaddam Recalls What Happened after Hafez al-Assad's Death

Bashar al-Assad during his father’s funeral in June 2000. (AFP)
Bashar al-Assad during his father’s funeral in June 2000. (AFP)
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72 Hours that Arranged the Succession: Khaddam Recalls What Happened after Hafez al-Assad's Death

Bashar al-Assad during his father’s funeral in June 2000. (AFP)
Bashar al-Assad during his father’s funeral in June 2000. (AFP)

Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam’s recent memoirs tackle the three days that followed the death of the late President Hafez al-Assad on June 10, 2000. He recalled the events from the perspective of someone who was inside the room where the succession was arranged.

The memoirs, edited and introduced by Ibrahim Hamidi, are due to be published in early September by Raff Publishing, a subsidiary of the Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG).

Khaddam contacted Hafez al-Assad to ask permission to travel to Baniyas, leading to a lengthy conversation about health and age in which Assad said: "I have carried burdens beyond my capacity." He ended the conversation with a request: "Call me when you arrive."

Upon Khaddam's return to Damascus on Saturday, he was informed that the presidential palace was calling for him and that "Dr. Bashar" - Assad’s son - was waiting for him at home, at which point he realized that the president had died.

In the reception hall, he found the members of the Syrian command with Bashar and his brother-in-law Assef Shawkat with discussions focusing on how to announced the death. Minister of Defense General Mustafa Tlass informed him that the Regional Command had made two decisions: nominating Bashar for the presidency and amending Article 83 of the Constitution regarding the age of the President of the Republic since Bashar was 34 years old and the constitution required the minimum age to be 40. The People's Assembly was to meet in the evening to approve the amendment.

The memoirs are due to be published in early September by Raff Publishing, a subsidiary of the Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG).

On the evening of Hafez’s death itself, Khaddam recalled that he met with Bashar at his home and suggested promoting him to the rank of general and appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces, "so that he would have a legitimate status in the state" before a referendum.

Bashar asked him whether they should consult Tlass, and Khaddam replied that they would inform him of the decision rather than ask him.

The following day, the proposal was presented to Tlass in the presence of Bashar, whereupon the Defense Minister's face turned pale and he fell silent before stating that he would order the drafting of the decree.

Here, the memoirs record the most striking point of contention: the decree was delayed, and when the director of Tlass's office was asked about the reason, he replied that the General wanted to promote Bashar to the rank of "Lieutenant General" rather than "General", a proposal that would have kept the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Army within the reach of the Defense Minister.

Khaddam revealed his conviction was that Tlass "was not fit for this position," and that he had made a decision to support Bashar "to the end, even if it were at the expense of old comrades."

Bashar al-Assad and Abdul Halim Khaddam at the Syrian parliament in 2000. (AFP)

The memoirs reveal that Bashar’s path to the presidency began in 1994 with the death of his brother Bassel. Khaddam recalled that while everyone was in Qardaha for the burial, he learned that Anisa Makhlouf and her brother Mohammad Makhlouf had met and decided to terminate Bashar’s studies in London so that he could take his brother’s place as Hafez’s eventual successor.

Recalling that period, Khaddam said: "We must not forget that the elder Assad built a regime in which he placed Syrians before two choices: either to accept the regime with all its flaws, or civil war."

The issue is not merely a story of military protocol; it reveals the fragility of the moment of transition in a regime built for decades around a single individual, and how the party, constitution, army, and family intervened within a few short hours to produce a succession intended to appear natural. The details of those 72 hours appear in the book's chapter titled "The Death of Hafez al-Assad."


School Starts Soon in Lebanon but Thousands Still Shelter in Them During War

Displaced woman, Randa al-Taki, 51, and her daughter Fatima Haidar, 11, arrange their clothes inside their makeshift room that set on a basketball court inside a public school turned into a shelter for people whose villages in southern Lebanon were destroyed or occupied by Israeli forces, in Tyre, southern Lebanon, Thursday, Aug. 27, 2026. (AP)
Displaced woman, Randa al-Taki, 51, and her daughter Fatima Haidar, 11, arrange their clothes inside their makeshift room that set on a basketball court inside a public school turned into a shelter for people whose villages in southern Lebanon were destroyed or occupied by Israeli forces, in Tyre, southern Lebanon, Thursday, Aug. 27, 2026. (AP)
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School Starts Soon in Lebanon but Thousands Still Shelter in Them During War

Displaced woman, Randa al-Taki, 51, and her daughter Fatima Haidar, 11, arrange their clothes inside their makeshift room that set on a basketball court inside a public school turned into a shelter for people whose villages in southern Lebanon were destroyed or occupied by Israeli forces, in Tyre, southern Lebanon, Thursday, Aug. 27, 2026. (AP)
Displaced woman, Randa al-Taki, 51, and her daughter Fatima Haidar, 11, arrange their clothes inside their makeshift room that set on a basketball court inside a public school turned into a shelter for people whose villages in southern Lebanon were destroyed or occupied by Israeli forces, in Tyre, southern Lebanon, Thursday, Aug. 27, 2026. (AP)

Eleven-year-old Fatima Khashab helps her mother tidy the small area where their family sleeps, in a row of makeshift living quarters in a school gymnasium.

About 200 families are sheltering in the school in Lebanon’s southern coastal city of Tyre. Most are from villages farther south that have been destroyed in the latest war between Israel and the Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah or are occupied by Israeli forces, like Fatima’s hometown of Mansouri.

The school year will start on Sept. 15, but thousands of displaced people still shelter in public schools. With negotiations between Israel and Lebanon — and between the US and Iran — stalled, there is no political solution in sight that would allow them to go home.

Education officials say they have a plan to reopen the schools while maintaining shelters for families with nowhere to go. But anxiety is high.

“We don’t know if we will be able to go back to our village or if the crisis will get even worse. Nobody except for God knows what’s going to happen," said Fatima’s mother, Randa al-Taki, 51.

On top of that, she said, “Our children are deprived of school, and we don’t know if they are going to learn this year or not.”

Education is again disrupted for children in Lebanon

Lebanon has traditionally prided itself on its education system. Its economy relies on sending educated young people abroad to work. They send remittances and make investments back home.

That system is in danger of crumbling.

Since 2019, Lebanon has been battered by an economic collapse, the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 Beirut port explosion and two wars. The current conflict has disrupted education for hundreds of thousands of children.

“There’s an estimated at least four years of learning loss now,” said Nora Ingdal, Lebanon country director for Save the Children, which has set up learning spaces for displaced children. “A sixth grader is actually on the level of a second grader.”

At the height of the current conflict, half of Lebanon’s public schools were used as shelters, disrupting education for more than 250,000 students, according to a report by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, a Qatar-based think tank.

Nasser Yassin, the center’s director in Beirut and a former Lebanese government minister who was in charge of the crisis response during the 2024 war, said the government should have used other places for shelters whenever possible, not schools.

“We should not respond to a displacement crisis by creating a long-term education crisis,” he said.

About 350,000 people remain displaced

The latest conflict between Israel and Hezbollah began on March 2, when the group fired rockets across the border two days after Israel and the US launched a war on Iran.

At the height of the war, some 1.2 million people were displaced in Lebanon.

Since late June, a shaky truce has allowed most to return home. In Beirut, the displacement crisis is no longer visible the way it was early in the war, when tents lined the seaside corniche and families slept in their cars along main thoroughfares.

But the Israeli military still occupies large swaths of southern Lebanon and has said it won't withdraw before Hezbollah is fully disarmed, a prospect that appears unlikely. Israeli troops have demolished houses in areas they control and launched strikes that they say target Hezbollah militants.

“Every day we see how they are demolishing our village with bulldozers, and they’re either blowing up the houses or bombing them in front of our eyes, and we can’t do anything,” al-Taki said of Israel's military. She is unsure if their house is still standing. Lebanon's state news agency reported new airstrikes and shelling on their hometown over the weekend.

Around 350,000 people remain displaced, according to the UN humanitarian office. While most have rented apartments or moved in with relatives, some 21,000 still stay in collective shelters.

Some have been displaced since the previous Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which erupted into full-scale war in September 2024.

That’s the case for Malak Abu Sari, 11, whose home was destroyed. Her family is staying in the school in Tyre.

Fatima's family was displaced in 2024, too, but they were able to return home before fleeing in March, early in the current war, and again about a month ago after briefly going back.

‘We feel that we’re suffocating’

At the school, Fatima's family is surrounded by relatives and former neighbors. The familiar faces make them feel less alone. Humanitarian groups organize activities for the children. One woman brought her cockatiel when she fled, and children stop by to play with him.

But the families chafe at the lack of privacy.

“We have a place to stay in the school, and thank God for that, but to be honest, we feel that we’re suffocating between these tarps,” al-Taki said.

Before the war, the family made a living farming zaatar, a herb used in a popular Levantine spice mix. Her husband sold snacks from a tuk-tuk on beaches. Now they've missed the zaatar season, and there’s no work.

Fatima pines for her old life. She misses being in her own bed and not in a cramped room with tarps for walls.

“I miss a lot of things,” she said. “I want to go back to school and stay in our own house.”

Online learning poses a challenge

Georgia Hachem, adviser to Lebanon’s education minister, said around 80 schools are still serving as shelters, but many host a small number of families.

In some cases, those schools will reopen for classes while part of the facility continues as a shelter. In other cases, families will be consolidated in a single location. In Beirut, the ministry will move displaced families to unused buildings.

“We have a solution for every single shelter, and no student will be left without a seat,” Hachem said.

The bigger issue, she said, is the 340 schools damaged in the war, with some 30 of them destroyed and no funds to repair them. Other schools are inaccessible in occupied areas.

After the war began, the education ministry offered online classes to students whose schools closed, but families in shelters often have internet problems and limited resources, Ingdal said.

“Maybe there’s one device in the family and you have five kids who are going to learn,” she said.

Most students can return to school in person this year, Hachem said, but a handful of schools will remain online.