Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
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Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)

The Syria that Rifaat al-Assad left when he was vice president to Hafez al-Assad decades ago is not the same one that he returned to after his nephew, President Bashar al-Assad, allowed him to return to as a “citizen.” The country has changed with its foreign alliances and role in the region. Its composition has changed and it is now “home” to five armies.

Accompanied by his wives, children and grandchildren, his first glimpses of Damascus, with its streets, checkpoints, officials and his former residence, may have rekindled memories of when he was at the height of his power. He may have recalled a time back in the 1980s when he orchestrated a “coup” against his brother and surrounded the capital.

Damascus, which 21 years ago ordered his arrest should he return from exile, rose above the wounds and received him so he can avoid imprisonment in France where he was sentenced to serve for five years. Days alone will decipher the “code” that was headlined by al-Watan newspaper last week and that said that Rifaat, 84, had returned “with no political or social role”. Days will tell the extent to which this “decree” will be implemented in Damascus and Latakia.

The brothers and the Brotherhood
When he was young, Rifaat had always been overshadowed by his stronger older brother, Hafez, who was seven years his senior. In 1952, he followed in his brother’s ideological footsteps and joined the Baath party. He also followed him in joining the military and later the interior ministry.

In March 1963, the Baath military committee, which his brother was a member of, seized power. Rifaat soon joined the military academy in Homs. After graduating, he served alongside his brother, who at the time was an air force commander.

His first military “tours” took place with Salim Hatoum and the raid of President Amin al-Hafez’s residence in February 1966. The raid was aimed at toppling the first Baath government. Under President Nureddin al-Atassi, Rifaat was tasked with commanding a special unit that was formed by the military committee to “defend the regime”.

Historians say that during the late 1960s, Syria witnessed two major conflicts. The first pitted Hafez and Rifaat against Salah Jadid and his chief of intelligence Abdulkarim al-Jundi. Between February 25 and 28, 1969, the Assad brothers launched a military operation in Damascus. Tanks moved in the capital against Jundi and Jadid loyalists. The former committed suicide on March 2, 1969, to avoid arrest. On November 17, 1970, Assad carried out the “comprehensive movement”, arresting Atassi and Jadid. Rifaat was then tasked with securing Damascus.

Rifaat became commander of the Defense Companies, which boasted some 40,000 soldiers and acted almost like an independent army that was not affiliated with the official military. Rifaat rose up the ranks in the party and he expanded his activities among students, the youth and the media.

The second conflict erupted in 1979. It pitted the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood. In December 1979, Rifaat declared it was time to “respond with force” against the movement, calling on everyone to pledge their absolute loyalty. He was quoted as saying: “Stalin sacrificed 10 million people to protect the Bolshevik revolution. Syria must do the same to protect the Baath revolution.” He threatened to wage a “hundred wars, destroy a million forts and sacrifice a million lives” to preserve the state-regime. He let loose in suppressing the uprising between 1979 and 1982. The situation reached its peak when he struck Hama in February 1982.

In 1983, he sent his paratroopers to Damascus with the command to remove the hijab off women on the streets. The move was met with widespread criticism, even his brother openly condemned him.

Edge of danger
When Hafez fell ill in November 1983, it appeared that the moment Rifaat had long awaited had arrived. He began to act as though he were the “legitimate heir”, seeing himself as the only heir. He began to rally the support of his generals, drawing the extreme ire of the president.

Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam recalled the tense situation in his memoirs, which were seen by Asharq Al-Awsat. He said he met with Hafez in March 1978 to address the extreme campaign against Rifaat among the Syrians. “This campaign weakens the regime,” Khaddam told Hafez. “You must address the situation with Rifaat.”

Indeed, Rifaat was meddling in the affairs of state and ordering around Prime Minster Mohammed Ali Halabi, who did not dare speak out.

Khaddam added: “The president wanted his brother to succeed him, but Rifaat committed a major sin when he tried to revolt against him when he had fallen ill in November 1983.”

He recalled that Hafez had at one point in 1980 told him that he wanted to appoint a vice president for the sake of “continuity, because no one knows when their time will come.” Khaddam, who was foreign minister at the time, understood that he was referring to Rifaat. His attempted coup, however, made his brother change his mind.

Remembering the failed coup, Khaddam said that when Hafez fell ill in November 1983, commander of the republican guard, Adnan Makhlouf, informed him that the president wanted to see him at hospital. “I believed that he was a victim of an assassination attempt,” said Khaddam. “I asked: ‘Was he shot or targeted by a bomb?’ to which Makhlouf replied: ‘He was struck by a heart attack.’ I headed to the hospital immediately.”

The next day, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel was scheduled to visit Syria. Hafez asked Khaddam to postpone the visit and to cite “his preoccupation with internal matters”. When Hafez left the ICU, Khaddam contacted army commander Hikmat al-Shihabi and asked him to come to the hospital. “We agreed to take measures that would avert attempts to blow up the situation in Syria, because I was fearful of Rifaat.”

Khaddam recalled how at one point he was on the phone with the Syrian ambassador to London to request that a doctor be flown over immediately. He demanded that the best doctor be sent to Syria. He had made a similar request to the envoy in Washington. Rifaat walked in at that moment and asked why should doctors be brought from abroad? Syria has doctors, he declared. Should doctors be brought in from abroad whenever anyone falls ill? Khaddam replied: “Your brother is called Hafez al-Assad, not Hafez Khaddam. It is my responsibility to provide all conditions for his recovery because I know what sort of chaos will happen if he is gone.”

Later, Khaddam said the American ambassador revealed to him that an American envoy was coming to Damascus to meet with Rifaat. He responded: “We won’t allow him to come. Syria has a state. If the United States wanted to contact us, then it should do so through the state that I represent as foreign minister.”

The next day, the Defense Companies paraded through the streets of Damascus and Rifaat declared to the people: “I am coming.” Soon after, Khaddam met with the military, Shihabi and Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. “We agreed to bring in two units from outside Damascus. They surrounded the city and the situation became tense. When senior officers who had pledged allegiance to Rifaat found out that Hafez was out of danger, they abandoned his brother. Rifaat became isolated.”

Tense meeting
At the time, the Central Command held a meeting. Everyone was shocked at the large numbers of Defense Companies members. Addressing the meeting, Rifaat said: “The Central Command must expel from the party Ali Duba (chief of military intelligence), Ibrahim Safi (commander of Syrian forces in Lebanon), Ali Haidar (commander of the special forces) and Mohammed Khawli (director of air force intelligence) because they are insulting me. I am the brother of the president. I should be treated like the president. If you don’t take a decision, then my forces will immediately occupy Damascus.”

Some of the members of the Central Command appeared hesitant. General Mustafa then addressed the gatherers: “These are your brothers. The problem can be solved if you meet together.” Khaddam then interjected, addressing Rifaat, he said: “You want to launch a coup? Go ahead. If every officer with a tank and soldiers wants to ride on our shoulders, then that is a dangerous thing. You have the tanks. Go ahead, make your move.” Rifaat was gradually becoming angrier. “I never said such a thing,” he retorted. Khaddam replied knowingly: “The discussion was recorded.”

After the meeting, Khaddam contacted Hafez to inform him of what happened. The president said he will check with Zuhair Masharqa, who was a member of the Central Command. Minutes later, Hafez told Khaddam that Masharqa had informed him that Rifaat did not make any threatening remarks. Khaddam told Hafez to check with the minister of defense and commander of the army because Masharqa was loyal to Rifaat. After around a quarter of an hour, Hafez contacted Khaddam again. “What you said was right. Zuhair is a coward and he lied to me,” said Hafez.

‘I am the regime’
In February 1984, Hafez carried out his retaliation. He ordered the arrest of Salim Barakat, Rifaat’s security aide. He also sent a message through their other brother, Jamil, to Rifaat, saying: “I am your older brother, whom you must obey. Do not forget that I am the one who made you.”

In March 1984, Hafez appointed Rifaat as vice president but with no official duties. In fact, this was not a form of promotion, but an attempt to curb Rifaat’s power through appointing him to a purely political role, one that would be under the constant watchful eye of the president. His security duties, as commander of the Defense Companies, were referred to Mohammed Ghanem.

Khaddam recalled how Rifaat’s appointment was announced. He said Hafez called the Central Command to meet in early March 1984. He informed the leadership that he had decided to appoint three vice presidents. He said he alone has the right to make such an order and name the officials, who were Rifaat Assad, Zuhair Masharqa and Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“I immediately told him that I didn’t want to be vice president or serve in any government or party position,” said Khaddam. “Hafez ended the meeting and then called me to his office. He asked me: ‘Why did you object?’ I replied: ‘How can you put Rifaat and Zuhair above me? Rifaat should be in jail, not act as first deputy to the president. I have worked tirelessly to serve my country. I will not practice any state or partisan work.’ He told: ‘Then take over the position of secretary of the Central Command.’ I rejected his offer and went home.”

“After about an hour, he called me back to his office. He welcomed me back with a laugh: ‘You are stubborn.’ He informed me that he issued a decree naming me as first vice president, followed by Rifaat and then Zuhair. I asked him what a vice president does. He replied that he is in charge of foreign policy. Soon after the decree was announced and I accepted.”

On March 30, 1984, Rifaat responded to the move. His soldiers entered Damascus with clear orders to seize power. They took over strategic positions throughout the capital and its surroundings. Rifaat’s forces clashes with Hafezloyalists, such as Ali Haidar of the special forces and Adnan Makhlouf of the republican guard.

Patrick Seale, author of Assad’s biography, “Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East,” wrote that had the two sides struck each other in the capital, the destruction would have been massive and the image of the regime would have been irreparably damaged. Hafez left the noose dangling enough for Rifaat to hang himself.

Hafez was in full military uniform, accompanied by his oldest son Bassel, who was to become his father’s right-hand man until his death in a car accident in 1994.

Hafez drove his car alone without any guards to confront Rifaat at the headquarters of his military command. Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass recalled the developments in a book, “Three months that shook Syria”. “Adnan Makhlouf, commander of the republican guard, informed me that Mr. president has headed alone to his brother’s headquarters in Mazzeh. He said the president had told him that if he was not back in an hour, then Tlass must carry out the plan (of confronting Rifaat’s forces),” wrote Tlass.

“Do you want to overthrow the regime?” Hafez asked Rifaat. “Here I am. I am the regime!” They argued and then Hafez offered Rifaat a way out, vowing to respect his dignity and interests and provide him with a safe exit to exile of his choosing. He promised that he would not arrest him.

In late April 1984, Rifaat sensed that the balance of power had started to lean in his brother’s favor to an extent that he could no longer move. He contacted his brother Jamil so that he could mediate a reconciliation and to say that he was ready to do anything the president wanted. Hafez was impatiently waiting for Rifaat to collapse and resign himself to the authority. He won the waiting game. Then the difficult negotiations began.

They agreed that the Defense Companies would come under the authority of the operations command in the armed forces. Rifaat would remain as vice president tasked with security affairs. They agreed that senior officers would travel with him to Moscow. On May 28, 1984, a plane carrying Rifaat and his senior officers flew to Moscow to cool down. They were summoned one by one back to Syria and Rifaat alone remained in exile.

‘My brother doesn’t love me’
It was said that prior to leaving Syria, Rifaat had thrown a huge banquet for his friends. “It appears as though my brother no longer loves me. When he sees me, he frowns. I am not an American agent. I did not conspire against my country,” he told them. “If I were a fool, I would have destroyed the entire city, but I love this place. My men have been here for 18 years, the people are used to us and they love us. Now the commandos want to kick us out.”

Rifaat returned to Syria in 1992 at the wishes of his mother, who died later that year. In 1994, he extended his condolences to Hafez when his son Bassel died. Later that year, he was discharged from his position in the army and kept his post as vice president before later being relieved of his duties.

In 1999, his supporters clashed in a gunfight with government forces in Latakia. He set up a satellite channel in London in September 1997. He established his own party in Europe that is headed by his son, Sumer. The party had called for political change and was met with criticism by loyalists and the opposition.

When Hafez died on June 10, 2000, he issued a statement to elegize him. He claimed to be his heir, but his calls fell on deaf ears. Khaddam ordered Rifaat’s arrest should he attempt to attend his brother’s funeral.

After the eruption of the 2011 protests in Syria, Rifaat stood against the regime. His son, Ribal, is openly involved in politics. Rifaat’s presence in the media gradually faded. He appeared during the presidential elections this year when he voted for his nephew at the Syrian consulate in Paris. He then sent a cable of congratulation to Bashar on his reelection. On Thursday, he returned to Syria.



Iran at a Critical Crossroads Testing the Survival of its Regime

Burning debris lies in the middle of a street during protests in Hamedan, western Iran, Jan. 1, 2026. (AFP/Getty Images)
Burning debris lies in the middle of a street during protests in Hamedan, western Iran, Jan. 1, 2026. (AFP/Getty Images)
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Iran at a Critical Crossroads Testing the Survival of its Regime

Burning debris lies in the middle of a street during protests in Hamedan, western Iran, Jan. 1, 2026. (AFP/Getty Images)
Burning debris lies in the middle of a street during protests in Hamedan, western Iran, Jan. 1, 2026. (AFP/Getty Images)

Iran is confronting one of the most consequential junctures since the founding of the republic in 1979. The pressures bearing down on the system are no longer confined to economic sanctions or familiar forms of external coercion, but now cut to the heart of the governing formula itself: how to ensure the regime’s survival without accelerating the very forces that threaten to undermine it.

At the center of this moment lies a stark existential dilemma. A permissive response to internal unrest risks allowing protests to spread and harden into a protracted campaign of political attrition, while a sweeping security crackdown would heighten external dangers, at a time of mounting international hostility and unprecedented US warnings.

Caught between these two paths, Tehran finds its room for maneuver shrinking to levels it has rarely faced before.

Passing protests or structural shift?

The evolution of the current protests raises a central question about their nature: are they a containable social wave, or a deeper expression of a shift in public mood? The spread of demonstrations to small and medium-sized cities, and the widening of their social base, reflect an advanced level of discontent, even if it has not yet reached the threshold of a comprehensive explosion.

Farzin Nadimi, a senior Iran analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argues that this wave differs from previous ones.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the latest protests, unlike earlier waves led by university students or low-income workers in major cities, are now driven by young people in smaller towns and supported by university students nationwide.

He described them as “more entrenched and widespread,” though not yet as large as some previous protests, noting the absence of government employees and oil workers, alongside a strong female presence once again.

This assessment aligns with the reading of Michael Rubin, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, who pointed to three key differences defining this wave: the nature of the participating forces, the symbolism of its launch from Tehran’s bazaar, and the impact of Israeli strikes that have punctured the aura surrounding Iran.

By contrast, Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, cautions against overestimating the street’s ability to bring about rapid change, noting that the Iranian system is highly organized and does not hesitate to use violence to control society.

‘Political fuel’

Iran’s economic crisis is no longer a technical issue that can be separated from politics. The collapse of the currency, the erosion of purchasing power, and declining trust in institutions have turned the economy into a direct driver of protest.

With each new round of pressure or sanctions, the sense deepens that the system is incapable of delivering real solutions without making political concessions.

Alex Vatanka, a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, argues that what is unfolding goes beyond anger over prices or living conditions.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the protests reflect a deeper shift in public opinion, in which opposition is no longer directed at specific policies but at the model of governance itself. This shift, he said, confronts the system with a difficult question: can the economy be saved without rethinking the structure of power?

The security establishment: cohesion or fatigue?

Security institutions, from the Revolutionary Guards and their Basij mobilization arm to the intelligence services, form the backbone of the system’s ability to endure. Historically, these institutions have been the primary guarantor of internal stability, but mounting pressures now raise questions about their moral and ideological cohesion.

Rubin said that cracks are widening, pointing to rumors that Tehran has turned to deploying forces from Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces and Afghanistan’s Fatemiyoun Brigade due to declining confidence in some Revolutionary Guard units’ willingness to carry out orders.

Vatanka, for his part, acknowledged that these institutions remain cohesive for now, but warned that this cohesion is under growing strain from economic and social exhaustion, which over time could erode morale and produce partial fractures, even if open defections remain unlikely in the foreseeable future.

From deterrence to breaking taboos

If internal challenges are pressing on the structure of power, the external environment multiplies the risks. US-Israeli escalation, coupled with the waning weight of regional allies, places Iran before a radically different strategic landscape.

Threats by US President Donald Trump to support Iranian protesters signal a qualitative shift in US rhetoric, in which the focus is no longer confined to the nuclear program, but now includes Iran’s internal dynamics as part of the pressure equation.

Nadimi said that the developments in Venezuela and the arrest of Nicolas Maduro as carrying troubling implications for Tehran, while stressing the differences between the two cases, arguing that Iran is larger and more complex, and that Washington does not believe its system can be easily overthrown without a clear internal alternative.

Vatanka, however, sees a significant psychological impact from that precedent, saying it has weakened the assumption that leaders are immune from personal targeting.

The regional network: asset or burden?

Israeli strikes in June that targeted military leaders and sovereign symbols inside Iran reflect a shift in Israel’s security doctrine, from containment to direct confrontation.

O’Hanlon said that this pattern, following events in Venezuela and attacks on figures linked to Iran’s nuclear program, has become more likely under Trump, reflecting a willingness to break taboos that once held.

At the same time, questions are resurfacing over the effectiveness of Iran’s regional network. According to Vatanka, these arms are no longer a real deterrent, but have become, given their rising costs, a strategic burden.

Rubin agreed, adding that they have drained the state treasury, although he does not rule out the system turning to them if the crisis intensifies on the domestic front.

Amid this complex entanglement between internal and external pressures, the Iranian system’s options are narrowing as never before.

Between those who see this weakness as an opportunity to rebalance the region and those who fear widespread chaos, the core question remains: Is Tehran facing a manageable crisis of governance or an existential crisis that could shape Iran and the region for decades to come?


‘Nobody Is Going to Run Home’: Venezuelan Diaspora in Wait-and-See Mode

A young protester sits on a large-scale Venezuelan national flag during a protest following US military action in Venezuela, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 05 January 2026. (EPA)
A young protester sits on a large-scale Venezuelan national flag during a protest following US military action in Venezuela, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 05 January 2026. (EPA)
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‘Nobody Is Going to Run Home’: Venezuelan Diaspora in Wait-and-See Mode

A young protester sits on a large-scale Venezuelan national flag during a protest following US military action in Venezuela, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 05 January 2026. (EPA)
A young protester sits on a large-scale Venezuelan national flag during a protest following US military action in Venezuela, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 05 January 2026. (EPA)

"A new dawn for Venezuela" is how a top US diplomat described the future awaiting the Caribbean country after Saturday's capture of President Nicolas Maduro by US special forces in a raid on Caracas.

But for some of the eight million Venezuelans who fled the country over the past decade of economic ruin and repression, the joy at seeing Maduro hauled before a New York court on Monday was tempered by the knowledge that his henchmen remain at the helm.

News of Maduro's demise initially triggered scenes of jubilation among the diaspora.

Several people choked up as they recalled the hardship they fled, and the family they left behind, over the course of his increasingly despotic rule.

But while many said they dreamed about returning to their homeland, they made it clear they had no plans to pack their bags just yet.

Most cited the country's tattered economy as a reason to keep working abroad and sending home remittances.

Some also spoke of their fear of Venezuela's security apparatus, pointing to the paramilitaries who roamed the streets of Caracas on Saturday to crack down on anyone rejoicing over Maduro's ouster.

"There has been no change of regime in Venezuela, there is no transition," said Ligia Bolivar, a Venezuelan sociologist and rights activist living in Colombia since 2019.

"In these circumstances nobody is going to run home," she told AFP.

Standing outside the Venezuelan consulate in Bogota, where he was waiting to renew his passport on Monday, Alejandro Solorzano, 35, echoed that view.

"Everything remains the same," he said, referring to US President Donald Trump's decision to work with Maduro's administration rather than the democratic opposition.

Maduro's former deputy Delcy Rodriguez was sworn in as acting president on Monday, becoming the interim head of an administration that still includes hardline Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello and powerful Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez.

Cabello in particular is a figure of dread for many Venezuelans, after commandeering a crackdown on post-election protests in 2024 in which some 2,400 people were arrested.

Many Venezuelans were particularly shocked by Trump's decision to sideline opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, from the transition.

The European Union on Monday demanded that any transition include Machado and her replacement candidate in the 2024 elections Maduro is accused of stealing, Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia.

Andrea, a 47-year-old immigration advisor living in Buenos Aires, argued, however, that Machado's hour had not yet come.

"Until Trump sees that the situation is under control, until he has all these criminals by the balls, he won't be able to put Maria Corina in charge. Because that would be throwing her to the wolves," she said.

- 'No other way' -

Luis Peche, a political analyst who survived a gun attack in Bogota last year suspected of being a political hit, also argued in favor of a negotiated transition.

"We have to see this as a process," Peche told AFP, referring to Venezuela's transition.

"You still need part of the state apparatus to remain," he said.

Tamara Suju, a leading Venezuelan rights expert based in Spain, said that keeping the same tainted cast in charge was a necessary evil -- in the short term.

"They are the ones with whom the Trump administration is negotiating the transition because there is no other way to do it," she told Spain's esRadio, predicting they would eventually be forced by Washington to fall on their swords.

Edwin Reyes, a 46-year-old window installer living in Colombia for the past eight years, said that once Venezuela was "completely free" he would consider a move back.

"We've waited so long, another four or five months won't hurt."


Trump Administration's Capture of Maduro Raises Unease about the International Legal Framework

President Donald Trump waves as he arrives on Air Force One, Sunday, Jan. 4, 2026, at Joint Base Andrews, Md. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)
President Donald Trump waves as he arrives on Air Force One, Sunday, Jan. 4, 2026, at Joint Base Andrews, Md. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)
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Trump Administration's Capture of Maduro Raises Unease about the International Legal Framework

President Donald Trump waves as he arrives on Air Force One, Sunday, Jan. 4, 2026, at Joint Base Andrews, Md. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)
President Donald Trump waves as he arrives on Air Force One, Sunday, Jan. 4, 2026, at Joint Base Andrews, Md. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)

From the smoldering wreckage of two catastrophic world wars in the last century, nations came together to build an edifice of international rules and laws. The goal was to prevent such sprawling conflicts in the future.

Now that world order — centered at the United Nations headquarters in New York, near the courtroom where Nicolás Maduro was arraigned Monday after his removal from power in Venezuela — appears in danger of crumbling as the doctrine of “might makes right” muscles its way back onto the global stage.

UN Undersecretary-General Rosemary A. DiCarlo told the body's Security Council on Monday that the “maintenance of international peace and security depends on the continued commitment of all member states to adhere to all the provisions of the (UN) Charter.”

US President Donald Trump insists capturing Maduro was legal. His administration has declared the drug cartels operating from Venezuela to be unlawful combatants and said the US is now in an “armed conflict” with them, according to an administration memo obtained in October by The Associated Press.

The mission to snatch Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores from their home on a military base in the capital Caracas means they face charges of participating in a narco-terrorism conspiracy. The US ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, defended the military action as a justified “surgical law enforcement operation.”

The move fits into the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, published last month, that lays out restoring “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere” as a key goal of the US president's second term in the White House.

But could it also serve as a blueprint for further action?

Worry rises about future action

On Sunday evening, Trump also put Venezuela’s neighbor, Colombia, and its leftist president, Gustavo Petro, on notice.

In a back-and-forth with reporters, Trump said Colombia is “run by a sick man who likes making cocaine and selling it to the United States.” The Trump administration imposed sanctions in October on Petro, his family and a member of his government over accusations of involvement in the global drug trade. Colombia is considered the epicenter of the world’s cocaine trade.

Analysts and some world leaders — from China to Mexico — have condemned the Venezuela mission. Some voiced fears that Maduro’s ouster could pave the way for more military interventions and a further erosion of the global legal order.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said the capture of Maduro “runs counter to the principle of the non-use of force, which forms the basis of international law.”

He warned the “increasing number of violations of this principle by nations vested with the important responsibility of permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council will have serious consequences for global security and will spare no one.”

Here are some global situations that could be affected by changing attitudes on such issues.

Ukraine

For nearly four years, Europe has been dealing with Russia’s war of aggression in neighboring Ukraine, a conflict that grates against the eastern flank of the continent and the transatlantic NATO alliance and has widely been labeled a grave breach of international law.

The European Union relies deeply on US support to keep Ukraine afloat, particularly after the administration warned that Europe must look after its own security in the future.

Vasily Nebenzya, the Russian ambassador to the UN, said the mission to extract Maduro amounted to “a turn back to the era of lawlessness” by the United States. During the UN Security Council’s emergency meeting, he called on the 15-member panel to “unite and to definitively reject the methods and tools of US military foreign policy.”

Volodymyr Fesenko, chairman of the board of the Penta think tank in Kyiv, Ukraine, said Russian President Vladimir Putin has long undermined the global order and weakened international law.

“Unfortunately,” he said, “Trump’s actions have continued this trend.”

Greenland

Trump fanned another growing concern for Europe when he openly speculated about the future of the Danish territory of Greenland.

“It’s so strategic right now. Greenland is covered with Russian and Chinese ships all over the place,” Trump told reporters Sunday as he flew back to Washington from his home in Florida. “We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security, and Denmark is not going to be able to do it.”

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in a statement that Trump has “no right to annex” the territory. She also reminded Trump that Denmark already provides the US, a fellow NATO member, broad access to Greenland through existing security agreements.

Taiwan

The mission to capture Maduro has ignited speculation about a similar move China could make against the leader of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te. Just last week, in response to a US plan to sell a massive military arms package to Taipei, China conducted two days of military drills around the island emocracy that Beijing claims as its own territory.

Beijing, however, is unlikely to replicate Trump’s action in Venezuela, which could prove destabilizing and risky.

Chinese strategy has been to gradually increase pressure on Taiwan through military harassment, propaganda campaigns and political influence rather than to single out Lai as a target. China looks to squeeze Taiwan into eventually accepting a status similar to Hong Kong and Macau, which are governed semi-autonomously on paper but have come under increasing central control.

For China, Maduro’s capture also brings a layer of uncertainty about the Trump administration’s ability to move fast, unpredictably and audaciously against other governments. Beijing has criticized Maduro’s capture, calling it a “blatant use of force against a sovereign state” and saying Washington is acting as the “world’s judge.”

The Mideast

Israel's grinding attack on Gaza in the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas underscored the international community's inability to stop a devastating conflict. The United States, Israel's staunchest ally, vetoed Security Council resolutions calling for ceasefires in Gaza.

Trump already has demonstrated his willingness to take on Israel's neighbor and longtime US adversary Iran over its nuclear program with military strikes on sites in Iran in June 2025.

On Friday, Trump warned Iran that if Tehran “violently kills peaceful protesters,” the US “will come to their rescue.” Violence sparked by Iran’s ailing economy has killed at least 35 people, activists said Tuesday.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry condemned the “illegal US attack against Venezuela.”

Europe and Trump

The 27-nation European Union, another post-World War II institution intended to foster peace and prosperity, is grappling with how to respond to its traditional ally under the Trump administration. In a clear indication of the increasingly fragile nature of the transatlantic relationship, Trump’s national security strategy painted the bloc as weak.

While insisting Maduro has no political legitimacy, the EU said in a statement on the mission to capture him that “the principles of international law and the UN Charter must be upheld,” adding that members of the UN Security Council “have a particular responsibility to uphold those principles.”

But outspoken Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a close Trump ally, spoke disparagingly about the role international law plays in regulating the behavior of countries.

International rules, he said, “do not govern the decisions of many great powers. This is completely obvious.”