Omani Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Time to Revive Transportation of Saudi Oil to Arabian Sea

Oman’s Economic Minister Said bin Mohammed al Saqri. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Oman’s Economic Minister Said bin Mohammed al Saqri. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

Omani Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Time to Revive Transportation of Saudi Oil to Arabian Sea

Oman’s Economic Minister Said bin Mohammed al Saqri. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Oman’s Economic Minister Said bin Mohammed al Saqri. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Oman’s Economy Minister Said bin Mohammed al Saqri said the economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman has increased since the establishment of the Saudi-Omani Coordination Council in July.

“The council aims to develop a common vision for deepening and sustaining relations between the two countries, in addition to raising the level of cooperation in political, economic, security, military, and human development fields,” al Saqri told Asharq Al-Awsat in an exclusive interview.

The minister emphasized that the Council is also tasked with developing a framework for joint agreements and projects between Oman and Saudi Arabia as well as providing facilities to investors.

Besides promoting investment, the Council follows up on the “implementation and facilitation of initiatives and projects between the Kingdom and the Sultanate.”

Al Saqri noted that the top three sectors in which Saudi investment is concentrated in the Sultanate are trade, construction, and services.

The upturn in economic cooperation stems from the common factors shared between the national visions launched by the Kingdom and the Sultanate.

Each of the Oman Vision 2040 and Kingdom’s Vision 2030 seek to diversify the economy, reduce dependence on oil and create conditions for the private sector and investors to have a more significant role in providing job opportunities, as well as seeking to attract foreign direct investment among others.

“We believe that there is a need for fruitful work from both sides in a way that contributes to enhancing integration and partnership between the two visions in all fields, especially cooperation in economic diversification projects,” al Saqri told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The minister emphasized that the two visions include substantial investment opportunities, especially in the fields of knowledge, innovation, and technology.

“The volume of trade exchange between the Sultanate and the Kingdom increased by the end of 2020 to $2.5 billion, compared to about $1.4 billion in 2010, while the number of Saudi companies in the Sultanate increased to 1,235 in 2021, compared to 467 companies in 2010,” revealed al Saqri.

He called for improving the maritime link between Saudi Arabia and Oman by transferring oil and gas exports in the region to the Arabian Sea through the Sultanate without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

He stressed that it has become a strategic goal to extend the existing network in case obstacles arise in the Strait of Hormuz.

“The Strait of Hormuz is the main route for oil and gas exports in the region, and there is no doubt that the existence of a vital port for the transfer of oil and gas pipelines to the Arabian Sea through the Sultanate of Oman has become of paramount strategic importance,” al Saqri told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The minister stressed that setting up an oil pipeline across the Sultanate to the Arabian Sea is a project that dates back to the 1970s.

More so, he affirmed that Riyadh and Muscat are seeking to accelerate and improve the volume of trade and investment exchange between them through joint strategic projects and enhanced investment opportunities across various sectors.

The minister also talked about incentives, like tax breaks, offered by Oman to attract industrial sector investments.

“The Saudi investor will receive the same treatment as the Omani investor, and vice versa,” said al Saqri, highlighting that Saudi Arabia is a prominent trading partner of the Sultanate.

“Oman provides an integrated economic environment that is ready to establish strategic projects in multiple industrial and free zones designated for this,” he noted.

“The Sultanate gives investors in these areas special advantages and attractive exemptions from taxes and fees,” he continued.

Al Saqri listed types of tax breaks offered by Oman, such as a five-year income tax exemption for industrial projects.

When asked about the decision to open a new road linking the Sultanate to the Kingdom, he replied: “It will reduce the travel time between two countries by 800km.”

“The direct road link between the Sultanate and the Kingdom will contribute to facilitating trade exchange and transporting goods in a shorter time and at a lower cost, which will open the way for Saudi goods to enter the Sultanate and also access the Omani ports for exports to the rest of the world,” he added.

“It will also facilitate the passage of pilgrims and tourists between the two countries, besides linking the city of Duqm in Oman with NEOM in Saudi Arabia,” he added.

“The new land route will help Omani goods access the Saudi ports located in the Red Sea for exports to the rest of the world,” affirmed al Saqri.

“The Sultanate launched the construction of the Industrial City project in the Wilayat of Ibri in Al Dhahirah Governorate in 2020, with a total area of 10 million square meters. It is an important project located on the road leading to the crossing between the Sultanate and the Kingdom,” he noted.

As for the investment opportunities offered by Oman, he asserted that it provides many options that cover several fields and that are available for Saudi investors.

“Concerning investment opportunities in the Sultanate of Oman, there are many of them in all fields, the most important of which are the fields of energy, food industries, building materials, mining, electronics, information technology, and agriculture, in addition to the pharmaceutical industries that we seek to localize in some of our industrial areas, and all of these projects - undoubtedly - are available to the Saudi investor,” said the minister.

Moreover, al Saqri pointed to memorandums of understanding regarding food security cooperation between Oman and Saudi Arabia.

“Fisheries Development Oman (FDO) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the National Aquaculture Group (Naqua) of Saudi Arabia centering on cooperation in the development of the former’s shrimp farming project at Al Jazer on the Sultanate’s Al Wusta coast,” reminded the minister.

Total investment in the venture, covering an area of 1,650 hectares, is estimated at $137 million across multiple phases. At full capacity, shrimp production is projected at 18,000 tons per annum.

Al Saqri said noted that “sectors that will receive priority investment are the promising sectors and activities that achieve integration between the two countries.”

Investments will focus on sectors characterized by high feasibility and speed of implementation, in addition to projects that can achieve quick gains for both countries.

The sectors whose projects were reviewed between the two sides include energy, petrochemicals, maritime transport, mining, shipping and transport services, agricultural industry, and fish farming, in addition to the postal services sector.

“These sectors are expected to contribute to the growth of Saudi investments in the Sultanate during the next period,” said al Saqri.



Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the prime minister's office gained significant power. It became customary for the prime minister to be Shiite, the president Kurdish, and the speaker of Parliament Sunni.

This power-sharing arrangement, focusing on sectarian representation over institutional structure, has remained strong.

Attempts to break this norm have failed, including when former US President Barack Obama and his Vice President Joe Biden tried to support Ayad Allawi, a Shiite politician, for the presidency. The aim was to keep Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in power with support from both Washington and Tehran.

Despite Allawi’s parliamentary majority win, he didn’t become president.

Arab states were slow to react to changes in Iraq, allowing Iran to step in. Iran supported the US-created Iraqi Governing Council and sought to bring together Shiite factions to join the political process.

Its influence grew due to its backing of groups that opposed Saddam Hussein. Iran gained a key role in Iraq, effectively having veto power over decisions and a say in forming governments, while also expecting an eventual US military withdrawal.

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said Iran stepped in to fill a vacuum in Iraq, solidifying its role and protecting its interests.

This made Iran’s Quds Force commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani a key figure in Iraq, shaping everything from the reduction of US military presence to the formation of governments.

A foreign power’s influence in a neighboring country grows only if locals accept its role.

Soleimani and deputy leader of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were killed in a US strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim noted that Soleimani “was dedicated to serving his country’s interests, and the other side should have defended its own role and interests.”

He recalled Soleimani as being “skilled, effective, and able to earn trust, shifting from flexibility to rigidity when needed.”

This was clear in a letter Soleimani sent to Talabani when he considered supporting a no-confidence motion against Maliki’s government.

Karim also mentioned that al-Muhandis was deeply trusted by the Iranian general.

Talabani assigned his senior adviser various missions in Iran, focusing on forming Iraqi governments and relations with Kurdistan.

During a visit to Tehran, Adil Abdul Mahdi, who would later become prime minister, informed Talabani and Karim that “Soleimani’s claim that Iran supports Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister is false.”

“I was told that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei supports me,” argued Abdul Mahdi at the time.

Talabani felt awkward despite being close to Abdul Mahdi. He asked Karim to visit Tehran, where he met Soleimani and al-Muhandis. Soleimani denied Abdul Mahdi’s claims, saying he could take Karim to the Supreme Leader to hear the truth.

For his part, Karim said the Supreme Council didn’t support al-Maliki and that influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s stance was hardening. Soleimani assured that the Iranians were in contact with al-Sadr and would handle the issue of the Supreme Council.

When Karim returned, he informed Talabani and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani that the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, had left the Supreme Council to join Maliki, shifting the balance and allowing the formation of a government without the Council’s interference.

Karim remembered that Iran initially supported Ibrahim al-Jaafari for prime minister (2005-2006). However, Jaafari quickly became a burden on the political process and Shiite leaders then signaled the need for change.

The US Ambassador advised Jaafari to resign, threatening him if he didn't comply.

Maliki’s name wasn’t initially considered; Ali al-Adib from the “Dawa” party, of which Maliki was a member, was the favored choice. But Maliki didn’t support Adib, so after deliberations, the party settled on Maliki instead.

Breakfast with Soleimani

Karim remembers a breakfast meeting with Soleimani and al-Muhandis. He brought up Maliki’s performance during his second term and the widespread corruption in Iraq.

Soleimani suggested discussing it further, but Karim insisted the issue was urgent.

He questioned why, if all major Shiite forces agreed, change couldn’t happen. Soleimani indicated that decisions within the Shiite alliance were made by those who remained in it, prompting Karim to ask if Soleimani was implying it was him. Soleimani then replied : “Think what you wish.”

Sadr’s misstep

In the post-Saddam Hussein era, Sadr emerged as a major political force in Iraq. He led a large popular and armed movement.

Dealing with Sadr was challenging for political factions, especially among Shiites. Some disputes even culminated in armed conflicts. Managing Sadr’s influence was difficult both internally and for external interests, especially given his unpredictability.

When asked about Sadr’s decision to quit politics in 2022, Karim called it a major mistake.

He believed Iraq suffered greatly from this move, as it left parliament without any influential Shiite force capable of standing up against decisions not aligned with common goals.

Karim highlighted that filling seats with losing candidates seemed odd and turned the minority into the majority, undermining the constitutional process. He also noted the Shiite community’s fragmentation, with many Shiites not participating in recent elections due to their disenchantment with the political parties.

Karim warned against underestimating the potential for renewed protests and uprisings among the marginalized against the government and ruling powers.

Sistani’s unexpected proposal

When discussing top Shiite Religious Authority in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, Karim highlighted his political astuteness, surpassing the majority of other Shiite leaders. Sistani’s Friday sermons, delivered by his representatives, reflect this forward-thinking approach.

Karim noted a key observation about Sistani’s mindset. Despite corruption concerns, Sistani surprised Karim by suggesting bringing back the former Minister of Trade for his effectiveness in managing the ration card distribution.

He even proposed considering a Christian minister if they were honest and prioritized the people’s interests.

Furthermore, Sistani emphasized the importance of inclusivity in the new Iraq, advocating for the rights of Sunni and Kurdish components. He rejected marginalization and insisted on their participation and rights.

Sistani’s fatwa and the PMF

Karim believes that Sistani issued a fatwa on “jihad” to rally people against the significant threat posed by ISIS in 2014. He didn’t specifically mention the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or any other organization but referred to volunteers.

“Many responded to Sistani’s call and made significant sacrifices alongside the armed forces and Peshmerga. Volunteers participated in liberating areas once occupied by the terror group,” said Karim.

Karim further noted that there was a belief that those who made sacrifices had the right to be part of the armed forces and receive state support.

“The idea of integrating militias or military entities into the armed forces is not new,” explained Karim.

“US diplomat Paul Bremer [the first post-invasion governor of Iraq] proposed something similar to factions and organizations under the banner of integration into the army, and steps were taken in this direction,” he added.

“The goal was to eliminate the threat of ISIS, not to create a parallel army or establish another institution.”