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Syrian War Brought Together Putin, Khamenei, Will 'Normalization' Pull them Apart?

Syrians wave the national, Iranian and Russian flags in Damascus in April 2019. (AP)
Syrians wave the national, Iranian and Russian flags in Damascus in April 2019. (AP)
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Syrian War Brought Together Putin, Khamenei, Will 'Normalization' Pull them Apart?

Syrians wave the national, Iranian and Russian flags in Damascus in April 2019. (AP)
Syrians wave the national, Iranian and Russian flags in Damascus in April 2019. (AP)

One of the main drivers of the initiatives, raids and pressure on Syria is the Iranian presence there and questions about the future of its military entrenchment there.

Iran is largely present, both directly and indirectly, in the recent contacts and disclosed and undisclosed meetings that have been held with Damascus and Syrian president Bashar Assad.

Damascus and Tehran have formed a "strategic relationship" since Iran's 1979 revolution and it has developed even further in wake of the eruption of the conflict in Syria in 2011. Iran's intervention in the war has helped keep the regime alive before Russia's military intervention in 2015 swooped in to play the role of "savior and victor".

Iran has sought to entrench itself further in the Middle East through the Syrian "gate" in order to protect its "backyard" in Iraq, link Baghdad to Beirut through Damascus and establish an opening to the Mediterranean. It also sought to establish a foothold that would put Israel within the range of its weapons.

The United States sought to confront Iran's entrenchment by establishing its own military presence in northeastern Syria and in the al-Tanf military base, to block the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut route.

Iran responded to that move by opening an alternate land route between Tehran, Damascus and Beirut through the Alboukamal and Deir Ezzor regions in Syria.

Israel, meanwhile, set its own red lines against Iran's entrenchment and delivery of sophisticated and advanced weapons to its ally Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Turkey, which is also involved militarily in Syria, has sought to confront Iran's presence south of its border. It did so by coexisting with it in line with the 2017 Astana process that Moscow was also party to.

The Astana process, with Ankara, Tehran and Moscow, led to understandings between the parties over the division of influence in Syria against the other main foreign parties involved in Syria, namely the US and Israel.

Some Arab countries, meanwhile, had banked on Russia in reining in Iran's influence, while others had turned to Washington when Donald Trump was still in the White House. Western countries have in the meantime insisted that all foreign forces, except Russia's, withdraw from Syria as a condition to normalizing ties with Damascus or helping in reconstructing the war-torn country.

The calculations have all changed now give the changes in Syria and the region and the arrival of Joe Biden to the White House.

Biden has adopted a different approach than Trump and like Barack Obama, has pitted high hopes on the nuclear negotiations with Iran in Vienna. When Tehran tests the waters by attacking the al-Tanf base or stokes tensions in the Gulf waters, Washington weighs its response by assessing how much its retaliation may impact the negotiations.

As it stands, the room for confrontation is now limited between two options: the first is engaging Assad and ending Damascus' isolation with the hope of easing Iran's influence. The purpose would not be to immediately shift Syria from the "resistance alliance", led by Iran, to the "moderate camp". Rather, the aim is for Damascus to be open between the two camps because this is the realistic option and because some Arab countries have signed normalization deals with Israel and left the door open for dialogue with Iran.

Some Arab countries have indeed forged ahead with normalization based on this assumption, while others believe the conditions are not ripe yet. They are instead demanding that Damascus take "tangible steps" and begin reining in Iran in Syria and the region.

The second option lies in banking on the leadership of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his ability to rein in Iran. This option stems from the position that the war had brought together Putin and Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei in Syria, but peace and normalization will pull them apart. Iran wants to support the militias, establish a regime that is subordinate to it and divide Syria. Russia, on the other hand, wants to strengthen the Syrian army and preserve the unity of the state. In other words, it supports the "Russian Syria" against the "Iranian Syria".

Israel also figures in the picture. It wants to receive logistic and intelligence support from the US as it raids Iranian positions in Syria. It wants to sever the Tehran-Damascus-Beirut route. It is also hoping that its normalization of relations with Arab countries would open Damascus' eyes to other opportunities that would end its isolation. It is also relying on its military strikes on Syria and military understandings with Russia.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had struck a deep understanding with Putin that prioritizes Israel's security. This understanding had also received the blessing of Trump and his team. This allowed Israel free reign in striking Iran in Syria to prevent its entrenchment.

Netanyahu's successor, Naftali Bennett, met with Putin in Sochi on October 22 and largely received the same reassurances over Syria that his predecessor did. He appeared to have received approval to expand attacks on Iranian targets as evidences in strikes on the outskirts of Damascus and the intensification of raids, whether from Lebanese airspace or from above the al-Tanf base of occupied Golan Heights.

The nuclear negotiations are significant for the fate of Syria and Iran's presence there. One must monitor the course of Israeli strikes on Syria and the various diplomatic visits to Damascus to determine just how much Iran will remain entrenched there or not.

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How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Hamas said it recruited and trained thousands of fighters during the 15-month Gaza war, a claim supported by former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Abu Obaida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, said in July: “We recruited thousands of new fighters, strengthened key capabilities, set up ambushes, and made explosives and rockets.”

The announcement highlights Hamas’ efforts to expand its military strength during the conflict.

In his final address as US Secretary of State on January 14, Blinken confirmed Hamas recruited new fighters during the war.

“Indeed, we assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost,” Blinken revealed. “That is a recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war,” he explained.

The statements from US officials and Hamas have raised questions about how the group managed to recruit and train fighters amid the war.

However, military training manuals belonging to Hamas, discovered by an Asharq Al-Awsat correspondent in the rubble of Jabalia camp in northern Gaza, provided partial insight into the group’s methods for preparing its fighters.

The Jabalia refugee camp was the site of a highly intense Israeli military operation that lasted around 100 days. According to Israeli army statements, the operation resulted in the deaths of dozens of Israeli officers and soldiers.

Hamas, however, has remained silent about its own losses during the battles, leaving questions about the full scale of casualties in the prolonged fighting.

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces.

The documents include instructions on using light weapons, guided rockets, and other munitions, aiming to train new fighters for operations against Israeli troops.

The manuals detail shooting techniques, effective firing ranges, and guidelines for targeting Israeli armored vehicles, particularly weaknesses in Merkava tanks to maximize damage and ensure destruction.

They also explain the use of various projectiles, including RBG rockets, PG-7V, F-7, BG-7M, Yassin rockets, tandem warheads, and both Chinese and Russian munitions, as well as the TBG rocket system.

According to Hamas sources speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, such manuals have long been part of Al-Qassam Brigades’ military training.

Recruits have been trained practically at military sites using these guides. The sources added that the manuals found in Jabalia, where clashes took place, were intended to help fighters, particularly new recruits, deal with the Israeli assault.

Hamas sources said the training manuals significantly aided fighters in battles across Gaza, particularly in the north, which faced the heaviest and most extensive Israeli assaults.

“The military capabilities were being eroded,” the sources said.

“However, field commanders quickly addressed this by recruiting new fighters and finding alternatives to manage the battle effectively,” they added.

The sources noted that many fighters recruited during the Gaza war had undergone only basic, fast-track training before being sent to the battlefield. After losing many experienced fighters, the group relied on trainees and loyalists with minimal preparation.

“These new recruits fought alongside seasoned fighters,” the sources said. “They received basic instructions and were taught to use advanced weapons like guided rockets but were mostly skilled with light arms like Kalashnikov rifles.”

Despite limited training, the recruits played a vital role in the conflict.

Sources acknowledged that new recruits had limited field experience and faced challenges but found urban and guerrilla warfare easier. Most of these fighters were involved in battles in northern Gaza, especially in Jabalia and Beit Lahia, while a smaller group fought in Beit Hanoun and took part in operations that killed Israeli soldiers.

Hamas emphasized its recruitment abilities during the first hostage exchange after last Sunday’s ceasefire. Al-Qassam Brigades members made a public appearance in Gaza City, which is in northern Gaza.

Hamas reportedly used a “deception” tactic, sending out vehicles resembling those used to transport hostages while also deploying decoy vehicles from different areas.

They also instructed their members to gather in Saraya Square to distract from the vehicle carrying female prisoners.

The exact number of new recruits remains unclear, though they have been called “2024 recruits” after a statement by Abu Obaida. Israeli media estimates the number at around 4,000 fighters, with some accusing Mohammad Sinwar, brother of the late Yahya Sinwar, of leading the recruitment.

Blinken criticized Israel’s approach in Gaza, saying Hamas can’t be defeated by military means alone. He stressed the need for a political solution to prevent the group’s return.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Mohammad Sinwar is focused on rebuilding the group's military strength.

Hamas’ recruitment during the war and its continued resistance have made it a tough challenge for Israel, which has had to return to areas it thought were cleared of militants, only to face renewed fighting.

Before the war, Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades had about 30,000 fighters in 24 battalions.

Blinken noted that Hamas had replaced the fighters it lost during the conflict and that militants in northern Gaza continue to regroup after Israeli military operations, showing the ongoing challenge for Israel without a political solution.