Drone Race in the Middle East

An Iranian drone (AFP)
An Iranian drone (AFP)
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Drone Race in the Middle East

An Iranian drone (AFP)
An Iranian drone (AFP)

Over the past two decades, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been characterized by deep divisions, political turmoil, and inadequate governance.

Geopolitical competition and increased ambitions of some countries (Iran, Israel, Turkey) were reflected in bold and unilateral foreign policies that in many cases exceeded longtime restrictions imposed by partnerships with foreign powers and conflicted with regional agendas.

In the MENA region, drones have become an essential part of the political and security dynamics and one of the aspects of competition between the region’s countries.

Drones have reached unprecedented levels of sophistication, expanding their use from a specialized military tool available only to Israel and the US in 2001 to the relatively cheap, high-tech weapons in the arsenal of a growing number of countries.

The global drone market is expected to attract nearly $100 billion in investment over the current decade, with a 30% increase in spending on research, development, and procurement. This underlines the growing strategic importance of drones within the defense systems of many countries.

Drones, or Combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), have captured the attention of many governments in the Middle East and made headlines due to their advancing role in the region’s conflicts, including Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

Currently, thirteen countries in the region operate combat drones or are in the process of acquiring them. Four of these countries are at the point of exporting their drones to regional or foreign countries.

Turkey

Turkey’s rapid and dynamic rise to the club of countries that owns armed drones was remarkable, not because of its leadership in using these drones in conventional combat operations, but rather for the major role that Ankara may play in the global market in the near future.

Among Turkey’s trading partners in the region are Qatar, Tunisia, and the Libyan Government of National Accord in Tripoli.

Doha recently received the first batch of six Bayraktar TB2 combat aircraft and three ground control stations, according to a deal signed in 2018.

Meanwhile, Tunisia signed in early March 2020 a contract worth $240 million with the Turkish Aerospace Industry to purchase six (Anka-S) combat drones with three control stations and training services.

Moreover, Azerbaijan signed a contract to purchase combat drones from Turkey.

Baku wants to deploy the acquired drones against Armenian forces in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. This was made possible after the Azerbaijani parliament recently approved bilateral military cooperation with Turkey.

Iran

Iran and Arab countries are racing to develop their drone capabilities. Chinese platforms, especially the Wing Loong series produced by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group since 2015, are popularly used by Iran.

The (Cai - Hong - CH 4B) produced by China’s State-owned Aerospace Science & Technology Corp is also being used.

These models have already been used in special operations. In parallel, some countries are boosting their local industries and have invested in local models.

Iran has made significant progress with its drone technology. A 2019 report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency describes drones as “Iran’s fastest-growing air capability.”

In Tehran’s military strategy, drones represented a cost-effective solution in terms of enhancing information-gathering, reconnaissance, attack capabilities and compensating for traditional structural deficiencies.

Israel

Israel has a leading position among the dominant countries in the field of drones, and it may come second only to the US.

Until 2014, Israel remained the world’s leading exporter of drones, accounting for 61% of global exports.

The most prominent Israeli drone (MALE), of the (Heron - TP) class, can perform strategic missions at an altitude of more than 13,000 meters and a flight time of more than 30 hours, thanks to a variety of sensors and munitions with a maximum payload of up to 2700 kg.

This aircraft can operate via satellite with an automatic take-off and landing system. It can also operate autonomously in harsh weather conditions and adapt to emergency missions.

It’s noteworthy that Israel does not sell its advanced aircraft to any of the countries in the MENA region due to constant concerns about the threat posed by its Arab neighbors.

In other words, Israel is absent from the regional market for drones, and its exports target European countries like Germany, Britain, and Latin American and Asian countries, where India tops the list in terms of spending.



Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
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Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)

The Iranian government is scrambling to restore some of its influence in Syria as it still reels from the shock ouster of its close ally President Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including an economy in shambles and continued tensions over its nuclear program. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to opposition groups that is exercising Iranian officials most, reported The Guardian on Friday.

“In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the opposition in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise,” it said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview this week: “We had long ago reached the conclusion that the continuation of governance in Syria would face a fundamental challenge. Government officials were expected to show flexibility towards allowing the opposition to participate in power, but this did not happen.”

He added: “Tehran always had direct contacts with the Syrian opposition delegation. Since 2011, we have been suggesting to Syria the need to begin political talks with those opposition groups that were not affiliated with terrorism.”

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson insisted it only entered Syria in 2012 at Assad’s request to help defeat ISIS, continued The Guardian. “Our presence was advisory and we were never in Syria to defend a specific group or individual. What was important to us was helping to preserve the territorial integrity and stability of Syria,” he said.

Such explanations have not cut much ice in Damascus. Iran remains one of the few countries criticized by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader.

Short honeymoon

Many Iranian officials are claiming the current victory lap being enjoyed by Türkiye in Syria may be brief as Ankara’s interests will start to diverge from the government led by the HTS.

Senior cleric Naser Makarem Shirazi said: “We must follow the Syrian issue with hope and know that this situation will not continue, because the current rulers of Syria will not remain united with each other”.

The conservative Javan newspaper predicted that “the current honeymoon period in Syria will end due to the diversity of groups, economic problems, the lack of security and diversity of actors.”.

Officially Iran blames the US and Israel for Assad’s collapse, but resentment at Ankara’s role is rife, ironically echoing Donald Trump’s claim that Syria has been the victim of an unfriendly takeover by Türkiye.

In his speech responding to Assad’s downfall supreme leader Ali Khamenei said a neighboring state of Syria played a clear role” in shaping events and “continues to do so now”. The Fars news agency published a poster showing the HTS leader in league with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden.

Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations questioned whether HTS would remain allies with Türkiye for long. It said: “Although Türkiye is only one of the main winners of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in the short term, Ankara can never bring a government aligned with itself to power in Syria. Even if HTS attempts to form a stable government in Syria, which is impossible, in the medium term, it will become a major threat to Türkiye, which shares an 830-kilometer border with Syria.”

Reliance on Türkiye

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted a bleak future for Syria and Türkiye. “In recent weeks, all of Syria’s military power has been destroyed by Israel, and unfortunately, the militants and Türkiye did not respond appropriately to Israel. It will take years to rebuild the Syrian army and armed forces.”

Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian ambassador to the UK, suggested the Damascus government may find itself overly reliant on Türkiye. “If the central government of Syria tries to consolidate its authority and sovereignty through military intervention and assistance from foreign countries – including Türkiye – Syria, or key parts of it, will be occupied by Türkiye, and Türkiye will enter a quagmire from which it will incur heavy human and economic costs.”

He predicted tensions between Türkiye and the HTS in particular about how to handle the Syrian Kurdish demand in north-east Syria for a form of autonomy. The Turkish-funded Syrian National Army is reportedly ready to mount an offensive against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in Kobani, a Kurdish-majority Syrian town on the northern border with Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Wednesday that if the issue were addressed “properly” Ankara would not seek a military intervention. “There is a new administration in Damascus now. I think this is primarily their concern now,” Fidan said.

More broadly, the Syrian reverse is forcing Iran to accelerate a rethink of its foreign policy. The review centers on whether the weakening of its so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising allied groups in the region – requires Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or instead strengthen Iran by building better relations in the region.

For years, Iran’s rulers have been saying that “defending Iran must begin from outside its borders.” This hugely costly strategy is largely obsolete, and how Iran explains its Syria reverse will be critical to deciding what replaces that strategy.