Drone Race in the Middle East

An Iranian drone (AFP)
An Iranian drone (AFP)
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Drone Race in the Middle East

An Iranian drone (AFP)
An Iranian drone (AFP)

Over the past two decades, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been characterized by deep divisions, political turmoil, and inadequate governance.

Geopolitical competition and increased ambitions of some countries (Iran, Israel, Turkey) were reflected in bold and unilateral foreign policies that in many cases exceeded longtime restrictions imposed by partnerships with foreign powers and conflicted with regional agendas.

In the MENA region, drones have become an essential part of the political and security dynamics and one of the aspects of competition between the region’s countries.

Drones have reached unprecedented levels of sophistication, expanding their use from a specialized military tool available only to Israel and the US in 2001 to the relatively cheap, high-tech weapons in the arsenal of a growing number of countries.

The global drone market is expected to attract nearly $100 billion in investment over the current decade, with a 30% increase in spending on research, development, and procurement. This underlines the growing strategic importance of drones within the defense systems of many countries.

Drones, or Combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), have captured the attention of many governments in the Middle East and made headlines due to their advancing role in the region’s conflicts, including Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

Currently, thirteen countries in the region operate combat drones or are in the process of acquiring them. Four of these countries are at the point of exporting their drones to regional or foreign countries.

Turkey

Turkey’s rapid and dynamic rise to the club of countries that owns armed drones was remarkable, not because of its leadership in using these drones in conventional combat operations, but rather for the major role that Ankara may play in the global market in the near future.

Among Turkey’s trading partners in the region are Qatar, Tunisia, and the Libyan Government of National Accord in Tripoli.

Doha recently received the first batch of six Bayraktar TB2 combat aircraft and three ground control stations, according to a deal signed in 2018.

Meanwhile, Tunisia signed in early March 2020 a contract worth $240 million with the Turkish Aerospace Industry to purchase six (Anka-S) combat drones with three control stations and training services.

Moreover, Azerbaijan signed a contract to purchase combat drones from Turkey.

Baku wants to deploy the acquired drones against Armenian forces in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. This was made possible after the Azerbaijani parliament recently approved bilateral military cooperation with Turkey.

Iran

Iran and Arab countries are racing to develop their drone capabilities. Chinese platforms, especially the Wing Loong series produced by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group since 2015, are popularly used by Iran.

The (Cai - Hong - CH 4B) produced by China’s State-owned Aerospace Science & Technology Corp is also being used.

These models have already been used in special operations. In parallel, some countries are boosting their local industries and have invested in local models.

Iran has made significant progress with its drone technology. A 2019 report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency describes drones as “Iran’s fastest-growing air capability.”

In Tehran’s military strategy, drones represented a cost-effective solution in terms of enhancing information-gathering, reconnaissance, attack capabilities and compensating for traditional structural deficiencies.

Israel

Israel has a leading position among the dominant countries in the field of drones, and it may come second only to the US.

Until 2014, Israel remained the world’s leading exporter of drones, accounting for 61% of global exports.

The most prominent Israeli drone (MALE), of the (Heron - TP) class, can perform strategic missions at an altitude of more than 13,000 meters and a flight time of more than 30 hours, thanks to a variety of sensors and munitions with a maximum payload of up to 2700 kg.

This aircraft can operate via satellite with an automatic take-off and landing system. It can also operate autonomously in harsh weather conditions and adapt to emergency missions.

It’s noteworthy that Israel does not sell its advanced aircraft to any of the countries in the MENA region due to constant concerns about the threat posed by its Arab neighbors.

In other words, Israel is absent from the regional market for drones, and its exports target European countries like Germany, Britain, and Latin American and Asian countries, where India tops the list in terms of spending.



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.