Drone Race in the Middle East

An Iranian drone (AFP)
An Iranian drone (AFP)
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Drone Race in the Middle East

An Iranian drone (AFP)
An Iranian drone (AFP)

Over the past two decades, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been characterized by deep divisions, political turmoil, and inadequate governance.

Geopolitical competition and increased ambitions of some countries (Iran, Israel, Turkey) were reflected in bold and unilateral foreign policies that in many cases exceeded longtime restrictions imposed by partnerships with foreign powers and conflicted with regional agendas.

In the MENA region, drones have become an essential part of the political and security dynamics and one of the aspects of competition between the region’s countries.

Drones have reached unprecedented levels of sophistication, expanding their use from a specialized military tool available only to Israel and the US in 2001 to the relatively cheap, high-tech weapons in the arsenal of a growing number of countries.

The global drone market is expected to attract nearly $100 billion in investment over the current decade, with a 30% increase in spending on research, development, and procurement. This underlines the growing strategic importance of drones within the defense systems of many countries.

Drones, or Combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), have captured the attention of many governments in the Middle East and made headlines due to their advancing role in the region’s conflicts, including Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

Currently, thirteen countries in the region operate combat drones or are in the process of acquiring them. Four of these countries are at the point of exporting their drones to regional or foreign countries.

Turkey

Turkey’s rapid and dynamic rise to the club of countries that owns armed drones was remarkable, not because of its leadership in using these drones in conventional combat operations, but rather for the major role that Ankara may play in the global market in the near future.

Among Turkey’s trading partners in the region are Qatar, Tunisia, and the Libyan Government of National Accord in Tripoli.

Doha recently received the first batch of six Bayraktar TB2 combat aircraft and three ground control stations, according to a deal signed in 2018.

Meanwhile, Tunisia signed in early March 2020 a contract worth $240 million with the Turkish Aerospace Industry to purchase six (Anka-S) combat drones with three control stations and training services.

Moreover, Azerbaijan signed a contract to purchase combat drones from Turkey.

Baku wants to deploy the acquired drones against Armenian forces in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. This was made possible after the Azerbaijani parliament recently approved bilateral military cooperation with Turkey.

Iran

Iran and Arab countries are racing to develop their drone capabilities. Chinese platforms, especially the Wing Loong series produced by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group since 2015, are popularly used by Iran.

The (Cai - Hong - CH 4B) produced by China’s State-owned Aerospace Science & Technology Corp is also being used.

These models have already been used in special operations. In parallel, some countries are boosting their local industries and have invested in local models.

Iran has made significant progress with its drone technology. A 2019 report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency describes drones as “Iran’s fastest-growing air capability.”

In Tehran’s military strategy, drones represented a cost-effective solution in terms of enhancing information-gathering, reconnaissance, attack capabilities and compensating for traditional structural deficiencies.

Israel

Israel has a leading position among the dominant countries in the field of drones, and it may come second only to the US.

Until 2014, Israel remained the world’s leading exporter of drones, accounting for 61% of global exports.

The most prominent Israeli drone (MALE), of the (Heron - TP) class, can perform strategic missions at an altitude of more than 13,000 meters and a flight time of more than 30 hours, thanks to a variety of sensors and munitions with a maximum payload of up to 2700 kg.

This aircraft can operate via satellite with an automatic take-off and landing system. It can also operate autonomously in harsh weather conditions and adapt to emergency missions.

It’s noteworthy that Israel does not sell its advanced aircraft to any of the countries in the MENA region due to constant concerns about the threat posed by its Arab neighbors.

In other words, Israel is absent from the regional market for drones, and its exports target European countries like Germany, Britain, and Latin American and Asian countries, where India tops the list in terms of spending.



Asharq Al-Awsat Uncovers New Details on Sinwar’s Movements During the Gaza Conflict

Yahya Sinwar 
Yahya Sinwar 
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Asharq Al-Awsat Uncovers New Details on Sinwar’s Movements During the Gaza Conflict

Yahya Sinwar 
Yahya Sinwar 

Reliable information from Asharq Al-Awsat sources within and close to Hamas reveals that Israel nearly captured the group's leader, Yahya Sinwar, at least five times before he was killed during a routine military operation in Rafah, southern Gaza, last month.

The sources described Sinwar's movements and those with him during the ongoing conflict in Gaza, which has lasted over a year. They noted that Sinwar sent a message to his family about the death of his nephew, Ibrahim Muhammad Sinwar, who was with him.

This message arrived two days after Sinwar was also killed.

Khan Younis Operation

During the Israeli military operation in Khan Younis in January, it was believed that Sinwar was hiding in one of the tunnels.

After entering several tunnels, Israeli forces found recordings from cameras showing Sinwar moving around and transferring supplies into a tunnel with his family just hours before the attack on Oct. 7, 2023, as well as on the day of the attack.

Despite this, Israel could not locate him in the tunnels or above ground. As the operation expanded, Sinwar had to find a safe place for his wife and children away from him due to the ongoing pursuit, according to reliable sources for Asharq Al-Awsat.

Sources report that Sinwar’s wife and children were safe, receiving written messages from him at least once a month.

As military operations intensified in Khan Younis, Sinwar chose to stay in the area, often separating from his brother Muhammad and Raef Salameh, the regional brigade commander who was killed in a July airstrike alongside Muhammad Deif, the leader of Hamas’s military wing.

They occasionally met in safe houses or tunnels since the conflict began.

The sources noted that the four did not remain together at all times; they spent hours or days together before parting based on the situation.

A closely guarded secret reveals that Israeli forces were just meters away from a house where Sinwar was hiding in Block G of Khan Younis, accompanied only by his personal bodyguard.

Sinwar was armed and ready for a potential Israeli raid.

However, the movements of Hamas fighters from house to house, as they demolished walls for street fighting, revealed Sinwar’s location.

He was quickly evacuated through gaps created by the fighters in neighboring homes and taken to a safe house about one kilometer away.

He was later moved to another location where he met his brother Muhammad and Salameh before they all separated as the Israeli operation expanded near the Nasser Medical Complex.

Sources say that in February, under pressure from his brother and Salameh, as well as Hamas fighters, Sinwar was forced to leave Khan Younis for Rafah. By then, Israeli forces had almost complete control over Khan Younis and had effectively tightened their siege.

However, Sinwar was safely transported to Rafah through coordinated movements above and below ground.

Sources indicate that the person who stayed with Sinwar throughout the conflict was Ibrahim Muhammad Sinwar, the son of his brother Muhammad, a senior Hamas leader.

Both Yahya and Muhammad named their firstborn sons after each other.

Ibrahim was killed in an Israeli airstrike in August while exiting a tunnel to monitor Israeli movements in Rafah, southern Gaza, alongside his uncle.

Sinwar sent a message to his brother’s family explaining the circumstances of Ibrahim’s death and detailing where he was buried in an underground tunnel, stating that he had personally prayed over his body.

The family received this message two days after Sinwar’s own death, indicating that it took more than two months for it to reach them.

The timing of the message, arriving just after Sinwar’s death, highlights the challenging security conditions he faced amid ongoing Israeli pursuit.

It also reflects the extreme precautions he took to avoid leaving any gaps that could lead Israel to him, which helps explain the circumstances of his “accidental” death.

Sources reveal that Sinwar stayed in Rafah for several months, moving between different areas, particularly in the western part since late May. He used both underground and above-ground shelters.

During his time away from his brother Muhammad, as well as Deif and Salameh, Sinwar communicated with them through written messages, following specific security protocols he defined.

This method also applied to his communications with Hamas leaders locally and abroad, especially regarding ceasefire negotiations and potential prisoner exchanges.

Sinwar was reportedly in tunnels in Rafah, including one where six prisoners were killed. It is believed he may have ordered their execution as Israeli forces advanced in late September.

Before his death, Sinwar and his companions experienced severe food shortages, going three days without eating while preparing for an Israeli confrontation. They moved between damaged buildings in the area.

In the final two weeks, attempts were made by Mahmoud Hamdan, the commander of the Tel Sultan brigade, who was killed the day after Sinwar, to extract him from the area. However, these efforts failed due to heavy military activity.

Sources indicate that Israeli forces came close to Sinwar’s location at least five times, including three times above ground and two underground.

Each time, he was moved to different locations despite wanting to remain with the fighting forces.

When asked if Sinwar’s presence in Rafah was related to assessing the Philadelphia corridor, sources denied this.

However, individuals close to Hamas suggested that he may have been considering a potential Israeli withdrawal from the corridor and its implications for prisoner exchange negotiations and the situation on the ground.

In related news, Hamas has issued a statement denying reports regarding the fate of Deif, the leader of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

Earlier, Asharq Al-Awsat reported new indications of Deif’s death in an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis in July. Despite these reports, Hamas officials continue to assert that Deif is alive, while Israeli officials claim he has been killed.