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Ukraine Not Joining NATO So Why Does Putin Worry?

Putin opposes NATO's missile defense presence in Romania and a similar base under development in Poland, saying they could be converted to offensive weapons capable of threatening Russia. (AP)
Putin opposes NATO's missile defense presence in Romania and a similar base under development in Poland, saying they could be converted to offensive weapons capable of threatening Russia. (AP)
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Ukraine Not Joining NATO So Why Does Putin Worry?

Putin opposes NATO's missile defense presence in Romania and a similar base under development in Poland, saying they could be converted to offensive weapons capable of threatening Russia. (AP)
Putin opposes NATO's missile defense presence in Romania and a similar base under development in Poland, saying they could be converted to offensive weapons capable of threatening Russia. (AP)

At the core of the Ukraine crisis is a puzzle: Why would Russian President Vladimir Putin push Europe to the brink of war to demand the West not do something that it has no plan to do anyway?

Russia says NATO, the American-led alliance that has on its hands the biggest European crisis in decades, must never offer membership to Ukraine, which gained independence as the Soviet Union broke apart about 30 years ago. Ukraine has long aspired to join NATO, but the alliance is not about to offer an invitation, due in part to Ukraine's official corruption, shortcomings in its defense establishment, and its lack of control over its international borders.

Putin's demands go beyond the question of Ukraine's association with NATO, but that link is central to his complaint that the West has pushed him to the limits of his patience by edging closer to Russian borders. He asserts that NATO expansion years ago has enhanced its security at the expense of Russia's.

The Russians demand a legal guarantee that Ukraine be denied NATO membership, knowing that NATO as a matter of principle has never excluded potential membership for any European country — even Russia — but has no plan to start Ukraine down the road toward membership in the foreseeable future. The principle cited by NATO is that all nations should be free to choose whom they align with.

Why, then, is Moscow making an issue of Ukraine's relationship with NATO now? The answer is complicated.

Why is Putin worried about Ukraine joining NATO?

The stated reason is that a further eastward expansion of NATO would pose a security threat to Russia. Washington and its allies deny this is a valid worry, since no NATO country is threatening to use force against Russia.

More broadly, Putin wants NATO to pull back its existing military presence in Eastern Europe, which includes a regularly rotating series of exercises in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, all former Soviet states. There are no US troops based permanently in those three Baltic countries; currently there are about 100 serving a rotational tour in Lithuania and about 60 in Estonia and Latvia combined, the Pentagon says.

Putin also opposes NATO's missile defense presence in Romania, a former Soviet satellite state, and a similar base under development in Poland, saying they could be converted to offensive weapons capable of threatening Russia. President Joe Biden this week approved sending an additional 2,700 American troops to Eastern Europe — 1,700 to Poland and 1,000 to Romania — plus 300 to Germany.

Ukraine has deep historical and cultural ties to Russia, and Putin has repeatedly asserted that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people.” He has said that large chunks of Ukrainian territory are historical parts of Russia that were arbitrarily granted to Ukraine by communist leaders under the Soviet Union.

Putin's own actions, however, have served to strengthen Ukrainians' sense of national identity. After Russia seized the Crimean Peninsula and instigated a rebellion in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine's desire to align itself with the West and join NATO only grew.

Putin recently described his Ukraine concern more specifically. He sketched out a scenario in which Ukraine might use military force to reclaim the Crimean Peninsula or to recapture areas in eastern Ukraine that are now effectively controlled by Russian-backed separatists.

“Imagine that Ukraine becomes a NATO member and launches those military operations,” Putin said. “Should we fight NATO then? Has anyone thought about it?”

Indeed, some in NATO have thought about the prospect of an expanded war with Russia inside Ukraine. It is a reminder of what NATO membership means — an attack on one is an attack on all, which in the theoretical case of Ukraine being attacked by Russia would mean a legal commitment by every NATO member to come to its defense.

What are Ukraine’s prospects for joining NATO?

The prospects are extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future.

Although Ukraine has no membership offer from NATO, it has drawn closer to the alliance over time, starting with the establishment in 1997 of a NATO-Ukraine Charter to further develop cooperation.

NATO heads of government did publicly declare in 2008 that Ukraine, and its fellow former Soviet republic Georgia, “will become members of NATO.” They did not say when or how, but the statement could be seen as explaining Moscow’s concern that Kyiv eventually will join the alliance.

On the other hand, the US and other NATO leaders who signed the 2008 statement about Ukraine and Georgia decided against giving them what is known as a Membership Action Plan — a pathway to eventual membership. Germany and France strongly opposed moving Ukraine toward membership and the broader view within NATO was that Ukraine would have to complete far-reaching government reforms before becoming a candidate for membership.

This seeming contradiction has never been resolved, which means that while NATO's door is open, Ukraine won't fit through anytime soon.

How is Putin pressuring Ukraine?

Moscow says it has no intention of invading Ukraine, yet over the past several months it has assembled a robust array of combat forces along Ukraine’s borders and has implied it will take action of some kind if its demands of Washington and NATO are not met. The Biden administration says Russia is now capable of a wide range of actions, including a full-scale invasion to capture Kyiv.

Putin says NATO has gone too far not only by providing Ukraine with weaponry and military training but also by stationing forces in other Eastern European countries that compromise Russian security.

It’s also true that increases over the past decade in the US and NATO military presence in Eastern Europe were triggered by Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and its incursion into eastern Ukraine in 2014. Those Russian actions prompted NATO to redouble its focus on collective security. In September 2014, NATO leaders established a new rapid-response force capable of deploying within days, and they reaffirmed pledges to boost their defense spending.

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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Lebanese former President Amine Gemayel’s term (1982–1988) was difficult and turbulent. The Lebanese people were divided, and regional and international conflicts over Lebanon intensified. His presidency began amid the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Beirut and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel. The difficult developments followed swiftly.

In the year following the 1982 invasion, Moscow and Damascus supported Walid Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, sparking the “Mountain War,” which deeply fractured the Druze–Maronite coexistence in the region. In 1984, Damascus backed Nabih Berri, head of the Amal Movement, leading to the “February 6 Intifada,” which shifted the sectarian power balance in Lebanon, which was in the throes of its 1975-1990 civil war.

Another significant event occurred in 1983 when suicide bombers attacked the barracks of the US Marines and French troops in the multinational peacekeeping force, killing hundreds and prompting Western withdrawal. Amid those explosions, Hezbollah was born—a force that would later become the most dominant player in Lebanon, particularly after inheriting Syria’s role there. During Gemayel’s term, Syria attempted to broker a “militia peace,” but the so-called “Tripartite Agreement” collapsed, paving the way for more wars and negotiation rounds.

Gemayel did not surrender to efforts aimed at controlling or isolating his presidency. He worked to maintain Lebanon’s relations with the West, strengthened ties with moderate Arab countries, and built relationships with leaders such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Moammar al-Gaddafi, as he recounts in the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amine Gemayel sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Close relationship with Saudi Arabia and its kings

Asked about his relationship with Saudi Arabia, beginning with his visit alongside his father, Pierre, to meet King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, Gemayel said: “I’m proud of that relationship. I’m proud to have met all the kings—from King Faisal to King Salman. There isn’t one of them with whom I didn’t have a close personal relationship, and I take pride in that. Most of them had a special affection for me.”

He added: “At this time in Lebanon’s history, Saudi Arabia is the elder brother. Saudi Arabia never stabbed Lebanon in the back. It was always by Lebanon’s side through good times and bad, offering moral, social, and humanitarian support. You can’t deny that. You have to appreciate and respect those who stood by you in tough times.”

He also recounted a fond memory involving King Salman: “May God prolong his life. When he was governor of Riyadh, I used to visit him regularly. The Riyadh office knew me well. Every time I came to the Kingdom, it was expected that I’d visit the governorate.”

“Once, when I had an appointment with him, he took me to the desert to a camp of his—traditional tents, but inside one of them was a high-tech office with internet and modern communications. He told me he could contact anyone from there at any time. I asked if I could call home. He replied, ‘No.’ I was surprised. Then he said, ‘You can’t call home because your home is here.’ That’s how warm the atmosphere was. I truly appreciated his gesture.”

He continued: “In Lebanon’s difficult days, the Kingdom was always by our side. Even today—despite frustration with Lebanon’s ingratitude or Iranian influence—Saudi Arabia still has Lebanon in its heart. It waited for the first opportunity to return and help. Today’s hope in Lebanon is due to the Kingdom’s full weight and influence, working to restore Lebanon’s institutions and stability.”

Saddam’s armored car

Regarding his relationship with Saddam, Gemayel said: “It was a very warm relationship. I visited him several times in Baghdad. Once, during my presidency, there was an assassination attempt against me. He called and asked, ‘What are you doing about your security? They say you need better protection.’ I told him we were doing our best and relying on God. He said, ‘That’s not good enough—I’ll send you my car.’ The next day, his armored car arrived by plane—fully fortified inside and out.”

That relationship lasted until Saddam’s final days in power. Gemayel recalled: “On the eve of the (American) war, he sent word asking to meet. I went to Baghdad. He told me, ‘Things aren’t going well with the Americans. You have good relations with them—can you help us understand their intentions?’ I told him the issue was bigger than me. I had good contacts, but not at the presidential level anymore. He asked me to try anyway. So I went to the US, met with some people, but avoided senior officials to avoid media attention.”

Gemayel’s cousin, a top US lawyer with ties to James Baker, helped arrange a meeting: “We met Baker, who was almost retired but still influential. After a few days, he said he saw a glimmer of hope. He jokingly pulled out a stack of one-dollar bills and asked when I was born. I said December 1942. He found a bill with a serial number matching my birthdate, signed it, and gave it to me for luck. I still have it.”

Saddam Hussein welcomes Gemayel in Baghdad. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

“Sadly, it didn’t work. The Americans had made up their minds. Many tried—including the Vatican—but nothing succeeded. Still, it was an effort made at Saddam’s request.”

Gemayel added: “My ties with Saddam and his team, especially Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, remained very good. Saddam wanted to help Lebanon. But his relationship with (Syrian President) Hafez al-Assad was bad. They had mutual hatred. I still have the armored Mercedes he sent me—top-level protection, still in excellent condition.”

Asked about Saddam’s personal demeanor, Gemayel said: “Very approachable. One-on-one, there was no protocol. He was warm and engaging—you forget he’s this powerful figure. But reaching him was a maze—multiple layers of security and misdirection. You’d think you were meeting Saddam, only to find it was a lookalike. Eventually, you’d be taken to a modest house far from the airport, where the real Saddam would be waiting.”

On Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, he said: “Kuwait’s issue with Iraq is old, like Lebanon’s issue with Syria. But historical claims don’t justify violating sovereignty or erasing borders. Despite my personal ties with Saddam, we strongly opposed the invasion of Kuwait—a country with excellent relations with Lebanon. Just as we rejected Assad’s plans to annex Lebanon to Syria, we rejected Saddam’s attempt to annex Kuwait.”

Gemayel and Gaddafi: From estrangement to friendship

Gemayel’s relationship with Gaddafi began with tension but later transformed into friendship. He recalled: “When I became president, Libya, without coordination, sent military forces to Lebanon. That was illegal and against Arab League protocols. I sent Gaddafi a message demanding their withdrawal. He refused and took a hostile media stance. So I cut diplomatic ties with Libya early in my presidency.”

Later, Moroccan King Hassan II helped mediate: “I had a close relationship with King Hassan II. He invited me to a private dinner in Morocco. During the meal, he left twice—unusual for him. The second time, he returned smiling and said, ‘Gaddafi is on the phone—he wants to meet you.’ I was surprised and hesitant, especially with the issue of Imam Moussa al-Sadr still unresolved. But the king reassured me, saying Gaddafi had promised a new page. He offered his own plane and a senior minister to accompany me to guarantee safety.”

Amine Gemayel had a frosty relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi that turned to friendship. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

They traveled secretly, landed at a military airport in Libya, and met Gaddafi. Gemayel recounted: “He was extremely courteous and warm. We had a long conversation and agreed to reset relations. He asked how Libya could support Lebanon internationally. I thanked him, and flew back to Beirut.”

“But during our flight, Israeli radio reported that my plane had disappeared en route from Morocco. Panic erupted in Beirut—emergency meetings, calls to the US, plans to file complaints at the UN and Arab League. My wife was informed. She calmly said, ‘I’m not worried. Amine does these things—there must be good behind it.’ Eventually, the king reassured everyone I was fine.”

After that, Gemayel and Gaddafi maintained a cordial relationship: “He would often insist I visit. During the Arab Summit in Algiers, our seats were side by side. Gaddafi wanted a statement condemning the US raid on Tripoli that killed his adopted daughter. I proposed he draft a statement to be added to the final communiqué. I wrote it for him. He loved it.”

“There was also an issue with his tent. He refused to stay in a hotel and insisted on his tent. Algerian security and President Chadli Benjedid objected. Gaddafi threatened to leave. I mediated, and in the end, he sent the tent as a gift to my plane.”

Gaddafi never discussed the disappearance of al-Sadr with Gemayel. Gemayel said Syrian intelligence had reportedly played a role in the disappearance, as it controlled Libyan airports at the time. The mass popularity of al-Sadr was said to have disturbed the Syrian regime because his vision for Lebanon’s Shiites conflicted with Syria’s agenda.

Despite all the hardships of his presidency, Gemayel said he harbors no bitterness: “I have peace of mind knowing I stayed true to national principles and did my best.”

He expressed satisfaction with his son Sami Gemayel’s political path as a lawmaker and head of the Kataeb Party, and praised President Joseph Aoun’s guidance of the army and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s professional record—wishing success for the current leadership in Lebanon.