The Historic Meeting between Saudi King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt

On Its 77th Anniversary, Asharq Al-Awsat Recalls the Historic Meeting between the Two Leaders

King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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The Historic Meeting between Saudi King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt

King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Every year on February 14, the Saudis and Americans remember the first meeting that brought together King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman with then US President Franklin Roosevelt in the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal.

The historic meeting was known as the Quincy Summit or the Quincy Meeting, in reference to the USS Quincy battleship, on which the meeting was held, and upon which the Saudi-American relations have been consolidated to this day.

Before that famous encounter, King Abdulaziz had recovered in April 1913 Al-Ahsa from the Ottomans in a preemptive step to block any British-Ottoman agreement to share influence in the Arabian Peninsula. The Anglo-Ottoman agreement was signed in late July 1913, according to which the Ottoman Empire ceded the coast of the Persian Gulf to Britain.

King Abdulaziz had imposed himself on the regional map and put the forces competing for influence before a fait accompli. He was keen on his country’s sovereignty, which made him constantly express friendship and try to avoid confrontation despite his distaste for British policies.

He was also watching - before the outbreak of World War II - American commercial interest in the region, even though the United States did not have the actual political means and saw the Middle East as a British area of influence primarily. Yet, he kept his political options open.

While King Abdulaziz was laying the foundations of his foreign policy, he expressed his keenness to diversify his relations with various countries in a way that enhances Saudi interests. After entering the Hijaz in 1924, influential states began to recognize the nascent kingdom, starting with Russia in 1926 and followed by European countries.

King Abdulaziz tried to get the United States to recognize his state, but America was not willing at the time to move in this direction. The latter monitored the king’s international engagements, foreign relations and trade deals, most notably his agreement with Germany in 1929.

The US government assigned the assistant trade attaché in Alexandria, Ralph Chesebrough, to visit Saudi Arabia to explore the situation. Chesebrough visited Jeddah in the summer of 1930 and prepared a report entitled, “The Economic Sources and Commercial Activities of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and its Appendices.”

The report indicated that trade relations between the two countries were expected to grow and flourish, which encouraged the US government at the time to move towards establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. The United States recognized the Kingdom in 1931.

In 1933, the Saudi government granted oil exploration concessions to Standard Oil of California (Socal). The agreement was signed at Khuzam Palace in Jeddah, Minister of Finance Sheikh Abdullah Al-Suleiman, representing the Saudi government, and lawyer Lloyd Hamilton, representing Socal. But commercial production did not start until 1938.

As World War II broke out in 1939, King Abdulaziz declared neutrality, despite his relations at the time with Britain and its military presence on its borders, and diplomatic relations with Germany.

Interest in Saudi Arabia and its King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman increased after US advisers and policymakers realized that the Kingdom was a potential strategic value for the United States. They saw in it a help in solving some of the problems that President Franklin Roosevelt expected to occur in the region after the war. America provided aid to the Saudi government within the lend-lease program, which amounted to $99 million according to a Senate report.

In 1942, the United States appointed a chargé d’affaires in Jeddah. Since then, official contacts accelerated, and King Abdulaziz received a number of US envoys. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to occupy a strategic importance in American foreign policy.

In 1944, the US appointed William Eddy at the head of its commission in Jeddah. Eddy was a naval colonel who had previously participated in the First and Second World Wars.

Eddy was born in Sidon to parents who work in missionaries. He grew up speaking Arabic and learning Arab culture and customs. After completing his studies at the prestigious Princeton University, he joined the Navy and enlisted in the government service. After his appointment in Jeddah, Eddy became one of the most prominent architects of Saudi-US relations and one of the witnesses to the historic meeting between King Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt.

Eddy, who passed away in Beirut in 1962, published a book in 1954 entitled, “F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud”, in which he narrated the background of the preparations for the meeting.

Eddy recounted that while he was in Jeddah in February 1945, he was told that President Roosevelt, on his way back from the Yalta Conference—the agreement between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States that discussed how to divide Germany and prosecute members of the Nazi Party and present them as war criminals—wanted to meet King Abdulaziz on board an American barge in the Bitter Lakes of the Suez Canal. Eddy was asked to arrange that meeting.

Arrangements were made and the USS Murphy sailed from Jeddah with King Abdulaziz on board, along with 48 companions.

At 10 a.m. on February 14, 1945 AD, the battleship arrived in the vicinity of the USS Quincy, which was carrying Roosevelt. King Abdulaziz, accompanied by the three princes and two ministers, disembarked, and crossed the bridge between the two ships to meet Roosevelt, who was sitting in his wheelchair on the Quincy. The two leaders spoke for an hour and a quarter before heading to lunch at 11.30.

Admiral Leahy (chief of staff and military advisor to the president) asked Eddy to escort King Abdulaziz in one elevator to the dining-room, while Leahy accompanied Roosevelt in the other.

Eddy recounted that he arrived with the King to the President’s suite, but Roosevelt did not show up! Leahy later said that the president stopped the elevator to smoke two cigarettes away from King Abdulaziz. In fact, Roosevelt was a heavy smoker, and yet he never smoked during his meeting with King Abdulaziz out of respect.

As soon as the two leaders met, charisma and diplomacy prevailed over the encounter. The two men were left to discuss the future and relations of their countries openly and transparently, Eddy’s book read.

After lunch, the meeting was limited to the two leaders only, with the presence of Eddy and Minister Youssef Yassin as translators. The talks lasted until 3:30 in the afternoon, which means that the total duration of the meeting extended over five hours. Then the king returned to the USS Murphy, which set sail.

Eddy sayid that he spent that night with Youssef Yassin to finish drafting the minutes of the talks. After they finished printing the minutes in both Arabic and English, the king signed the Arabic version, and on the following morning, February 15, 1945, Eddy flew to Alexandria, and presented the report to the president, who signed it without making any amendments.

King Abdulaziz asked Roosevelt for friendship and support, and noted that his country was not under occupation or mandate and that he wanted to remain independent.

After that, the president gave his pledge to King Abdulaziz - which he confirmed in a letter he sent on April 5, 1945, one week before his death - that he would not engage in any hostile acts against the Arabs, and that his government would not change its policy towards Palestine without prior consultations with the Arabs and Jews. For the King, the verbal assurances were then an agreement, and did not expect the sudden death of Roosevelt.

According to various sources, the historic meeting between the two leaders, apart from the Palestine, touched on the following issues: guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Kingdom, especially as the world war was still raging and King Abdulaziz did not disregard foreign ambitions in his country; developing the Saudi army and ensuring the independence of the Arab countries under colonialism, as well as the economic aspect relating to freedom of trade, services and the oil relations.

The meeting had political, humanitarian, economic and military dimensions. King Abdulaziz disposed of British influence, affirmed his position on the Palestinian issue, and relieved the monetary link to the pound sterling. Moreover, the Saudi Defense Agency became a ministry.

In 2020, the US State Department’s Office of Historians published an official document about the meeting, the first part of which corresponds to Eddy’s narration on the Palestinian issue, while the second part was about King Abdulaziz’s concern about the French policy towards Syria and Lebanon, whereas the US president affirmed America’s support for the independence of the two countries.

The meeting represented the largest Western-Islamic alliance, and symbolized the integration with the Islamic world with its resources, population, products, oil, strategic location and warm water ports.



What Al-Gaddafi’s Inner Circle Said about Musa Al-Sadr’s Disappearance

Imam Musa al-al-Sadr. (File photo)
Imam Musa al-al-Sadr. (File photo)
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What Al-Gaddafi’s Inner Circle Said about Musa Al-Sadr’s Disappearance

Imam Musa al-al-Sadr. (File photo)
Imam Musa al-al-Sadr. (File photo)

Fifteen years after the fall of Moammar al-Gaddafi’s regime, the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, head of Lebanon’s Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, during a visit to Libya on Aug. 31, 1978, remain unclear. Al-Sadr was accompanied by Sheikh Mohammed Yacoub and journalist Abbas Badreddine. No trace of the three men has ever been found. To date, Lebanese authorities have not disclosed the outcome of contacts they held with the forces that governed Libya after al-Gaddafi’s fall in 2011.

The disappearance of Imam al-Sadr was among the subjects I raised with Libyan officials during conversations about al-Gaddafi, his rule and the abuses committed under his regime. What follows are accounts I heard from them.

Moammar al-Gaddafi. (Reuters file)

Abdel Moneim al-Houni: The killing of al-Gaddafi’s pilot

After the Sept. 1, 1969, coup that brought al-Gaddafi to power, Abdel Moneim al-Houni held several senior posts. He was a member of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, headed the intelligence service and served as both interior and foreign minister.

I asked Houni about the case of the Lebanese Shiite leader.

“It is clear that Imam al-Sadr was eliminated,” he said. “This is certain, and it is the conviction of every Libyan I have met.”

“I will tell you something. My brother-in-law was a pilot who flew al-Gaddafi’s plane. His name was Najm al-Din al-Yaziji, and he held the rank of lieutenant colonel. Shortly after Imam al-Sadr disappeared, my brother-in-law was eliminated.”

“Family members said his killing was connected to the al-Sadr case. He had transported the imam’s body for burial in southern Libya, in the Sabha area. Relatives say his knowledge of what happened to Musa al-Sadr prompted the Libyan security services to kill him to conceal the secret. These are things that happen in crimes of this kind.”

Jalloud: "I alluded to the disappearance once. He merely replied, ‘Are you accusing me?’ The conversation ended there.”

Jalloud: Khomeini asked only for an explanation

Days after the triumph of Iran’s 1979 revolution, a Libyan delegation led by Abdessalam Jalloud, the Libyan regime’s “number two,” visited Tehran to offer congratulations and met Khomeini.

I asked Jalloud whether Khomeini had raised al-Sadr’s disappearance during the meeting.

“Yes,” he replied. “He expressed the hope that an explanation would be released about the circumstances of the case so that there would be no obstacle to cooperation between the two revolutions.”

“While I was at the hotel, a demonstration was organized outside involving 37 people, led by al-Sadr’s sister and her husband. They chanted slogans, but security personnel affiliated with the revolution quickly removed and dispersed them.”

I asked whether the al-Sadr case later became an obstacle in relations with Tehran.

“No,” Jalloud said. “As I told you before, we gave Iran missiles and played a central role in helping it obtain weapons” during its war with Iraq in the 1980s.

“I met al-Sadr once, in Lebanon in the mid-1970s,” he recalled.

“I did not even know that he was visiting Libya. When I learned of his disappearance, I was deeply distressed for two reasons. The first concerned the man himself and what he represented. The second was that I considered the act vile. It is not an Arab custom to invite someone into your home or country and then turn on him. Such conduct goes against Arab morals and Islamic values. The whole affair was strange and subjected to a severe blackout.”

I asked whether he had ever confronted al-Gaddafi about al-Sadr.

“I alluded to the matter once,” he said. “He merely replied, ‘Are you accusing me?’ The conversation ended there.”

Asked about reports of an altercation between al-Gaddafi and al-Sadr, Jalloud said: “I do not know the details. But I heard years ago that the police officer who impersonated al-Sadr and traveled to Italy using his passport after his disappearance had been placed under heavy guard by Moammar, who feared that he might be abducted after people began talking about his role.”

Asked whether he believed al-Sadr had been killed and buried, he said: “That is what reason tells me. It is impossible that he has remained hidden until now. Before the incident, of course, I had heard al-Gaddafi express annoyance that Iran was sending clerics who wielded influence among Arab Shiites. The truth is that I never imagined matters would go this far.”

Imam al-Sadr speaks at a press conference. (Imam Moussa al-Sadr Center for Research & Studies)

Shalgham: He came to Libya on Boumediene’s recommendation

I asked former Foreign Minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham about al-Sadr’s case.

He said he had met al-Sadr once, when the imam came to Cairo to deliver a lecture while Shalgham was a student there. Shalgham said he was under house arrest when al-Sadr came to Libya.

“There were reports that he came to Libya on the recommendation of Algerian President Houari Boumediene,” Shalgham said. “It was said that he had asked the Algerian president for assistance and that Boumediene advised him to meet al-Gaddafi.”

“It was also said that a dispute arose between al-Gaddafi and al-Sadr over religious issues. That is possible: al-Gaddafi was a Sunni of the Maliki school, while al-Sadr was a Shiite. The claim later emerged that someone had impersonated al-Sadr and traveled to Italy,” he added.

Shalgham continued: “One day, when I was foreign minister, al-Gaddafi and I were walking in Bab al-Aziziya. He said to me, ‘Abdel Rahman, the Italians are your friends, including the foreign and interior ministers. I only want to know the truth about the Musa al-al-Sadr affair.’

“After al-Gaddafi’s regime fell, numerous scenarios circulated. Some spoke of a possible role in al-Sadr’s elimination by Sabri al-Banna, better known as Abu Nidal, the leader of what was called Fatah – the Revolutionary Council,” he said.

“Many wondered whether al-Sadr had received a sum of money and whether that money led to what happened to him. I asked around, but no one confirmed the story about the money. Abdel Moneim al-Houni says al-Sadr was killed in Libya.”

Former Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Abdussalam Treki. (AFP file photo)

Treki: A strange crime

I put the same question to former Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Abdussalam Treki.

“Let us speak honestly: I have no knowledge of the details,” he said.

“Imam al-Sadr did not come to Libya through the Foreign Ministry. The ministry’s only role was to convey an invitation to al-Sadr through the Libyan chargé d’affaires in Beirut. Coordination was subsequently handled by other parties,” Treki explained.

“I did not meet al-Sadr. What I heard was that he was a man of struggle who held Arab nationalist views,” he added.

Treki noted: “We at the Foreign Ministry did not know how or when he arrived. Later, after I left the post of foreign minister, the ministry contacted the Italians. The authorities said at the time that he had left Tripoli for Rome.

“It was later rumored that a heated argument had taken place between al-Gaddafi and al-Sadr, and led to what followed. The story is strange. This serious and regrettable incident brought no benefit to Libya or the Arab nationalist cause and caused extensive damage. It was a strange crime, and I do not know whose interests it served or in what context it occurred,” he stated.

The account of Mismari, the protocol chief and ‘the colonel’s shadow’

Nouri al-Mismari served as chief of protocol with the rank of minister of state and was regarded as “the colonel’s shadow,” accompanying al-Gaddafi at home and on his travels.

I asked him about al-Sadr and let him tell the story.

“Something happened whose significance I did not appreciate at the time,” he said.

“Abdullah Senussi called me. At the time, he was a junior officer in the Military Intelligence Department, whose office was on Shatt Street. The department was headed by Capt. Abdullah al-Hijazi. That was his rank at the time, of course, and he was among those al-Gaddafi called the ‘Free Officers.’”

“Senussi asked me: ‘Is it necessary for the Italian authorities to stamp the passport of someone seeking to enter their territory?’ I replied: ‘Of course. It has to be stamped. Those are the rules followed in every country.’ He ended the call,” said al-Mismari.

“Senussi contacted me later and said: ‘I will send you some passports, and you are required to secure Italian visas for their holders.’ I believe there were three passports, but we are talking about something that happened decades ago. A soldier sent by Senussi came to me and handed me the passports.”

“I had no reason to be suspicious, but I opened them and found that one belonged to Imam Musa al-al-Sadr, may God have mercy on him. I do not recall the other names,” continued al-Mismari.

“I called the Italian ambassador and said we wanted visas for guests who were staying with us. He welcomed the request. I sent the passports, but Senussi soon called again and asked, ‘Is it done?’ I told him the process needed some time and that I would send the passports to him as soon as they were returned to me. That is what happened.”

“I later heard about Imam al-Sadr’s disappearance, and the incident remained in my memory, particularly because it was Senussi who had sent the passports,” he added.

Al-Mismari said al-Sadr never left Libya and that the Italians were innocent and had been deceived. Three people entered Italy, including a tall officer who wore al-Sadr’s clothes. They deliberately left the passports of al-Sadr and his two companions at the hotel, along with the imam’s prayer rug, and later departed using Libyan diplomatic passports.


Nepal Floods Expose Risks to Hydropower in a Warming Himalayas

An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)
An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)
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Nepal Floods Expose Risks to Hydropower in a Warming Himalayas

An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)
An undated handout photo of rescue workers taking part in a rescue operation near the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project, following deadly flash floods and mudslides, in Rasuwa, Nepal. (Nepal Army/Handout via Reuters)

Workers shoveled thick mud from a flood-ravaged power station in central Nepal this week, trying to restore electricity to more than 20,000 people.

The floods that swept through Nepal and China, killing hundreds and leaving thousands missing, have also overrun hydropower facilities, knocking out about 10% of Nepal’s power capacity.

Once the immediate aftermath of the disaster is dealt with, the question will be how to restore power plants, roads, bridges, schools and health facilities without exposing them to the same vulnerabilities, disaster experts said.

“Authorities have to take a hard look in the mirror now and ask how they will be rebuilding in these places. They will also have to take a close look at other projects in Nepal that have not been built yet, whether they’ll be approved after this event,” said Jakob Steiner, a geoscientist at the University of Graz in Austria, who is currently based in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Rebuilding for resilience, not just replacement Hydropower projects that were operating or under construction were fully or partly destroyed across Rasuwa, Nuwakot and Dhading, among the worst-hit districts.

Hundreds of workers in Nepal are unaccounted for from a dozen hydropower projects, according to the Independent Power Producers’ Association, Nepal. Many had taken shelter in the tunnels but are stuck, waiting to be rescued, according to officials.

“The tunnels are built to access hydropower infrastructure and to divert water,” Steiner said, describing the tunnels as big enough for trucks to pass through.

Apart from the hydropower projects, tens of kilometers of roads, multiple bridges and essential buildings like schools and hospitals have been destroyed.

Ramraj Narasimhan, a senior director with the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, said rebuilding should focus on continuity of services rather than trying to make every structure indestructible.

“If it gets damaged, let it get damaged, but can we build in redundancy in the system?” he said.

That can mean choosing a better location for construction, alternate routes, backup power, improved early warning and financial tools such as insurance to speed recovery, Narasimhan said. Risk assessments should examine where a river bends, where slopes are unstable and where a single failure could cut off several communities.

Narasimhan’s organization estimates that $124 billion worth of Nepal’s infrastructure is exposed to climate-driven disasters, creating the potential for hundreds of millions of dollars in losses each year. A report by the coalition earlier this year found that Nepal’s average annual losses are nearly $760 million from various disasters, while the country’s national disaster funds is only a fraction of this amount.

Climate risks grow for Himalayan hydropower

Climate scientists said the Himalayan region, which is warming faster than many other parts of the world, is particularly at risk from increasing global warming as a result of human-caused climate change.

Climate experts said the flooding adds to evidence that infrastructure planning in the Himalayas should account for disasters that are increasing as the climate warms. Glaciers across the Hindu Kush Himalaya are losing ice at an accelerating rate, while permafrost degradation, unstable slopes, glacial lakes and increasingly erratic rainfall are raising the risks of floods, landslides and debris flows, according to reports by Kathmandu-based climate research group International Center for Integrated Mountain Development.

The stakes are particularly high for Nepal because hydropower is both a foundation of its electricity grid and an important source of economic growth and export revenue. Much of the country’s potential is run-of-river hydropower, Narasimhan said, meaning facilities are closely tied to steep river corridors where land is limited and hazards can cascade quickly.

Steiner said smaller floods can sometimes be managed with diversions that keep debris and high flows away from expensive infrastructure and tunnels. But for events as large as the latest flood, he said, physical defenses may be overwhelmed. In those cases, early warning becomes the critical protection for people.

He said the flood was detected at the China-Nepal border after moving rapidly from its source, leaving little warning time upstream. But there was still time as the flood traveled downstream toward hydropower sites, raising questions about whether warnings could have reached workers sooner.

The disaster is also likely to intensify scrutiny of where future projects are approved. Himanshu Thakkar, coordinator of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, said environmental, social and disaster-risk assessments need to reflect the specific landscape and past hazards of each valley, backed by land-use rules and stronger accountability.

Hydropower projects can themselves become “force multipliers” when large structures, debris and altered river channels add to downstream damage, Thakkar said. He argued that Nepal should also consider more decentralized solar power as part of a broader energy mix.

Thakkar said the question now is not only how fast Nepal can rebuild, but what it chooses to put back in the path of the next flood.


72 Hours that Arranged the Succession: Khaddam Recalls What Happened after Hafez al-Assad's Death

Bashar al-Assad during his father’s funeral in June 2000. (AFP)
Bashar al-Assad during his father’s funeral in June 2000. (AFP)
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72 Hours that Arranged the Succession: Khaddam Recalls What Happened after Hafez al-Assad's Death

Bashar al-Assad during his father’s funeral in June 2000. (AFP)
Bashar al-Assad during his father’s funeral in June 2000. (AFP)

Former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam’s recent memoirs tackle the three days that followed the death of the late President Hafez al-Assad on June 10, 2000. He recalled the events from the perspective of someone who was inside the room where the succession was arranged.

The memoirs, edited and introduced by Ibrahim Hamidi, are due to be published in early September by Raff Publishing, a subsidiary of the Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG).

Khaddam contacted Hafez al-Assad to ask permission to travel to Baniyas, leading to a lengthy conversation about health and age in which Assad said: "I have carried burdens beyond my capacity." He ended the conversation with a request: "Call me when you arrive."

Upon Khaddam's return to Damascus on Saturday, he was informed that the presidential palace was calling for him and that "Dr. Bashar" - Assad’s son - was waiting for him at home, at which point he realized that the president had died.

In the reception hall, he found the members of the Syrian command with Bashar and his brother-in-law Assef Shawkat with discussions focusing on how to announced the death. Minister of Defense General Mustafa Tlass informed him that the Regional Command had made two decisions: nominating Bashar for the presidency and amending Article 83 of the Constitution regarding the age of the President of the Republic since Bashar was 34 years old and the constitution required the minimum age to be 40. The People's Assembly was to meet in the evening to approve the amendment.

The memoirs are due to be published in early September by Raff Publishing, a subsidiary of the Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG).

On the evening of Hafez’s death itself, Khaddam recalled that he met with Bashar at his home and suggested promoting him to the rank of general and appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces, "so that he would have a legitimate status in the state" before a referendum.

Bashar asked him whether they should consult Tlass, and Khaddam replied that they would inform him of the decision rather than ask him.

The following day, the proposal was presented to Tlass in the presence of Bashar, whereupon the Defense Minister's face turned pale and he fell silent before stating that he would order the drafting of the decree.

Here, the memoirs record the most striking point of contention: the decree was delayed, and when the director of Tlass's office was asked about the reason, he replied that the General wanted to promote Bashar to the rank of "Lieutenant General" rather than "General", a proposal that would have kept the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Army within the reach of the Defense Minister.

Khaddam revealed his conviction was that Tlass "was not fit for this position," and that he had made a decision to support Bashar "to the end, even if it were at the expense of old comrades."

Bashar al-Assad and Abdul Halim Khaddam at the Syrian parliament in 2000. (AFP)

The memoirs reveal that Bashar’s path to the presidency began in 1994 with the death of his brother Bassel. Khaddam recalled that while everyone was in Qardaha for the burial, he learned that Anisa Makhlouf and her brother Mohammad Makhlouf had met and decided to terminate Bashar’s studies in London so that he could take his brother’s place as Hafez’s eventual successor.

Recalling that period, Khaddam said: "We must not forget that the elder Assad built a regime in which he placed Syrians before two choices: either to accept the regime with all its flaws, or civil war."

The issue is not merely a story of military protocol; it reveals the fragility of the moment of transition in a regime built for decades around a single individual, and how the party, constitution, army, and family intervened within a few short hours to produce a succession intended to appear natural. The details of those 72 hours appear in the book's chapter titled "The Death of Hafez al-Assad."