The Historic Meeting between Saudi King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt

On Its 77th Anniversary, Asharq Al-Awsat Recalls the Historic Meeting between the Two Leaders

King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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The Historic Meeting between Saudi King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt

King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Every year on February 14, the Saudis and Americans remember the first meeting that brought together King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman with then US President Franklin Roosevelt in the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal.

The historic meeting was known as the Quincy Summit or the Quincy Meeting, in reference to the USS Quincy battleship, on which the meeting was held, and upon which the Saudi-American relations have been consolidated to this day.

Before that famous encounter, King Abdulaziz had recovered in April 1913 Al-Ahsa from the Ottomans in a preemptive step to block any British-Ottoman agreement to share influence in the Arabian Peninsula. The Anglo-Ottoman agreement was signed in late July 1913, according to which the Ottoman Empire ceded the coast of the Persian Gulf to Britain.

King Abdulaziz had imposed himself on the regional map and put the forces competing for influence before a fait accompli. He was keen on his country’s sovereignty, which made him constantly express friendship and try to avoid confrontation despite his distaste for British policies.

He was also watching - before the outbreak of World War II - American commercial interest in the region, even though the United States did not have the actual political means and saw the Middle East as a British area of influence primarily. Yet, he kept his political options open.

While King Abdulaziz was laying the foundations of his foreign policy, he expressed his keenness to diversify his relations with various countries in a way that enhances Saudi interests. After entering the Hijaz in 1924, influential states began to recognize the nascent kingdom, starting with Russia in 1926 and followed by European countries.

King Abdulaziz tried to get the United States to recognize his state, but America was not willing at the time to move in this direction. The latter monitored the king’s international engagements, foreign relations and trade deals, most notably his agreement with Germany in 1929.

The US government assigned the assistant trade attaché in Alexandria, Ralph Chesebrough, to visit Saudi Arabia to explore the situation. Chesebrough visited Jeddah in the summer of 1930 and prepared a report entitled, “The Economic Sources and Commercial Activities of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and its Appendices.”

The report indicated that trade relations between the two countries were expected to grow and flourish, which encouraged the US government at the time to move towards establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. The United States recognized the Kingdom in 1931.

In 1933, the Saudi government granted oil exploration concessions to Standard Oil of California (Socal). The agreement was signed at Khuzam Palace in Jeddah, Minister of Finance Sheikh Abdullah Al-Suleiman, representing the Saudi government, and lawyer Lloyd Hamilton, representing Socal. But commercial production did not start until 1938.

As World War II broke out in 1939, King Abdulaziz declared neutrality, despite his relations at the time with Britain and its military presence on its borders, and diplomatic relations with Germany.

Interest in Saudi Arabia and its King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman increased after US advisers and policymakers realized that the Kingdom was a potential strategic value for the United States. They saw in it a help in solving some of the problems that President Franklin Roosevelt expected to occur in the region after the war. America provided aid to the Saudi government within the lend-lease program, which amounted to $99 million according to a Senate report.

In 1942, the United States appointed a chargé d’affaires in Jeddah. Since then, official contacts accelerated, and King Abdulaziz received a number of US envoys. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to occupy a strategic importance in American foreign policy.

In 1944, the US appointed William Eddy at the head of its commission in Jeddah. Eddy was a naval colonel who had previously participated in the First and Second World Wars.

Eddy was born in Sidon to parents who work in missionaries. He grew up speaking Arabic and learning Arab culture and customs. After completing his studies at the prestigious Princeton University, he joined the Navy and enlisted in the government service. After his appointment in Jeddah, Eddy became one of the most prominent architects of Saudi-US relations and one of the witnesses to the historic meeting between King Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt.

Eddy, who passed away in Beirut in 1962, published a book in 1954 entitled, “F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud”, in which he narrated the background of the preparations for the meeting.

Eddy recounted that while he was in Jeddah in February 1945, he was told that President Roosevelt, on his way back from the Yalta Conference—the agreement between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States that discussed how to divide Germany and prosecute members of the Nazi Party and present them as war criminals—wanted to meet King Abdulaziz on board an American barge in the Bitter Lakes of the Suez Canal. Eddy was asked to arrange that meeting.

Arrangements were made and the USS Murphy sailed from Jeddah with King Abdulaziz on board, along with 48 companions.

At 10 a.m. on February 14, 1945 AD, the battleship arrived in the vicinity of the USS Quincy, which was carrying Roosevelt. King Abdulaziz, accompanied by the three princes and two ministers, disembarked, and crossed the bridge between the two ships to meet Roosevelt, who was sitting in his wheelchair on the Quincy. The two leaders spoke for an hour and a quarter before heading to lunch at 11.30.

Admiral Leahy (chief of staff and military advisor to the president) asked Eddy to escort King Abdulaziz in one elevator to the dining-room, while Leahy accompanied Roosevelt in the other.

Eddy recounted that he arrived with the King to the President’s suite, but Roosevelt did not show up! Leahy later said that the president stopped the elevator to smoke two cigarettes away from King Abdulaziz. In fact, Roosevelt was a heavy smoker, and yet he never smoked during his meeting with King Abdulaziz out of respect.

As soon as the two leaders met, charisma and diplomacy prevailed over the encounter. The two men were left to discuss the future and relations of their countries openly and transparently, Eddy’s book read.

After lunch, the meeting was limited to the two leaders only, with the presence of Eddy and Minister Youssef Yassin as translators. The talks lasted until 3:30 in the afternoon, which means that the total duration of the meeting extended over five hours. Then the king returned to the USS Murphy, which set sail.

Eddy sayid that he spent that night with Youssef Yassin to finish drafting the minutes of the talks. After they finished printing the minutes in both Arabic and English, the king signed the Arabic version, and on the following morning, February 15, 1945, Eddy flew to Alexandria, and presented the report to the president, who signed it without making any amendments.

King Abdulaziz asked Roosevelt for friendship and support, and noted that his country was not under occupation or mandate and that he wanted to remain independent.

After that, the president gave his pledge to King Abdulaziz - which he confirmed in a letter he sent on April 5, 1945, one week before his death - that he would not engage in any hostile acts against the Arabs, and that his government would not change its policy towards Palestine without prior consultations with the Arabs and Jews. For the King, the verbal assurances were then an agreement, and did not expect the sudden death of Roosevelt.

According to various sources, the historic meeting between the two leaders, apart from the Palestine, touched on the following issues: guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Kingdom, especially as the world war was still raging and King Abdulaziz did not disregard foreign ambitions in his country; developing the Saudi army and ensuring the independence of the Arab countries under colonialism, as well as the economic aspect relating to freedom of trade, services and the oil relations.

The meeting had political, humanitarian, economic and military dimensions. King Abdulaziz disposed of British influence, affirmed his position on the Palestinian issue, and relieved the monetary link to the pound sterling. Moreover, the Saudi Defense Agency became a ministry.

In 2020, the US State Department’s Office of Historians published an official document about the meeting, the first part of which corresponds to Eddy’s narration on the Palestinian issue, while the second part was about King Abdulaziz’s concern about the French policy towards Syria and Lebanon, whereas the US president affirmed America’s support for the independence of the two countries.

The meeting represented the largest Western-Islamic alliance, and symbolized the integration with the Islamic world with its resources, population, products, oil, strategic location and warm water ports.



What to Know about Israel's Ground Invasion in Southern Lebanon

A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
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What to Know about Israel's Ground Invasion in Southern Lebanon

A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)
A picture taken from northern Israel along the border with southern Lebanon shows smoke billowing above south Lebanon during Israeli bombardment on October 4, 2024. (Photo by Jalaa MAREY / AFP)

Israel’s ground invasion in Lebanon stretched into its second week, as the Hezbollah militant group fired hundreds of rockets deep into Israel — with no end in sight to the escalating conflict.
More than 1,400 people have been killed in Lebanon — mostly in airstrikes — and over a million displaced since the fighting intensified in mid-September. At least 15 Israeli soldiers and two civilians have been killed since the ground operation began, and more than 60,000 people have been displaced from towns along the border for more than a year.
Hezbollah began firing rockets into Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, a day after Hamas, the Palestinian militant group, attacked southern Israel, which sparked the war in Gaza. Israel and Hezbollah have exchanged fire almost every day since, coming close to a full-fledged war on several occasions but stepping back from the brink until this month, The Associated Press said.
Here’s what to know about the current ground incursion in southern Lebanon:
What is the aim of the Israeli military’s ground invasion? The Israeli military began what they called a “limited, localized and targeted ground raids” in southern Lebanon on Oct. 1. The same day, the military said that it had carried out dozens of secretive cross-border operations to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure over the past year. The aim, Israel says, is to allow its displaced residents to return home.
A military official said that thousands of Israeli troops are currently operating along the roughly 100-kilometer-long (62-mile) border, clearing the area just along the border to try to remove the launch pads where Hezbollah fires rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles into Israeli towns, as well as infrastructure they say would allow for an Oct. 7-style invasion of Israel.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the military’s strategy, said the troops haven’t ventured deep inside Lebanon so far, and have conducted operations from distances of a few hundred meters (yards) up to 2 to 3 kilometers (1.5 to 2 miles) into Lebanese territory.
The Israeli military has shared videos of what it says are underground tunnels chiseled into rock used by Hezbollah. The tunnels are used to store weapons and stage attacks. One tunnel stretched from Lebanon into Israeli territory, according to the military.
The goal is not to destroy Hezbollah, and the army is aware that this will not remove the threat of longer-range rockets and missiles, the official said.
Elijah Magnier, a Brussels-based military and counterterrorism analyst, said Israeli forces haven’t seized any ground positions yet.
“They need to go in, harass, test and come out,” Magnier said. In order to hold ground positions, Israel would need tanks to come in and take high critical ground overlooking territory, he said. He estimates it would require clearing some 10 kilometers of Hezbollah presence, which is still a long way off.
It is not clear how long the operation will last or how long Israel will maintain a presence in these towns. The official said the hope is that this can lead to a diplomatic arrangement pushing Hezbollah away from the border. But the plans could change. A previous Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, initially intended to push back Palestinian militants, turned into an 18-year occupation.
What is Hezbollah’s strategy? Hezbollah officials, including assassinated leader Hassan Nasrallah, have conceded that the Israeli military has the superior air force and intelligence. But Hezbollah has the advantage in direct confrontations on Lebanese turf.
Hezbollah forces have better equipment and training compared to Hamas, which Israel has been battling for more than a year in Gaza. Hezbollah forces gained experience in wars in Syria and Iraq. Lebanon’s terrain is also more rugged and challenging than the Palestinian enclave, which is mostly flat and sandy.
Hezbollah’s strategy, led by its elite Radwan Forces, has been drawing in and ambushing incoming Israeli troops, detonating explosive devices or firing rockets at them, and firing artillery and rockets at Israeli border towns. Although Hezbollah has lost many of its top officials and commanders in recent weeks, militants have continued to fire rockets deeper into Israel, including heavy barrages on the city of Haifa.
Former Lebanese Army General Hassan Jouni said that he assessed Israel is still conducting reconnaissance ahead of its main attack, but that it had already suffered heavy losses in the smaller operations. Jouni said Hezbollah had dug many tunnels in the south and were well equipped with weapons caches and ammunition.
“The land always works in the favor of those who own it,” he said.
How does this compare to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah? Israel and Hezbollah last went to war in 2006, a 34-day conflict that ended with the United Nations Resolution 1701, which was supposed to push Hezbollah further north and keep the border region exclusively under the control of the Lebanese army and UN peacekeepers.
Israeli leaders say they want Lebanon to implement the resolution. Hezbollah says Israel hasn’t held up its part of the treaty and will stop firing rockets when there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
Israel’s searing air campaign in southern Lebanon and Beirut in recent weeks is similar to the 2006 war, though this time, better intelligence has enabled Israel to kill several of Hezbollah’s top leadership.
“The Air Force is better and is using all kinds of methods to penetrate deeper into the ground, like dropping bomb after bomb after bomb,” said Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in September by dropping more than 80 bombs on an apartment complex built over an underground compound in quick succession.
In the 2006 war, Israel sent ground troops into Lebanon after 10 days of airstrikes before withdrawing them about four weeks later. Troops attempted to reach the Litani River, about 30 kilometers (18.5 miles) north of the border, but suffered heavy losses before a ceasefire ended the operation and the war.
Could there be a diplomatic solution? Hezbollah’s acting leader signaled Tuesday that the group is open to a cease-fire. Guzansky believes Israeli troops will stay on the ground in southern Lebanon until there is an internationally enforced diplomatic solution that’s stronger than the current UN peacekeeping force. If Israeli troops retreat, he said, they risk the same situation as 2006, where Hezbollah simply rearmed and resumed operations.
But former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was Israel’s leader during the 2006 war, said that war served as a lesson that immediate diplomacy, rather than military force, is the only way to keep the border quiet.
“Why not try and make a deal now rather than to fight for half a year?” he asked in an interview with The Associated Press. “You lose how many soldiers, kill how many innocent people? And then in the end we’ll make a deal which may have been made in advance.”