The Historic Meeting between Saudi King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt

On Its 77th Anniversary, Asharq Al-Awsat Recalls the Historic Meeting between the Two Leaders

King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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The Historic Meeting between Saudi King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt

King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)
King Abdulaziz, US President Roosevelt and members of the Saudi delegation (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Every year on February 14, the Saudis and Americans remember the first meeting that brought together King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman with then US President Franklin Roosevelt in the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal.

The historic meeting was known as the Quincy Summit or the Quincy Meeting, in reference to the USS Quincy battleship, on which the meeting was held, and upon which the Saudi-American relations have been consolidated to this day.

Before that famous encounter, King Abdulaziz had recovered in April 1913 Al-Ahsa from the Ottomans in a preemptive step to block any British-Ottoman agreement to share influence in the Arabian Peninsula. The Anglo-Ottoman agreement was signed in late July 1913, according to which the Ottoman Empire ceded the coast of the Persian Gulf to Britain.

King Abdulaziz had imposed himself on the regional map and put the forces competing for influence before a fait accompli. He was keen on his country’s sovereignty, which made him constantly express friendship and try to avoid confrontation despite his distaste for British policies.

He was also watching - before the outbreak of World War II - American commercial interest in the region, even though the United States did not have the actual political means and saw the Middle East as a British area of influence primarily. Yet, he kept his political options open.

While King Abdulaziz was laying the foundations of his foreign policy, he expressed his keenness to diversify his relations with various countries in a way that enhances Saudi interests. After entering the Hijaz in 1924, influential states began to recognize the nascent kingdom, starting with Russia in 1926 and followed by European countries.

King Abdulaziz tried to get the United States to recognize his state, but America was not willing at the time to move in this direction. The latter monitored the king’s international engagements, foreign relations and trade deals, most notably his agreement with Germany in 1929.

The US government assigned the assistant trade attaché in Alexandria, Ralph Chesebrough, to visit Saudi Arabia to explore the situation. Chesebrough visited Jeddah in the summer of 1930 and prepared a report entitled, “The Economic Sources and Commercial Activities of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and its Appendices.”

The report indicated that trade relations between the two countries were expected to grow and flourish, which encouraged the US government at the time to move towards establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. The United States recognized the Kingdom in 1931.

In 1933, the Saudi government granted oil exploration concessions to Standard Oil of California (Socal). The agreement was signed at Khuzam Palace in Jeddah, Minister of Finance Sheikh Abdullah Al-Suleiman, representing the Saudi government, and lawyer Lloyd Hamilton, representing Socal. But commercial production did not start until 1938.

As World War II broke out in 1939, King Abdulaziz declared neutrality, despite his relations at the time with Britain and its military presence on its borders, and diplomatic relations with Germany.

Interest in Saudi Arabia and its King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman increased after US advisers and policymakers realized that the Kingdom was a potential strategic value for the United States. They saw in it a help in solving some of the problems that President Franklin Roosevelt expected to occur in the region after the war. America provided aid to the Saudi government within the lend-lease program, which amounted to $99 million according to a Senate report.

In 1942, the United States appointed a chargé d’affaires in Jeddah. Since then, official contacts accelerated, and King Abdulaziz received a number of US envoys. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to occupy a strategic importance in American foreign policy.

In 1944, the US appointed William Eddy at the head of its commission in Jeddah. Eddy was a naval colonel who had previously participated in the First and Second World Wars.

Eddy was born in Sidon to parents who work in missionaries. He grew up speaking Arabic and learning Arab culture and customs. After completing his studies at the prestigious Princeton University, he joined the Navy and enlisted in the government service. After his appointment in Jeddah, Eddy became one of the most prominent architects of Saudi-US relations and one of the witnesses to the historic meeting between King Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt.

Eddy, who passed away in Beirut in 1962, published a book in 1954 entitled, “F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud”, in which he narrated the background of the preparations for the meeting.

Eddy recounted that while he was in Jeddah in February 1945, he was told that President Roosevelt, on his way back from the Yalta Conference—the agreement between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States that discussed how to divide Germany and prosecute members of the Nazi Party and present them as war criminals—wanted to meet King Abdulaziz on board an American barge in the Bitter Lakes of the Suez Canal. Eddy was asked to arrange that meeting.

Arrangements were made and the USS Murphy sailed from Jeddah with King Abdulaziz on board, along with 48 companions.

At 10 a.m. on February 14, 1945 AD, the battleship arrived in the vicinity of the USS Quincy, which was carrying Roosevelt. King Abdulaziz, accompanied by the three princes and two ministers, disembarked, and crossed the bridge between the two ships to meet Roosevelt, who was sitting in his wheelchair on the Quincy. The two leaders spoke for an hour and a quarter before heading to lunch at 11.30.

Admiral Leahy (chief of staff and military advisor to the president) asked Eddy to escort King Abdulaziz in one elevator to the dining-room, while Leahy accompanied Roosevelt in the other.

Eddy recounted that he arrived with the King to the President’s suite, but Roosevelt did not show up! Leahy later said that the president stopped the elevator to smoke two cigarettes away from King Abdulaziz. In fact, Roosevelt was a heavy smoker, and yet he never smoked during his meeting with King Abdulaziz out of respect.

As soon as the two leaders met, charisma and diplomacy prevailed over the encounter. The two men were left to discuss the future and relations of their countries openly and transparently, Eddy’s book read.

After lunch, the meeting was limited to the two leaders only, with the presence of Eddy and Minister Youssef Yassin as translators. The talks lasted until 3:30 in the afternoon, which means that the total duration of the meeting extended over five hours. Then the king returned to the USS Murphy, which set sail.

Eddy sayid that he spent that night with Youssef Yassin to finish drafting the minutes of the talks. After they finished printing the minutes in both Arabic and English, the king signed the Arabic version, and on the following morning, February 15, 1945, Eddy flew to Alexandria, and presented the report to the president, who signed it without making any amendments.

King Abdulaziz asked Roosevelt for friendship and support, and noted that his country was not under occupation or mandate and that he wanted to remain independent.

After that, the president gave his pledge to King Abdulaziz - which he confirmed in a letter he sent on April 5, 1945, one week before his death - that he would not engage in any hostile acts against the Arabs, and that his government would not change its policy towards Palestine without prior consultations with the Arabs and Jews. For the King, the verbal assurances were then an agreement, and did not expect the sudden death of Roosevelt.

According to various sources, the historic meeting between the two leaders, apart from the Palestine, touched on the following issues: guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Kingdom, especially as the world war was still raging and King Abdulaziz did not disregard foreign ambitions in his country; developing the Saudi army and ensuring the independence of the Arab countries under colonialism, as well as the economic aspect relating to freedom of trade, services and the oil relations.

The meeting had political, humanitarian, economic and military dimensions. King Abdulaziz disposed of British influence, affirmed his position on the Palestinian issue, and relieved the monetary link to the pound sterling. Moreover, the Saudi Defense Agency became a ministry.

In 2020, the US State Department’s Office of Historians published an official document about the meeting, the first part of which corresponds to Eddy’s narration on the Palestinian issue, while the second part was about King Abdulaziz’s concern about the French policy towards Syria and Lebanon, whereas the US president affirmed America’s support for the independence of the two countries.

The meeting represented the largest Western-Islamic alliance, and symbolized the integration with the Islamic world with its resources, population, products, oil, strategic location and warm water ports.



The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
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The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.

Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.

After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.

Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Arafat and Abbas

More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.

Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.

In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.

Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.

Weapons smuggled in undergarments

Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.

Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.

German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.

Black September

The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.

The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.

Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.

Several setbacks

In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.

Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.

Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.

Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.

The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Meeting at a Rome cafe

Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.

The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.

Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”

So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.

Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.

Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)

Scouting visits

Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.

In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.

Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.

Lebanese ‘wife’

Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.

Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.

Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)

Finishing touches

The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.

The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.

Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.

The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.

German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Night of the operation

Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.

Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.

The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)

Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.

‘Wrath of God’

Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.