Sudan's Hemedti Visits Moscow

The deputy head of Sudan's ruling council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Reuters
The deputy head of Sudan's ruling council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Reuters
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Sudan's Hemedti Visits Moscow

The deputy head of Sudan's ruling council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Reuters
The deputy head of Sudan's ruling council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Reuters

The deputy head of Sudan's ruling council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, who is widely known as Hemedti, was in Moscow on Thursday for talks with the Russian government.

The official visit comes at a testing time for both countries. Russia is facing new Western sanctions after ordering troops into eastern Ukraine, while the United States has threatened Sudan's military with sanctions after the coup.

"Through this visit, we hope to advance relations between Sudan and Russia to broader horizons, and strengthen the existing cooperation between us in various fields," Dagalo said in a tweet.

The Sudanese delegation's visit to Moscow fell "within the framework of exchanging views and discussing ways to develop and strengthen cooperation between Sudan and Russia," the ruling Sovereign Council said.

The delegation, which also includes Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim as well as senior energy and trade officials, would hold a series of talks with Russian counterparts during the visit, it said in a statement.

Russia was due to send a shipment of wheat to Sudan as humanitarian aid, Sputnik News reported in January.

Military leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who visited Russia in 2019, said in December that relations with Russia were strong and that an agreement on a Russian naval base on the country's Red Sea coast was under discussion.

The visit is the latest in a string of diplomatic trips Hemedti has made this year, including to the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, and South Sudan.

Sudan has found itself increasingly isolated since an October 25 coup that has seen foreign aid cut as part of the international community's response to the military takeover.



Hezbollah Responds to Disarmament Efforts with Media Campaign, Political Escalation

Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Official, Wafiq Safa, speaking to the media earlier... at the site of the assassination of Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, in southern Beirut's suburbs (EPA)
Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Official, Wafiq Safa, speaking to the media earlier... at the site of the assassination of Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, in southern Beirut's suburbs (EPA)
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Hezbollah Responds to Disarmament Efforts with Media Campaign, Political Escalation

Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Official, Wafiq Safa, speaking to the media earlier... at the site of the assassination of Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, in southern Beirut's suburbs (EPA)
Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Official, Wafiq Safa, speaking to the media earlier... at the site of the assassination of Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, in southern Beirut's suburbs (EPA)

Amid ongoing Lebanese and international efforts to centralize weaponry under the control of the Lebanese state and enforce UN Resolution 1701, statements and campaigns launched by Hezbollah officials threaten to disrupt a path that had been clearly outlined by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam.

Both leaders remain committed to dialogue in pursuit of an internal understanding, steering clear of any internal conflicts.

Recently, Hezbollah officials have made noteworthy statements following the President's announcement that 2025 will be the year to consolidate weapons under state authority.

Aoun reaffirmed that communication between the presidency and Hezbollah remains active, with tangible results on the ground.

He also highlighted that he and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri are in agreement on all matters, particularly the goal of placing weapons solely under the control of the state.

After Hezbollah's Deputy Political Council Head, Mahmoud Qamati, threatened to sever any hand that reaches for “the resistance's weapons,” he later clarified that his remarks were aimed at those launching campaigns against him and calling for the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, the party's liaison and coordination official, Wafiq Safa, told Al-Nour Radio, a Hezbollah-affiliated station, that the term “disarmament” only exists on social media and among instigators.

He emphasized that discussions on a defense strategy would only take place after Israel’s withdrawal and cessation of its attacks, asserting that the strategy begins with equipping the army.

Addressing the resistance's supporters, Safa advised, “Do not be influenced by all the false narratives you hear. No force can disarm us.”

He further urged them to trust Hezbollah and its leadership, as they had trusted the late Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.

On Thursday, MP Hassan Fadlallah launched a scathing attack on the Lebanese state, accusing it of failing to fulfill its duties in confronting external aggressions. He linked any dialogue about a “defense strategy” to the conditions of ending attacks, liberating land, freeing prisoners, and rebuilding.
“When these issues are resolved, and when the state fully assumes its responsibilities, ensuring our people's blood is no longer spilled, our land is no longer occupied, and our homes are no longer destroyed, we will discuss other matters, including the defense strategy.”

As Fadlallah denounced a “psychological war” against the resistance, it was notable that Hezbollah launched an advertising campaign with posters bearing the slogan:

“Your weapon is your steed... Protect it, and it will protect you,” signaling the group's firm stance on retaining its weapons. One poster also featured an image of the group's former media official, Mohammad Afif, with the inscription: “Hezbollah is a nation, and nations do not die.”

Hezbollah’s recent media messages, primarily revolving around the party's weaponry and defense strategy, are seen by Lebanese ministerial sources as “directed more at the party’s base than at the Lebanese state or the international community.”

These sources believe that the decision has already been made, and the process of centralizing weapons under the state's control has begun. They describe these statements as part of “domestic consumption” aimed at preparing the party's supporters for the changes unfolding, sending a message to the internal audience that “we are still here.”

The sources characterize the positions as “unrealistic,” noting that no Lebanese official has suggested disarming Hezbollah by force.

Instead, President Aoun, the government, and its leadership have emphasized dialogue on limiting weapons to the state and pursuing a defense strategy, while focusing on maintaining civil peace and avoiding sectarian conflict. These points are also underscored by international communications.

The sources further recall what they consider to be “established principles” that were clearly outlined in the President's inaugural speech and in the government’s ministerial statement, which was approved by Hezbollah and its parliamentary bloc.

They also note that the ceasefire agreement, approved by Hezbollah and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, was reached in the previous government in which Hezbollah participated.

Political analyst Ali Amin argues that some Hezbollah officials' statements about disarming the party reflect internal confusion within the group's leadership and an attempt to raise the negotiating stakes, both with Iran vis-à-vis Washington and with Lebanon's official authorities.

“Some of the media campaigns and statements by Hezbollah officials reflect this internal struggle more than they signal a firm stance on the issue of placing weapons solely under the state's control,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Hezbollah, both in its Lebanese leadership and Iranian reference, understands that avoiding a solution to the issue of illegal weapons is no longer possible after the consequences of the 'support war' and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, with near-unanimous Lebanese agreement on the need to centralize arms in the state,” he explained.

“Adding to this is the ongoing Israeli aggression against Lebanon, with no response from Hezbollah or any capability for retaliation, confirming that the party is in no position to continue opposing these new realities that did not exist before the war.”

“The only remaining function for weapons not aimed at Israel is an internal one—engaging in an internal war, which is unlikely to occur given the ongoing regional and international support for Lebanon,” Amin concluded, adding that “this support has played a crucial role in reorganizing constitutional institutions and pushing for urgent financial reforms.”

He believes the confusion and failure to grasp the ongoing transformations reflect internal party dynamics more than a broader conflict between Hezbollah and external forces.