Syria Is the 'Hostage' of Russia's Ukrainian Adventure

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (L) visit Russia’s Hmeimim Air Base, southeast of Latakia in Syria, December 11, 2017. (EPA)
Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (L) visit Russia’s Hmeimim Air Base, southeast of Latakia in Syria, December 11, 2017. (EPA)
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Syria Is the 'Hostage' of Russia's Ukrainian Adventure

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (L) visit Russia’s Hmeimim Air Base, southeast of Latakia in Syria, December 11, 2017. (EPA)
Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (L) visit Russia’s Hmeimim Air Base, southeast of Latakia in Syria, December 11, 2017. (EPA)

It won't be a stretch to say that Syria will be among the countries most affected by the Russian attack on Ukraine, with all its military and political implications and whether President Vladimir Putin manages to "change the regime" in Kyiv or languish in the "Ukrainian swamp."

The situation in Syria has long been tied to other crises in recent years, such as the ones in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, given that the main players there are the Russians and Turks. The players had often exchanged blows on the front to deliver messages and carry out geopolitical deals. However, the clearest military connection lies between Ukraine and Russia:

- Assad-Yanukovych: After former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014, Putin retaliated to the revolution in Ukraine by annexing Crimea in March that same year. Moscow at the time also demanded that Damascus take a harder line at the peace talks that were being held in Geneva, adding that it should not yield to the Syrian revolution. During a meeting at the time with Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad told him he will not act like Yanukovych and flee Syria, choosing instead to "stay and persevere."

- Military intervention: Even though Moscow had objected to the western intervention in Iraq and Libya, it yielded to Damascus and Tehran's pleas that it intervene in Syria. In September 2015, Putin intervened militarily in Syria to prevent "regime change". In exchange, Russia reaped major military privileges, most significant of which was establishing a permanent military base in Hmeimim and a naval base in Tartus.

Not only did Russia turn the tide of war in the regime's favor, it also turned Syria into a military testing ground. Observers noted that the images of the fighting in Ukraine look largely like those that were coming out of western and central Syria in 2016.

- Warm waters: Deploying Russian forces by the Mediterranean had long been a czarist dream and it was achieved by transforming the small port of Tartus into a naval base, not too far from NATO's borders in Turkey. Russia underlined this "strategic achievement" on the eve of the Ukrainian invasion by holding the largest naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean, where NATO forces were also holding drills. Moreover, Russian Defense Minister Serge Shoigu was at the Hmeimim to oversee the exercise, demonstrating that Moscow now views Syria as an "extension of its national security".

- Symbolic signs: It was no coincidence that Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mikdad was in Moscow the day Putin declared the "independence" of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics. Mikdad said the declaration was in line with international law and the United Nations Charter. Assad on Thursday hailed the attack on Ukraine as a "correction of history" after the break up of the Soviet Union. Syria had also previously recognized several separatist republics controlled by Moscow, a sign that it is part of the "Russian world" envisioned by Putin.

- Spearhead: Moscow views the Hmeimim base, which boasts the S-400 and S-300 systems, as the spearhead of its confrontation with NATO, which has a base in Incirlik in southern Turkey. Putin was able to win over Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan, who has been disappointed with the American support to Kurds in eastern Syria. The best example of this is Ankara's refusal of Ukraine's request to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian ships. In return, Shoigu, on his latest visit to Syria, rejected Damascus' request to wage a wide-scale offensive against the Idlib province in the northwest.

- Iron Dome: Turkey is not the only one treading carefully with the Russian attack on Ukraine. Reports have said Israel has refused to offer military support to Kyiv because it fears angering Putin and having the freedom it has in attacking "Iranian positions" in Syria restricted, especially amid reports that one of the outcomes of the Ukrainian war would be further Russian-Iranian rapprochement.

- Contact lines: The "borders" of the three "zones of influence" in Syria have remained largely unchanged in the past two years. The confrontation in Ukraine may, however, expose them to several tests. Washington has declared that the collision avoidance agreement with Russia in Syria still stands. Moscow has also rejected Damascus' request to attack Idlib. These "understandings" will undoubtedly be tested as developments in Ukraine unravel. The situation in Ukraine will likely also impact the fate of the resolution on the cross-border aid deliveries in Syria.

- Economic cost: The crisis in Ukraine will not only have political and military implications on Syria, but major economic ones as well, especially since Damascus relies heavily on food and oil support from Moscow to grapple with western sanctions.



Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mubarak Was a Patriot

Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo
Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mubarak Was a Patriot

Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo
Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo

Former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat that the first ten years of the current century were disastrous in Egypt. Hosni Mubarak had aged and lost interest in governing the country.

Mubarak and Hereditary Rule

Asked about Mubarak’s ties with former Presidents Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser, Moussa said: “Mubarak believed that what Anwar Sadat had done was right. And he used to love Abdel Nasser a lot.”

Asharq Al-Awsat asked him if the end of Mubarak’s term was painful. Moussa replied: “Yes of course. He wasn’t as bad as pictured. This man was a patriot and knew what he was doing. He wasn’t at all naïve.”

“The issue that his son could become his heir was not accepted by anyone ... Mubarak did not want for his son to rule Egypt, which is not an easy task. It’s a huge and very complicated country, and the presidency requires a lot of experience,” Moussa said.

Mubarak Loved Elegance and Joking

Was Mubarak interested in his personal elegance? Moussa replied: "Yes. He knew what to wear with what, and he valued elegance greatly.”

“He also had a way of looking at people, and he was often right about that.”

"He was Egyptian par excellence. He loved sarcasm and listening to jokes. He would laugh very energetically and loudly when something amused him, surrounded by a group of humorous people. And then, suddenly, the president would return,” said Moussa.

"He used to wake up early and sit in a pleasant little kiosk in the garden, reading the newspapers and the reports sent to him by various agencies, taking his time. After finishing, he would be fully briefed on many different matters."

Policymaker

Moussa had sometimes implied that he was a policymaker, not just an executor of policies. “First of all, the Foreign Minister must be one of the policy makers ... If he is merely an executor, then he will have no role in the history of diplomacy or in politics, nor will he have the influence that a Foreign Minister is supposed to have like taking initiative, thinking, and acting quickly,” said Moussa.

“This, in my opinion, was the case. However, I cannot claim that I was one of the makers of Egyptian policy. But I certainly contributed to many political steps and political thinking. For example, what were the priorities? A priority was to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. This was the work of Egyptian diplomacy, which I headed, and I was committed to this issue.”

Advice to Assad on Lebanon Pullout

Asked if Mubarak had advised Syrian President Bashar Assad to withdraw his forces from Lebanon after the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Moussa said: "I don’t know, I was Arab League Secretary General back then. I advised.”

But Moussa said that when he went to Beirut to offer his condolences to the Hariri family, he visited Damascus to meet with Assad. “I asked him if he was ready to withdraw the Syrian army. He said: Yes,” according to Moussa, who also said Assad clearly stated that the Arab League chief can officially announce the Syrian stance to the media.

Yet, as soon as he returned to Cairo, the Syrian government spokesman denied Moussa’s claim that Assad had promised a pullout of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The regime later retracted his statement.

Asked about the reasons for Hariri’s assassination, Moussa said that the former prime minister was “bigger than Lebanon. He was a huge Arab personality that could have met the president of the United States and of France anytime he wanted.”

Moussa confirmed that Hariri had complained to him about Syria’s relationship with him.