Possible Impact of Ukraine War on Middle East

A destroyed military vehicle near Kyiv. (dpa)
A destroyed military vehicle near Kyiv. (dpa)
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Possible Impact of Ukraine War on Middle East

A destroyed military vehicle near Kyiv. (dpa)
A destroyed military vehicle near Kyiv. (dpa)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is expected to impact the whole world, with its repercussions going beyond Europe and "areas of conflict," with some observers arguing that it will ripple throughout the Middle East and North Africa in the short and long term as well.

The economic and political challenges of the war will impact the Middle East. Many countries depend on Russian wheat and Russian and Ukrainian oil and industries, which will lead to "political polarization" with governments siding with Russia or the West.

In a report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, Senior Vice President and Director of Middle East Program Jon Alterman believes that the effects of Russia's February invasion of Ukraine will ripple throughout the Middle East and North Africa region.

Alterman noted that it would reveal new geo-strategic alignments, compound food insecurity, and threaten to spark further military confrontations.

If the confrontation between Russia and much of the rest of the world is prolonged, as seems likely, the more severe impacts may be in the longer-term rather than the shorter term.

Alterman, who co-authored the report with his fellow Will Todman, believes Iran and Syria took predictably anti-Western stances.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad declared that Damascus would recognize the independence of two Russian-backed separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, and Iran's foreign minister said that crisis is "rooted in NATO's provocations."

But key US allies and partners in the region have been cautious. While Israel's foreign minister condemned Russia, its prime minister notably did not.

Israel sees Russia as an essential partner, and Russian emigrants are an important constituency in the Israeli electorate.

The Gulf states and some Arab countries all see Russia as an important fellow energy producer and a potential source of arms, investment, and other goods. They have expressed concern but avoided placing the blame on Russia.

Oil price hike

The crisis and the Russian-Ukrainian war that erupted on February 24 led to a surge of oil prices above $100 per barrel for the first time since 2014. For oil-exporting states in the region, higher prices will provide welcome budgetary relief in the short term after the economic hit of COVID-19.

Counterintuitively, in the longer term, sustained higher oil prices could accelerate the energy transition by making renewables and electrification more economically attractive.

While there is always pressure among oil-exporting states to channel windfalls into public salaries and subsidies, some governments may use a portion of the newfound profits to invest in efforts to diversify their energy investments, in particular in renewables and hydrogen.

Some regional countries also fear that Russia will lack the resources to sustain its role in Syria, leaving a vacuum that Iranian forces will fill, especially if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA) is revived and higher oil prices put even more money in the Iranian treasury.

Shortage of Russian wheat and food commodities

The report presented the impact of the Ukrainian-Russian crisis on the supply lines and global food commodities, which constitute about a quarter of global wheat exports. The pandemic and resultant logistics challenges had already boosted wheat prices by 80 percent since April 2020; wheat futures in Paris rose 16 percent on February 24.

In addition, Russia has cut off exports of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Several countries in the Middle East are particularly vulnerable to higher prices and disrupted supplies.

For example, Egypt is the world's largest importer of wheat, and many of its imports come from the Black Sea area. Although the government attempted to diversify its supplies in the run-up to the invasion, signs of supply shortages are already apparent.

The government announced that its strategic stockpile of wheat would last for less than five months.

Egypt received many bids for a wheat tender last week, but this week canceled a tender after receiving only one high-priced offer.

In North Africa, the price hikes and supply disruptions coincide with severe droughts.

The economic challenges come at a difficult time for Tunisian President Kais Saied, who is in a renewed effort to consolidate power after dismissing parliament last summer and faces increasingly stubborn economic stagnation.

The report argues that wheat shortages will hit fragile states in the region even harder. Lebanon's economic crisis has already undermined its population's ability to buy food, with prices increasing by 1,000 percent in less than three years. Lebanon imports wheat to meet most of its needs, with about 60 percent from Ukraine. The country has approximately a month's worth of grain in storage.

War-torn Libya and Yemen are similarly vulnerable to wheat shortages.

Regional political and military polarization

President Vladimir Putin promised "consequences you have never seen" to countries that interfere with Russia's operations in Ukraine. Russia has several options to inflict pain on the West in the Middle East in retaliation to sanctions. Tensions could result in Russia acting as a spoiler in Syria.

Meanwhile, the new CENTCOM commander, Lieutenant General Michael Kurilla, warned that Russia has increasingly violated de-confliction protocols with the United States in eastern Syria in recent months.

If relations deteriorate further and Russia shuns de-confliction mechanisms, the risk of a more severe confrontation will rise.

Russia will have a clear opportunity to undermine the West in July when the UN Security Council votes to renew UN cross-border humanitarian operations into opposition-held areas in northwest Syria.

A Russian veto would imperil the four million Syrians who depend on the life-saving assistance, sharply increase pressure on Turkey and prompt a large wave of forced migration in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Biden administration has emphasized humanitarian diplomacy, and a Russian veto would likely quash any hopes of serious cooperation on the Syria file between the United States and Russia.

Russia could seek to increase pressure on Europe by stoking conflict in Libya at a fragile time for the peace process.

Russia could similarly instrumentalize the threat of irregular migration from Libya to destabilize Europe just as it grapples with refugees from Ukraine.

Finally, Russia could complicate international diplomacy on the Iran nuclear file. While the invasion of Ukraine has not derailed JCPOA negotiations in Vienna up to now, successful negotiations will still require a delicate process of implementation, and Russia could seek to play a disruptive role.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.