How to Use Syrian Oil as an 'Entry Point' to Breaking the Deadlock

A US military vehicle near an oil field in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province on July 1, 2020. (Reuters)
A US military vehicle near an oil field in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province on July 1, 2020. (Reuters)
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How to Use Syrian Oil as an 'Entry Point' to Breaking the Deadlock

A US military vehicle near an oil field in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province on July 1, 2020. (Reuters)
A US military vehicle near an oil field in Syria's northeastern Hasakeh province on July 1, 2020. (Reuters)

In the face of the stability of the “borderlines” between the three Syrian zones of influence for two years, the continuation of the political stalemate and the emergence of a global energy crisis, a set of ideas is being circulated aimed at turning Syrian oil into a point of consensus between the players and an “entry point to break the deadlock”. This can be achieved through understandings that lead to an increase in oil production to about 500,000 barrels per day within three years to provide about 20 billion US dollars annually, distribute the revenues for the benefit of all Syrians, and support “early recovery” projects in accordance with the international resolution on humanitarian aid.

'Warlords'

After the eruption of the conflict in 2011, Western countries imposed sanctions on the Syrian oil sector, and foreign companies, which were producing about 400,000 barrels per day, left the country.

Currently, the Syrian Democratic Forces, with the support of the US-led coalition, control a quarter of Syria's area, but significantly 90 percent of the oil and more than half of the gas.

Syrian Oil Minister Bassam Tohme said a few days ago that the oil sector's losses since the beginning of the crisis amounted to $91.5 billion. He revealed that the direct losses to equipment in the oil sector amounted to 19.3 billion dollars, "of which 3 billion are the value of damages inflicted by the international coalition's strikes."

The indirect losses amounted to 72 billion dollars. The minister said the daily production of oil last year amounted to 89,000 barrels, the majority of which took place in Kurdish-controlled areas and is described by Tohme as “stolen”.

Since early 2017, the SDF has taken over oil fields east of the Euphrates River and their infrastructure owned by contracts with the government by foreign companies, including Gulfsands, Total, and Shell. Oil wells and facilities were also cordoned off. The Autonomous Administration of the SDF uses some of the production locally. Mediators and warlords transfer some of the oil to government areas to refine an amount and keep the other. Oil is also smuggled into Iraqi Kurdistan, for local consumption or for smuggling to Turkey. Oil is sold at very low prices, and wells are damaged

'Oil protection'

On October 6, 2019, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham played a role in persuading President Donald Trump to keep 900 members of the US military in eastern Syria, after his decision to withdraw from the border with Turkey. Trump later said that "a small number of soldiers will remain in the areas that contain oil," stressing that "we have ensured the security and protection of oil."

In July 2020, Graham, who is close to Trump, announced before Congress that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi informed him of the signing of an agreement with the American company Delta Crescent Energy to invest in oil after obtaining an exception from the Treasury Department (which was not extended by the administration of Joe Biden).

He added: "The American company will work to improve the feasibility of the oil fields to make them more productive. It makes sense that, rather than just writing checks, we should help people help themselves." Meanwhile, then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that "the agreement took more time than expected" and aims to "modernize oil."

The situation embarrassed the Syrian Ministry of Defense, which said that "Syrian oil belongs to the Syrian people, and we remain committed to the unity and territorial integrity of Syria." It added that "the United States government does not own, control, or manage the oil resources in Syria, and the population in areas liberated from ISIS make their own decisions regarding local governance."

After that, US Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced: "We are taking measures to strengthen our position in Deir Ezzor to prevent ISIS access to the oil fields." The Pentagon confirmed sending reinforcements and mechanisms to protect the oil fields, so that about 500 soldiers remained east of the Euphrates, with an increase in the number and quality of military equipment to provide protection for the oil wells.

'Quadruple rage'

The oil agreement, brokered by the US, was widely criticized by Damascus, Moscow, Tehran and Ankara as "political recognition of the Kurdish administration". They said it "contradicts the understanding of the guarantors of Astana, Russia, Iran and Turkey, to oppose any separatist agenda in Syria." Moscow considered it "a theft of Syrian wealth." It also angered foreign companies that hold sovereign rights in the oil fields.

Among those companies is Gulfsands, which had signed a contract with the Syrian government in 2003 to invest and develop Block 26 east of the Euphrates. According to its 2019 Annual Report, unauthorized production since early 2017 has been around 20,000 barrels a day, meaning that around 35 million barrels have been produced since then. Gulfsands expressed "concern" about this unlawful activity, and particularly the involvement of Delta Crescent Energy.

Profits...and ideas

According to experts' estimates, the Autonomous Administration receives 16 dollars per barrel, and 15 dollars goes to the Syrian government. The rest, which could amount to up to 50 dollars per barrel, is "lost" and ends up in the hands of war profiteers.

It is again reported in the Gulfsands Annual Report that Block 26 could, with appropriate investment, be increased in production from 20,000 to 100,000 barrels per day. If this could be replicated across the region, it could mean an industry that produces 500,000 barrels per day which at todays' high oil prices could raise round 18 billion dollars of gross revenue per year.

Challenges

Rebuilding the Syrian oil industry this way faces many obstacles. It would need agreement between the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and Damascus and also require international support. In particular, this project requires political understandings between the US, which imposes sanctions on the oil sector, and Russia, which accuses Washington of "stealing oil."

Some experts suggest the establishment of a structure that falls within the context of UN envoy Geir Pedersen's proposal for "step-for-step" measures, to include aspects of financing "early recovery" projects under the new Security Council resolution for humanitarian aid drafted by Washington and Moscow, and providing new sources of relief funding from Syria. Significantly, the European Union had in the past 11 years allocated 25 billion euros to Syrians, 14 billion dollars from America, and 3.7 billion pounds from Britain. A fully functioning and revitalized oil industry could exceed these contributions.

The proposal suggests a formal structure of specially selected and audited service providers, such as. returning foreign oil companies, preferred oil traders, and financiers who, in exchange for sanctions exemptions and approvals, would ensure full transparency and accountability for the exploration, development, production, marketing and sale of oil and gas through established international channels.

There is no doubt that such an initiative is ambitious and would need to navigate international sanctions, as well as provide transparency and benefits for all participants to them to have confidence in its implementation and provide their support. However, the prize is huge, particularly for the Syrian people, and surely is worth attention and consideration from all sides.



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.