The Case for and against EU Sanctions on Russian Oil

A large European Union flag lies at the center of Schuman Square outside European Commission headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, May 8, 2021. (Reuters)
A large European Union flag lies at the center of Schuman Square outside European Commission headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, May 8, 2021. (Reuters)
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The Case for and against EU Sanctions on Russian Oil

A large European Union flag lies at the center of Schuman Square outside European Commission headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, May 8, 2021. (Reuters)
A large European Union flag lies at the center of Schuman Square outside European Commission headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, May 8, 2021. (Reuters)

European Union countries on Thursday approved a ban on Russian coal imports from August as part of new measures against Moscow, but are split over whether oil or gas sanctions should follow.

The coal embargo is the EU's first energy sanction against Moscow following its invasion of Ukraine. Officials say the bloc will now discuss sanctions on oil, which represent far bigger imports from Russia than coal.

However, not all countries are on board, with some like Germany and Hungary fearing the economic impact even though civilian killings in Ukraine have increased Europe's resolve to punish the Kremlin.

Russia denies allegations that it has targeted civilians in what President Vladimir Putin calls a "special military operation" to disarm Ukraine.

Here are arguments for and against sanctioning Russian oil.

The case for oil sanctions
Ukraine and EU states including Poland and Lithuania want a ban on Russian oil and gas. Oil is Russia's most lucrative energy export, and blocking it would deprive Moscow of a major revenue stream those countries complain is funding the war.

EU lawmakers on Thursday approved a non-binding resolution for an immediate embargo on Russian energy imports.

Oil and oil products made up more than a third of Moscow's export revenues last year. Currently, Europe spends around $450 million per day on Russian crude oil and refined products, around $400 million per day for gas, and roughly $25 million for coal, according to think-tank Bruegel.

In theory, producers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have enough spare capacity for Europe to replace the Russian oil it buys, which is roughly half of Russia's total crude exports of 4.7 million barrels per day. However, producer group OPEC+ has so far only committed to incrementally increase output.

The terms of any oil embargo could determine its support among EU states, with options for flexibility including a transition period - like the four-month phase-in agreed for the EU's Russian coal sanctions - or carve-outs for specific products, such as the 10% of Europe's diesel that comes from Russia.

Some countries have suggested halfway measures that would not ban Russian oil purchases, but would withhold some payments for it.

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas - who supports oil and gas sanctions - last week asked the European Commission to propose skimming off a share of Europe's payments for Russian fossil fuels and placing them in a third-party account instead of sending them to Moscow, effectively imposing a tariff on such imports.

The case against oil sanctions
Germany and Hungary are opposed to an immediate oil embargo, which Berlin has said would risk German economic and social stability.

Russia is Europe's biggest oil supplier, providing 26% of EU oil imports in 2020. Europe gets roughly a third of its gross available energy from oil and petroleum products, in sectors from transport to chemicals production.

Sanctioning Russian supply could push up already-high oil prices, which soared to a 14-year peak last month. Germany, Sweden, France and Italy have announced subsidies to shield motorists from high prices - moves criticized by climate campaigners as fossil fuel subsidies.

Brent crude prices could be around 21% higher on average in 2022 under EU oil sanctions, compared with a reference case where voluntary "self-sanctioning" by companies caused a smaller shut-in of Russian supplies, according to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

The price impact of sanctions would also depend on factors including releases of strategic oil reserves aimed at cooling prices.

Brent crude futures were last trading 0.8% up on Friday at $101.36.

Another concern is that EU oil sanctions could see Russia retaliate by also cutting off the 40% of EU gas it supplies.

Gas sanctions are seen as the last resort in the EU's package of potential energy measures, because of the dependence of European industries and home heating on the fuel, plus the challenges Europe would face to replace Russian supply in a tight global gas market and with limited infrastructure for importing more liquefied natural gas.



Ceasefire Ends Iran-Israel War, Stakeholders Weigh Costs and Benefits

US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
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Ceasefire Ends Iran-Israel War, Stakeholders Weigh Costs and Benefits

US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump (Reuters)

In a stunning development, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire that effectively ended the conflict between Iran and Israel.

The announcement came shortly after a carefully calibrated Iranian retaliation targeted a US military base in Qatar, an attack that caused no casualties or material damage.

Trump expressed gratitude to Iran for pre-warning Washington about the strike, framing the gesture as a face-saving move.

The question now gripping regional and international capitals is: What have the United States, Iran, and Israel each gained if the ceasefire holds?

United States

The United States has once again asserted itself as the dominant and decisive power in the Middle East. It delivered a crippling blow to Iran’s nuclear facilities without escalating into full-scale war, thereby undermining the very justification for Israel’s initial strike on Tehran.

Recent events have underscored that Israel cannot engage Iran militarily without close coordination with Washington, nor can it exit such a conflict without a pivotal American role.

The confrontation has also highlighted the unparalleled strength of the US military machine, unmatched by any other power, large or small.

Iran, for its part, clearly showed reluctance to escalate the conflict in a way that could trigger direct, open confrontation with the United States.

Trump himself demonstrated tactical skill by combining military pressure with diplomatic overtures, swiftly moving to invite Iran back to the negotiating table.

Meanwhile, the limited role of Europe and the modest involvement of Russia became apparent, unless aligned with US efforts. China appeared “distant but pragmatic,” despite its broad interests in Iran and a vested concern in keeping the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz open.

Iran

Iran demonstrated that the devastating initial strike it suffered from Israel did not undermine its military or political resolve despite the severity of the attack.

The Tehran regime confirmed that, although Israeli fighter jets controlled Iranian airspace briefly, its missile arsenal remained capable of unleashing scenes of destruction across Israeli cities unseen since the founding of the Jewish state. Iran’s missile forces, it showed, could sustain a costly war of attrition against Israel.

Tehran also succeeded in preventing calls for regime overthrow from becoming a shared objective in a US-Israeli war against it.

Yet, Iran appeared to lack a major ally comparable to the United States or even a lesser power, despite its “strategic” ties with Russia and China.

The confrontation revealed Tehran’s inability to fully leverage its proxy forces in Gaza and Lebanon following the fallout of the “Al-Aqsa flood” escalation.

The exchange of strikes further highlighted Israel’s clear technological superiority and the success of Israeli intelligence in penetrating deep inside Iran itself, raising alarming concerns in Tehran.

Israel

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can claim credit for persuading the Trump administration to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, particularly those beyond the reach of the Israeli military.

Israeli forces succeeded in gaining control over distant Iranian airspace within days, a feat Russia has not achieved after three years of war in Ukraine.

Israeli intelligence breakthroughs inside Iran played a crucial role in the conflict, culminating in Israel’s public release of videos it labeled “Mossad-Tehran branch” and drone bases.

Netanyahu can argue that he made a difficult decision to attack Iran and convinced the Israeli public that the fight was existential. He can also remind critics that he expelled Iran from Syria and curtailed Hezbollah’s ability to wage war on Israel.

He may also point to new regional power balances he has imposed - part of his broader ambition to reshape the Middle East - with Israel maintaining the region’s most powerful military force.

However, Netanyahu’s policies risk renewed clashes with many, especially as tensions over Gaza and the “two-state solution” resurface.

Observers say the gains made by the parties at the end of the Iran-Israel conflict remain fragile and could shift depending on how events unfold.

Any calm could enable Israeli opposition forces to reopen debates on Netanyahu’s “wars” and their costs. It might also prompt the Iranian public to question their leadership’s responsibility for the military setbacks and Iran’s regional and global standing.

For now, the spotlight remains firmly on the primary player: Trump.