In North Syria, Business Hub Hopes to Drive Recovery from War

 Workers labor at a metal factory in the industrial zone of Syria's rebel-held city of Al-Bab, Syria March 10, 2022. Picture taken March 10, 2022. (Reuters)
Workers labor at a metal factory in the industrial zone of Syria's rebel-held city of Al-Bab, Syria March 10, 2022. Picture taken March 10, 2022. (Reuters)
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In North Syria, Business Hub Hopes to Drive Recovery from War

 Workers labor at a metal factory in the industrial zone of Syria's rebel-held city of Al-Bab, Syria March 10, 2022. Picture taken March 10, 2022. (Reuters)
Workers labor at a metal factory in the industrial zone of Syria's rebel-held city of Al-Bab, Syria March 10, 2022. Picture taken March 10, 2022. (Reuters)

In an industrial zone in northern Syria's opposition-held city of Al-Bab, Abu Omar al-Shihabi's smelter churns out iron bars he says can compete with any produced in Syria and beyond.

The industrial zone is an unlikely business hub. It is located on the edge of a city which was once occupied by ISIS and now sits between a Turkish border wall to the north and a frontline with Syrian government forces to the south.

But the zone, one of five in the region which is controlled by Turkey-backed opposition factions, is key to efforts to develop an economy hit by hardship and destruction during Syria's 11-year conflict.

Success could bring sorely needed jobs and opportunities, six years after Turkish troops and Syrian fighters drove ISIS from the region and prevented a Kurdish force from filling the void.

Turkey hopes that stability can encourage some of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees it currently hosts to head back across the border into Syria.

Shihabi said the low wages in northern Syria and abundance of scrap metal after years of war offer big advantages to his iron smelter.

"In Syria, I can compete with the Turks with my own products," said Shihabi, who mainly sells into opposition-held territories and also into Turkey.

The industrial zone, home to about 30 factories and workshops, was established four years ago on the road north from Al-Bab, with support from Turkey.

A sign across the road which bisects the zone is written in both Arabic and Turkish, highlighting Ankara's lasting influence since its 2016 military incursion. The Turkish lira is widely used in the region and Turkish administrators help run schools and hospitals.

BUILDING SELF-RELIANCE
At the industrial zone, factories produce a range of goods including iron bars used in construction, shoes, clothes, mats, mineral water, and tehina, said businessman Omar Waki who set up the project.

"The biggest inducement (to set up operations)... is the low cost. Labor for us is cheap compared to other areas," he said.

"The average worker's wage in Turkey is $400 (a month). Here it's a quarter of that."

Northern Syria, particularly the city of Aleppo just 30 km (18 miles) to the southwest of Al-Bab, was Syria's commercial hub before 2011, when protests against President Bashar al-Assad spiraled into a war, driving many businesses across into Turkey.

Most products in the Al-Bab zone are sold within the northern opposition-held territories, although some do reach more distant markets across frontlines or borders.

Despite cheap labor costs, businesses in the industrial zone face steep challenges. The region is still vulnerable to a possible offensive by Syrian government forces, while poor transport links and rising electricity costs hamper expansion.

Shihabi's smelter is just a fraction of the size of his pre-war operation, which employed 150 people before it was hit in a 2012 air raid. Now it has just 25 workers, and production is down nearly 90%, producing just .

Abdel Khaleq Tahbash set up a factory producing floormats after fleeing bombardment in Idlib. Despite complaints about electricity costs and obstacles to selling abroad, he said he was happy to be in Al-Bab.

"I prefer to work in Syria," he said. "Without capital you can't work in Turkey, and this is my country."

Waki said security in the northwest was improving, drawing more people to invest including three Turkish companies. While the Al-Bab zone remains modest, it shows Syrian businesses are resilient, he said.

"Instead of importing from China or Turkey, we can make it ourselves. We are self-reliant."



How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
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How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)

Hamas is facing major challenges in its efforts to reorganize after Israel assassinated several high-ranking figures from its political bureau, both in and outside the Gaza Strip, including key figures in the political, military, and governance wings of the movement.

During the 58-day truce—collapsed in March—Hamas leaders in Gaza had begun restructuring the organization by appointing new officials to key positions. There was a move to quickly hold internal elections to confirm Khalil al-Hayya as head of the political bureau in Gaza, a decision that was agreed upon due to his previous role as deputy to Yahya Sinwar, who was killed in clashes with Israeli forces in Rafah in October 2024.

Administrative Vacuum

Al-Hayya, based in Qatar and shuttling between Egypt, Türkiye, and other countries as he leads Hamas’ delegation in ceasefire talks, tried to work closely with figures in Gaza such as political bureau members Mohammed al-Jamassi, Yasser Harb, Ismail Barhoum, and Issam al-Daalis to reorganize the movement’s internal operations. However, many of these individuals were later assassinated by Israel following the resumption of its military campaign.

As a result, Hamas is now grappling with a leadership vacuum inside Gaza, particularly as Israel continues targeting its on-ground operatives. This leadership disruption has contributed to delays in salary disbursement for government employees, although some political and military members received partial payments—up to 60%—on the second day of Eid al-Fitr.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the salary delays are partly due to the leadership void and the difficulties in decision-making, as many of those responsible for finances and internal affairs have been assassinated. The sources confirmed that the wave of assassinations has significantly impacted the group’s internal administration in Gaza.

How Hamas Operates Now

Leadership in Gaza traditionally handled central and strategic files within Hamas’ political bureau, meaning that the assassinations in the Strip had a ripple effect across the broader organization. With the deaths of top leaders like Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and his successor Yahya Sinwar in Gaza three months later, Hamas formed a temporary governing body known as the “Leadership Council” to oversee the movement’s affairs.

Due to the inability to hold internal elections to select a new political bureau chief and deputy, the Leadership Council—comprising regional heads—was empowered to make collective decisions. While the traditional structure relied on consensus among bureau members with deference to the president, vice president, and heads of the West Bank and external wings, the council now makes urgent decisions, consulting other bureau members only when necessary.

The council includes political bureau members from Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad, with decisions taken by consensus among those who can be reached—communication challenges within Gaza often complicate this.

The de facto head of the Leadership Council is Mohammed Darwish, chair of Hamas’ Shura Council, following the assassination of Osama al-Muzaini in an Israeli airstrike on his Gaza City apartment in October 2023. The precise number of council members remains unclear, but sources estimate it includes between 5 and 7 individuals, while the political bureau consists of over 20 positions. Israel has assassinated around 15 Hamas political bureau members in Gaza alone, in addition to leaders abroad like Saleh al-Arouri and Haniyeh.

Decision-Making Process

According to Hamas sources, for security reasons and the ongoing threat of Israeli targeting, decisions are now made through the Leadership Council without reverting to the Gaza leadership unless in urgent cases.

The sources noted that the council briefly assumed this role during the war, particularly just before the last ceasefire in late January. While some normalcy returned during the lull, renewed assassinations and resumed fighting pushed Hamas back into emergency decision-making mode.

Nevertheless, the sources stress that there are “clear red lines”—such as ceasefire negotiations—that require consulting all political bureau members, especially those still in Gaza, and military leaders from the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing. Among these is Mohammed Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, who now leads Qassam after Israel assassinated Mohammed Deif and his deputy Marwan Issa.

Hamas sources say Mohammed Sinwar plays a central role in strategic decision-making, especially in military operations and negotiations over Israeli hostages. Still, neither he, nor al-Hayya, nor Darwish can make critical decisions unilaterally; all major moves require consensus between the council, political bureau, and Qassam’s military command.

The sources acknowledge communication difficulties between Gaza and the outside world due to ongoing security threats and Israeli surveillance, sometimes delaying responses to mediators and stalling negotiations.

However, they emphasized that these delays have had limited impact lately, as Israel continues to reject international proposals, diminishing the effect of Hamas’ internal constraints on the overall diplomatic process.