US Draft for Syrian-Israeli Peace: Abandoning Iran and Hezbollah in Return for Golan Heights

Hof's latest book, "Reaching the Heights," reveals the details of secret talks between Damascus and Tel Aviv between 2009 and 2011.

Hof's latest book, "Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace".
Hof's latest book, "Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace".
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US Draft for Syrian-Israeli Peace: Abandoning Iran and Hezbollah in Return for Golan Heights

Hof's latest book, "Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace".
Hof's latest book, "Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace".

Frederic C. Hof, the American diplomat, was "living the dream" between 2009 and 2011 of achieving peace between Syria and Israel. The idea first occurred to him when he visited Damascus as an exchange student when he was 16. Forty-five years later, he had the opportunity to turn the idea in a reality. But like all other lost chances for peace, he soon reached a failure that will haunt him for the rest of his life.

Hof details the peak of optimism and the slide towards the abyss of disappointment in his latest book, "Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace", which was published by the United States Institute of Peace Press.

Hof had kicked of his peace mediation during the term of former President Barack Obama. His mediation differed from others that were based on "land for peace", meaning Israel would return the occupied Golan Heights to Syria, in exchange for Damascus normalizing ties with Israel.

Hof's approach was based on a different exchange: Restoring land in exchange for strategic positioning. What does that mean? Tel Aviv would return the Golan, while Damascus would abandon its alliances and military ties with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas.

This was at the heart of secret American talks between 2009 and 2011.

Hof was among the first officials to suggest adopting the June 4, 1967 line for peace between Syria and Israel. He often wonders if Syrian President Bashar Assad truly wanted the "Golan - strategic positioning" peace deal, especially after he consolidated his alliance with Tehran and Hezbollah in wake of the 2011 Syria protests.

Eleven years after the eruption of the protests, Syria is now divided into three zones of influence, Iran and Russia are heavily involved in the country, and Israel strikes "Iranian positions" with Moscow's silent approval. The United States and Turkey boast military presence in other parts of the country.

Several secret and open initiatives and steps towards normalization with Damascus have been proposed in exchange for it to abandon its ties with Iran and Hezbollah. Several lessons can be derived from Hof's efforts over a decade ago.

The peace process was launched from Madrid in 1991. Soon after, several secret and declared Syrian-Israeli negotiations were held. In 1993, then US President Bill Clinton received a pledge from Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that Israel would fully withdraw from the Golan in exchange for establishing peaceful relations and making security arrangements. This was known as Rabin's "deposit".

Ensuing American efforts led nowhere until 2000 when Syria and Israel were on the verge of signing a deal. But disputes over the withdrawal line in the Golan led to their collapse.

Efforts were revived with Assad's arrival to power. Turkey led a mediation in 2007 and 2009. Damascus wanted Israel to withdraw to the June 4 line. Discussions also tackled security relations and attempts at normalizing ties. Ankara even proposed a direct meeting between Assad and then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The efforts ultimately collapsed when Israel launched an offensive against Gaza without informing Ankara.

Hof joined the US State Department in 2009. That same year, he traveled to Damascus and Tel Aviv to test whether the negotiations could resume. In 2010, he made progress in persuading Israeli leaders of the security benefits of achieving peace with Syria, a shift from the previous "land for peace approach."

The efforts continued with an air of optimism. In 2011, Hof pressed for then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to hold a direct meeting with Assad. In February of that year, Assad informed visiting American senators that peace with Israel must be based on "specific references" that cover land and security issues. Hof and US envoy Dennis Ross then set about drafting these references.

On February 28, 2011, Assad met with Hof in Damascus. He agreed to the "specific references related to security", which entail ending Syrian activities and relations that pose a security threat to Israel, said the envoy. Assad also stressed that Lebanon, Iran and Hezbollah would commit to the peace treaty between Syria and Israel. Assad's demand that Israel withdraw to the June 4 line remained a central issue throughout the talks.

On March 2, Hof relayed the details of his talks with Assad to Netanyahu, who expressed his satisfaction with them, declaring that the mediation and opportunity for peace were "real."

The Syrian protests erupted in mid-March and Syrian security forces reacted violently to protesters in Daraa. The mediation was consequently suspended due to the "official chaos" in Syria. Hof sought to visit Damascus, but the White House barred him from talking with Assad given the regime's brutal crackdown on the protests.

Soon after, American officials started to call on Assad to step down and clear the way for democracy in Syria.

As Syria plunged into war, former US President Donald Trump officially recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights in March 2019, dashing the previous peace efforts.

Draft peace agreement
Prior to the eruption of the war in Syria, the series of talks between Damascus, Tel Aviv and Washington had led to a draft Syrian-Israeli peace agreement. Key among its articles was for Damascus to distance itself from Iran and Hezbollah.

The deal would end the state of war between Syria and Israel and lead to peace. The fulfilment of the agreement demanded actions from both parties. Diplomatic relations would also be established.

No party would threaten the other and they must abide by international laws and the UN Charter to that end. They must also cease supporting any efforts or plans by a party, representing another state, aimed at threatening Syria or Israel.

The agreement would see Syria and Israel resolving disputes through peaceful means. They would end and bar any activity on their territories that would help regular or non-regular forces that are seeking to harm another country.

No party would transfer weapons or military equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon or allow for operations to be carried out from its territories. Syria must also cease its military assistance to Hamas and other Palestinian groups.

Syria and Israel would commit to achieving Arab-Israeli peace, while realizing that that would entail peace between the Palestinians and Israelis and Lebanon and Israel. Syria and Israel would exert their utmost efforts to achieve these goals, said the draft treaty.

To that end, Syria would be demanded to sever its relations with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, including its Quds Force.

Hof presented the draft agreement to Assad in Damascus in February 2011. The American official spoke of his keenness on achieving peace between Syria and Israel and establishing amicable formal relations between Damascus and Washington. Assad reacted positively to his proposal, wrote Hof in his book.

Hof handed Assad the draft agreement. The Syrian leader noted that many of the points related to Lebanon, with one explicitly mentioning it. He wondered if it would be appropriate to mention Lebanon in a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement. That was his only reservation, recalled Hof.

On the points related to Hezbollah, Assad told Hof that everyone will be surprised with how quickly the party's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, would commit to the rules once Syria and Israel declare that they have reached peace. Hof said that he would be the first to be surprised. Assad then explained to him that Nasrallah was Arab, not Persian. Moreover, he said that Nasrallah would no longer be able to retain his position as "resistance" leader if peace is established. Assad even described Hezbollah as the only real Lebanese political party.

Hof expected the meeting with Assad to take hours as he mulled the treaty, but the Syrian president "eagerly" agreed to it with the talks lasting no more than 50 minutes.



Egypt, Trump Reaffirm Strategic Alliance in 2025 amid Regional Turmoil

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
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Egypt, Trump Reaffirm Strategic Alliance in 2025 amid Regional Turmoil

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)

After months of speculation over the trajectory of Egyptian-US relations, fueled by persistent talk of strain and an impending rift, a high-level meeting between President Donald Trump and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh reaffirmed the resilience of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Washington, even as the region remains in turmoil.

The meeting followed a turbulent period marked by Trump’s adoption of a proposal to relocate Gaza’s population, an idea firmly rejected by Sisi and one that prompted warnings of a diplomatic crisis between the two longtime allies.

The subsequent signing of a Gaza peace agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh sent a clear signal that, despite sharp disagreements over policy, the foundations of the bilateral relationship remain intact.

Early in Trump’s second term, media reports said Sisi had scrapped plans to visit Washington. As the year draws to a close, speculation has said that the visit may happen. Trump has acknowledged Sisi as a friend and said he would be happy to meet him as well.

Trump’s election victory late last year raised Egyptian hopes of strengthening the strategic partnership. Sisi voiced that expectation in a congratulatory post on X, stating that he looked forward to working together with Trump to achieve peace, preserve regional peace and stability, and strengthen the strategic partnership.

Those hopes were tested when Trump floated a plan to “clean out Gaza” and relocate its residents to Egypt and Jordan. Cairo rejected the idea outright, mobilized international opposition, unveiled an alternative plan for Gaza’s reconstruction and hosted an emergency summit on the issue in March.

Limited public engagement

David Butter, a research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, noted that the striking feature of Egypt-US ties over the past year has been their low public profile.

Aside from Trump’s appearance in Sharm el-Sheikh, there was not much happening in the open, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amr Hamzawy, an Egyptian political scientist and director of the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described the first year of Trump’s second term as difficult for bilateral relations.

He said it began with talk of displacement and a “Middle East Riviera” in Gaza, but Egyptian diplomacy succeeded in shifting the trajectory.

Trump’s peace plan, he said, ultimately signaled rejection of displacement and spoke of security and political tracks for Gaza and a broader political process for the Palestinian issue, though details remain unclear.

Hamzawy added that the year opened from a tough starting point that followed what he called President Joe Biden’s hesitant stance on Gaza, when displacement was first discussed.

After nearly a year of Egyptian political and diplomatic effort, he said, displacement dropped from Washington’s agenda, even if it remains a risk that cannot be ignored.

Historically, Egypt has been a pivotal state for US national security, given its geography, demographic weight and diplomatic role, according to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service.

Gaza, the main test

The Gaza war shaped Egyptian-US relations during Trump’s first year back in office. Washington backed Egyptian-Qatari mediation to halt the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio thanked Cairo after a truce was reached between Israel and Hamas in January.

When hostilities resumed, however, Egypt faced complex diplomatic choices with both Washington and Israel. It rejected Trump’s call to resettle Gaza’s population, while its reconstruction plan failed to gain US or Israeli acceptance.

Cairo also drew criticism from Trump for declining to join US strikes against Yemen’s Houthis, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) revealed.

Butter noted that ties with the Trump administration were strained over Gaza after Sisi canceled a Washington visit early in the year, following Trump’s “Middle East Riviera” remarks, which left contacts at a minimum.

He said Trump’s Sharm el-Sheikh visit, the signing of the Gaza agreement and the celebration of his plan’s success offered a chance to reset relations. Egypt, he added, has become indispensable to Trump’s administration in Gaza.

Hamzawy said Gaza dominated the first year of Trump’s term, giving Egypt a chance to restore its standing with US and European decision-makers as a key mediator. Cairo put its vision on the table, he said, shifting US thinking toward parallel security and political tracks and from talk of disarmament to limiting weapons.

Throughout the year, Egypt publicly counted on Trump to end the Gaza war. In July, Sisi urged him in a televised address to press for a halt, saying Trump was capable of doing so.

Analysts Daniel Byman and Jon Alterman wrote in Foreign Policy that Egypt is indispensable to international responses to the Gaza war, even if it remains a difficult partner for Washington and Israel. The conflict, they said, restored diplomatic focus on Egypt and strengthened its leverage.

Sara Kira, director of the European North African Center for Research, said relations in Trump’s second term differ from his first. The earlier term saw broad alignment and personal warmth from Trump, particularly on counterterrorism, she said. The second term has been marked by divergence.

That surfaced in April when Trump called for free passage for US commercial and military vessels through the Suez Canal in exchange for US efforts to protect the waterway.

Positive signals despite differences

Despite disagreements over Gaza, there were positive signs elsewhere. Early in the year, the US State Department froze new funding for most aid programs worldwide, exempting humanitarian food programs and military aid to Israel and Egypt.

Washington did not include Egypt on a travel ban list issued in June. Trump said Egypt was a country with which the United States dealt closely and that things there were under control. Egypt was also spared higher US tariffs. Cairo has repeatedly stressed the depth and resilience of the strategic relationship.

Kira said Egypt exerted maximum pressure to achieve peace and stop the Gaza war, eventually convincing Washington of its approach and reaching a peace agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh. She said Egypt acted pragmatically and astutely, reading Trump’s personality and US interests.

As talks on the second phase of the Gaza agreement stall, Egypt continues to rely on the Trump administration to advance its plan. Cairo remains in contact with Washington and is working with it to prepare a donor conference for Gaza’s reconstruction, which has yet to receive sufficient momentum from the Trump administration.

The dialogue extends beyond Gaza to Libya, Sudan, Lebanon and Iran, as well as water security, led by Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt fears could affect its Nile water share.

GERD

In mid-June, Trump stirred controversy in Egypt when he wrote on Truth Social that the United States had “stupidly” funded the dam Ethiopia built on the Blue Nile, triggering a severe diplomatic crisis with Egypt.

In August, the White House released a list of Trump’s foreign policy achievements, which included a purported agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia over the dam.

Trump has repeatedly spoken of his administration’s efforts to resolve the dispute, but those claims have yet to translate into concrete action.

Hamzawy said there is an opportunity for Washington to mediate and revive an agreement reached near the end of Trump’s first term.

Charles Dunne of the Arab Center Washington DC wrote recently that Trump’s stance may please Cairo but could also produce adverse outcomes if Washington does not assume a mediation role.

The United States hosted talks with the World Bank in 2020 during Trump’s first term, but they failed after Ethiopia refused to sign the draft agreement.

Military ties endure

Military cooperation continued largely as usual. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with about $90 billion in aid, with a sharp increase after 1979, which successive administrations have framed as an investment in regional stability, according to the CRS.

For more than a decade, Congress has imposed human rights conditions on part of Egypt’s aid.

Between fiscal years 2020 and 2023, the Biden administration and Congress withheld approximately $750 million in military funding. Trump’s technical annex to the proposed fiscal 2026 budget seeks $1.3 billion in military assistance for Egypt without conditions, the CRS said.

Hamzawy said the administration is far from imposing conditionality, noting that relations rest on mutual interests between a major power and a positively influential middle power.

Since the Gaza war, the Biden and Trump administrations have accelerated US arms sales to Egypt. The State Department notified Congress of military sales totaling $7.3 billion. In July, the Pentagon announced that the State Department had approved the sale of an advanced air defense missile system to Egypt, valued at approximately $4.67 billion. Egypt also hosted the Bright Star military exercises in September.

Kira said ties with Washington are driven by interests and that Cairo has positioned itself as a core regional player.

Hamzawy said Egypt occupies a central place in US Middle East thinking, as Washington needs a spectrum of allies, with Egypt at the heart of that network.


Why Metal Prices are Soaring to Record Highs

A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
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Why Metal Prices are Soaring to Record Highs

A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP

Precious and industrial metals are surging to record highs as the year ends, driven by economic and geopolitical uncertainty, robust industrial demand and, in some cases, tight supply.

Below AFP examines the reasons for the surge in demand.

- Safe havens -

Gold and silver are traditionally seen as safe-haven assets, and demand has soared amid mounting geopolitical tensions, from US President Donald Trump's tariffs onslaught to wars in Ukraine and Gaza, as well as recent pressure by Washington on Caracas.

Investors are also uneasy about rising public debt in major economies and the risk of a bubble in the artificial intelligence sector.

These uncertainties are driving up gold and silver, with other metals now starting to see the impact as investors seek to diversify their portfolios, explained John Plassard, an analyst at Cite Gestion Private Bank.

"Metal is once again becoming insurance rather than just a speculative asset," he told AFP.

- A weak dollar -

Traditional safe havens like the dollar and US Treasuries have become less attractive this year.

Uncertainty around Trump's presidency and the prospect of further Federal Reserve interest rate cuts, have weakened the dollar, reducing its appeal to investors.

As a result, many investors are turning to gold and silver.

Gold has climbed more than 70 percent this year and passed $4,500 an ounce for the first time on Wednesday, while silver reached a record high of $72 an ounce, with prices up about 2.5 times since January.

A weak dollar is also boosting industrial metals, since commodities priced in dollars become cheaper for buyers when the currency falls.

- Fresh demand -

Industrial demand has surged in recent months, driven by the rise of artificial intelligence and the energy transition.

Copper, used for solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicle batteries and data centers, has seen strong gains as a result.

Prices hit a record on Wednesday, topping $12,000 a ton, helped further by China, the world's largest copper consumer, announcing new measures to boost demand.

Aluminium, a cheaper alternative to copper, and silver are also benefiting from the AI boom and the shift to renewable energy.

Platinum and palladium, used in car catalytic converters, have also risen, reaching a record high and a three-year high respectively, after the European Union decided to allow sales of new internal combustion vehicles beyond 2035.

- Tight supply -

Copper prices have been lifted this year by fears of US tariffs, prompting companies to stockpile ahead of their introduction, with duties imposed on semi-finished products and potentially extending to refined copper.

Supply risks from disruptions at mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile and Indonesia have added to the price surge.

Physical markets for silver, platinum, and aluminium are also tight.

According to Ole Hansen, an analyst at Saxo Bank, thin holiday trading, which increases volatility, and investor fear of missing out have further amplified the rise at the end of the year.


How Trump’s Decisions Reshaped Syria

A photo of US President Donald Trump meeting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Washington on Nov. 10 (AFP)
A photo of US President Donald Trump meeting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Washington on Nov. 10 (AFP)
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How Trump’s Decisions Reshaped Syria

A photo of US President Donald Trump meeting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Washington on Nov. 10 (AFP)
A photo of US President Donald Trump meeting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Washington on Nov. 10 (AFP)

In a crowded regional and international landscape shaped by overlapping security, strategic, economic, and political pressures, the administration of US President Donald Trump has moved since its return to the White House in January 2025 to recalibrate its approach to Syria.

After years of US policy marked by hesitation and competing agendas, particularly under the administrations of Barack Obama and Joe Biden, Washington is now pursuing a more direct and openly pragmatic course, one focused on achieving tangible results on the ground and managing delicate balances, rather than ideological commitments or long-term strategic gambles.

The shift reflects profound changes inside Syria itself, led by the collapse of the former regime and the emergence of a new government seeking to consolidate domestic legitimacy and secure international recognition.

These developments coincide with the persistent threat posed by ISIS, a retreat in Iranian influence, and the expanding regional roles of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Qatar.

Within this evolving landscape, Washington is repositioning its policy in line with what officials describe as Trump’s Middle East doctrine, centered on enforcing stability, limiting the costs of direct military involvement, and opening pathways for reconstruction, development, and investment.

Interests before ideology

Commenting on this shift, Firas Fahham, a researcher at the Abaad Studies Center, said President Trump’s policy toward Syria could be described as “decidedly pragmatic,” focusing primarily on international and economic interests while setting aside the ideological or intellectual background of Syria’s new government.

Fahham said the central pillar of the emerging convergence between Washington and Damascus was preventing the return of Iranian influence to Syria, a goal that sits at the top of the current US administration’s priorities.

He added that this approach could not be separated from the positions of Arab states allied with the United States, which have openly supported the new Syrian government, led by Saudi Arabia, followed by Türkiye and Qatar.

Fahham said the Trump administration had shown a willingness to respond to these positions, viewing them as a key foundation for rebuilding regional alliances.

Comparing the approach with previous administrations, Fahham said the policies of Obama and Biden had been closer to allowing Iran a free hand in the region and supporting minority influence, particularly through close cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces, known as the SDF.

He said this had complicated the landscape and weakened prospects for establishing a strong central state capable of maintaining security and preventing the return of extremist groups.

From Riyadh to Washington...turning points

Fahham traced key milestones in Trump’s new policy, saying the starting point came during meetings held in Riyadh in June, when the US president, at the request of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria.

He described the move as the first positive signal from Washington toward Damascus. This was followed by a trilateral meeting bringing together Trump, the Saudi Crown Prince, and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, during which the US president offered notable praise for his Syrian counterpart, reflecting Washington’s desire for political openness.

The most important moment, Fahham said, came at the Washington summit held in November, when Trump received President al-Sharaa at the White House in what he described as a pivotal turning point.

Following the meeting, the US administration began concrete efforts to pressure Congress to repeal the Caesar Act, while announcing Syria’s inclusion in the international coalition against ISIS.

This, Fahham said, shifted the relationship from limited coordination to something resembling an alliance.

The SDF and the future of eastern Syria

On the issue of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Fahham said the Trump administration was dealing with the matter from a strictly practical standpoint, balancing its interests with Syria’s new government, reflected in reduced support for the SDF compared with the Biden era, and its interests with its Turkish ally.

Washington, he said, now views Damascus as the most effective actor in the fight against ISIS.

This assessment, he said, was based on recommendations from US research centers. They concluded that previous reliance on the Kurdish component alone, and practices associated with it in eastern Syria, had created a sense of grievance that ISIS later exploited for recruitment.

As a result, the administration became convinced that cooperation with Damascus was more effective.

In a related context, Fahham said Washington viewed Israeli incursions in southern Syria with dissatisfaction, considering them destabilizing and contrary to Trump’s vision for regional development.

The United States, he added, fears that weakening the Syrian government could reopen the door to renewed Iranian influence and ISIS activity.

As for the southern province of Sweida, Fahham said the US administration supports integrating the province into the state, citing remarks by US envoy Tom Barrack, who stated that decentralization had failed in the Middle East, reflecting a preference for backing a unified Syria.

A parallel reading from the military establishment

From another angle, researcher on armed groups Raed al-Hamed offered a complementary reading of the US position.

He said that although Trump, during his first term, had moved toward withdrawing forces and ending the partnership with the SDF, warnings from senior military commanders about a possible ISIS resurgence after the battle of Baghouz in March 2019 prompted him to keep about 2,000 troops in Syria.

Al-Hamed noted that the partnership with the SDF dated back to the battle of Kobani in 2015, when Washington relied on the group as a ground force.

However, he said the new policy following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Syria’s entry into the international coalition was now based on refusing to recognize any independent entity east of the Euphrates and rejecting federal formulas similar to Iraq’s Kurdistan region.

Al-Hamed said the new policy offered no real US guarantees to the SDF in the face of Türkiye and coincided with pressure to integrate the group into Syria’s military and security institutions, in line with the vision of the Syrian government, which rejects any armed presence outside the framework of the state.

This, he said, is still rejected by the SDF as the deadline approaches for implementing the March agreement with the government in Damascus, scheduled for the end of this year.

Overall, the Syrian scene appears to have entered a pivotal phase that goes beyond traditional conflict equations, laying the groundwork for a new reality governed by the language of interests and reciprocal security arrangements.

While Washington and its regional allies, particularly Riyadh and Ankara, are betting on the ability of the new leadership in Damascus to impose stability and end years of chaos, observers say the success of this path will depend on developments on the ground in the coming months.

The ability of the “new republic” to balance the demands of internal reconciliation with the conditions of external alliances will be the decisive test in determining whether this turn truly marks the opening chapter of an end to years of US hesitation in the region.