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Ukraine War and Syria: Opportunities, Challenges for External Powers

Combination photo: The top of the bombing in Kyiv on March 14, and the second of the destruction in Aleppo, northern Syria, in December 2016. (Getty Images)
Combination photo: The top of the bombing in Kyiv on March 14, and the second of the destruction in Aleppo, northern Syria, in December 2016. (Getty Images)
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Ukraine War and Syria: Opportunities, Challenges for External Powers

Combination photo: The top of the bombing in Kyiv on March 14, and the second of the destruction in Aleppo, northern Syria, in December 2016. (Getty Images)
Combination photo: The top of the bombing in Kyiv on March 14, and the second of the destruction in Aleppo, northern Syria, in December 2016. (Getty Images)

In Syria, the immediate effects of the war in Ukraine have made an already difficult humanitarian situation even worse. Protracted violence in Ukraine or an expansion of the Ukraine war into a larger NATO-Russia confrontation would endanger multilateral cooperation on conflict management, conflict resolution and humanitarian issues in Syria.

Protracted conflict in Ukraine could also disrupt the volatile status quo in Syria, potentially endangering ceasefire agreements, tilting the power balance in favor of Iran and thereby increasing the risk of military escalation between Iran and its antagonists, complicating the fight against ISIS, and endangering cross-border humanitarian aid deliveries.

While large-scale military operations have been reduced significantly over the past few years, stability in Syria has remained fragile, and conflict resolution has witnessed a protracted stalemate. Five foreign states as well as a multitude of domestic and foreign militias have a military presence on the ground. Russia, Turkey, the US, and Iran have each established zones of influence, whose boundaries remain contested.

Asharq Al-Awsat has published a summary of a report published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. The report tackles the impact of the war in Ukraine on Syria.

Immediate effects of the war

The effects of the war in Ukraine were felt immediately in Syria. It has led to a worsen­ing of an already grim humanitarian situation in this former lower-middle-income country. Syria’s economy had already all but collapsed due to war damage, large-scale displacement, poor governance, sanc­tions, Covid-19 and repercussions of the financial meltdown in Lebanon.

Even before the war in Ukraine, 90% of Syria’s population lived in poverty, two-thirds were dependent on humanitarian aid and 55% were food insecure. In December 2021, the UN Food and Agri­culture Organization warned of the risk of famine against the backdrop of severe drought and a steep decline in Syria’s wheat harvest.

Early in the war, Russia announced that it would not keep its December 2021 com­mitment to deliver wheat to Syrian regime-controlled areas that were meant to fill the gap.

Northwest Syria is also likely to suffer shortages as it procures wheat from Ukraine and Russia as well as Turkey, where pro­duction has been affected by drought.

In addition, the World Food Program, which largely depends on Ukrainian pro­duc­tion, is set to come under strain due to supply loss, soaring food prices and an increase in the number of people in need worldwide.

Starting May 2022, it will have to reduce life-saving food assistance to some 1.35 million people in northwestern Syria.

While the Syrian regime has adopted austerity measures, such as rationing, price controls and export restrictions, it has not been successful in preventing the spiraling of food and energy prices.

In contrast, direct effects of the war in Ukraine on the geopolitical dynamics in Syria seem to have been limited to date.

The main external powers with a military presence on the ground in Syria have so far insulated their cooperation there from tensions over Ukraine: military deconfliction between Russia and the US as well as Russia and Israel continues; Russia and Turkey maintain joint patrols in the north of Syria based on the March 2020 ceasefire arrangements; and informal talks among Russia, Turkey, the US and European countries on humanitarian access have still taken place.

At the same time, Israel-Iran relations have been tense ever since the killing of two Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officers in Syria in early March 2022; this has resulted in Iranian attacks on Israel-linked targets in Iraq, as well as Israeli airstrikes on Iran-linked targets in Syria.

Yet, some players – in particular Russia and Iran – have started to adapt their presence in Syria. Accordingly, Syria would not necessarily be left unscathed even if the war in Ukraine were to come to an end sooner rather than later.

While the overall interests of the dominant external players are likely to remain the same, their priorities, approaches and capacities are likely to be affected, prompting further adaptations, and risking renewed and heightened conflict in Syria.

The extent of these changes will depend on the duration and evolution of the conflict in Ukraine and its potential escalation into a wider NATO-Russia confrontation.

Russia – From pro-regime stabilizer to spoiler?

The war against Ukraine directly impacts the capacities available to Russia for its involvement in Syria. In addition, a shift in priorities in Russian foreign policy can already be observed. To what extent this will affect Russia’s specific interests in the Syrian conflict will depend on the duration and trajectory of the conflict in and beyond Ukraine.

The Kremlin cannot afford to see its Syria policy fail. The military operation in Syria has become too much of a symbol for Russia’s ambition to return to being a great power.

Russia therefore now faces the challenge of securing its position in Syria and the MENA region with reduced capabilities.

Russia has a strategic interest in maintaining its air and naval bases in Syria. They underpin Russia’s military pres­ence in the eastern Mediterranean, which becomes even more important in the face of increasing confrontation with the US and NATO.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine doesn’t risk significantly undermining its official military posture in Syria in the short-term as this presence primarily revolves around aerospace defense forces and military police rather than substantial ground forces, which only number around 4,000 according to the Military Balance 2022 report published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

However, the war in Ukraine may have a greater impact on Russia’s deployment of irregular armed forces.

In order to fill gaps in the Ukrainian theater, Russia might find it useful to send private military companies and “volunteers” from Syria to Ukraine, which might undermine the striking power of the Syrian armed forces.

Furthermore, Turkey’s closure of the shipping route through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to military vessels from/to Russia’s Black Sea ports is likely to cause problems and increase costs for Moscow.

Specifically, supplies and reinforcements for Russian troops in Syria will largely need to be flown in.

In the medium-term, the sanctions-induced deterioration of Russia’s economic capacities will also have an impact on its Syria policy. Russia’s ability to engage in Syria’s reconstruction and to influence its economic development is likely to significantly diminish.

At least in the short-term, Moscow is likely to avoid steps that could trigger significant armed confrontations in Syria as this risks stretching Russian forces thin.

Yet, against the backdrop of Russian-Western confrontation, there are still in­centives for Moscow to exploit its spoiler potential with regard to Syria, for example with respect to humanitarian access or military deconflicting.

Geopolitical dynamics

Protracted violence in Ukraine or an expansion of the war in Ukraine into a larger NATO-Russia confrontation is likely to have an impact on conflict dynamics in Syria beyond the adaptations of individual external actors.

With regards to Russia’s posture and approach in Syria, three trajectories seem plausible: First, Moscow might be forced to reduce its military presence and decrease its attention and resources spent in Syria.

In that context, Russia might no longer block the expansion of Iranian influence over Syria’s military-security infrastructure and post-war economic activities as long as Moscow’s strategic interests in maintaining dominance over the Mediterranean ports of Latakia and Tartus are duly observed.

Tehran’s ultimate desire to expel the US from Syria might also become more accept­able to Moscow. Such a development could therefore tilt the power balance in Syria in Iran’s favor.

Second, if Russia is forced to move air assets from Syria to Ukraine, this could have a negative effect on Russian (and the Syrian regime’s) efforts to contain ISIS in the Badia, as well as other regime-held areas. To date, air assets, especially attack helicopters, have been employed to prevent ISIS resurgence in these areas. However, there are rising concerns that an ISIS comeback in regime-held areas could be a real threat in the time to come.

The problem could be compounded if Syrian soldiers and pro-regime militias are deployed to Ukraine in considerable numbers, as this would undermine the striking power of Syria’s armed forces.

According to Ukrainian mili­tary intelligence, over 40,000 Syrian fighters had registered for deployment in Ukraine by mid-March 2022, including soldiers from the Syrian Armed Forces.

Up to the end of March, according to press reports, only several hundred fighters from Syria arrived in Russia for training. None have yet been deployed to Ukraine.

Third, while Moscow has aimed at preserving the status quo in Syria for the time being, against the backdrop of a perceived threat to the security of its own regime, the Kremlin might radically shift its approach in Syria and exploit its spoiler potential. This could happen with the aim of coercing NATO members, including Turkey, into offering concessions with regard to Ukraine or perhaps just to deflect attention away from Ukraine.

In concrete terms, this sce­nario might play out by Russia complicat­ing or denying US-led counter terrorism operations in areas under its control, in engaging in risky encounters with US aircraft over Syria or in taking aggressive action against Western warships in the eastern Mediterranean.

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Features

Report: Europe’s Options in the Strait of Hormuz Are Few and Risky

A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
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Report: Europe’s Options in the Strait of Hormuz Are Few and Risky

A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)

When senior officials from 40 countries met virtually this week to discuss how to bring shipping traffic back to the Strait of Hormuz, Italy’s foreign minister had a proposal. He urged them to establish a “humanitarian corridor” allowing safe passage for fertilizer and other crucial goods headed to impoverished nations.

The plan, described after the meeting by Italian officials, was one of several competing proposals from Europe and beyond that were meant to prevent the Iran war from causing widespread hunger. But it was not endorsed by the envoys on the call, and the meeting ended with no concrete plan to reopen the strait, militarily or otherwise, reported the New York Times.

European leaders are under pressure from US President Donald Trump to commit military assets, immediately, to end Iran’s blockage of the strait and tame a growing global energy and economic crisis. They have refused to meet his demands by sending warships now. Instead, they are hotly debating what to do to help unclog the vital shipping lane once the war ends.

But they are struggling to rally around a plan of action.

That partly reflects the slow gears of diplomacy in Europe and the sheer number of nations, including Gulf states, that are invested in safeguarding the strait once the war ends. Many nations involved in the talks, including Italy and Germany, have insisted that any international effort be blessed by the United Nations, which could slow action further. Military leaders will take up the issue in discussions next week.

More than anything, the struggle reflects how difficult it could be to actually secure the strait under a fragile peace — for Europe or for anyone else. None of the options available to Europe, the Gulf states and other countries look foolproof, even under the assumption that the major fighting will have stopped.

Naval escorts

French officials, including President Emmanuel Macron, have repeatedly raised the possibility that French naval vessels could help escort merchant ships through the strait after the war ends.

American officials have pushed for Europeans and other allies, like Japan, to escort ships sailing under their own countries’ flags.

Naval escorts are expensive. Also, their air defense systems alone might not be sufficient to stop some types of attacks, like drone strikes, should Iran choose to start firing again.

“What does the world expect, what does Donald Trump expect, from let’s say a handful or two handfuls of European frigates there in the Strait of Hormuz,” Defense Minister Boris Pistorius of Germany said last month, “to achieve what the powerful American Navy cannot manage there alone?”

Sweep for mines

German and Belgian officials, among others, say they are prepared to send minesweepers to clear the strait of explosives after the war.

Western military leaders aren’t convinced that Iran has actually mined the strait, in part because some Iranian ships still pass through it. So while minesweepers might be deployed as part of a naval escort, they might not have much to do.

Help from above

Another option is sending fighter jets and drones to intercept any Iranian air assaults on ships. American officials have pushed Europe to do this.

It is quite expensive and still not guaranteed to work. Iran can attack ships with a single soldier in a speedboat, and if just a few attempts succeed, that could be enough to spook insurers and shipowners out of attempting passage.

Diplomacy

Another option are negotiations and economic leverage to pressure Iran to refrain from future attacks, and deploy a variety of military means to enforce that. This effort would go beyond Europe. On Thursday, the German foreign ministry called on China to use its influence with Iran “constructively” to help end the hostilities.

This option is expensive and still not guaranteed. Negotiations seem to have done little to stop the fighting. But this may be Europe’s best bet, for lack of a better one.

What if none of that works?

Iranian officials said this week that they would continue to control traffic through the strait after the war. They have already made plans to make ships pay tolls for passing through the strait, which is supposed to be an unfettered waterway under international law.

A continued blockage risks global economic disaster. Countries around the world rely on shipments through the strait for fuel and fertilizer, among other necessities.

In some regions, shortages loom. In others, like Europe, high oil, gas and fertilizer prices have raised the specter of spiking inflation and cratering economic growth.

“The big threat right now is stagflation,” said Hanns Koenig, a managing director at Aurora Energy Research, a Berlin consultancy. “You’ve got higher prices, and they strangle the tiny growth we would have seen this year.”

*Jim Tankersley for the New York Times

Features

US Military Jets Hit in Iran War Are the First Shot Down by Enemy Fire in Over 20 Years

An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)
An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)
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US Military Jets Hit in Iran War Are the First Shot Down by Enemy Fire in Over 20 Years

An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)
An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)

Iran shooting down two American military jets marks an exceedingly rare assault for the US that has not happened in more than 20 years and shows Iran’s continued ability to hit back despite President Donald Trump asserting it has been “completely decimated.”

The attacks came five weeks after US and Israeli strikes first pounded Iran, with Trump saying earlier this week that Tehran's “ability to launch missiles and drones is dramatically curtailed."

Iran shot down a US F15-E Strike Eagle fighter jet Friday, with one service member getting rescued and the search still underway for a second, US officials say. Iranian state media also said a US A-10 attack aircraft crashed after being hit by Iranian defense forces.

The last time a US warplane was shot down by enemy fire in combat was an A-10 Thunderbolt II during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, said retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Houston Cantwell, a former F-16 fighter pilot.

But, he said, that’s because the US had largely been fighting insurgents who didn’t have the same anti-aircraft capabilities. The fact that there have not been more fighter jets lost in Iran, Cantwell said, is a testament to the capabilities of US forces.

"The fact that this hasn’t happened until now is an absolute miracle,” said Cantwell, who served four combat tours and is now a senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “We’re flying combat missions here, they are being shot at every day.”

Shoulder-fired missile likely used, experts say

US Central Command said in a statement Wednesday that American forces have flown more than 13,000 missions in the Iran war while striking more than 12,300 targets.

After more than a month of punishing US-Israeli airstrikes, a degraded Iranian military nonetheless remains a stubborn foe. Its steady stream of strikes against Israel and Gulf Arab neighbors have been causing regional upheaval and global economic shock.

When it comes to American dominance over Iran's airspace, there’s still a distinction between air superiority and air supremacy, said Behnam Ben Taleblu, Iran program senior director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a hawkish Washington think tank.

“A disabled air defense system is not a destroyed air defense system,” he said. “We shouldn’t be shocked that they’re still fighting.”

American planes have been flying missions at lower altitudes, which makes them more vulnerable to Iran's missiles, Taleblu said. It’s possible that Iran fired at the F-15 with a surface-to-air missile, but it's more likely that a portable, shoulder-fired missile was used, he said. Those are much harder to detect and reflect how Iran is “weak but still lethal.”

“This is a regime that is fighting for its life,” he said.

Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and a senior defense adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agreed that a shoulder-fired missile was likely used against the fighter jet.

Nonetheless, the American air war against Iran has been a “tremendous success” so far, he said.

To put things in perspective, he said the loss rate for American warplanes flying over Germany during World War II was 3% at one point, which would equal about 350 warplanes in the US war against Iran.

“But then there’s the political side — you have an American public that is accustomed to fighting bloodless wars,” Cancian said. “Then a large part of the country doesn’t support the war. So to them, any loss is unacceptable.”

Pilots are trained on what to do if their plane is hit

The last US jet shot down in combat was struck by an Iraqi surface-to-air missile over Baghdad on April 8, 2003. The pilot safely ejected and was rescued, according to the Air Force.

In high-threat environments like missions over Iran, Cantwell, the retired general, said an aviator's blood pressure goes up and they become highly alert to incoming missiles. Those are typically either infrared- or radar-guided missiles, he said, requiring different evasive tactics.

If they are hit and need to eject from their aircraft, they are trained on what to do next, he said.

Pilots learn to check for wounds after a violent ejection and the shock of a missile explosion and, most crucially, how they are going to communicate their location so rescuers can find them.

At the same time, he said, the enemy is likely working to intercept the communications or even spoof the location.

Helicopters are more at risk than other aircraft

The planes that went down Friday were not the first crewed American aircraft to be lost overall in Iran.

A military helicopter and airplane exploded in 1980 during an aborted mission to rescue several dozen American hostages at the US embassy in Tehran, according to the Air Force Historical Support Division.

After a series of setbacks, including severe dust storms and mechanical failures, the mission was called off. As the aircraft took off, the rotor blades of one of the RH-53 helicopters collided with an EC-130 aircraft full of fuel and both exploded, killing eight.

More US helicopters have been shot down in recent decades, including a MH-47 Army Chinook helicopter that was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade in Afghanistan in 2005, killing 16. Helicopters are more dangerous because “the lower and the slower, the more susceptible you are,” Cantwell said.

That’s why those who went out on this week's rescue missions, likely in helicopters, he said, did “such a brave and honorable act.”

Features

Iran Leaders Join Crowds on Tehran’s Streets to Project Control in Wartime

An Iranian flag is seen on a residential building that was damaged by recent strikes at Vahdat town in Karaj, southwest of Tehran on April 3, 2026. (AFP)
An Iranian flag is seen on a residential building that was damaged by recent strikes at Vahdat town in Karaj, southwest of Tehran on April 3, 2026. (AFP)
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Iran Leaders Join Crowds on Tehran’s Streets to Project Control in Wartime

An Iranian flag is seen on a residential building that was damaged by recent strikes at Vahdat town in Karaj, southwest of Tehran on April 3, 2026. (AFP)
An Iranian flag is seen on a residential building that was damaged by recent strikes at Vahdat town in Karaj, southwest of Tehran on April 3, 2026. (AFP)

After more than a month of being stalked by targeted assassinations, Iran's leadership has adopted a new tactic to show it is still in control - with senior officials walking openly in the streets among small crowds who have gathered in support of the regime.

In recent days, Iran's president and foreign minister have separately mixed with groups of several hundred people in central Tehran. On Tuesday, state television aired footage of the two posing for selfies, talking to members of the public and shaking hands with supporters who had gathered in public areas.

According to insiders and analysts, the appearances are part of a calculated effort by Iran's theocratic leadership to project resilience and authority — not only over the vital Strait of Hormuz but also over the population — despite a sustained US-Israeli campaign aimed at "obliterating" it.

One insider close to the hardline establishment said such public outings are intended to show that the regime is "unshaken by strikes and that it remains in control and vigilant" as the war grinds on.

The US-Israeli war ‌on Iran began on ‌February 28 with the killing of veteran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several senior military ‌commanders ⁠in waves of ⁠strikes that have since continued to target top officials.

Iran's new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has not been seen in public since taking over on March 8 from his father. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, meanwhile, was removed from Israel's hit list amid mediation efforts last month, including by Pakistan, to bring Tehran and Washington together for talks to end the war.

Talks aimed at ending the war have since appeared to have petered out, as Tehran brands US peace proposals "unrealistic". Against that backdrop, recent public appearances by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Araqchi appear designed to project defiance, if not a convincing display of public support.

A senior Iranian source said officials' public presence demonstrates that "the establishment is not intimidated by Israel's targeted killing of top Iranian ⁠figures".

Asked whether Iran's foreign minister or president were on any sort of kill list, an Israeli ‌military spokesperson, Nadav Shoshani, said on Friday he would not "speak about specific personnel."

NIGHTLY RALLIES TO ‌SHOW RESILIENCE

Despite widespread destruction, Tehran appears emboldened by surviving weeks of intense US-Israeli attacks, firing on Gulf countries hosting US troops and demonstrating its ability ‌to effectively block the Strait of Hormuz.

On Wednesday, US President Donald Trump vowed more aggressive strikes on Iran, without offering a timeline ‌for ending hostilities. Tehran responded by warning the United States and Israel that "more crushing, broader and more destructive" attacks were in store.

Encouraged by clerical rulers, supporters of the regime take to the streets each night, filling public squares to show loyalty even as bombs rain down across the country.

Analysts say the establishment is also seeking to raise the "political and reputational" cost of the strikes at a time when civilian casualties are deeply disturbing for Iranians.

Omid Memarian, ‌a senior Iran analyst at DAWN, a Washington-based think tank, said the decision to send officials into gatherings reflects a layered strategy, including an effort to sustain the morale of core supporters ⁠at a moment of acute pressure.

"The system ⁠relies heavily on this base; if its supporters withdraw from public space, its ability to project control and authority weakens significantly," Memarian said.

Speaking to state television, some in the crowds voice unwavering loyalty to Iran's leadership; others oppose the bombing of their country regardless of politics; and some have a stake in the system, including government employees, students and others whose livelihoods are tied to it.

Hadi Ghaemi, head of the New York-based Center for Human Rights in Iran, said the establishment is using such loyal crowds as human shields to raise the cost of any assassination attempts.

"By being in the middle of large crowds they have protections that would make Israeli-American attacks against them very bloody and generate sympathy worldwide," he said.

POTENTIAL PROTESTERS STAY OFF STREETS AT NIGHT

The Islamic republic emerged from a 1979 revolution backed by millions of Iranians. But decades of rule marked by corruption, repression and mismanagement have thinned that support, alienating many ordinary people.

While there has been little sign so far of anti-government protests that erupted in January and abated after a deadly crackdown, the establishment has adopted harsh measures, such as arrests, executions and large-scale deployment of security forces, to prevent any sparks of dissent.

Rights groups have warned about "rushed executions" during wartime after Iran hanged at least seven political prisoners during the war.

"Many potential protesters are frightened by the continuing presence of armed men and violent crowds in the streets and largely stay at home once darkness falls," Ghaemi said.