Borrell: Russia Not Invited to Syria Brussels Conference Because of Aggression on Ukraine

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. AFP
EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. AFP
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Borrell: Russia Not Invited to Syria Brussels Conference Because of Aggression on Ukraine

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. AFP
EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. AFP

EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell told Asharq Al-Awsat in an interview that the European Union holds onto its three “red lines” which involve not contributing to Syria’s reconstruction, not removing sanctions and not re-establishing full diplomatic ties with Damascus “until a genuine and comprehensive political transition is firmly under way in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.”

“The EU policy positions have not changed since the behavior of the Assad regime is not changing,” said Borrell, adding that the EU continues to help Syrians inside and outside the country. “Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the European Union and its Member States have been the largest donors of humanitarian and resilience assistance to Syria and the region with € 27.4 billion.”

Borrell spoke on the eve of the two-day donor conference that is set to be held in Brussels on Monday.

“This conference is traditionally the main pledging event of the year for the Syrian people. What is different this year is that it takes place on the backdrop of an unprecedented military aggression directly in EU’s neighborhood. But we want to show to Syrian people that despite the Russian aggression against Ukraine, we remain committed to continue supporting also the Syrian people and host communities in neighboring countries, and we are not forgetting them,” he said.

Borrell confirmed that Russia was not invited to the conference.

“We are inviting those partners who have a genuine interest to contribute to peace in the world and to help victims of conflict. Through its aggression on Ukraine, Russia has proven that it is not sharing this interest,” he said.

Here is the full text of the interview carried out on Saturday.

1- What do you expect of the donor conference in Brussels on May 9 and 10? How does this one differ from the previous ones?

This conference is traditionally the main pledging event of the year for the Syrian people. What is different this year is that it takes place on the backdrop of an unprecedented military aggression directly in EU’s neighborhood. But we want to show to Syrian people that despite the Russian aggression against Ukraine, we remain committed to continue supporting also the Syrian people and host communities in neighboring countries, and we are not forgetting them. With the Brussels Conference this year, we want to ensure sustained international attention and support for them.

We have hosted the Brussels Conference since 2017. The objectives are to reassert the international community’s commitment towards Syrians and towards a negotiated political solution to the conflict in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, to continue mobilizing much needed financial support to meet the needs of Syrian refugees and their host communities in neighboring countries, and to provide a platform for dialogue with civil society.

2- Why did you not invite the Russian government to the Brussels conference?

As host of the Conference, we are inviting those partners who have a genuine interest to contribute to peace in the world and to help victims of conflict. Through its aggression on Ukraine, Russia has proven that it is not sharing this interest.

3- The conference comes after the European Union renewed economic sanctions against Damascus. Does it have any effect on Brussels conference?

These are two different things, they are not linked and are not in contradiction. The Conference aims to raise funds for the Syrian people – mainly the refugees and internally displaced. The sanctions target the regime for its continued violent repression against the civilian population. Our sanctions are a clear signal that the repressive policies of the Assad regime against the civilian population of Syria, including the expropriation of land for political purposes, as well as the use of chemical weapons, are considered unacceptable by the European Union. They are also sending a message to the supporters of the Syrian regime that their support to the regime would come at a cost.

EU sanctions are not targeted against the Syrian people, do not prohibit the export of food, medicines or medical equipment and a number of exceptions are foreseen for humanitarian purposes. This shows that we care for Syrian people and the Brussels Conference is only reinforcing this commitment to help them in any way we can.

4- The EU after last meeting in Brussels, have said that they are committed to the three No’s: no to contribution to the reconstruction, to lifting of the sanctions, no formulations [“normalization”?] without success of the political process in Syria. Are these conditions still valid?

The EU policy positions have not changed since the behavior of the Assad regime is not changing. The EU will not re-establish full diplomatic relations with Syria, we will not start working on reconstruction until a genuine and comprehensive political transition is firmly under way in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

As long as there is no progress in the implementation of the relevant UN resolutions for Syria, the European Union will maintain its sanctions regime as an additional means of pressure on the Syrian regime to change its behavior.

At the same time, we will continue our large-scale humanitarian work in Syria and the region, in support of the Syrian people, wherever they reside as well as their host communities in neighboring countries. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the European Union and its Member States have been the largest donors of humanitarian and resilience assistance to Syria and the region with € 27.4 billion.

5- Moscow and Damascus are asking to put money in “early recovery” projects. What's the EU position on this?

We do not work with the regime inside Syria, in line with our position on no relations with the Syrian regime and no reconstruction until a genuine and comprehensive political transition is firmly under way in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

However, the European Union is supporting the Syrian people directly suffering from the conflict, to build their future. We are actively fostering local initiatives in Syria where EU parameters and red lines are respected. We are supporting and empowering civilians across the country, working on education, health, livelihoods, building social cohesion, demining. These activities implemented at grassroots level aim at addressing the current needs of the population while also preparing the ground for Syria’s future for all Syrians.

We are also supporting the restauration of a dialogue and social cohesion among Syrians inside Syria and the region after eleven years of conflict. Supporting the development of a strong civil society with a specific emphasis on Syrian women and youth is essential in this regard. This is also the reason why the Brussels Conferences put a strong emphasis on the dialogue with civil society. Together with the Syrian people, they are the actor of change for the future of Syria.

6- What is your position on the efforts of the UN Envoy to Syria Mr. Pedersen on Constitutional reforms and on his “step-for-step" proposal?

The European Union fully supports the efforts of UN Special Envoy Pedersen to make progress on all elements of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, including the work of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva and the Special Envoy’s “steps-for-steps” approach. We discussed this and other related issues at Ministerial level at the meeting of EU Foreign Affairs minister in January, which was also attended by UNSE Pedersen.



Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the prime minister's office gained significant power. It became customary for the prime minister to be Shiite, the president Kurdish, and the speaker of Parliament Sunni.

This power-sharing arrangement, focusing on sectarian representation over institutional structure, has remained strong.

Attempts to break this norm have failed, including when former US President Barack Obama and his Vice President Joe Biden tried to support Ayad Allawi, a Shiite politician, for the presidency. The aim was to keep Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in power with support from both Washington and Tehran.

Despite Allawi’s parliamentary majority win, he didn’t become president.

Arab states were slow to react to changes in Iraq, allowing Iran to step in. Iran supported the US-created Iraqi Governing Council and sought to bring together Shiite factions to join the political process.

Its influence grew due to its backing of groups that opposed Saddam Hussein. Iran gained a key role in Iraq, effectively having veto power over decisions and a say in forming governments, while also expecting an eventual US military withdrawal.

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said Iran stepped in to fill a vacuum in Iraq, solidifying its role and protecting its interests.

This made Iran’s Quds Force commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani a key figure in Iraq, shaping everything from the reduction of US military presence to the formation of governments.

A foreign power’s influence in a neighboring country grows only if locals accept its role.

Soleimani and deputy leader of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were killed in a US strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim noted that Soleimani “was dedicated to serving his country’s interests, and the other side should have defended its own role and interests.”

He recalled Soleimani as being “skilled, effective, and able to earn trust, shifting from flexibility to rigidity when needed.”

This was clear in a letter Soleimani sent to Talabani when he considered supporting a no-confidence motion against Maliki’s government.

Karim also mentioned that al-Muhandis was deeply trusted by the Iranian general.

Talabani assigned his senior adviser various missions in Iran, focusing on forming Iraqi governments and relations with Kurdistan.

During a visit to Tehran, Adil Abdul Mahdi, who would later become prime minister, informed Talabani and Karim that “Soleimani’s claim that Iran supports Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister is false.”

“I was told that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei supports me,” argued Abdul Mahdi at the time.

Talabani felt awkward despite being close to Abdul Mahdi. He asked Karim to visit Tehran, where he met Soleimani and al-Muhandis. Soleimani denied Abdul Mahdi’s claims, saying he could take Karim to the Supreme Leader to hear the truth.

For his part, Karim said the Supreme Council didn’t support al-Maliki and that influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s stance was hardening. Soleimani assured that the Iranians were in contact with al-Sadr and would handle the issue of the Supreme Council.

When Karim returned, he informed Talabani and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani that the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, had left the Supreme Council to join Maliki, shifting the balance and allowing the formation of a government without the Council’s interference.

Karim remembered that Iran initially supported Ibrahim al-Jaafari for prime minister (2005-2006). However, Jaafari quickly became a burden on the political process and Shiite leaders then signaled the need for change.

The US Ambassador advised Jaafari to resign, threatening him if he didn't comply.

Maliki’s name wasn’t initially considered; Ali al-Adib from the “Dawa” party, of which Maliki was a member, was the favored choice. But Maliki didn’t support Adib, so after deliberations, the party settled on Maliki instead.

Breakfast with Soleimani

Karim remembers a breakfast meeting with Soleimani and al-Muhandis. He brought up Maliki’s performance during his second term and the widespread corruption in Iraq.

Soleimani suggested discussing it further, but Karim insisted the issue was urgent.

He questioned why, if all major Shiite forces agreed, change couldn’t happen. Soleimani indicated that decisions within the Shiite alliance were made by those who remained in it, prompting Karim to ask if Soleimani was implying it was him. Soleimani then replied : “Think what you wish.”

Sadr’s misstep

In the post-Saddam Hussein era, Sadr emerged as a major political force in Iraq. He led a large popular and armed movement.

Dealing with Sadr was challenging for political factions, especially among Shiites. Some disputes even culminated in armed conflicts. Managing Sadr’s influence was difficult both internally and for external interests, especially given his unpredictability.

When asked about Sadr’s decision to quit politics in 2022, Karim called it a major mistake.

He believed Iraq suffered greatly from this move, as it left parliament without any influential Shiite force capable of standing up against decisions not aligned with common goals.

Karim highlighted that filling seats with losing candidates seemed odd and turned the minority into the majority, undermining the constitutional process. He also noted the Shiite community’s fragmentation, with many Shiites not participating in recent elections due to their disenchantment with the political parties.

Karim warned against underestimating the potential for renewed protests and uprisings among the marginalized against the government and ruling powers.

Sistani’s unexpected proposal

When discussing top Shiite Religious Authority in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, Karim highlighted his political astuteness, surpassing the majority of other Shiite leaders. Sistani’s Friday sermons, delivered by his representatives, reflect this forward-thinking approach.

Karim noted a key observation about Sistani’s mindset. Despite corruption concerns, Sistani surprised Karim by suggesting bringing back the former Minister of Trade for his effectiveness in managing the ration card distribution.

He even proposed considering a Christian minister if they were honest and prioritized the people’s interests.

Furthermore, Sistani emphasized the importance of inclusivity in the new Iraq, advocating for the rights of Sunni and Kurdish components. He rejected marginalization and insisted on their participation and rights.

Sistani’s fatwa and the PMF

Karim believes that Sistani issued a fatwa on “jihad” to rally people against the significant threat posed by ISIS in 2014. He didn’t specifically mention the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or any other organization but referred to volunteers.

“Many responded to Sistani’s call and made significant sacrifices alongside the armed forces and Peshmerga. Volunteers participated in liberating areas once occupied by the terror group,” said Karim.

Karim further noted that there was a belief that those who made sacrifices had the right to be part of the armed forces and receive state support.

“The idea of integrating militias or military entities into the armed forces is not new,” explained Karim.

“US diplomat Paul Bremer [the first post-invasion governor of Iraq] proposed something similar to factions and organizations under the banner of integration into the army, and steps were taken in this direction,” he added.

“The goal was to eliminate the threat of ISIS, not to create a parallel army or establish another institution.”