What’s the Fallout from Ukraine’s Pipe Shutdown?

An employee walks at Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom's Sudzha pumping station, January 13, 2009. (Reuters)
An employee walks at Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom's Sudzha pumping station, January 13, 2009. (Reuters)
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What’s the Fallout from Ukraine’s Pipe Shutdown?

An employee walks at Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom's Sudzha pumping station, January 13, 2009. (Reuters)
An employee walks at Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom's Sudzha pumping station, January 13, 2009. (Reuters)

The shutdown of a gas pipeline in eastern Ukraine has sent a fresh wave of energy jitters through Europe.

The price of gas jumped - then fell. The cutoff is in sharp focus because it's the first time that the war has disrupted the Russian natural gas that flows through Ukraine to get to Europe, where it powers factories and generates electricity.

Here are key things to know:

What happened in Ukraine?
The operator of the gas pipeline system, Gas TSO of Ukraine, said it could no longer transport gas through a compressor station in the Luhansk region in eastern Ukraine, near the border with Russia. It said it had no operational control over the station in Russian-held territory, with occupying forces interfering in the station's operation and diverting gas in a way that endangered the stability of the pipeline system.

The company said it repeatedly told Russian state-owned gas exporter Gazprom about threats to flows from such interference but that its appeals were ignored.

The pipeline handles around a third of Russian gas heading to Europe. The Ukrainian operator said the gas flows could be made up through another pipeline that crosses from Russia into Ukraine near the town of Sudzha.

Gazprom said that was not possible, but gas flows at Sudzha rose overnight, by about 8 million cubic meters per day.

Why is this getting attention?
While Russia has halted natural gas to Poland and Bulgaria over a dispute about payments in rubles, Wednesday's cutoff is the first disruption in gas supplies flowing through Ukraine due to the war.

Any suggestion that energy supplies are vulnerable sends prices higher. Spot gas prices rose 4% at the open of trading Wednesday, to 103 euros per megawatt. They later eased, to around 95 euros per megawatt hour, below where they were Tuesday.

European governments aren't happy about sending hundreds of millions of dollars a day to Russia for energy but haven't been able to agree on a natural gas boycott because of heavy dependence of major economies like Germany and Italy. The European Union’s executive commission has proposed a phaseout of Russian oil but has run up against resistance from reliant countries like Hungary.

Economists estimate that a total cutoff of both oil and natural gas would throw Europe into a recession. A loss of gas alone would hit industries such as metals, fertilizer, glass and ceramics that have already throttled back production in some cases due to high gas prices. And consumers would face even higher electric and heating bills than they already do.

To avoid those outcomes, the EU has proposed cutting Russian gas imports by two-thirds by the end of the year through additional supplies of pipeline gas from Norway and Azerbaijan, more purchases of liquefied gas that comes by ship, faster rollout of wind and solar, and conservation. Whether that can be achieved remains to be seen.

What is going on with gas flows?
Tom Marzec-Manser, head of gas analytics at the ICIS market intelligence firm, said the Ukraine move "is not a huge cutoff to gas supplies." He described it as a loss of a few percent in overall European gas supply, when considering imports and domestic production.

"Nevertheless, it is worrying to the market that a development like this has happened," he said, noting concerns about possible energy sanctions that could interrupt deliveries and the gas cutoff to Bulgaria and Poland. "But it is not fundamentally altering the supply and demand balance in the European gas market."

Before the war, the share of Russian gas that flowed to Europe through Ukraine had fallen to around 18%. Of that, about a third goes through this particular part of the pipeline system that was shut down. That can be up to 32.6 million cubic meters a day; in recent days, it has been around 23 million cubic meters a day.

Much but not all of that gas could be rerouted through the pipeline entering Ukraine near Sudzha, said Zongqiang Luo, a gas analyst at Rystad Energy.

Even with added capacity through that town, some 10 million cubic meters per day of gas would still be in search of a pipeline route to get to Europe, and "where exactly is not clear as capacity in seemingly full," Luo said.

Over the course of a year, that daily flow would amount to around 3.6 billion cubic meters of gas, out of the roughly 150 billion cubic meters that Europe imports from Russia. It isn't a huge amount by comparison, but gas supplies are scarce, prices are high and gas importers and governments are scrambling to find all the non-Russian gas supplies they can.

What’s the impact on energy users in Europe?
Thanks to mild weather, Europe is in better shape on gas after scraping through the winter with barely adequate reserves. Reserves are filling faster than they did last year, but that needs to continue to cover demand this coming winter.

The interruption would make it harder for European countries to meet their goals for storage levels next winter and would "hasten Europe’s plans to move away from imports of Russian gas," Luo said.

"As the European gas grid is well integrated, no one country is likely to suffer any immediate impact, but this will put further strain on the system and place a floor on downside price movement,” Luo added.

Germany is receiving a quarter less gas through Ukraine, the Energy Ministry said Wednesday. Increased supplies from Norway and the Netherlands are partly compensating for the shortfall, said Annika Einhorn, a ministry spokeswoman.

She noted that the majority of Russian gas reaches Germany through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline under the Baltic Sea rather than via Ukraine.

What are possible motivations for the move?
Both Gas TSO of Ukraine and Gazprom have sought to underline their reliability as gas suppliers despite the enmity fueled by the war so analysts are still trying to figure out what the game is. Barbara Lambrecht at Commerzbank said, "It remains to be seen whether the disruption to supply turns out to be anything more than just a flexing of muscles."

Tim Ash, senior emerging markets sovereign strategist at BlueBay Asset Management, said it could be about forcing Europe's hand.

"I think frustrations are building in Ukraine that Europe is proving too slow in rolling out an energy embargo on Russia," he said. "If Europe is not prepared to shut off the energy money printing machine for Moscow, why would Ukraine not take matters into their own hands?"



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.