Russia, Israel Exchange ‘Ukrainian Letters’ in Syria

A Russian military patrol in northern Syria. Asharq Al-Awsat
A Russian military patrol in northern Syria. Asharq Al-Awsat
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Russia, Israel Exchange ‘Ukrainian Letters’ in Syria

A Russian military patrol in northern Syria. Asharq Al-Awsat
A Russian military patrol in northern Syria. Asharq Al-Awsat

Each wave of Israeli raids on Syria in the past years had been weighty. But the latest attacks, which occurred on Friday night, had an additional significance. Syria, in fact, has turned into a “letter box” between Russia and Israel, as a result of tension over Ukraine on the one hand, and Iran’s efforts to “fill the vacuum” in Syria, on the other.

The most powerful Russian message came on May 13, when Israel launched raids in Syria. In an unprecedented move, the Hmeimim base operated the advanced S-300 missile system, and targeted Israeli bombers as soon as the raids stopped. It was the first time that the Russian base used one of its three systems - the S-300, the advanced S-300, and the S-400 - since its deployment in Syria following the military intervention at the end of 2015.

This is an important development, especially as Moscow had given pledges to Tel Aviv that it would control the command room of the missile system in Syria, and prevent its fall into the grip of the Syrian Air Force, which operates the old systems such as the S-200 and below.

These understandings were underlined following efforts to alleviate Russian-Israeli tension in the wake of the targeting of a Russian plane in western Syria in September 2018.

But why did Moscow change its behavior? Why did Mikhail Bogdanov, the envoy of Russian President Vladimir Putin, deny reports of the use of the system against Israeli planes?

According to a senior Western official, intelligence reports confirm that the Hmeimim base operated the system, in a rare incident, “because Russia wanted to tell Israel that its ability to chase Iranian targets was linked to Moscow’s decision, and that it should take this into consideration when taking a stance over the Ukrainian file.”

Since the outbreak of the Russian war in Ukraine, Tel Aviv has tried to play a “balanced role” and refused to hand over the Iron Dome to Kyiv. However, as the bombing intensified, political signs and an escalatory rhetoric emerged, along with talk of military support and the presence of Israeli “mercenaries” or experts alongside the Ukrainian army, followed by a diplomatic rift.

At this moment, Moscow sent a message to Tel Aviv through the “Syrian box.” The response - which came in the form of the Israeli bombing – was aimed at “testing the resolve” of the Russian side, along with a determination to chase “Iranian targets” in Syria. In fact, the latest raids on Friday were broader and more comprehensive than the previous ones, because they targeted points in the countryside of Damascus and central and western Syria, leading to the killing of Syrian officers.

Despite Bogdanov’s denials and claims that Western reports were “lies,” the Russian reminder not only affected Israel, but also included hints to Damascus and Tehran that the military-air decision remained in Moscow.
This comes following the intense exchange of visits between Syrian and Iranian officials in recent weeks, including the visit of President Bashar al-Assad to Tehran, to work on “filling the Russian vacuum.”

The reminder also highlighted Israel’s adherence to its “red lines” in the phase shifting between the Russian withdrawal and Iranian advances.

President Putin wants to say that despite his preoccupation with Ukraine, he has not forgotten Syria and its “players.” Or perhaps he wants to use it to improve his position in his great war in “Little Russia”.
Here, it was remarkable that after Jordanian officials announced that they had noticed a decline in the Russian military presence in southern Syria, with the possibility that Iran and its militias would advance to “fill the vacuum,” the Hmeimim base rushed to conduct Russian military patrols on the Syrian-Jordanian border.

The same can be said about the Russian messages to Turkey. The Hmeimim planes target from time to time areas of Turkish influence in northern Syria, to remind Ankara of the Russian papers when it reviews its decisions and options regarding the Dardanelles and Bosphorus corridors to the Black Sea, and when it discusses the request of Sweden and Finland to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

So far, Putin has been able to use Syria as a “letter box” and a platform to pressure players in Ukraine. Only time will tell whether Russia would be capable of maintaining this strategy, if the Ukrainian land turns into a “swamp” for the Russian forces, impacting the Russian depth and the theaters of the Middle East.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.