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Syria 'Safe Zone': 3 Options for Turkey

Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the UN Headquarters in New York on September 24, 2019. (AP)
Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the UN Headquarters in New York on September 24, 2019. (AP)
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Syria 'Safe Zone': 3 Options for Turkey

Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the UN Headquarters in New York on September 24, 2019. (AP)
Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the UN Headquarters in New York on September 24, 2019. (AP)

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has renewed his demand to establish a safe zone, devoid of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), 30 kilometers deep into northern Syria.

Erdogan first made his intentions clear in 2013 and then presented a detailed map of his vision before the United Nations in 2019. His plan was rejected by the United States, Europe and Russia. Ankara managed, however, through various exchanges and military incursions to establish pockets of control in the area.

This was achieved through four military operations: Euphrates Shield in Jarablus in northern Aleppo in 2016, Olive Branch in Afrin in Aleppo's countryside in 2018, Peace Spring in Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain east of the Euphrates River in late 2019 and Spring Shield in Idlib in spring 2020.

The process also demanded a series of agreements: Ankara, Moscow and Tehran signed an agreement over Idlib in Astana in 2017; Ankara signed a number of understandings with Moscow in 2018 and 2020; Ankara signed an agreement with Washington over the Manbij "roadmap" in 2018 and another one on the Peace Spring region in October 2019.

These deals allowed Turkey to establish its zones of influence that take up around 10 percent of Syria, or roughly twice the size of Lebanon. Turkey, along with Russia and Iran, which control 63 percent of Syria with the regime, is one of the main players in the war-torn country. Added to them are the United States and its allies, who back the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which hold 23 percent of northeastern Syria.

Turkey's incursions in Syria have prevented the Kurds from establishing their own state, similar to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. It partially succeeded in driving out the YPG and PKK from its southern borders and prevented dramatic demographic changes in northern Syria. Ankara, Tehran and Damascus are in agreement over barring the establishment of a Kurdish entity. Syria, Iran and Turkey had in the 1990s also stood against the establishment of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.

What has changed?
Erdogan believes that the war on Ukraine has granted Turkey a unique and major negotiations position with Russia, the US and Washington.

Washington supports Sweden and Finland's bid to join NATO and in order for that to succeed, it needs the approval of all members, including Turkey.

Moscow opposes the bid and is banking on Turkey's veto to that end.

Through the series of tradeoffs and understandings in Syria, and Ankara and Moscow's bilateral military, economic and political relations, Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeded in using his special ties with Erdogan in making a main breakthrough in NATO's southern front. Turkey's Incirlik base near the Syrian border lies just dozens of kilometers away from Russia's Hmeimim air base in western Syria.

Days ago, as NATO was preparing to hold a summit in Spain next month, Erdogan raised his tone and threatened to wage a new incursion in northern Syria with the aim of establishing a "safe zone" and driving out the YPG.

Turkish intelligence and allied Syrian factions have been preparing for the new battle. Shelling along the frontlines has also intensified in recent days, namely in the Peace Spring region covering Tal Abyad, Ras al-Ain and the area east of the Euphrates, the areas near Manbij in the Aleppo countryside, and in Tal Rifaat.

Each of these three zones has its own risks should Turkey choose to attack:

- Red zone. The US has deployed its forces, patrols and drones in the area east of the Euphrates to stress that it is there to protect its allies - the SDF - and repel the Turkish army. The US informed Ankara, through its UN ambassador, of its rejection of any military attacks.

Russia, meanwhile, has used the Turkish threats of an offensive to justify reinforcing its strategic deployment near American forces east of the Euphrates.

This has forced Turkey to backtrack somewhat with Erdogan clearly stating that the new offensive would not include the area east of the Euphrates, but it will cover the region west of the river, specifically Manbij and Tal Rifaat.

- Yellow - grey zone, covering west of the Euphrates in Manbij, where an old American-Turkish agreement called for the withdrawal of the YPG and PKK. Washington and Ankara also agreed to deploy joint patrols in the area and form a local council.

The US assurances to the YPG included Manbij and Washington believes that any threat to the Kurdish force will undermine the war against ISIS.

Any Turkish attack in this zone will lead to instability and raise demands in the US Congress for Washington to impose sanctions on Ankara that were imposed after the 2019 offensive.

Erdogan certainly wants to avoid more economic pressure, a year before presidential elections. He may, however, increase pressure in Manbij to reach a new settlement against the YPG.

- Green zone that covers Tal Rifaat, also west of the Euphrates. This area is, in theory, held by Russia, Iran and the Damascus regime. A Turkish incursion here may be easier than the other two zones. All Ankara needs is a green light from Moscow, just as it did for the Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Spring Shield operations.

At the time, Russia extracted a price from Turkey in Syria. This time around, Turkey's request for control of Tal Rifaat from Russia will be met with Moscow's demands over Ukraine and Sweden and Finland's NATO bids or perhaps that Ankara normalize ties with Damascus and agree to the deployment of Syrian border guards on the Syrian-Turkish border.

The coming days will reveal Turkey's true intentions: Is it seeking better negotiations conditions ahead of the NATO summit or is Erdogan seeking to impose a new reality on the ground before flying to Spain? Moreover, how will this clash play out with the UN Security Council seeking to extend the cross-border aid deliveries through Turkey before the July 10 deadline?

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Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
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Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)

Iran and the United States are in discussions to extend ‌their ceasefire so as to start negotiations on issues including Tehran's nuclear program, where Washington insists Iran must not be able to make a nuclear weapon.

While much of Iran's uranium enrichment infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged when Israel and the US bombed it in June, a large part of the highly enriched uranium it amassed is thought to have survived. That is the biggest US concern ahead of nuclear talks.

On Friday Trump said in a social media post that Iran must agree that the enriched uranium buried underground after earlier US strikes be "unearthed" and destroyed in coordination with Iran and the UN nuclear watchdog.

WHAT IS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM?

One of two fissile materials, along with plutonium, with which one can make the core of a nuclear bomb. While plutonium is usually extracted from the spent fuel of a nuclear reactor, requiring large and highly visible infrastructure, uranium can be enriched using centrifuges that have a much smaller footprint. Two of Iran's three enrichment sites that are known to have been operating when Israel and the ‌US attacked in ‌June were underground. The above-ground one was clearly destroyed.

Uranium is highly enriched when it ‌has ⁠reached 20% purity, and ⁠weapons-grade as of around 90%.

Modern reactors generally use fuel enriched to up to 5%, but some use fuel enriched to higher levels. The ones that power US nuclear submarines reportedly use fuel enriched beyond 90%.

HOW MUCH DOES IRAN HAVE?

Iran has not informed the UN nuclear watchdog of the fate of its enriched uranium since the June attacks or let its inspectors return to the sites where it was stored.

The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates Iran had these amounts when the first Israeli bombs fell on June 13:

- 440.9 kg enriched to up to 60%

- 184.1 kg enriched to up to 20%

- 6,024.4 kg enriched to ⁠up to 5%

- 2,391.1 kg enriched to up to 2%

According to an IAEA yardstick, ‌the amount at 60% is enough, if enriched further, for 10 nuclear weapons. ‌The 20% stock would be enough for one and the 5% could produce 12. How much has survived is unclear. IAEA chief ‌Rafael Grossi has said his agency believes "a bit more than 200 kg" of the 60% stock is stored at a ‌tunnel complex in Isfahan that appears to have been largely unharmed by the June attacks. Some was also at the Natanz nuclear site, he said.

WHY THE CONCERN? US concern has been focused on the 60% material because that would be easiest and thus quickest to make a bomb with. Washington wants it gone. Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons.

As the enrichment level of uranium increases, it becomes exponentially easier to enrich ‌further. Getting from 60% to 90% is easier than getting from unenriched to 5%.

President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of a nuclear deal between Iran and ⁠major powers that kept Tehran ⁠at a far greater distance from being able to produce an atom bomb than it is at now. The US withdrawal in 2018 caused the deal to unravel, and Iran quickly expanded its atomic program.

Under that 2015 deal, Iran did not enrich beyond 3.67%.

Even at 90%, however, it takes more steps to produce the core of a bomb. When it is enriched, the uranium is in gas form. It must then be turned into metal for use in a weapon.

CAN YOU MOVE IT?

Yes. Iran moved enriched material between sites under IAEA monitoring before the June attacks.

Under the 2015 deal and a precursor to it, Iran's stocks of uranium enriched to up to 20% were diluted or turned into reactor fuel plates and shipped out of the country.

Moving nuclear material like highly enriched uranium internationally is a sensitive but relatively routine procedure.

"It requires some precaution but it can be moved," Grossi told PBS in March when asked about the 60% material.

WILL IRAN GIVE IT UP? Iran's supreme leader has issued a directive that the 60% material should not be sent abroad, two senior Iranian sources said last week.

Iranian sources say Tehran might agree to send half of it to a third country, receiving uranium enriched to 5% in return, and dilute the other half inside Iran.

Features

Beaufort Castle: Israel’s Geographic Gateway to South Lebanon

Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
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Beaufort Castle: Israel’s Geographic Gateway to South Lebanon

Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)

Repeated Israeli strikes on the medieval Beaufort Castle and its surroundings east of Nabatieh have revived debate over one of southern Lebanon’s most sensitive sites due to its elevated position overlooking Palestinian territories, Syria and Lebanon.

For decades, the Crusader fortress was a commanding military position and a battlefield etched into Israeli and Lebanese memory. Now, as fighting escalates in the south, it is back at the center of events. Military assessments say its battlefield value remains, despite major changes in warfare over recent decades.

The renewed focus on Beaufort Castle comes as Israel intensifies strikes around the site and the heights overlooking Nabatieh. The attacks have raised fresh questions about the military value of a position that has remained present in major confrontations in southern Lebanon since Israel's 1982 invasion.

Heritage landmark

Beaufort Castle, known in Arabic as Qalaat al-Shaqif, is one of southern Lebanon’s most prominent historical and heritage landmarks, and among the most important Crusader castles in the Levant.

The Crusaders named it Beaufort, meaning “beautiful fortress.” It later fell to Salaheddine after a long siege. The Crusaders then retook it for a period, and the Knights Templar inhabited it, before the Mamluks, led by Sultan al-Zahir Baybars, seized it in 1268.

Smoke rises from Beaufort Castle following strikes, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 27, 2026. (Reuters)

Although the Romans first built initial fortifications at the strategic site, the Crusaders greatly expanded it and built most of its existing structures.

Since 2024, the castle has held “enhanced protection” status under the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Lebanon's Arnoun municipality said in a statement.

The municipality warned that repeated Israeli strikes could damage the castle and urged Lebanese authorities and relevant international organizations to act to protect the landmark and prevent further harm.

Battlefield advantage

Claiming the castle has long been seen as a battlefield advantage. In the 1970s, it came under heavy Israeli airstrikes after the Palestine Liberation Organization used it as a position to fire at Israel. In 1982, it was the scene of one of the fiercest battles between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies. Israel occupied it until 2000.

Retired Brigadier General Bassam Yassine said Beaufort Castle’s importance today is little different from the value that made it a focus of battles since the 1982 invasion. The site, he said, remains one of southern Lebanon’s most prominent commanding military positions.

“Beaufort Castle has been present in all wars and battles with Israel from 1982 until today because of its strategic location,” Yassine told Asharq Al-Awsat, saying it offers a commanding view over wide areas of southern Lebanon and northern occupied Palestine.

“Beaufort Castle overlooks the settlement of Metula, which is less than four kilometers away. It overlooks the area between the Litani and Zahrani rivers and is considered the highest hill in this sector,” he said.

The site gives whoever controls it a major military advantage, Yassine said.

“From Beaufort Castle, one can observe Taybeh, Deir Seryan and Qantara, where the Israeli army is present today. That is why it cannot leave it outside its control if it wants to remain in the area where it is deployed,” he said.

Yassine said this importance is not new. Before Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, it controlled hills and heights around the area, including Beaufort Castle, to secure battlefield superiority and maintain observation over its surroundings.

Destroyed buildings are pictured in the village of Kfar Kila in southern Lebanon as seen from across the border in the Upper Galilee region of northern Israel on May 29, 2026, with the Crusader-period Beaufort Castle pictured in Lebanon in the background. (AFP)

Asked which sectors the castle exposes, he said: “It directly overlooks Yohmor al-Shaqif, eastern Zawtar, western Zawtar, Kfar Tebnit and Nabatieh al-Fawqa. All these areas are exposed from the castle.”

“It also protects forces on the Yohmor and Zawtar axes, and provides cover for troops deployed in Taybeh, Deir Seryan and Qantara, and across this entire sector,” he added.

Yassine said the castle’s military value also lies in its defensive terrain.

“If any resistance force managed to infiltrate the castle and possess anti-armor missiles there, it would become very difficult to remove it from the site or destroy it because of the geography of the location,” he explained.

He said Israel had faced that problem before, during the period of Palestinian armed presence in the south.

“The Israelis tried many times to destroy the castle during the Palestinian period, but they did not succeed because of its geography,” he said.

Yassine said the site includes old historical passages and tunnels.

“The castle has tunnels that reach the Litani River below. They have existed since the Crusader era and are not newly built tunnels, which gives the site additional defensive value,” he said.

Control of the castle does not mean control of the area

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Bahaa Halal said Beaufort Castle is one of southern Lebanon’s most important military and geopolitical sites because of its strategic location.

“Israeli military doctrine views Beaufort Castle as a key point for achieving visual and intelligence superiority, which forms part of fire superiority, as it allows the monitoring of movements between south and north of the Litani, the tracking of routes toward the western Bekaa and Iqlim al-Tuffah, as well as monitoring the operational environment of attack drones and FPV aircraft,” Halal told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Any “resistance force that is able to deploy freely around Beaufort Castle gains a tactical advantage in missile maneuvering, managing ambushes and concealing combat infrastructure inside the mountainous terrain,” he added, making the area a constant Israeli security concern.

“Israel can theoretically reach the surroundings of Beaufort Castle through air cover, prior destruction and special forces. But there is a major difference between reaching the area and maintaining stable control,” he remarked.

Holding it, he said, would require secure supply lines, fire control over the castle’s surroundings, preventing flanking moves and ambushes, and ensuring permanent superiority in observation.

Such conditions are difficult to secure in an area geographically connected to Arnoun, Yohmor, Zawtar, Iqlim al-Tuffah and the valleys leading to the Litani, he stressed.

Features

US and Iran Standoff at Sea: A Test of ‘Who Will Blink First’

A woman walks past an anti-US and anti-Israel mural depicting missiles hitting an aircraft carrier in Tehran on May 26, 2026. (AFP)
A woman walks past an anti-US and anti-Israel mural depicting missiles hitting an aircraft carrier in Tehran on May 26, 2026. (AFP)
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US and Iran Standoff at Sea: A Test of ‘Who Will Blink First’

A woman walks past an anti-US and anti-Israel mural depicting missiles hitting an aircraft carrier in Tehran on May 26, 2026. (AFP)
A woman walks past an anti-US and anti-Israel mural depicting missiles hitting an aircraft carrier in Tehran on May 26, 2026. (AFP)

Naval blockades, military history has shown, require patience. That is not the leading attribute of the officials in Washington.

“So when President Trump imposed a blockade of Iranian ports in April, the quick result he was looking for — a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic — was not in the cards. Wearing down an enemy with a blockade can take months or years, military experts say, and certainly not weeks,” reported the New York Times on Friday.

“Iran, with thousands of miles of land borders with seven neighbors, and a trade lifeline to its ally Russia across the Caspian Sea, had alternatives. The standoff persisted.”

“It’s difficult to rapidly bring an adversary to its knees with a blockade,” said Michael Connell, a specialist on the Iranian military at the Center for Naval Analyses in Virginia. “It’s the kind of thing that works well over time but it’s not a quick solution.”

Now, as the United States appears closer to a peace agreement with Iran, dropping the American blockade and reopening the strait are among the top priorities. If a deal can be reached, it would end one of the more unique naval standoffs in modern times: a tense stalemate that is neither peace nor raging conflict, between two mismatched adversaries who have exercised their leverage at sea.

It has featured an increasingly familiar pattern of conflict in an era of technological disruption — the ability of Iran’s speedboats, drones, mines and missiles to hold off America’s arsenal of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with advanced fighter jets and populations the size of small towns.

The stalemate at sea has also underscored an old imperative of war. Swift victory without gaining and controlling territory on land is difficult to accomplish. A naval standoff is an attempt at economic and commercial strangulation on the water — seemingly bloodless but with hidden costs and risks for both sides, reported the NYT.

Indeed, Adm. Brad Cooper, the leader of US Central Command, which directs military operations in the Middle East, emphasized the value of economic pressure in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee last week. There had been “zero trade” in or out of Iranian ports, he said, “squeezing Iran economically and creating powerful leverage for the ongoing negotiations.”

Iran can also inflict economic pain. Because the world economy relies on a global supply chain, it means that Iran’s blocking of exports like fertilizer, helium and most importantly oil and gas has been felt worldwide.

“It has become a contest of wills, to see who blinks first,” Connell said.

A blockade is an act of war under international law; escalation, purposeful or not, is always a risk. That point was driven home on Wednesday when Iran launched four one-way attack drones over the Strait of Hormuz and the US military conducted airstrikes against a drone ground-control station in the port city of Bandar Abbas. It was the second time in three days that American forces conducted strikes in southern Iran, including against Iranian boats trying to emplace mines.

Vessels anchored at the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)

The war at sea also imposes burdens. For Iran, the constriction of goods flowing in and out of the country puts enormous pressure on an economy that was reeling even before the war began — despite the alternative paths it has for trade.

“For the United States, sending ships to patrol waters far from home not only is expensive, but also risks overtaxing the ships and the crews. The USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, for instance, limped home this month after a grueling 10 months in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean and the Red Sea, demonstrating how wear and tear can impose costs on a superpower overextending itself,” said the report.

“The US Navy can do some phenomenal things for a phenomenal amount of time,” said Mike Franken, a retired vice admiral who served as commodore of a destroyer squadron. “Around the edges things get tattered, and we’ve been at a very high op tempo.”

There are also strategic opportunities lost. The ships used to blockade Iran, and the sailors that operate them, cannot be used for other missions. Trump’s recent trip to China served as a reminder that East Asia remains a region of strategic significance, with allies like South Korea, Japan and especially Taiwan relying at least to some extent on a US naval deterrent.

Finally, having two adversaries in static tension creates the risk of accidental escalation, through a misreading of circumstances caused by anxiety, confusion or a lapse in concentration.

The US Central Command said this week it had redirected 111 commercial vessels and disabled four ships bound for Iranian ports thus far. Iranian forces have attacked American guided-missile destroyers crossing the Strait of Hormuz with missiles, drones and small boats. Central Command said the American warships successfully fended off the attack. Iran has also fired on ships from other countries trying to pass through the strait, causing some damage.

The United States has some two dozen warships involved in the blockade, which includes two aircraft carriers, the USS George H.W. Bush and the USS Abraham Lincoln, as well as guided-missile destroyers, amphibious ships, littoral combat ships and minesweepers, and refueling and supply ships to keep them provisioned and combat ready.

One precedent for the current stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz is the so-called Tanker War of the 1980s, when the war between Iran and Iraq spilled into the Gulf. Though the United States was not one of the combatants, it was drawn into the fray as it began to escort civilian oil tankers through the strait.

If the current standoff continues, the tactic has direct costs in terms of keeping ships in the region supplied with food, fuel and ammunition. There’s also the need to keep drones, helicopters, fighters and surveillance planes in the air. Sailors, Marines and airmen receive imminent danger pay.

For sailors, the combination of long stretches of dullness punctuated by moments of stress and tension can be a grind. “A blockade is a very boring thing to do,” said Andrew Lambert, professor of naval history in the department of war studies at King’s College. “You’re just hanging around waiting for something to happen.”

“There is a ripple effect from keeping large numbers of assets on station for protracted periods of time,” said James R. Holmes, chair of maritime strategy at the Naval War College.

He cited the USS Gerald R. Ford and its long deployment and posited that the carrier could encounter unexpected engineering problems when undergoing maintenance. While at sea, the ship endured mechanical problems with the gear that launches and recovers warplanes on the flight deck. A major fire destroyed the sleeping area for hundreds of sailors. There were also complaints about food shortages and delays in receiving mail that led to a decline in morale.

It will be difficult for the United States to reopen trade through the strait without coming to terms with Iran, Holmes said. “All Iran needs to keep its chokehold on the Strait is enough of its mosquito fleet, including shore-based missiles and drones, to keep shipping firms and insurers jittery,” he said. “And seldom if ever does a military campaign fully disarm an antagonist short of regime change.”

Lambert, the King’s College professor, said costs will mount as the standoff persists. “Because nothing particularly violent is happening on a large scale, the temptation to let it roll on is a real problem,” he said.

* Nicholas Kulish and John Ismay for the New York Times