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Russia, Syria and the ‘Ukrainian Volcano’

A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)
A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)
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Russia, Syria and the ‘Ukrainian Volcano’

A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)
A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)

Two new developments in Syria unveiled once again the extent to which the country is affected by the Russian war in Ukraine. This time, the wind is blowing through the doors of UN political and humanitarian institutions.

The connection between the crises in Syria and Ukraine dates back to 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea in retaliation to a change of Ukrainian presidents and its ally, Viktor Yanukovych, fleeing the Ukrainian presidential palace.

At the time, Moscow demanded that Damascus show toughness towards the UN Geneva track. That was before it finally decided to have its military intervene directly in Syria by the end of 2015.

With the start of war in Ukraine, the economic suffering of the Syrians worsened and indications of a military entanglement between the two “arenas” appeared: Russia’s military role in Syria declined due to its preoccupation with Ukraine, leaving space for Iranian attempts to fill the vacuum in Syria, which was met with escalated Israeli strikes against Tehran’s interests there.

Moreover, several Russian-US military tests have taken place in Syrian airspace.

For its part, Turkey tried to take advantage of these developments by launching a new incursion in northern Syria.

Presently, there are two developments: the first is that Moscow has informed Damascus not to participate in the UN-sponsored meetings of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva, and the other is that Russia has informed the Western parties that it will not extend the international resolution on cross-border aid delivery when its term expires on July 10.

Damascus has always been uncomfortable with the UN track since the issuance of the “Geneva Declaration” in 2012 and the convening of the international conference in early 2014.

It opposes transforming the Syrian crises into an international issue and wants to implement a local agenda with local priorities, considerations, and calculations.

Moscow, for various reasons, had pushed Damascus to accept the UN track in Geneva because this gives legitimacy to Russian efforts and presence in Syria. The track also provides Moscow with a platform for its international calculations and trade-offs.

Despite this, Russia has preserved its options and has continued its attempts to “dismantle Western influence at the UN.”

Russia has added two other tracks to the equation: the first in Astana, in cooperation with Iran and Turkey, to discuss military matters, and the other in Sochi, to discuss political matters and hold a conference for Syrian national dialogue.

Moscow sometimes thought of attacking the Geneva track and the international efforts, but it waited and negotiated, and then pressured Damascus to send its delegations to meetings in Europe.

Also, Moscow was sending presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentiev to meet with the Turkish and Iranian “guarantors,” and US and European interlocutors. Geneva has become a platform for Russia's international outlook on Syria. This path has become an urgent need for all parties to achieve gains or justify shortfalls.

What changed now?

The eruption of the Ukrainian volcano changed everything. Some UN institutions, backed by the West, have punished Russia for its war. Also, the US-Russian back-track that existed in Geneva has come to a stop. Before the last round of the Constitutional Committee's meetings at the end of May, Lavrentiev did not get the same welcome he usually received.

Russia declared that Switzerland is “not a neutral territory,” and demanded that Damascus ask the UN to find a new place to host the committee meetings. Four alternatives were offered: Moscow, Sochi, Damascus or Algiers.

Russia understands that the possibility of Western envoys and the Syrian opposition traveling to Russia or Damascus is not on possible. Also Algiers, which will host the Arab League summit in November, to discuss the return of Damascus' membership in the organization, is not realistic.

The Geneva track for the Constitutional Committee is now faced with two options: either freeze negotiations or succumb to Russia’s conditions.

The Geneva track file has become, more or less, a paper that is added to another development which pertains to the international resolution on cross-border aid delivery.

A year ago, Moscow signaled several times that it would not extend the resolution and pressured donors to knock on the doors of Damascus.

As for Washington, it raised the bar by talking about opening three border crossings, two of them with Turkey and the third with Iraq, and considered extending the resolution a priority for the new administration of President Joe Biden.

Secret negotiations between the envoys of Putin and Biden, which took place in mid-June last year, were able to produce a new draft resolution that included an extension for a single crossing between Turkey and Syria’s Idlib.

The drafted resolution, which was worded differently, also included US setbacks and support for funding early recovery and aid delivery across the lines of contact.

The situation has changed a lot. Contact between the two superpowers has stopped, there is a military escalation in Ukraine, and signs are emerging of a military clash between the US and Russian armies in Syria.

With the end of the resolution's mandate approaching, there is a possibility that Russia will initiate a request for a draft resolution regarding cross-border humanitarian aid to eastern Ukraine in return for passing the resolution for northern Syria.

Once again, the link between the two files is clear.

Another possibility is that the resolution remains without extension and alternative plans get reviewed. Indeed, the envoy of Western countries discussed alternative plans.

Can Turkish organizations be relied upon as an alternative? Western countries do not want to give it this advantage.

Is it possible to establish a Western-funded trust that uses existing institutions and lines? This prospect is being seriously considered.

Faced with the humanitarian options and the two Syrian developments, the UN sharpened its rhetoric and used new vocabulary.

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres intervened by presenting a detailed statement on the importance of preserving the role of the UN, extending the international resolution to provide relief to more than four million people, and to provide aid to 14 million people in a country where 90% of its people live below the poverty line.

“It is a moral imperative to address the suffering and vulnerability of 4.1 million people in the area who need aid and protection,” he said.

Aside from what is moral and humane, what about the strategic and geopolitical aspect? Most likely, the two new tests will show that Syria has become a hostage to an international-regional game and that the Syrians may pay the price of the “Ukrainian volcano.”

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25 Years of Unanswered Questions in Iraq

A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
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25 Years of Unanswered Questions in Iraq

A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)
A Saddam Hussein mural is seen in Baghdad in 1991. (Getty Images)

People in Iraq often wonder dejectedly: What if Saddam Hussein were alive and ruling the country today? Many will reply with fantastical answers, but Saddam’s era would have responded: Iraq is isolated, either by siege or by a war that he launched or was being waged against him.

Many people cast doubt on whether actual change has been achieved in Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. The invasion ousted the Baath version of Iraq and Saddam was executed in December 2006, leaving questions to pile up over the years with no one having any answers.

After a quarter century, Iraq is accumulating questions. It casts them aside and forges ahead without addressing them. At best, it reviews itself and returns to that moment in April 2003 when the US launched its invasion. Or it asks new questions about the 2005 civil war, the armed alternatives that emerged in 2007, how ISIS swept through the country in 2014, or the wave of protests that erupted in 2019. It also asks new questions about Iran’s influence in the country that has persisted for decades.

The questions are many and none of the Iraqis have answered them.

A US marine wraps the American flag around the head of a Saddam Hussein statue in Baghdad. (Reuters file)

Saddam and the alternative

The September 11, 2001, attacks shook the United States and the entire world. They struck fear in Baghdad. Saddam had that year claimed that he had written a book, “The Fortified Castle”, about an Iraqi soldier who is captured by Iran. He manages to escape and return to Iraq to “fortify the castle”.

The terrifying Saddam and the terrified Iraqis have long spun tales about escaping to and from Iraq. It is a journey between the question and the non-answers. That year, when Baghdad was accused of being complicit in the 9/11 attacks, Saddam’s son Uday was “elected” member of the Baath party’s leadership council. The move sparked debate about possible change in Iraq. Bashar al-Assad had a year earlier inherited the presidency of Syria and its Baath party from his father Hafez.

The US invaded Iraq two years later and a new Iraq was born. Twenty-five years later, the country is still not fully grown up. Twenty-one years ago, on April 9, 2003, a US marine wrapped the head of a Saddam statue in Baghdad with an American flag. The Iraqis asked: why didn’t you leave us this iconic image, but instead of an American flag, used an Iraqi one?

Baghdad’s question and Washington’s answer

As the Iraqis observe the developments unfold in Syris with the ouster of Bashar from power, they can’t help but ask how this rapid “change” could have been possible without US tanks and weapons. Why are the Syrians insisting on celebrating “freedom” every day? They are also astonished at the Syrians who scramble to greet Abu Mohammed al-Golani, who has not yet managed to put this image behind him and fully assume his original identity of Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Iraqis wonder how the Syrians are managing this transition so far without a bloodbath.

They ask these questions because the Iraqis view and judge the world based on their own memories. They keep asking questions and await answers from others instead of themselves.

The Iraqis recall how in August 2003, after four months of US occupation, that the Jordanian embassy and United Nations offices were attacked, leaving several staff dead, including head of the UN mission Sergio de Mello. The Americans arrested Ali Hassan al-Majid, or “chemical Ali”, Saddam’s cousin, and 125 people were killed in a bombing in al-Najaf, including Shiite cleric Mohammed Baqer al-Hakim.

During that bloody month, the Iraqis asked questions about security, forgetting about Saddam’s alternative, democracy and the promised western model. Later, the facts would answer that the question of security was a means to escape questions about transitional justice.

Sergio de Mello (r) and Paul Bremmer (second right) attend the inaugural meeting of the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad on July 13, 2003. (Getty Images)

The question of civil war

Paul Bremer, the American ruler of Iraq, once escorted four opposition figures to Saddam’s prison cell. They flooded him with questions. Adnan al-Pachachi, a veteran diplomat, asked: “Why did you invade Kuwait?” Adel Abdul Mahdi, a former prime minister, asked: “Why did you kill the Kurds in the Anfal massacre?” Mowaffak al-Rubaie, a former national security adviser, asked: “Why did you kill your Baath comrades?” Ahmed al-Halabi simply insulted the former president. Saddam recoiled and then just smiled.

Saddam’s opponents left the prison cell with answers that should have helped them in running the transitional justice administration, but they failed.

The following year, Washington appointed Ayad Allawi to head the interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) that had limited jurisdiction so that it could be free to wage two fierce battles: one in Najaf against the “Mahdi Army”, headed by Moqtada al-Sadr, and the other against armed groups comprised of “resistance fighters” and “extremists” in Fallujah.

The opposition in the IGC got to work that was already prepared by the Americans. They outlined the distribution of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds in the country, with historic questions about the majority and minority, and the “oppressed” now assuming rule after the ouster of the “oppressors”.

On the ground, the Ghazaliya neighborhood in western Baghdad with its Shiite and Sunni residents was in store for a bloodbath. On a winter night in 2005, an entire family was massacred and an enfant strangled to death. Soon after, lines drawing the Shiite and Sunni sections of the neighborhood emerged. The popular market became the tense border between the two halves. Two new rival “enemies” traded attacks, claiming several lives.

In Baghdad’s Green Zone, the IGC drew up a draft of the transitional rule. In January 2005, 8 million Iraqis voted for the establishment of a National Assembly.

Meanwhile, different “armies” kept on emerging in Baghdad. The media was filled with the death tolls of bloody relentless sectarian attacks. Checkpoints manned by masked gunmen popped up across the capital.

Those days seemed to answer the question of “who was the alternative to Saddam.” No one needed a concrete answer because the developments spoke for themselves.

Nouri al-Maliki came to power as prime minister in 2006. He famously declared: “I am the state of law” - in both the figurative and literal sense. Iraqis believed he had answers about the “state” and “law”, dismissing the very pointed “I” in his “manifesto”.

Nouri al-Maliki. (Getty Images)

The Maliki question

The American admired Maliki. Then Vice President Dick Cheney had repeatedly declared that he was committed to the establishment of a stable Iraq. Before that however, he had dispatched James Steele - who was once complicit in running dirty wars in El Salvador in the mid-1980s - to Baghdad to confront the “Sunni rebellion”. Steele set up the Shiite “death squads”. Steele was the man in the shadows behind Ahmed Kazim, then interior minister undersecretary, and behind him stood the new warlords.

In 2006, the political process was shaken by the bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra. Questions were asked about the “need” to draw up new maps. Shiite high authority Ali al-Sistani said in February 2007 that the Sunnis were not involved in the attack. In July 2013, Maliki denied an American accusation that Tehran was behind it.

In those days, Maliki’s ego was growing ever bigger, and Steele’s death squads were rapidly growing greater in numbers.

The Iran and ISIS questions

Maliki tried to save himself as one city after another fell into the hands of ISIS. On June 9, 2014, as ISIS was waging battles in Mosul, Maliki met with senior Sunni tribal elders based on advice he had not heeded earlier and which could have averted the current disaster.

It was said that he made reluctant pledges to them and a third of Iraq later fell in ISIS’ hands. Sistani later issued a fatwa for “jihad” against the group, which later turned out not be aimed at saving the premier.

Maliki left the scene and Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force, took over. Successive prime ministers would know from then on what it is like to be shackled by Tehran’s pressure as IRGC officials made regular visits to their offices.

Soleimani reaped what Steele sowed. By 2017, armed factions were the dominant force in Iraq. Running in their orbit were other factions that took turns in “rebelling” against the government or agreeing with its choices.

Today, and after 14 years, Iran has consolidated what can be described as the “resistance playground” in Iraq that is teeming with armed factions and massive budgets.

Protesters in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square in October 2019. (AFP)

The October question

The Iraqis were unable to answer the ISIS question and the armed factions claimed “victory” against the group. Many ignored Sistani’s “answer” about whether the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) was there to protect Iraq or just its Shiites.

Exhausted Iraqis asked: “What next?”

Next came Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government in October 2018. It was weighed down by unanswered questions and a year later, thousands of youths took to the streets to protest the state of affairs in Iraq, specifically the dominance of armed groups.

They were met with live bullets. Many were abducted and others were silenced. Abdul Mehdi acquitted the killers, saying instead that a “fifth column” had carried out the bloody crackdown on protesters.

After he left office, some Iraqi politicians were brave enough to tell the truth, dismissing former PM’s acquittal and pinning blame on the factions.

Sistani called for PMF members to quit their partisan affiliations. His demand was left unheeded. Mustafa al-Qadhimi became prime minister in May 2020. He left office months later, also failing in resolving the issue of the PMF and armed factions.

By 2022, everyone had left the scene, but Iran remained, claiming the Iraqi crown for itself, controlling everything from its finances to its weapons.

Question about post-Assad Syria

On December 8, Syria’s Bashar fled the country. Everyone in Iraq is asking what happens next. The whole system in Iraq is at a loss: Do we wait for how Tehran will deal with Ahmed al-Sharaa, or do we ask Abu Mohammed al-Golani about his memories in Iraq?

The Iraqi people’s memories are what’s ruling the country, more so than the constitution, political parties and civil society because they are burdened with questions they don’t want to answer.

And yet they ask: What if we weren’t part of the “Axis of Resistance”? Iraq’s history would reply that it has long been part of axes, or either awaiting a war or taking part in them.