Russia, Syria and the ‘Ukrainian Volcano’

A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)
A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)
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Russia, Syria and the ‘Ukrainian Volcano’

A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)
A boy rides a bike during a sandstorm in Syria's Idlib on June 2. (AP)

Two new developments in Syria unveiled once again the extent to which the country is affected by the Russian war in Ukraine. This time, the wind is blowing through the doors of UN political and humanitarian institutions.

The connection between the crises in Syria and Ukraine dates back to 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea in retaliation to a change of Ukrainian presidents and its ally, Viktor Yanukovych, fleeing the Ukrainian presidential palace.

At the time, Moscow demanded that Damascus show toughness towards the UN Geneva track. That was before it finally decided to have its military intervene directly in Syria by the end of 2015.

With the start of war in Ukraine, the economic suffering of the Syrians worsened and indications of a military entanglement between the two “arenas” appeared: Russia’s military role in Syria declined due to its preoccupation with Ukraine, leaving space for Iranian attempts to fill the vacuum in Syria, which was met with escalated Israeli strikes against Tehran’s interests there.

Moreover, several Russian-US military tests have taken place in Syrian airspace.

For its part, Turkey tried to take advantage of these developments by launching a new incursion in northern Syria.

Presently, there are two developments: the first is that Moscow has informed Damascus not to participate in the UN-sponsored meetings of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva, and the other is that Russia has informed the Western parties that it will not extend the international resolution on cross-border aid delivery when its term expires on July 10.

Damascus has always been uncomfortable with the UN track since the issuance of the “Geneva Declaration” in 2012 and the convening of the international conference in early 2014.

It opposes transforming the Syrian crises into an international issue and wants to implement a local agenda with local priorities, considerations, and calculations.

Moscow, for various reasons, had pushed Damascus to accept the UN track in Geneva because this gives legitimacy to Russian efforts and presence in Syria. The track also provides Moscow with a platform for its international calculations and trade-offs.

Despite this, Russia has preserved its options and has continued its attempts to “dismantle Western influence at the UN.”

Russia has added two other tracks to the equation: the first in Astana, in cooperation with Iran and Turkey, to discuss military matters, and the other in Sochi, to discuss political matters and hold a conference for Syrian national dialogue.

Moscow sometimes thought of attacking the Geneva track and the international efforts, but it waited and negotiated, and then pressured Damascus to send its delegations to meetings in Europe.

Also, Moscow was sending presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentiev to meet with the Turkish and Iranian “guarantors,” and US and European interlocutors. Geneva has become a platform for Russia's international outlook on Syria. This path has become an urgent need for all parties to achieve gains or justify shortfalls.

What changed now?

The eruption of the Ukrainian volcano changed everything. Some UN institutions, backed by the West, have punished Russia for its war. Also, the US-Russian back-track that existed in Geneva has come to a stop. Before the last round of the Constitutional Committee's meetings at the end of May, Lavrentiev did not get the same welcome he usually received.

Russia declared that Switzerland is “not a neutral territory,” and demanded that Damascus ask the UN to find a new place to host the committee meetings. Four alternatives were offered: Moscow, Sochi, Damascus or Algiers.

Russia understands that the possibility of Western envoys and the Syrian opposition traveling to Russia or Damascus is not on possible. Also Algiers, which will host the Arab League summit in November, to discuss the return of Damascus' membership in the organization, is not realistic.

The Geneva track for the Constitutional Committee is now faced with two options: either freeze negotiations or succumb to Russia’s conditions.

The Geneva track file has become, more or less, a paper that is added to another development which pertains to the international resolution on cross-border aid delivery.

A year ago, Moscow signaled several times that it would not extend the resolution and pressured donors to knock on the doors of Damascus.

As for Washington, it raised the bar by talking about opening three border crossings, two of them with Turkey and the third with Iraq, and considered extending the resolution a priority for the new administration of President Joe Biden.

Secret negotiations between the envoys of Putin and Biden, which took place in mid-June last year, were able to produce a new draft resolution that included an extension for a single crossing between Turkey and Syria’s Idlib.

The drafted resolution, which was worded differently, also included US setbacks and support for funding early recovery and aid delivery across the lines of contact.

The situation has changed a lot. Contact between the two superpowers has stopped, there is a military escalation in Ukraine, and signs are emerging of a military clash between the US and Russian armies in Syria.

With the end of the resolution's mandate approaching, there is a possibility that Russia will initiate a request for a draft resolution regarding cross-border humanitarian aid to eastern Ukraine in return for passing the resolution for northern Syria.

Once again, the link between the two files is clear.

Another possibility is that the resolution remains without extension and alternative plans get reviewed. Indeed, the envoy of Western countries discussed alternative plans.

Can Turkish organizations be relied upon as an alternative? Western countries do not want to give it this advantage.

Is it possible to establish a Western-funded trust that uses existing institutions and lines? This prospect is being seriously considered.

Faced with the humanitarian options and the two Syrian developments, the UN sharpened its rhetoric and used new vocabulary.

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres intervened by presenting a detailed statement on the importance of preserving the role of the UN, extending the international resolution to provide relief to more than four million people, and to provide aid to 14 million people in a country where 90% of its people live below the poverty line.

“It is a moral imperative to address the suffering and vulnerability of 4.1 million people in the area who need aid and protection,” he said.

Aside from what is moral and humane, what about the strategic and geopolitical aspect? Most likely, the two new tests will show that Syria has become a hostage to an international-regional game and that the Syrians may pay the price of the “Ukrainian volcano.”



Xi-Putin-Trump Summit: What Comes Next?

19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
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Xi-Putin-Trump Summit: What Comes Next?

19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)
19 November 2026, China, Shenzhen: (L-R) Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump pose for a photo as they arrive for a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa, on the sidelines of the APEC Summit. (Kremlin/dpa)

An unprecedented summit between Chinese, US and Russian leaders this week in Shenzhen was light on substance but immensely symbolic, analysts say.

From nuclear weapons to reforming the United Nations and cancelling international arrest warrants, AFP looks at what was announced, its significance and what might come next:

- Substance or hot air? -

The three leaders jointly declared lofty goals to "reduce nuclear risks" and reform the United Nations, as well as commitments to immunity for state officials.

Their "Declaration toward Peace" also said the countries plan to boost oil supply and reaffirmed the importance of "stable energy flows".

The promise of dialogue on nuclear risks and non-proliferation "creates an opening for cooperation despite disagreements over arsenal reductions", said Sun Chenghao, senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.

"Implementation is now the main test," he told AFP.

Progress could be signaled by dates for nuclear talks or the appointment of designated officials.

Beijing previously rebuffed Trump's invitations to nuclear arms talks, arguing the US and Russia should first cut their giant arsenals before it agreed to discuss its smaller stockpiles.

The four-point declaration contains few details on future actions, with Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz calling the meeting a "photo op".

The "fairly sparse" points were "least common denominators" among the leaders, said Ryan Hass at the Brookings Institution.

Trump told reporters he would give a press conference on Friday, where he may provide more details.

- A new Yalta? -

The symbolism of three powerful leaders gathering to discuss global security issues -- including Putin's invasion of Ukraine and Trump's war with Iran -- had raised comparisons to the 1945 Yalta Conference.

Then-leaders of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union met to hash out the post-World War II settlement and re-draw European borders.

Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky and European powers worried Thursday's summit would push for a peace settlement favorable to Moscow without them at the table.

The format "suggests the creation of conditions where Beijing, Moscow, and Washington call the shots for the rest of the world", said Chong Ja Ian, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore.

But "a functioning 'G3' would require much greater agreement among the three countries and cooperation from many other governments," Tsinghua University's Sun told AFP.

"The Yalta analogy also overlooks today's economic interdependence and the influence of regional actors," he said.

- Should Europe, others worry? -

Other US allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan -- which unlike China and Russia are vibrant democracies -- will also have eyed the summit with unease.

"From South Korea's perspective, this inevitably raises questions about whether it can continue to rely on its alliance with the United States," said Lee Jae-mook, a political science professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

"The pillars of South Korea's foreign and security policy that it has long taken for granted are being shaken," Lee told AFP.

Japan, too, may reconsider its relationships with China and the US.

"If China and Russia really draw the United States together, I think Japan will have a huge pressure to... make a better relationship with China," said Tzeng Wei-feng, an associate research fellow at Taiwan's National Chengchi University.

However, Tokyo and Washington maintain a bilateral defense pact, so there will likely be "no substantial change" in their ties, he added.

The US has roughly 54,000 military personnel stationed in Japan -- whose relations with China are poor -- and 28,500 in South Korea.

Despite the bonhomie between Xi, Trump and Putin displayed in Shenzhen, major strategic differences remain between their countries.

Washington has curbed Beijing's access to US technologies, while Moscow is fighting a Ukraine that still relies in large part on American intelligence.

Diverging national interests between China, the US and Russia means the rest of Asia won't be "overly concerned" yet, according to Dylan Loh of Singapore's Nanyang Technological University.

The format may not stick, especially after Trump leaves office in two years, he said.

- What next? -

"Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect is the absence of any commitment to reconvene or continue meeting at the leader-level," said Brookings' Hass.

With no follow-up announced, eyes will turn to next month's G20 summit in Miami, where Xi and Trump are due to hold their fourth meeting of the year, and Putin could make his first appearance at the grouping since his war in Ukraine began.

He has been shunned by most Western leaders since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.

Still, "there is little chance that such a meeting will be held again", said Shen Dingli, a Shanghai-based scholar of international relations.

International Criminal Court (ICC) members -- which exclude the US -- are obliged to detain Putin if he travels to their territory after the court issued a warrant for him for war crimes associated with the Ukraine invasion.

"Putin has been ruled an international criminal by the ICC, and most APEC and G20 members are signatories to the Rome Statute. So, there are few opportunities for the three countries' leaders to convene," said Shen.


Turkish Investments in Egypt Strengthen Ties Despite Political Differences

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Turkish Investments in Egypt Strengthen Ties Despite Political Differences

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomes his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cairo last February. (Egyptian Presidency)

Growing Turkish investment in Egypt is strengthening economic ties between Cairo and Ankara despite ongoing disagreements over a maritime deal between Türkiye and Libya, according to analysts.

The Egyptian government highlighted the expanding Turkish business presence in the country on Wednesday, releasing figures that analysts interpreted as a sign of both sides’ determination to deepen economic cooperation while managing political disputes.

According to the Egyptian Cabinet’s Media Center, Turkish investment has expanded across manufacturing, trade, services and other economic activities in recent years. Turkish companies have contributed around $921.5 million in investment through 1,869 businesses established in Egypt, creating around 43,900 jobs.

Annual Turkish investment inflows surged 393.2% over eight years, reaching $175.1 million in the 2024-2025 fiscal year, compared with $35.5 million in 2016-2017.

The increase came despite a period of strained relations before Cairo and Ankara restored ambassador-level diplomatic ties in 2023.

Bilateral trade rose 44.7%, reaching $6.8 billion in 2025, up from $4.7 billion in 2016, according to the government figures, which highlighted major Turkish projects in the garment and food-processing industries.

Economic interests

Bashir Abdel Fattah, a Türkiye affairs specialist at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said the growth in Turkish investment reflects Ankara’s determination to strengthen its strategic partnership with Cairo.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Fattah described economic cooperation as a key component of the rapprochement, adding that Türkiye is seeking to capitalize on investment opportunities in Egypt while broadening the partnership across multiple sectors.

Egypt also provides Turkish companies with access to Arab and African markets through trade arrangements, including the free trade agreement with members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), enabling businesses to manufacture goods in Egypt for export across the continent.

Hani al-Gamal, deputy director of the Tafkir Center for Political Affairs, said that the government figures demonstrate how closely Turkish capital has become integrated into Egypt’s economy, particularly in manufacturing, employment and exports, generating benefits for both countries.

While acknowledging the importance of investment in strengthening bilateral cooperation, al-Gamal cautioned that economic ties alone could not resolve geopolitical disputes.

He attributed the broader improvement in relations to political and regional circumstances that have also facilitated closer military cooperation and notable progress in defense industries.

Military cooperation

Egyptian and Turkish naval forces participated in the Sea of Friendship exercises this month. The Egyptian military described the drills as part of growing cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces, aimed at sharing expertise and strengthening naval coordination.

The exercises took place despite Cairo’s repeated rejection of the Libyan parliament’s ratification in October of a maritime boundary agreement with Ankara.

Egypt and Türkiye have nevertheless continued consultations aimed at reducing regional tensions.

Abdel Fattah identified the separation of contentious political issues from areas of cooperation as a key factor behind the recent improvement in relations.

Disagreements over maritime boundaries and the Libyan crisis have not prevented Cairo and Ankara from developing ties in other sectors, he explained.

He viewed this approach as evidence of political maturity and a shared determination to avoid a return to tensions.

He said that rapprochement and cooperation could build confidence, narrow disagreements and create more favorable conditions for resolving outstanding issues.

Al-Gamal similarly emphasized that translating political rapprochement into tangible economic interests could deepen mutual trust and broaden the foundations of cooperation.


Al-Mirghani: A Statesman of Peace

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
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Al-Mirghani: A Statesman of Peace

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.
Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the late leader of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party.

November 16 was no ordinary date in Sudan’s collective memory. It was the day Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani was laid to rest in Khartoum North. It was also the anniversary of the Sudanese Peace Initiative he signed 38 years earlier with Dr. John Garang in Addis Ababa, an accord known as the Mirghani-Garang Agreement.

It was as though history had chosen the day of his farewell to remind Sudan of the defining conviction he carried throughout his life: that the country could not be saved through war, but through dialogue.

This is not to place al-Mirghani, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, beyond criticism or to dismiss the disputes and disagreements that marked his political career. But fairness demands recognition of his unwavering commitment, at decisive moments, to peace, consensus and national unity. That is why he deserves to be called a man of peace.

On November 16, 1988, al-Mirghani and Garang made political history with a remarkably brief document: barely a page long and fewer than 400 words. But its significance was immense.

The agreement called for a ceasefire, the suspension of the provisions on hudud punishments and related articles of the September 1983 laws pending a national constitutional conference, the lifting of the state of emergency, cancellation of military agreements affecting national sovereignty, and formation of a national committee to prepare for the constitutional conference.

Its central premise was fundamental: the war was not an isolated southern problem, but a manifestation of a broader Sudanese crisis that could be resolved only through dialogue on equal terms among all political and social forces.

The agreement faced open opposition from the National Islamic Front before the Constituent Assembly approved it on April 3, 1989. Then came the June 30 coup, cutting short the process before it could be completed.

It would be wrong to attribute the coup solely to the Mirghani-Garang Agreement, just as it would be impossible to assert that peace was guaranteed had democracy been allowed to run its course. But it is entirely reasonable to say that Sudan lost a genuine opportunity for peace, one that would not be forgotten.

Instead of the swift peace envisioned in a single-page document, the war continued for roughly another 16 years after the coup. It claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, forced millions from their homes and into exile, and saw the proliferation of armed groups and militias.

Ultimately, Sudan needed years of negotiations and volumes of protocols and agreements to reach the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That accord, in turn, opened the way to self-determination, the 2011 referendum and the secession of South Sudan.

This contrast is what makes the Mirghani-Garang initiative a living document to this day. One page had outlined a broad political vision for a united country. Years later, Sudan required seemingly endless documents to reach an outcome in which it lost a cherished part of its territory and people.

Jaafar Hassan, a leading figure in the Unionist Alliance and spokesman for the Sumoud coalition, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the late al-Mirghani was “one of Sudan’s pillars and one of the few men of sound judgment.”

Hassan said al-Mirghani had pursued peace early on, drawing on his position as head of the Democratic Unionist Party and leader of the Khatmiyya Sufi order.

Al-Mirghani had put his considerable popularity among his followers at the service of peace, recognizing early the dangers of allowing the war in South Sudan to continue. He was behind the landmark agreement between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by John Garang.

“Had it not been for the National Islamic Front’s coup in 1989, Sudan would still be united today,” Hassan said.

He stressed that al-Mirghani’s commitment to peace and national unity was not a fleeting political position, but of principles on which he refused to compromise.

Milestones in the pursuit of peace

The 1988 initiative was not the only landmark in al-Mirghani’s record. At least six major milestones can be identified in his pursuit of peace.

The first was his agreement with Garang. The second was his leadership of the National Democratic Alliance after the coup, bringing together political parties, trade unions and armed movements of differing orientations under one umbrella.

The third was the 1995 Asmara Conference on Fundamental Issues, which placed war, democracy, identity and the relationship between religion and the state at the heart of the national dialogue.

The fourth came at the alliance’s second conference in Massawa in 2000, when it affirmed that Sudan’s problems could be resolved only through “serious and sustained dialogue among all Sudanese political forces” in a democratic environment.

The fifth milestone came through negotiations in Jeddah and Cairo, culminating in the 2005 Cairo Agreement between the government and the National Democratic Alliance under al-Mirghani’s leadership. The agreement opened the door to ending a prolonged political confrontation and allowing opposition forces to return to political life.

In Darfur, al-Mirghani sought to narrow differences between the government and armed movements that had not signed peace agreements. He encouraged those movements to unify their positions so they could join negotiations from a stronger position.

In 2022, he again proposed an initiative for comprehensive national dialogue and returned to Khartoum after a long absence, making another attempt to bring Sudanese factions together before the country descended into its current war.

Not everyone agreed with all his political choices. But at the time of his passing, there was broad agreement that his name had been closely associated with national unity and dialogue.

Political analyst Mohamed Latif told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Mirghani’s political record might be a subject of disagreement for some, “but it is difficult to dispute that he was one of the leaders of Sudan’s two largest religious communities.”

“He succeeded in preserving the cohesion of the Khatmiyya order inside and outside Sudan, as well as its peaceful religious mission, far removed from violence and extremism,” he added.

The Mirghani-Garang Agreement was among the most significant moments not only in al-Mirghani’s life but also in Sudan’s modern history, he went on to say.

The agreement came after more than five years of fierce war between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudanese army, despite repeated attempts to bring the fighting to an end.

Latif said Sudanese collective memory preserves two contrasting images from that period: the enormous crowds that welcomed al-Mirghani upon his return to Khartoum after signing the agreement in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, and the subsequent attempt to assassinate him at his home in the Khartoum 2 neighborhood.

The two episodes seemed to offer early signs of the struggle between the desire for peace and the path of violence that would later come to define Sudan.

The most meaningful tribute to al-Mirghani lies not in words of mourning alone, but in drawing lessons from his life and Sudan’s recent history.

Whenever the door to dialogue has been closed, the doors to war have opened wider. Whenever the illusion of a military solution has prevailed, the Sudanese people have paid the price in bloodshed, displacement and division.

Sudan once squandered the opportunity presented by a brief agreement that might have opened a different path. It must not squander today’s opportunity to end this devastating war.

Peace is not weakness. Negotiation is not betrayal. Ending the war is not merely one political option among many, but a national and moral duty to save what remains of Sudan.