Memoirs of Late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam (Part 1): I Expressed my Objection to Hafez al-Assad to Syria’s Political, Military Role in Lebanon

Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.
Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.
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Memoirs of Late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam (Part 1): I Expressed my Objection to Hafez al-Assad to Syria’s Political, Military Role in Lebanon

Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.
Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes three episodes of the memoirs of late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam, covering important stages of the Lebanese crisis, from the entry of Syrian forces into Lebanon in 1976 to the Israeli invasion of the South in 1982.

The memoirs reflect the late premier’s frankness in evaluating the role of Arab and Lebanese leaders and his attempts to bring the views closer, to ensure Islamic-Christian consensus, and to preserve Lebanon’s position as an independent country away from conflicts.

The memoirs are issued in three parts by Hachette Antoine publishing house, and will be available in Lebanon starting June 28 and on the Antoine Online website.

In this episode, Salam presents the circumstances of the election of President Elias Sarkis and the entry of the Syrian forces. He recounts his communication during that period with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and with Lebanese and Palestinian officials.

He recounted that on May 10, 1976, immediately after the election of Elias Sarkis, a meeting was held at his office, in the presence of MPs Raymond Edde, Emile Rouhana Saqr, Jamil Kebbi, Mohammad Youssef Beydoun, Mikhail Al-Daher, Hussein Al-Husseini, Hassan Al-Rifai and Albert Mansour, who had all boycotted the elections.

“After deliberation, we issued a very calm and brief statement calling for patience; it was noticed that Raymond Edde took the loss in a very good spirit, and seemed less affected than others by what happened,” he said, as translated from the official Arabic version.

Salam continued: “But on the following Monday, we decided to step up a bit, so we gathered and issued a statement warning against the continuation of the conspiracy… This is because people have begun to get fed up with the lack of progress since Sarkis was elected, knowing that the general feeling that prevailed after his election - despite the bitterness and oppression - was hope for a breakthrough.”

He said that at that time, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his comrades in the resistance felt very upset, so they asked for a summit in Aramoun.

“It was decided to send Mr. Musa al-Sadr to Damascus in an attempt to convey to the Syrians our feelings of concern as a result of their military intervention, especially because of what happened in Tripoli,” he stated.

“At the end of the summit meeting, an argument erupted between me and Mufti Sheikh Hassan Khaled… I was very harsh on him, especially since I was in pain at his (and Karami’s) flattering stance towards Syria, and at the time of the argument I withdrew from the meeting. This caused an uproar in the newspapers and in public opinion,” Salam recounted.

The Syrian Army in Lebanon

In his memoirs Salam described the entry of the Syrian forces to Lebanon on the first of June 1976, from the north and the east of the country, under the pretext of protecting the Christians.

“Whatever the case, despite the fact that many Islamic and Palestinian parties were looking at the increasing Syrian intervention in recent months with apprehension, considering it a prelude to a massive military presence, the desperate situation led people to wish that any armies would come to stop the mass massacre and achieve salvation. The question today, after what happened, is whether salvation will be at the hands of the Syrian army, or will things escalate in Lebanon, and then in Syria, as some talk about the existence of an American-international conspiracy that aims to tear Lebanon apart, and then implicate the Syrians to tear Syria apart as well?”

Salam noted that when the entry of the Syrian army became a reality, Kamal Jumblatt and the resistance held many meetings, and issued many violent and escalatory statements with threats of confrontation.

“The difficult days were those that followed the entry of the Syrian forces, as the military and political events succeeded… and the ‘Palestinian resistance’ seemed forced to fight many battles, whether on the front with the Syrians, or with the Phalanges and their allies,” he said.

The assassination of Kamal Jumblatt and its repercussions

Salam recounted that on March 16, 1977, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated on Mukhtara Road in the Chouf region. He said that the event constituted a great shock throughout the country.

“An immediate angry reaction from the Chouf Druze people claimed the lives of more than one hundred Christians, especially in the village of Mazraat al-Chouf, near Mukhtara,” he said.

He added: “It was clear that the country was on the verge of a great strife, perhaps greater than any other strife it knew, due to Jumblatt’s position in Lebanon, and because of the complexity of Lebanese circumstances…”

The late premier said that in view of the escalating tension, he rushed to cooperate with the Phalange Party (Kataeb), in an attempt to quell the fire of sedition.

“We have succeeded in that to the greatest extent. Especially since Walid Jumblatt, son of the late leader, immediately appeared sane and wise, and decided to bury his father the next day, after the National Movement parties had decided to postpone the burial until Sunday, inflaming the reactions,” he remarked.

The visit of Assad and Sadat

Salam recounted details of his meetings with Assad in 1977: “Before the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt, I was determined to go to Egypt to meet President Anwar Sadat, after the delayed response I was waiting for from Syria regarding a meeting I requested with President Hafez al-Assad… Suddenly, as I was preparing to travel to Egypt, I received a telegram from Mr. Abdel Halim Khaddam stating that President Assad will receive us in the Syrian capital on Saturday, March 19.

“As usual, I was frank with President al-Assad, so I explained to him all my complaints about their actions in Lebanon, militarily and politically. He did not hesitate to tell me that he takes this into consideration... However, I had the feeling that he is now acting on the basis of the new reality, that is, his feeling that he has drowned the Syrian army is in the Lebanese swamp, and that this makes him anxious, and thus hardens his stance further.”

As for his meeting with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Salam recounted:
“During the meeting, I felt that Sadat was very optimistic about his upcoming encounter with US President Jimmy Carter. I told him that I, in turn, was optimistic…

Salam said that Sadat told him that they were about to clash militarily with Israel because of its aggression in the Gulf of Suez, and that the battleships and planes were about to collide, but Carter intervened, confirming that the area was and will remain Egyptian.

“Sadat said that he insisted on playing all his cards with the Americans; because he believes that the key to resolving the conflict with Israel is entirely in the hands of America. As for the Soviets, they are only obliged to go along with Washington,” he noted in his memoirs.

“With regard to Lebanon, Anwar Sadat told me, as Lebanese President Elias Sarkis had previously confirmed during my meeting with him a few days ago, that it was the Syrians who assassinated Kamal Jumblatt,” Salam revealed.

He added: “When the meeting ended, and while President Sadat was bidding farewell to me, he warned me again that I might be assassinated, and told me that I should be aware of the Syrians.”

Salam said that the following weeks continued with political maneuvers and instability in the Islamic ranks.

“The ‘Palestinian resistance’ continued to sink into the swamp of the Lebanese situation, in parallel with growing resentment of the citizens... Meanwhile, the Syrian army was strengthening its presence in Lebanon. It was clear that Syria had become the center of gravity in the Lebanese reality. As for Israel, it was interfering from time to time.

“On the Arab level, the situation went in ups and downs... I was getting stricter towards “Abu Ammar” and his group, because I was keen on them as much as I was keen on and Lebanon as a whole, but they did not want to heed my advice.”



Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
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Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo

Tehran has sought to tighten its grip over the Strait of Hormuz by charging tolls on vessels to ensure safe passage, in conjunction with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The following explains law governing toll collections and actions that countries opposed to tolls might take, according to Reuters.

WHAT IS THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ?

The Strait of Hormuz is ‌a waterway connecting the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, and located within Iran's and Oman's territorial waters. It is perhaps the world's most important energy shipping lane. About 20% of the world's oil passes through it.

The waterway is about 104 miles (167 km) long. Its width varies, and at its narrowest point provides 2-mile channels for inbound and outbound shipping, separated by a 2-mile buffer zone.

Iran effectively closed the strait following US-Israeli strikes on the country, and has demanded a right ⁠to collect tolls as a precondition to ending the war. The status of any toll collections so far could not immediately be confirmed.

WHAT LAW GOVERNS PASSAGE ON THE STRAIT?

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opens new tab, sometimes known as UNCLOS, was adopted in 1982 and has been in force since 1994.

Article 38 provides vessels a right of unimpeded "transit passage" through more than 100 straits worldwide, including the Strait of Hormuz.

The treaty allows a country bordering a strait to regulate passage within its "territorial sea," up to 12 nautical miles from its border, but shall permit "innocent passage."

Passage is innocent if it is not prejudicial to a country's peace, good order and security. Military action, serious pollution, spying and fishing are not permitted. The concept of innocent passage was key to a 1949 International Court ‌of ⁠Justice case concerning the Corfu Channel, along the coasts of Albania and Greece.

Approximately 170 countries and the European Union have ratified UNCLOS. Iran and the United States have not. This raises the question of whether the treaty's rules affording freedom of maritime navigation have become part of customary international law, or bind only ratifying countries.

Experts say UNCLOS has become or is generally viewed as customary international law. Some non-ratifying countries may ⁠argue that they need not follow the treaty because they persistently and consistently object. Iran has argued that it has made such objections. The United States disputes Iran's authority to charge tolls.

HOW CAN TOLLS BE CHALLENGED?

There is no formal mechanism to enforce UNCLOS. The International Tribunal for the Law ⁠of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany, which the treaty established, and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands could issue rulings but cannot enforce them.

Countries and businesses have other potential means to counteract tolls.

A willing state or coalition of states could ⁠try to enforce the treaty. The UN Security Council could pass a resolution opposing tolls.

Companies could redirect shipments away from the Strait of Hormuz, and have begun doing so. Countries could expand sanctions targeting financial transactions believed to benefit Iran's government, by sanctioning companies willing to pay tolls.


How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
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How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo

Washington: David Pierson

For much of the last two decades, China has maintained a delicate balance in its military relationship with Iran, offering often indirect assistance instead of arms sales.

That approach is now drawing renewed attention after US officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by US intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East.

Chinese arms sales to Iran exploded in the 1980s and have all but vanished in the last decade to comply with a United Nations embargo and US sanctions. Chinese support for Iran in recent years has instead come in the form of components that could be used in both civilian technologies as well as missiles and drones.

China has a major stake in the crisis in Iran. About a third of its total crude oil imports come from the Arabian Gulf.

Here is how China’s military support for Iran has evolved over the years:

The 1980s: The Boom Years

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 coincided with major market reforms in China when the leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, ordered state-owned companies to wean themselves off government support and instead seek commercial profit.

Chinese state-run defense companies were suddenly empowered to export their wares. That resulted in a deluge of Chinese missiles, fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles and assault rifles being sold to Iran starting in 1982 and peaking in 1987, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

At the same time, China sold even more arms to Iraq, resulting in a situation in which the two warring sides clashed with each other using the same Chinese weapons.

The Reagan administration opposed China’s arms sales to Iran, particularly Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles. Tehran used the missiles in attacks in Kuwaiti waters in 1987 that struck an American-owned tanker and an American-registered tanker.

The United States responded by curbing exports of some high-technology products to China. China denied selling arms directly to Iran, but said it would do more to prevent its military exports from reaching Iran through intermediaries.

The 1990s: Technology Transfers

Following the war, Iran set out to develop its own military-industrial base with the help of China. One of its key products was the Noor anti-ship cruise missile, which had been reverse-engineered through purchases of Chinese C-802 cruise missiles.

“China played a major role in supporting Iran’s military modernization for decades, especially in developing Iran’s missile capabilities,” said Brian Hart, a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Iran also received help from China in building missile-production facilities and even in constructing a missile test range east of Tehran, wrote Bates Gill, a longtime China expert, in the Middle East Review of International Affairs.

Under US pressure to curtail its sale of finished weapons, particularly missiles, to Iran, China began increasing exports of machine tools and components that could be used for both military and civilian purposes.

The 2000s to the Present: Dual-Use Technologies

In 2006, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China voted in favor of the resolution and largely pivoted away from new, formal arms contracts with Tehran.

The shift was as much about regional strategy as it was about international law. Starting in the mid-2010s, China began deepening its strategic relationships with Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Qatar.

China continued to supply Iran with dual-use technologies and materials that have helped it amass an arsenal of missiles and drones.

That included chemicals used to produce fuel for ballistic missiles and components for drones, such as radio frequency connectors and turbine blades.

But Mr. Hart said China was still “a critical form of support, given Iran’s reliance on ballistic missiles and drones to attack US and Israeli forces and other countries in the region.”

The US Treasury Department has sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong front companies it says were set up to source parts and ingredients for ballistic missiles and drones for Iran.

Suspicions are also growing that Iran is using its access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, an alternative to the US-owned Global Positioning System, for military purposes. Last month, a US congressional agency said BeiDou may have been used to direct Iran’s drone and missile strikes across the Middle East.

The New York Times


A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
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A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)

Sudan is entering a fourth year of war between the military and paramilitary forces.

The fighting has pushed many people into famine, caused a huge displacement crisis and left over 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties have been accused of committing atrocities like ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence against civilians.

Here's a look at the war by the numbers:

59,000 At least this many people have been killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, or ACLED. Aid groups say the true toll could be much higher as access to areas of fighting across the vast country remains limited.

4.5 million About this many people have fled the country to places like Egypt, South Sudan, Libya and Chad.

9 million About this many people remain displaced in Sudan.

19 million More than this many people face acute hunger, according to the World Food Program.

24% This is the amount that fuel prices have shot up in Sudan since conflict in the Middle East escalated.

354 This is the number of community kitchens that have closed over the last six months after providing a lifeline for millions of people, according to Islamic Relief.

Over 4,300 About this many children have been killed or maimed in the war, according to UNICEF.

8 million At least this many children are still out of school, according to UNICEF.

11% About this many schools are being used by warring sides or are shelters for displaced people, according to UNICEF.

63% This many of Sudan's health facilities are fully or partially functioning, according to World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

217 This is the number of verified attacks on health facilities since the war began, according to the WHO.

1,032 This was the number of civilians killed by air and drone strikes in 2025, according to ACLED, as a surge in drone strikes took a growing toll.