Memoirs of Late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam (Part 1): I Expressed my Objection to Hafez al-Assad to Syria’s Political, Military Role in Lebanon

Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.
Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.
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Memoirs of Late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam (Part 1): I Expressed my Objection to Hafez al-Assad to Syria’s Political, Military Role in Lebanon

Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.
Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes three episodes of the memoirs of late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam, covering important stages of the Lebanese crisis, from the entry of Syrian forces into Lebanon in 1976 to the Israeli invasion of the South in 1982.

The memoirs reflect the late premier’s frankness in evaluating the role of Arab and Lebanese leaders and his attempts to bring the views closer, to ensure Islamic-Christian consensus, and to preserve Lebanon’s position as an independent country away from conflicts.

The memoirs are issued in three parts by Hachette Antoine publishing house, and will be available in Lebanon starting June 28 and on the Antoine Online website.

In this episode, Salam presents the circumstances of the election of President Elias Sarkis and the entry of the Syrian forces. He recounts his communication during that period with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and with Lebanese and Palestinian officials.

He recounted that on May 10, 1976, immediately after the election of Elias Sarkis, a meeting was held at his office, in the presence of MPs Raymond Edde, Emile Rouhana Saqr, Jamil Kebbi, Mohammad Youssef Beydoun, Mikhail Al-Daher, Hussein Al-Husseini, Hassan Al-Rifai and Albert Mansour, who had all boycotted the elections.

“After deliberation, we issued a very calm and brief statement calling for patience; it was noticed that Raymond Edde took the loss in a very good spirit, and seemed less affected than others by what happened,” he said, as translated from the official Arabic version.

Salam continued: “But on the following Monday, we decided to step up a bit, so we gathered and issued a statement warning against the continuation of the conspiracy… This is because people have begun to get fed up with the lack of progress since Sarkis was elected, knowing that the general feeling that prevailed after his election - despite the bitterness and oppression - was hope for a breakthrough.”

He said that at that time, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his comrades in the resistance felt very upset, so they asked for a summit in Aramoun.

“It was decided to send Mr. Musa al-Sadr to Damascus in an attempt to convey to the Syrians our feelings of concern as a result of their military intervention, especially because of what happened in Tripoli,” he stated.

“At the end of the summit meeting, an argument erupted between me and Mufti Sheikh Hassan Khaled… I was very harsh on him, especially since I was in pain at his (and Karami’s) flattering stance towards Syria, and at the time of the argument I withdrew from the meeting. This caused an uproar in the newspapers and in public opinion,” Salam recounted.

The Syrian Army in Lebanon

In his memoirs Salam described the entry of the Syrian forces to Lebanon on the first of June 1976, from the north and the east of the country, under the pretext of protecting the Christians.

“Whatever the case, despite the fact that many Islamic and Palestinian parties were looking at the increasing Syrian intervention in recent months with apprehension, considering it a prelude to a massive military presence, the desperate situation led people to wish that any armies would come to stop the mass massacre and achieve salvation. The question today, after what happened, is whether salvation will be at the hands of the Syrian army, or will things escalate in Lebanon, and then in Syria, as some talk about the existence of an American-international conspiracy that aims to tear Lebanon apart, and then implicate the Syrians to tear Syria apart as well?”

Salam noted that when the entry of the Syrian army became a reality, Kamal Jumblatt and the resistance held many meetings, and issued many violent and escalatory statements with threats of confrontation.

“The difficult days were those that followed the entry of the Syrian forces, as the military and political events succeeded… and the ‘Palestinian resistance’ seemed forced to fight many battles, whether on the front with the Syrians, or with the Phalanges and their allies,” he said.

The assassination of Kamal Jumblatt and its repercussions

Salam recounted that on March 16, 1977, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated on Mukhtara Road in the Chouf region. He said that the event constituted a great shock throughout the country.

“An immediate angry reaction from the Chouf Druze people claimed the lives of more than one hundred Christians, especially in the village of Mazraat al-Chouf, near Mukhtara,” he said.

He added: “It was clear that the country was on the verge of a great strife, perhaps greater than any other strife it knew, due to Jumblatt’s position in Lebanon, and because of the complexity of Lebanese circumstances…”

The late premier said that in view of the escalating tension, he rushed to cooperate with the Phalange Party (Kataeb), in an attempt to quell the fire of sedition.

“We have succeeded in that to the greatest extent. Especially since Walid Jumblatt, son of the late leader, immediately appeared sane and wise, and decided to bury his father the next day, after the National Movement parties had decided to postpone the burial until Sunday, inflaming the reactions,” he remarked.

The visit of Assad and Sadat

Salam recounted details of his meetings with Assad in 1977: “Before the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt, I was determined to go to Egypt to meet President Anwar Sadat, after the delayed response I was waiting for from Syria regarding a meeting I requested with President Hafez al-Assad… Suddenly, as I was preparing to travel to Egypt, I received a telegram from Mr. Abdel Halim Khaddam stating that President Assad will receive us in the Syrian capital on Saturday, March 19.

“As usual, I was frank with President al-Assad, so I explained to him all my complaints about their actions in Lebanon, militarily and politically. He did not hesitate to tell me that he takes this into consideration... However, I had the feeling that he is now acting on the basis of the new reality, that is, his feeling that he has drowned the Syrian army is in the Lebanese swamp, and that this makes him anxious, and thus hardens his stance further.”

As for his meeting with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Salam recounted:
“During the meeting, I felt that Sadat was very optimistic about his upcoming encounter with US President Jimmy Carter. I told him that I, in turn, was optimistic…

Salam said that Sadat told him that they were about to clash militarily with Israel because of its aggression in the Gulf of Suez, and that the battleships and planes were about to collide, but Carter intervened, confirming that the area was and will remain Egyptian.

“Sadat said that he insisted on playing all his cards with the Americans; because he believes that the key to resolving the conflict with Israel is entirely in the hands of America. As for the Soviets, they are only obliged to go along with Washington,” he noted in his memoirs.

“With regard to Lebanon, Anwar Sadat told me, as Lebanese President Elias Sarkis had previously confirmed during my meeting with him a few days ago, that it was the Syrians who assassinated Kamal Jumblatt,” Salam revealed.

He added: “When the meeting ended, and while President Sadat was bidding farewell to me, he warned me again that I might be assassinated, and told me that I should be aware of the Syrians.”

Salam said that the following weeks continued with political maneuvers and instability in the Islamic ranks.

“The ‘Palestinian resistance’ continued to sink into the swamp of the Lebanese situation, in parallel with growing resentment of the citizens... Meanwhile, the Syrian army was strengthening its presence in Lebanon. It was clear that Syria had become the center of gravity in the Lebanese reality. As for Israel, it was interfering from time to time.

“On the Arab level, the situation went in ups and downs... I was getting stricter towards “Abu Ammar” and his group, because I was keen on them as much as I was keen on and Lebanon as a whole, but they did not want to heed my advice.”



Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Lebanese former President Amine Gemayel’s term (1982–1988) was difficult and turbulent. The Lebanese people were divided, and regional and international conflicts over Lebanon intensified. His presidency began amid the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Beirut and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel. The difficult developments followed swiftly.

In the year following the 1982 invasion, Moscow and Damascus supported Walid Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, sparking the “Mountain War,” which deeply fractured the Druze–Maronite coexistence in the region. In 1984, Damascus backed Nabih Berri, head of the Amal Movement, leading to the “February 6 Intifada,” which shifted the sectarian power balance in Lebanon, which was in the throes of its 1975-1990 civil war.

Another significant event occurred in 1983 when suicide bombers attacked the barracks of the US Marines and French troops in the multinational peacekeeping force, killing hundreds and prompting Western withdrawal. Amid those explosions, Hezbollah was born—a force that would later become the most dominant player in Lebanon, particularly after inheriting Syria’s role there. During Gemayel’s term, Syria attempted to broker a “militia peace,” but the so-called “Tripartite Agreement” collapsed, paving the way for more wars and negotiation rounds.

Gemayel did not surrender to efforts aimed at controlling or isolating his presidency. He worked to maintain Lebanon’s relations with the West, strengthened ties with moderate Arab countries, and built relationships with leaders such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Moammar al-Gaddafi, as he recounts in the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amine Gemayel sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Close relationship with Saudi Arabia and its kings

Asked about his relationship with Saudi Arabia, beginning with his visit alongside his father, Pierre, to meet King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, Gemayel said: “I’m proud of that relationship. I’m proud to have met all the kings—from King Faisal to King Salman. There isn’t one of them with whom I didn’t have a close personal relationship, and I take pride in that. Most of them had a special affection for me.”

He added: “At this time in Lebanon’s history, Saudi Arabia is the elder brother. Saudi Arabia never stabbed Lebanon in the back. It was always by Lebanon’s side through good times and bad, offering moral, social, and humanitarian support. You can’t deny that. You have to appreciate and respect those who stood by you in tough times.”

He also recounted a fond memory involving King Salman: “May God prolong his life. When he was governor of Riyadh, I used to visit him regularly. The Riyadh office knew me well. Every time I came to the Kingdom, it was expected that I’d visit the governorate.”

“Once, when I had an appointment with him, he took me to the desert to a camp of his—traditional tents, but inside one of them was a high-tech office with internet and modern communications. He told me he could contact anyone from there at any time. I asked if I could call home. He replied, ‘No.’ I was surprised. Then he said, ‘You can’t call home because your home is here.’ That’s how warm the atmosphere was. I truly appreciated his gesture.”

He continued: “In Lebanon’s difficult days, the Kingdom was always by our side. Even today—despite frustration with Lebanon’s ingratitude or Iranian influence—Saudi Arabia still has Lebanon in its heart. It waited for the first opportunity to return and help. Today’s hope in Lebanon is due to the Kingdom’s full weight and influence, working to restore Lebanon’s institutions and stability.”

Saddam’s armored car

Regarding his relationship with Saddam, Gemayel said: “It was a very warm relationship. I visited him several times in Baghdad. Once, during my presidency, there was an assassination attempt against me. He called and asked, ‘What are you doing about your security? They say you need better protection.’ I told him we were doing our best and relying on God. He said, ‘That’s not good enough—I’ll send you my car.’ The next day, his armored car arrived by plane—fully fortified inside and out.”

That relationship lasted until Saddam’s final days in power. Gemayel recalled: “On the eve of the (American) war, he sent word asking to meet. I went to Baghdad. He told me, ‘Things aren’t going well with the Americans. You have good relations with them—can you help us understand their intentions?’ I told him the issue was bigger than me. I had good contacts, but not at the presidential level anymore. He asked me to try anyway. So I went to the US, met with some people, but avoided senior officials to avoid media attention.”

Gemayel’s cousin, a top US lawyer with ties to James Baker, helped arrange a meeting: “We met Baker, who was almost retired but still influential. After a few days, he said he saw a glimmer of hope. He jokingly pulled out a stack of one-dollar bills and asked when I was born. I said December 1942. He found a bill with a serial number matching my birthdate, signed it, and gave it to me for luck. I still have it.”

Saddam Hussein welcomes Gemayel in Baghdad. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

“Sadly, it didn’t work. The Americans had made up their minds. Many tried—including the Vatican—but nothing succeeded. Still, it was an effort made at Saddam’s request.”

Gemayel added: “My ties with Saddam and his team, especially Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, remained very good. Saddam wanted to help Lebanon. But his relationship with (Syrian President) Hafez al-Assad was bad. They had mutual hatred. I still have the armored Mercedes he sent me—top-level protection, still in excellent condition.”

Asked about Saddam’s personal demeanor, Gemayel said: “Very approachable. One-on-one, there was no protocol. He was warm and engaging—you forget he’s this powerful figure. But reaching him was a maze—multiple layers of security and misdirection. You’d think you were meeting Saddam, only to find it was a lookalike. Eventually, you’d be taken to a modest house far from the airport, where the real Saddam would be waiting.”

On Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, he said: “Kuwait’s issue with Iraq is old, like Lebanon’s issue with Syria. But historical claims don’t justify violating sovereignty or erasing borders. Despite my personal ties with Saddam, we strongly opposed the invasion of Kuwait—a country with excellent relations with Lebanon. Just as we rejected Assad’s plans to annex Lebanon to Syria, we rejected Saddam’s attempt to annex Kuwait.”

Gemayel and Gaddafi: From estrangement to friendship

Gemayel’s relationship with Gaddafi began with tension but later transformed into friendship. He recalled: “When I became president, Libya, without coordination, sent military forces to Lebanon. That was illegal and against Arab League protocols. I sent Gaddafi a message demanding their withdrawal. He refused and took a hostile media stance. So I cut diplomatic ties with Libya early in my presidency.”

Later, Moroccan King Hassan II helped mediate: “I had a close relationship with King Hassan II. He invited me to a private dinner in Morocco. During the meal, he left twice—unusual for him. The second time, he returned smiling and said, ‘Gaddafi is on the phone—he wants to meet you.’ I was surprised and hesitant, especially with the issue of Imam Moussa al-Sadr still unresolved. But the king reassured me, saying Gaddafi had promised a new page. He offered his own plane and a senior minister to accompany me to guarantee safety.”

Amine Gemayel had a frosty relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi that turned to friendship. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

They traveled secretly, landed at a military airport in Libya, and met Gaddafi. Gemayel recounted: “He was extremely courteous and warm. We had a long conversation and agreed to reset relations. He asked how Libya could support Lebanon internationally. I thanked him, and flew back to Beirut.”

“But during our flight, Israeli radio reported that my plane had disappeared en route from Morocco. Panic erupted in Beirut—emergency meetings, calls to the US, plans to file complaints at the UN and Arab League. My wife was informed. She calmly said, ‘I’m not worried. Amine does these things—there must be good behind it.’ Eventually, the king reassured everyone I was fine.”

After that, Gemayel and Gaddafi maintained a cordial relationship: “He would often insist I visit. During the Arab Summit in Algiers, our seats were side by side. Gaddafi wanted a statement condemning the US raid on Tripoli that killed his adopted daughter. I proposed he draft a statement to be added to the final communiqué. I wrote it for him. He loved it.”

“There was also an issue with his tent. He refused to stay in a hotel and insisted on his tent. Algerian security and President Chadli Benjedid objected. Gaddafi threatened to leave. I mediated, and in the end, he sent the tent as a gift to my plane.”

Gaddafi never discussed the disappearance of al-Sadr with Gemayel. Gemayel said Syrian intelligence had reportedly played a role in the disappearance, as it controlled Libyan airports at the time. The mass popularity of al-Sadr was said to have disturbed the Syrian regime because his vision for Lebanon’s Shiites conflicted with Syria’s agenda.

Despite all the hardships of his presidency, Gemayel said he harbors no bitterness: “I have peace of mind knowing I stayed true to national principles and did my best.”

He expressed satisfaction with his son Sami Gemayel’s political path as a lawmaker and head of the Kataeb Party, and praised President Joseph Aoun’s guidance of the army and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s professional record—wishing success for the current leadership in Lebanon.