Ukraine FM Rules out Russian Use of Nuclear Weapons, Calls for Isolating Moscow over its Threats

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Asharq Al-Awsat
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Asharq Al-Awsat
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Ukraine FM Rules out Russian Use of Nuclear Weapons, Calls for Isolating Moscow over its Threats

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Asharq Al-Awsat
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Asharq Al-Awsat

The world is laying out the worst scenarios for the Russian-Ukraine war. Predictions are morbid, whether they are about protracting the conflict, widening the global food gap, or hiking prices of supply chains and energy.

Moreover, concerns are growing around the race towards acquiring advanced weapons, including nuclear arms.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has shown relative optimism about the international community succeeding in stopping the war by implementing harsher sanctions on Russia.

According to Kuleba, stronger sanctions would affect Russia’s economy and force Moscow to opt for a political solution.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Kuleba urged Ukraine’s partners to provide his country with advanced anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems.

He urged Ukraine partners to provide his country with advanced anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems. “If we make our skies safe, we will save many civilian lives,” he explained.

Kuleba also estimated Ukraine’s economic and infrastructure losses at a whopping $1 trillion.

Reviewing the Ukraine-Gulf ministerial meeting held on June 1, Kuleba said that his country anticipates for Arab Gulf countries to play an effective role in resolving the current global food and energy problems.

Kuleba noted that Russia is using food and energy shortages as tools of war to pressure the international community.

The top diplomat affirmed that Ukraine has submitted a proposal to establish a special advisory council between Ukraine and the Gulf states. The platform would be used to discuss pressing issues, such as grain and energy security.

Kuleba predicted that Ukraine's GDP would fall by 30%, and inflation would reach 20% in the first quarter of 2022.

Russia’s aggression on Ukraine has wiped out 30% of the latter’s infrastructure at an estimated cost of $100 billion.

“It is difficult to give exact figures while the war is still raging, but Ukraine's GDP is expected to fall by at least 30% in 2022, and inflation could reach 20% in the first quarter of this year,” said Kuleba.

“Ukraine's GDP has already lost 16%, making up a monthly budget deficit of more than $3 billion,” he added.

When asked about Russian President Vladimir Putin's threat to strike new targets if the West continues to deliver long-range missiles to Ukraine, Kuleba said: “those are empty threats.”

“Putin is already indiscriminately hitting targets in Ukraine, and he is already engaged in a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine,” said the foreign minister.

“He (Putin) does everything that terrifies Ukraine and he continues to kill Ukrainians every day.

“The Russian army is waging a barbaric war and mostly hits civilian targets.”

“Last week, Russia struck many Ukrainian cities and towns with long-range missiles, killing dozens of innocent people,” he said.

Commenting on Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s claims about the presence of hundreds of US and UK intelligence personnel operating in Ukraine, Kuleba said that it is all a part of Russian propaganda.

“The Russian foreign minister is trying one way or another to justify his country's aggressive war against Ukraine,” said Kuleba, adding that Lavrov’s excuses were laughable.

“The Russian invasion, which was supposed to achieve its goals within days, continues so far for the fifth month without major successes,” noted Kuleba.

On Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, Kuleba said: “Russians are stealing Ukrainian minerals and grain, looting private property, kidnapping, torturing and killing people.”

“The takeover (of Zaporizhzhia) is an attempt to seize Ukrainian state property, and just another heinous act in a series of Russian crimes that will surely be punished.”

“I assure that the heroic Ukrainian resistance and the support of our partners will defeat the Russian plan. Russians need to understand that they made a mistake by invading Ukraine and they should withdraw their forces from our lands,” Kuleba told Asharq Al-Awsat.

As for Ukraine’s hopes for joining NATO, Kuleba said that his country can’t wait forever, especially in the face of the existential threat posed by Russia.

“We need effective security guarantees now, not at some point in the future,” said the top diplomat.

Regarding the threat of nuclear warfare, Kuleba said that it was unlikely for Russia to use its nuclear arsenal to attack Ukraine.

“It is unlikely that Russia will use nuclear weapons, but its officials and its spokesmen on television propaganda talk about them casually. I am sure that they should be punished for the threat to use nuclear weapons,” said Kuleba.

According to the Ukrainian minister, Russia threatening to use nuclear weapons against another sovereign country warrants its isolation from the international theater.

“In the course of its aggression, Russia has already demonstrated its complete disregard for nuclear safety,” said Kuleba.

While Ukraine has demanded sanctioning Russian oil and gas, there are some countries, such as Hungary, that reject the proposal.

“Doing business as usual with Russia, and buying their oil and gas, means taking care of its war machine, and its ability to destroy Ukraine and kill the Ukrainians, and this is contrary to the principles of justice and international laws,” said Kuleba.

“But the issue of sanctions is not morally perfect, there is also a practical aspect to it. For example, reliance on Russian energy and supplies is the main blackmail chip in the Kremlin,” he explained.

“They use energy as a weapon, blackmailing states by threatening to cut supplies if they oppose Moscow’s political decisions,” he added, noting that Russia has banned Ukrainian food exports.

“We hope to work on the seventh package of sanctions at an accelerated pace, as Russia's GDP growth fell from 5.6 % in January to 3 % last April and is expected to shrink by 8% to 15% this year.”

Asked to comment on Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, Kuleba said: “Russia now does not want to negotiate.”

“Putin's spokesman said a few days ago that Ukraine can end this war the day it lays down its arms and accepts all Russian requests, which means that Russia is not ready for negotiations and is seeking military solutions.”

“Putin's path to the negotiating table is through defeats on the battlefield. Only when he realizes that his army cannot win over Ukraine will he get serious about the talks,” clarified Kuleba.

The Minister stressed that Ukraine will focus on the restoration of territorial integrity, economic recovery, punishment for war crimes, and compensation for damages in any future talks.

Moreover, Ukraine will push for a new system of security guarantees, which is currently under discussion with potential guarantor states.

Discussing prospects for a Saudi role in making Russian-Ukrainian negotiations successful, Kuleba said: “We are grateful for the proposal by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to contribute to de-escalation and mediation between Russia and Ukraine expressed in the call with President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky on March 3.”

“We expressed the Ukrainian side's interest in deepening engagement with Saudi Arabia and all other Arab countries, especially in the reconstruction efforts,” said Kuleba.

“We also affirmed our hope that the Gulf states will play an active role in solving the current global food and energy problem, which Russia uses as tools of war and pressure on the international community,” he added.

“It is time for decisive action and confident steps,” said the minister.



Behind The Scenes: US-Israeli Military Decisions Shaping Iran's War

US CENTCOM chief Adm. Brad Cooper meets Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Eyal Zamir during his visit to Israel (Israeli Army)
US CENTCOM chief Adm. Brad Cooper meets Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Eyal Zamir during his visit to Israel (Israeli Army)
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Behind The Scenes: US-Israeli Military Decisions Shaping Iran's War

US CENTCOM chief Adm. Brad Cooper meets Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Eyal Zamir during his visit to Israel (Israeli Army)
US CENTCOM chief Adm. Brad Cooper meets Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt-Gen. Eyal Zamir during his visit to Israel (Israeli Army)

Although US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have made the ultimate war and ceasefire decisions regarding Iran, The Jerusalem Post revealed the details and extent to which Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir, US Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, and CENTCOM Chief Admiral Brad Cooper have been the next most dominant figures.

In many ways, Zamir was key to convincing Caine and Cooper that such a war was feasible, such that they would support it, or at least not oppose it.

Caine was then critical in convincing Trump that such a war was viable, while precisely describing risks and second and third order considerations, even as the US chairman himself held doubts about significant aspects of the war, according to the Jerusalem Post.

Caine has also hovered over Trump's decisions to repeatedly announce unilateral ceasefires with Iran out of concern that any upping the ante on the military playing field could cost him in both American lives and politically.

When Netanyahu made an emergency flight to Washington to meet with Trump around 11:00 am on February 12 to try to convince him to go to war with Iran, as the US president had started to move away from that option, he presented a four-step plan.

The four steps were: First, assassinating Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his top military and intelligence officials. Second, pounding Iran's ballistic missile and drone capabilities. Third, helping foment an uprising within Iran against the regime, and fourth, transforming the uprising, plus possibly a ground attack by the Kurds who straddle Iran and Iraq, into regime change.

None of the three high commanders really believed in steps three or four, but Zamir was willing to roll the dice to see what might come of it, the Jerusalem Post said. Caine and Cooper were ready to go in for the first two steps and hold their noses regarding efforts at steps three and four.

It was not a coincidence that Israel was assigned to bomb Iran's top leaders and thousands of Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij command centers and locations, as well as Iranian military threat capabilities, while US forces stayed more focused almost exclusively on Iranian capabilities.

Trump, to some extent under the influence of Caine (with Cooper supporting in the background), kept the US out of direct military involvement in regime change.

Sources have indicated to the Jerusalem Post that Israeli efforts to influence Trump and when and how to go to war have also heavily focused on Caine.

Zamir, Mossad Director David Barnea, and Israeli Army Intelligence Chief Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder also visited Washington leading up to Netanyahu's February 12 White House sales pitch to make their case directly to a variety of officials, but collectively especially to Caine.
In some ways, Cooper was easier to convince than Caine, the report said.

This is partially true because Cooper did not try as much as his predecessor, Erik Kurilla, to influence the decision of whether to go to war or not, focusing more on being the architect of what the different options of going to war would look like.

Right Timing

Zamir was very successful in bringing on board Caine and Cooper, and then indirectly Trump, in the sense of convincing them that the timing was right.

The Post has learned that Zamir made a sophisticated and nuanced argument to Caine, Cooper, and others, which reached Trump.

The argument acknowledged that in theory Israel and the US could wait some period of months, as Iran had not yet crossed a redline threshold of a volume of ballistic missiles which the Israeli army would have trouble with. After all, Israel's original plan was not to attack Iran's ballistic missile program until sometime between June and November 2026.

However, Zamir said that Iran was racing forward too fast.

Iran was producing an additional 200-300 ballistic missiles per month. It had replaced about half of its lost missiles and half of its lost missile launchers in only eight months, getting back up to 2,500 missiles.

In Zamir's understanding, waiting another six months could mean an Iran with 3,700-4,300 missiles, and waiting another year could mean 4,900 to 6,100 missiles.

The report said it could also mean much more damage, could lead to Israeli difficulties with its volume of missile interceptors at a much earlier point, and collectively force Israel and the US to cut short their attacks on Iran's missile and other capabilities much earlier than what might make sense strategically.

Adding on that if Israel and the US wanted to take a real shot at regime change, that February was a unique moment to build on the January Iranian domestic protests, the Post understands that Zamir argued that February was a unique moment to go to war. This was true despite Israel's original plan for an attack in later 2026.

Two Main Failures

The report held Zamir, Caine and Cooper responsible for two main failures, the first being the inability to stop Iranian missiles.

It said only days into the war, Zamir, Caine, and CENTCOM were telling the public that missile fire was down 70-90%. The expectation was that within a week or two, it would be down to a drizzle. But while missile fire did drop to a medium level, the fading to a drizzle never happened.

None of the top Israeli or American officials anticipated how rapidly Iran would be able to unearth its underground missile launchers, which the allies had caused to be neutralized with cave-ins.

Pre-war estimates were that cave-ins would neutralize such missiles for the rest of the war, whereas in many cases, the Post has learned that Iran has developed bulldozer teams and techniques to uncover caved-in missile teams or silos within less than a day.

Also, Iran spread its surviving missile crews throughout its vast country, making it nearly impossible to track them down efficiently, and adjusted its missiles such that over 70% of them included cluster munitions, which the Israeli army was much less ready to defend against.

The second potential failure of Caine and Cooper relates to Hormuz.

The report found that neither Caine nor Cooper raised their voices loudly and decisively about the Hormuz nightmare scenario, again preferring to provide neutral advice to a US president, who clearly was out of his depth in aspects of this conflict.

The two of them could have seen this scenario coming, and so their choice, despite their heavy potential influence, to not raise the alarm loudly enough leaves them with some contributory fault in not better preparing Trump and the US.

The fact that the US needed to wait several weeks into the war before troops were in place to do something about Hormuz, if necessary, was a massive strategic miss.

In fact, the US could have even deployed forces into the Hormuz area the day the conflict started, as opposed to focusing on sinking large Iranian naval vessels first.

Overall, the report found that the military campaign pitched by Zamir and approved by Caine and Cooper succeeded more than might have been expected upfront, with notable exceptions regarding the continuity of medium-level ballistic missile threats and regarding Hormuz.

It said the military gains into long-standing strategic achievements is now more in the hands of the political and diplomatic leaders than the generals.


Hormuz Crisis Throws Spotlight on World's Largest 'Chokepoint' - the Malacca Strait

FILE PHOTO: A container ship enters the Singapore Strait for the Strait of Malacca, as tourists stand at mainland Asia's southern most point in Johor, Malaysia November 12, 2016. Picture taken November 12, 2016.  REUTERS/Henning Gloystein/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A container ship enters the Singapore Strait for the Strait of Malacca, as tourists stand at mainland Asia's southern most point in Johor, Malaysia November 12, 2016. Picture taken November 12, 2016. REUTERS/Henning Gloystein/File Photo
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Hormuz Crisis Throws Spotlight on World's Largest 'Chokepoint' - the Malacca Strait

FILE PHOTO: A container ship enters the Singapore Strait for the Strait of Malacca, as tourists stand at mainland Asia's southern most point in Johor, Malaysia November 12, 2016. Picture taken November 12, 2016.  REUTERS/Henning Gloystein/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A container ship enters the Singapore Strait for the Strait of Malacca, as tourists stand at mainland Asia's southern most point in Johor, Malaysia November 12, 2016. Picture taken November 12, 2016. REUTERS/Henning Gloystein/File Photo

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has forced policymakers in Asia to face questions over the security of other maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Malacca, which is the world's busiest waterway for international trade.

Importance of The Malacca Strait

The 900-km (550-mile) long Malacca Strait, bounded by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, provides the shortest sea route from East Asia to the Middle East and Europe, according to Reuters.

It carries nearly 22% of the world's maritime trade, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This includes oil and gas shipments from the Middle East to the energy-hungry economies of China, Japan and South Korea.

Malacca is the largest “oil transit chokepoint” in the world and the only one that outpaces Hormuz, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

In the first half of 2025, some 23.2 million barrels of oil per day were transported through the Malacca Strait, accounting for 29% of total maritime oil flows. The next largest chokepoint, Hormuz, saw about 20.9 million bpd pass through.

More than 102,500 ships, mostly commercial vessels, transited through the Malacca Strait in 2025, up from around 94,300 in 2024, data from Malaysia's ⁠Marine Department showed. These include most tankers, but some very large vessels avoid the strait because of draught restrictions and go south around Indonesia instead.

This route allows the Strait of Malacca to be bypassed if it were closed, but it adds to journey time that would delay shipments and drive up prices.

Concerns About Strait of Malacca

At its narrowest point in the Phillips Channel of the Singapore Strait, the Malacca Strait is only 1.7 miles (2.7 km) wide, creating a natural bottleneck, as well as potential for collisions, grounding, or oil spills.

Some parts of the strait are relatively shallow, with a depth of 25-27 meters restricting the largest vessels, but even very large crude carriers (VLCCs) measuring more than 350 meters long, 60 meters wide, and with a draft of more than 20 meters, make the transit.

For years, the strait has been a hotbed of piracy and attacks on merchant vessels. Last year saw criminal attacks spike to at least 104, but these have fallen off in the first quarter of this year, according to the ReCAAP ⁠Information Sharing Centre, an organization established by regional governments to combat piracy.

The narrow and congested waterway has been strategically important to Beijing, with around 75% of China's seaborne crude oil imports passing through it from the Middle East and Africa, data from tanker tracker Vortexa shows.

The Iran crisis has crystallized long-standing worries about how chokepoints such as Malacca could be affected if a conflict breaks out in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, where another 21% of global maritime trade transits, according to CSIS.

Malaysian authorities say the Malacca Strait is also a growing spot for illegal ⁠ship-to-ship transfers, where oil is shifted between tankers at sea to obscure its origin.

Officials Assurances

Indonesian Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa made waves on Wednesday by openly musing about ways countries could impose tolls on ships as a way to monetize the strait, before noting that such an arrangement is not possible.

When asked about the risks of tolls or other restrictions on movement in ⁠the strait, Singapore Foreign Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan told CNBC that the nations along the strait share a strategic interest to keep it open, and have agreed not to collect tolls.

He also said Singapore had assured the United States and China that the right of passage was guaranteed for all and it would not participate in any efforts to ⁠block the strait or impose tolls.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan told a forum on Wednesday that no unilateral decisions can be made about the strait and that Malaysia is on the same page with Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, and they conduct joint patrols to ensure the waterway remains open.


A 60-Day Deadline Could Pressure Trump on Ending the Iran War

US Air Force personnel perform maintenance on bomber at UK's RAF Fairford (EPA)
US Air Force personnel perform maintenance on bomber at UK's RAF Fairford (EPA)
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A 60-Day Deadline Could Pressure Trump on Ending the Iran War

US Air Force personnel perform maintenance on bomber at UK's RAF Fairford (EPA)
US Air Force personnel perform maintenance on bomber at UK's RAF Fairford (EPA)

Washington - Robert Jimison

Over nearly eight weeks of war in Iran, Republicans in Congress have turned back repeated efforts by Democrats to halt the operation and force US President Donald Trump, who began the conflict without congressional authorization, to consult with lawmakers on the military campaign.

But some Republicans have signaled that a key statutory deadline in the coming weeks could be an inflection point when they will expect the president to either wind down the conflict or seek congressional approval to continue it.

Democrats have tried and failed several times to invoke a provision of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, a law aimed at curbing a president’s ability to wage war without congressional approval, to challenge the conflict in Iran.

The latest defeat came on Wednesday, when Senate Republicans blocked such a measure for the fifth time since the war began.

Yet the law also establishes a set of deadlines, the first of which is coming on May 1, that could increase the pressure on the Trump administration in the coming days. Here is what the law says about how long a president can continue to direct US forces in a conflict without congressional approval.

The 60-Day Mark

When the United States began joint strikes with the Israeli air force on Feb. 28, the president said he was acting under his authority as commander in chief to protect US bases in the Middle East, and to “advance vital United States national interests.”

He said the action was taken in “collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.”

Many Democrats disputed that justification and have continued to argue that Trump acted illegally.

White House officials and most Republicans on Capitol Hill say he is operating within the bounds of the war powers statute, which sets a 60-day clock for a president to remove American forces from hostilities without congressional authorization to use military force.

Although the war began at the end of February, Trump formally notified Congress of the operation on March 2, starting the 60-day period that ends on May 1.

Some Republicans have already signaled they will not support any extension beyond 60 days.

Senator John Curtis, Republican of Utah, wrote in an opinion essay earlier this month that he “will not support ongoing military action beyond a 60-day window without congressional approval.”

Other Republicans, including Representative Brian Mast of Florida, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Committee, warned that the president could lose significant support if the conflict continued into May.

Moments after Republicans just barely blocked a war powers resolution in the House last week, Mast said there could be “a different vote count after 60 days,” alluding to the May 1 deadline.

A 30-Day Extension

Under the statute, once the initial 60-day deadline passes, the president’s options for continuing a military campaign without congressional approval become limited.

At that point, Trump would effectively have three choices: seek congressional authorization to continue the campaign, begin winding down US involvement or give himself an extension.

The law allows a one-time, 30-day extension of the deployment if the president certifies in writing that additional time is necessary to facilitate the safe withdrawal of US forces, but it does not grant authority to continue waging an offensive campaign.

Congress Can Authorize the War

Lawmakers also have the option at any time of granting explicit permission for Trump to continue the operation by passing an authorization for the use of military force.

Such measures have become the primary way Congress approves military campaigns short of a formal declaration of war, something that has not been done since World War II.

While Republicans have largely united in blocking Democrats’ attempts to halt the war, it is unclear whether the same unity exists when it comes to affirmatively authorizing the conflict.

Senator Lisa Murkowski, Republican of Alaska, has said she is working with a group of senators on a formal authorization for the use of military force against Iran, but has yet to introduce the resolution.

Congress has not voted in favor of using military force since 2002, when lawmakers authorized it against Iraq.

Murkowski was an early critic of the administration’s lack of transparency around the objectives, costs and timeline for the war, and said that her goal with an authorization vote would be to reassert congressional authority and require the administration to be held to firm parameters for the operation.

Why Trump Might Ignore the Deadlines

Administrations led by presidents of both parties have long argued that the Constitution gives broad authority to the commander in chief, meaning that the limits the war powers law places on the president are unconstitutional.

In 2011, President Barack Obama continued a military engagement in Libya beyond the 60-day mark, arguing that the law did not apply because “US operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve US ground troops.”

Though that prompted bipartisan backlash at the time, some lawmakers anticipate that the Trump administration could make a similar argument about Iran.

During his first term, Trump similarly balked at the law in 2019 when he vetoed a bipartisan resolution both chambers had passed that sought to end American military involvement in Yemen’s civil war. He argued then that the measure was an “unnecessary, dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities.”

Still, ignoring the deadline could pose a political problem for Republicans, which so far has given the administration broad latitude to carry out the war without congressional involvement, including any formal oversight.

“Many Republicans are on record having set the 60-day mark as somehow legally important,” said Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut, who has been among the Democrats offering resolutions aimed at limiting the president’s ability to continue the war without congressional authorization. “So I do think it will be harder for Republicans to continue to look the other way once we are out of the 60 days.”

The New York Times