Why Does Russia Want to Remove the Syrian Political Process from Geneva?

Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
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Why Does Russia Want to Remove the Syrian Political Process from Geneva?

Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)

Damascus has informed United Nations envoy Geir Pedersen that it would not send its delegation to Geneva to participate in the ninth round of the Constitutional Committee on July 25, which means freezing the Syrian political process that is held under the auspices of the UN.

The actual reason is not related to Damascus’ objection to the Committee’s mechanism or the topic of “discussions” between the two delegations – namely the government delegation, and the other representing the opposition “negotiating committee.”

In fact, the decision came upon a recommendation from Moscow. It is also not related to Russia’s objection to the Syrian constitutional reform efforts and issues, such as sovereignty, foreign agendas, and “occupations”; rather, it concerns Switzerland’s position on the Ukrainian war and its break from neutrality.

In short, Moscow is not satisfied with Switzerland’s joining Western sanctions against Russia because of the Ukraine war.

What is the Russian solution?
Moscow is punishing Geneva - a major European capital for the United Nations and its institutions - and attempting to shake European unity because of Ukraine, at the lowest price, and not through Russia’s withdrawal from UN organizations or boycotting international meetings on the Syrian crisis.

The punishment came from Syria. Accordingly, Moscow asked Damascus to refrain from participating in the Constitutional Committee meetings in Geneva, and suggest Sochi, Moscow, Damascus, Algeria or Muscat as possible alternative hosts.

What prompted the issue>
At the conclusion of the meetings of the eighth round of the Constitutional Committee in May, Pedersen agreed with the heads of the two government and opposition delegations - Ahmed Al-Kuzbari and Hadi Al-Bahra respectively - to hold the next round after the Eid Al-Adha holiday, between July 25-29.

At that time, Russian presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentyev was reportedly not satisfied with the Swiss authorities’ handling of entry visas for the Russian delegation and the coldness of the reception.

What does Pedersen want?
Based on the agreement between the Syrians and the regional and international sponsors in the previous round in June, Pedersen sent written invitations to Al-Kuzbari, Al-Bahra and the civil society, asking them to present some ideas on the means to accelerate the work of the committee to achieve the goal stipulated in the reference standards and the basic elements of the internal regulations and to work quickly and continuously to achieve results and progress without external interference or time frames imposed from the outside.

Pedersen wants to present practical proposals to expedite constitutional discussions within three options: discussing more than one topic per day, tackling one chapter of the constitution in each round, submitting drafts and discussing one chapter of the constitution in each session, until all chapters are completed.

The atmosphere and diplomatic contacts remained positive, suggesting that the meetings will take place. Syrian officials said their delegation would participate in the meetings if “logistical problems for Russian friends” were resolved.

Indeed, the Swiss authorities facilitated the visa procedures for the Russian delegation. But suddenly, the decision to boycott was relayed to Geneva from Damascus hours after a “breakthrough” represented in the Western acceptance of Russian conditions on extending the Security Council resolution to deliver humanitarian aid across the border for only six months.

What are the problems of the Russian veto?
Boycotting the Constitutional Committee meetings has many complexities. First, it exposes the realities of the meetings, collides with the public discourse of Moscow and embarrasses Damascus, which does not seem to mind abandoning the international umbrella to discuss its constitution and what it sees as a sovereign matter issue.

Most importantly, the boycott contradicts the political process, as UN Security Council Resolution 2254 stipulated that reforming the Syrian constitution was a Syrian-led process and not a Russian matter. This was confirmed in writing by the work standards document completed by the Syrian parties in 2019.

Moreover, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, which was held in Sochi in early 2018, stipulated that reform must be discussed in Geneva. This was coupled with several statements from the “guarantors” of the Astana process, stressing that the work of the Constitutional Committee should be carried out “without external interference.”

What are the options?
An envoy of a Western country, who participated in the Geneva meetings, said after receiving a letter from Pedersen’s office about the cancellation: “When you attack another country, and targeting civilians becomes a cornerstone of military strategy, whether it is in Ukraine or Syria, political hypocrisy is a key feature embedded in your foreign policy.”

The decision meanwhile, came as a surprise to the opposition, which found in the Geneva Process a platform that gives it political significance and parity with Damascus.

A leader in the opposition said the government delegation has tied its participation to “fulfilling Russian demands.”

He continued: “We are facing a very deep crisis that will last for more than a few months, while the Constitutional Committee will not hold any meetings.”

“This fabricated crisis was not created by any Syrian side, but by a foreign party, Russia,” he added. “This is blatant foreign interference in the work of what is supposed to be a committee maintained and led by Syrians. Russia is not a party to the Constitutional Committee to decide whether they should travel or not.”

There is no doubt that the decision that Damascus conveyed to Geneva on behalf of Moscow will be discussed by the Astana “guarantors” - Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish and Iranian counterparts, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ebrahim Raisi - in Tehran on Tuesday.

It is true that Tehran, along with Ankara, is looking for an achievement in the Syrian arena. But the fate of the possible Turkish military operation in northern Syria will likely be the most pressing issue at hand. The officials will also likely prioritize the areas of “hostile cooperation” between Ankara and Moscow in Ukraine. Iran also wants to propose issues that concern its role and US President Joe Biden's recent visit to the Middle East.

It is known that the Constitutional Committee is neither a committee, nor working on the constitution. It is nothing but a pretext that allows “players” to act like there was a political process to justify military choices and social engineering, as well as prevent another real process from taking shape. And there are those who want a constitutional process without an international umbrella.

Russia is using Syria and its “political process” as an arena for controlling its partners, punishing its opponents and “testing” its rivals and the Constitutional Committee is small evidence of this.



Pleasing No One: Netanyahu Puts Election First with Gaza Decision

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during a press conference in Jerusalem on March 19, 2026. (AFP)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during a press conference in Jerusalem on March 19, 2026. (AFP)
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Pleasing No One: Netanyahu Puts Election First with Gaza Decision

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during a press conference in Jerusalem on March 19, 2026. (AFP)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during a press conference in Jerusalem on March 19, 2026. (AFP)

Faced with a divisive US-led Gaza plan just before elections that could end his career, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had to choose between pleasing his ally Donald Trump or his right-wing base.

In rejecting the plan, he may not please anyone.

The decision is a tactical and PR victory for Hamas, analysts say, with the movement publicly backing the deal under which it would disarm, without taking any steps yet to do so.

Netanyahu, who has built his decades-long career on hawkish security positions, had voiced concerns but softly after the US president on July 30 hailed what he called the historic milestone on ending the Gaza war.

He finally rejected the plan Sunday during a cabinet meeting after pushback from the far-right, which strongly opposes the 15-point deal that would see Israel eventually withdraw troops from much of Gaza.

Netanyahu, Israel's longest-serving prime minister, is by nature "a procrastinator" and is struggling to secure the trust of the hard-right ahead of the October 27 vote, said Yossi Mekelberg, an expert on Israeli politics at London-based think tank Chatham House.

Netanyahu's calculation is to dissuade votes for the opposition by creating the impression that he is "still the only bastion of power that will stop Hamas", Mekelberg said.

"Netanyahu knows that falling out with Trump doesn't serve him or Israel. On the other hand, he knows the minute that he agrees to the 15 points, he would be attacked not only by the right wing, but that some opposition parties will attack him, too," he said.

"He's trying to appease everyone. At the end of the day, he will be appeasing no one."

- Cooperating despite rejection -

Israel will be voting for the first time since the trauma of Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack, the deadliest ever against Israel, which retaliated with an overwhelming offensive in Gaza.

Despite Netanyahu's public rejection of Trump's plan, Israel in practice appears to be complying with a key part of it. Israel has stopped air strikes since August 3, although Gaza authorities report periodic Israeli gunfire.

"These strikes could be resumed and even intensified at any time. It is one of the cards Israel can maneuver with," said Ehud Eilam, a former analyst at Israel's defense ministry.

He noted that Israel had not succeeded in its goal of completely destroying Hamas after October 7.

"Therefore, Israel at least seeks to disarm Hamas, which is also a very difficult task," Eilam said.

"Hamas will anyway refuse to completely disarm, and for now can continue to use Netanyahu as an excuse to avoid or at least slow down this process," he said.

Netanyahu had long campaigned on his close rapport with Trump, who has taken unprecedented steps such as moving the US embassy to Jerusalem and joining Israel in attacking Iran.

But Trump's popularity in Israel took a nosedive in April when he called a ceasefire with Iran and sought a settlement, seeing the Middle East war as politically and economically damaging.

Netanyahu could be willing to take some steps forward on Gaza to please Trump in return for new US action against Iran, Eilam said.

"For Netanyahu, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon too for that matter, are not the most urgent concerns; Iran is," he said.

- Tactical win for Hamas -

Hamas publicly backed the disarmament agreement shortly after it chose a new leader, Khalil al-Hayya.

"I think Hamas, from the get-go, did this for tactical reasons," said Ghaith al-Omari, a former Palestinian Authority official who is now a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

He said that Hamas wanted to be seen as a "reasonable actor" -- and that Netanyahu's rejection worked in its favor.

"What this does is actually give Hamas and mediators reason to say, look, Hamas has committed, Israel has not committed -- the ball is in Israel's court," he said.

"It lets the pressure off Hamas."


Iran's Leaders Think They Have Trump Cornered, But Their Strategy Carries Great Risks

A banner with a picture of US President Donald Trump next to an Iranian missile system at Azadi Square in Tehran, Iran, July 30, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
A banner with a picture of US President Donald Trump next to an Iranian missile system at Azadi Square in Tehran, Iran, July 30, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
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Iran's Leaders Think They Have Trump Cornered, But Their Strategy Carries Great Risks

A banner with a picture of US President Donald Trump next to an Iranian missile system at Azadi Square in Tehran, Iran, July 30, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
A banner with a picture of US President Donald Trump next to an Iranian missile system at Azadi Square in Tehran, Iran, July 30, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS

The Strait of Hormuz is, by some accounts, named for a Zoroastrian deity destined to emerge victorious after a 9,000-year standoff with an adversary.

Iran's leaders feel their own victory is at hand and won't require the same epic patience.

They are betting that military pressure will ultimately force the United States to accept their control over the crucial waterway for global energy — and that time is on their side.

They know about the diminishing stockpiles of key US weapons such as advanced missile interceptors. They know the war is deeply unpopular with Americans. They know that as long as the strait is largely closed, the price of gas and other goods will stay high ahead of US congressional elections in November. They know that trying to open it by force would be costly and may require American ground troops. They know their Houthi allies in Yemen could widen the war and disrupt another major trade route.

By that logic, US President Donald Trump has no choice but to capitulate.

But Iran's strategy carries risks.

Trump points to strikes that have decimated Iran's top leadership, navy and air force. He alternates between threatening escalation and saying talks are going well. Iran's own economy has been battered, in part because of a US blockade. Iranians rose up in mass protests just months ago and could do so again.

And Iran's leaders need only look to how Trump's “short-term excursion” to the Middle East has bogged down to be reminded that wars rarely turn out as expected.

An evolving deal could give Iran a major win

Iran says it is close to reaching a deal with Oman to manage the strait, which runs between the two countries. But it would be conditioned on the US lifting its blockade, so even if there are no direct negotiations — as Iran says — Trump would have to approve.

It's unclear whether the deal would allow Iran to charge fees. But it would formalize its control over what had been an open international waterway before the war, one that carried a fifth of the world's traded oil and gas.

Abdolreza Davari, an analyst who once advised former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said Iran's effective control of the strait has given it leverage with the US and regional countries that can help guarantee its security.

“More than revenue from the strait, Iran wants to confirm its management and sovereignty over the strait,” he said by phone from Tehran.

Formal control over even part of the strait would be a clear win for Iran and a loss for the US, which has yet to accomplish some of its various and shifting goals in the war.

It would also deal a blow to global norms on freedom of navigation and set a precedent that much of the world would find disturbing — that nations can shut down trade choke points at will.

China, which buys oil from Iran and has influence over it, said as recently as May that “normal and safe passage” through the strait should be restored.

Iran feels time is on its side

To borrow a phrase from Trump's own theory of geopolitics, Iran believes it holds the cards.

“They started the war, but its end was never with them. We always decide for ourselves when it ends," Mahdi Mohammadi, an adviser to Iran's chief negotiator, posted on social media. “Iran is going after the enemy’s defeat — not an agreement.”

He said a surprise Iranian attack on Jordan in July “compensated” for a drop in oil prices. That contributed to the collapse of an interim agreement reached in June that had offered significant concessions to Iran, including a US waiver to sell oil internationally and the promise of broader sanctions relief.

Iran has repeatedly said the Strait of Hormuz will not go back to being an open waterway, and that it will keep attacking ships trying to transit without its permission. Iran's joint military command has called it an “unbreakable red line.”

“For Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has become a strategic lever for deterrence, maintaining the regional balance of power, and reshaping the security rules” in the Arabian Gulf, said Mostafa Najafi, a Tehran-based security analyst.

That poses a major obstacle to ending the war, much less resolving the even more complex, long-standing dispute over Iran's nuclear program.

"The atomic issue, because of the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, has been pushed to the side, and in reality, that is in Iran’s interests,” said Rahman Ghahremanpour, an Iran-based analyst. Control of the strait would give Iran leverage if the nuclear talks resume, he added.

It's still a risky gamble

The economic fallout from the war has spread worldwide but is particularly acute in Iran.

US and Israeli strikes have pummeled its industrial base. The US blockade has choked off much of its oil exports. Iranians are grappling with triple-digit food inflation. Trump has repeatedly threatened major strikes on civilian infrastructure like water and electricity.

In December, a currency crisis sparked some of the biggest anti-government protests in the 47-year history of the Iranian Republic. Authorities responded with a bloody crackdown in which thousands were killed and tens of thousands detained.

Many in Iran, including those close to its moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian, fear it may go too far.

Mohammad Javad Zarif, who as foreign minister helped negotiate the 2015 nuclear deal, wrote in a recent essay that Iran's achievements in the war had opened “an exceptional window for diplomacy.” But he warned that if it doesn't strike a deal soon, then “economic recovery will be difficult, and the possibility of internal unrest or renewed aggression, especially after the US elections, cannot be ruled out.”

The war has already been marked by surprises.

After the first wave of US and Israeli airstrikes on Feb. 28 killed Iran's supreme leader and other top officials, Trump suggested it would be over in a matter of weeks.

Instead, the conflict has emboldened Iran's leaders and mobilized their supporters. Tehran is using the strait “to show that it has not been defeated," Ghahremanpour said. "It can increase its legitimacy at home.”

But the strategy could also backfire. Iran's resilience has limits and there are concerns that an economic crash could trigger unrest. “Iran cannot continue with this strategy forever, and at a certain point, in reality, it has to reach a deal with America," he said.

But Davari said that for now, Iran can withstand the pressure. "It’s unlikely, despite the difficulties of the economic situation, that Iran will retreat from its positions," he said.


Will Trump Make Concessions over Hormuz?

A drone view shows vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, June 15, 2026. (Reuters)
A drone view shows vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, June 15, 2026. (Reuters)
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Will Trump Make Concessions over Hormuz?

A drone view shows vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, June 15, 2026. (Reuters)
A drone view shows vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, June 15, 2026. (Reuters)

To reach a deal with Iran that reopens the economically vital Strait of Hormuz, President Donald Trump may need to do something out of character — compromise, reported The Associated Press.

Any concession would be tough for the Republican president, who has insisted there is no truth to his sagging poll numbers, the sluggish economy and the US military’s dwindling stockpiles of key weapons following the Iran war he launched with Israel more than five months ago.

“He divides the world into winners and losers, and this would make him a loser,” said Eliot Cohen, who served as counselor of the State Department in the George W. Bush administration. “And the image of being a loser, I think, would be intolerable for him.”

The sticking point has been over control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world's oil normally flows. While both sides say a deal is close, the Trump administration has ruled out any arrangement that would cement Iran’s grip over the waterway, including Tehran charging fees.

But Iran has insisted on some measure of control, saying the strait will not go back to being an open international waterway as it was before the war. Despite thousands of US strikes, Iran can still fire drones and missiles at vessels, giving it a chokehold over commercial shipping.

Cohen said yielding ground to Iran would be difficult for the president, even if the conflict keeps gasoline prices elevated and poses problems for Republicans in November’s midterm elections.

But David Schenker, a former State Department official in the first Trump administration, said the increasing economic pressure may actually prompt Trump to compromise on the strait, even if it's likely to have profound implications on global trade.

“There will be a lot of spin both ways, but my guess is that the president has tipped his hand as to the urgency for him of resolving the crisis,” said Schenker, now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “This is a concession he may very well be willing to make.”

Trump, however, has so far conceded little about the war.

He posted on social media Thursday that the US military still has “massive amounts” of weapons and that large amounts are being manufactured. He threatened jail time for the alleged “leakers” of information on the nation's weapons stockpiles.

Trump was referencing a Washington Post story that reported his frustration with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth over the shrinking inventories of advanced weapons, as the Cabinet had gathered at Camp David last week.

A senior administration official said there had been a “robust and healthy” discussion about Iran in the Cabinet meeting and would not provide additional details except to say there had not been a "knock-down, drag-out fight” over the matter. The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal administration deliberations.

Experts say the US military is running short on weapons like advanced missile interceptors that have defended American troops from Iranian attacks. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, has released reports on declining inventories based on budget documents and other public information.

When asked later about weapons stockpiles, Trump told reporters that “we need more all the time.” He claimed that certain kinds of munitions are in “virtually unlimited supply” and others are “a little bit tighter.” He didn't offer more specifics.

He insisted that “we’re in great shape. But, with that being said, we always want more. We have to have more,” noting that the military could tap into US supplies of munitions around the world if needed.

Hegseth was on Capitol Hill this week, meeting privately with Republican senators as he makes the case for billions of dollars in additional Pentagon spending as part of a major GOP budget package.

Sen. Mark Kelly, an Arizona Democrat and former Navy pilot, said the weapons shortfall stems from a war that lacked a well-defined goal and strategy beyond striking more than 14,000 targets.

“My contention on this is, if you knew what the goal is, maybe the target list would have been 500 targets. Maybe it would have been 200 targets," Kelly said, adding the Pentagon wants "billions and billions of dollars to fix their self-inflicted problem.”

Trump also has claimed in a social media post Tuesday that his polling numbers are the best “they have ever been.” He cited accomplishments including employment numbers and the “Denuclearization of Iran.”

But about two-thirds of US adults say the war with Iran has not been worthwhile, according to a poll from late July by The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. That includes the vast majority of Democrats and independents, as well as about 37% of Republicans.

On employment, the United States had nearly 159 million jobs in June, not including farmworkers, which was a record. In Trump’s second term, however, job growth has slowed considerably.

Trump also continues to claim that the Strait of Hormuz is open to commercial shipping. He said Thursday that the strait is “sort of open right now” and pointed to the Navy's blockade of Iranian ports.

“But they can always shoot something, they always have something or drop a mine,” Trump said of Iran. “And if you have one mine sitting out there, you sort of mess things up because people don’t want to take their billion-dollar boats and accidentally get hit by a mine.”

At least two ships were hit in the Strait of Hormuz in the past week, while several others reported near misses or warnings from entities claiming to represent Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, according to maritime data company Lloyd’s List Intelligence.

Vessel traffic through the strait increased to 84 transits last week, up from 45 the week before. But traffic is still far below the more than 700 transits seen in a typical week before the crisis, Lloyd’s List said.

A deal over the Strait of Hormuz could hinge on fees US and Iranian officials say they are close to reaching an agreement to reopen the strait. That is even as the US military insists the strait is open through a route it helps oversee near Oman’s coast, saying this week that it “remains free and open for all commercial vessels seeking to transit the international waterway.”

The Associated Press reported Wednesday that the potential deal is being portrayed as a temporary solution to the dispute over the strait, and that it would allow ships to enter the Arabian Gulf through an Iranian-controlled route and exit through an Omani-controlled route.

The Trump administration has said repeatedly that it is strongly opposed to any arrangement that would see Iran charge fees.

Any temporary routes through the waterway will not have tolls, charges or other impediments, according to a US official not authorized to comment publicly who spoke Thursday on condition of anonymity. The official said Trump’s preferred choice is diplomacy and he “holds all the cards” in dealing with Iran.