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Why Does Russia Want to Remove the Syrian Political Process from Geneva?

Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
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Why Does Russia Want to Remove the Syrian Political Process from Geneva?

Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)

Damascus has informed United Nations envoy Geir Pedersen that it would not send its delegation to Geneva to participate in the ninth round of the Constitutional Committee on July 25, which means freezing the Syrian political process that is held under the auspices of the UN.

The actual reason is not related to Damascus’ objection to the Committee’s mechanism or the topic of “discussions” between the two delegations – namely the government delegation, and the other representing the opposition “negotiating committee.”

In fact, the decision came upon a recommendation from Moscow. It is also not related to Russia’s objection to the Syrian constitutional reform efforts and issues, such as sovereignty, foreign agendas, and “occupations”; rather, it concerns Switzerland’s position on the Ukrainian war and its break from neutrality.

In short, Moscow is not satisfied with Switzerland’s joining Western sanctions against Russia because of the Ukraine war.

What is the Russian solution?
Moscow is punishing Geneva - a major European capital for the United Nations and its institutions - and attempting to shake European unity because of Ukraine, at the lowest price, and not through Russia’s withdrawal from UN organizations or boycotting international meetings on the Syrian crisis.

The punishment came from Syria. Accordingly, Moscow asked Damascus to refrain from participating in the Constitutional Committee meetings in Geneva, and suggest Sochi, Moscow, Damascus, Algeria or Muscat as possible alternative hosts.

What prompted the issue>
At the conclusion of the meetings of the eighth round of the Constitutional Committee in May, Pedersen agreed with the heads of the two government and opposition delegations - Ahmed Al-Kuzbari and Hadi Al-Bahra respectively - to hold the next round after the Eid Al-Adha holiday, between July 25-29.

At that time, Russian presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentyev was reportedly not satisfied with the Swiss authorities’ handling of entry visas for the Russian delegation and the coldness of the reception.

What does Pedersen want?
Based on the agreement between the Syrians and the regional and international sponsors in the previous round in June, Pedersen sent written invitations to Al-Kuzbari, Al-Bahra and the civil society, asking them to present some ideas on the means to accelerate the work of the committee to achieve the goal stipulated in the reference standards and the basic elements of the internal regulations and to work quickly and continuously to achieve results and progress without external interference or time frames imposed from the outside.

Pedersen wants to present practical proposals to expedite constitutional discussions within three options: discussing more than one topic per day, tackling one chapter of the constitution in each round, submitting drafts and discussing one chapter of the constitution in each session, until all chapters are completed.

The atmosphere and diplomatic contacts remained positive, suggesting that the meetings will take place. Syrian officials said their delegation would participate in the meetings if “logistical problems for Russian friends” were resolved.

Indeed, the Swiss authorities facilitated the visa procedures for the Russian delegation. But suddenly, the decision to boycott was relayed to Geneva from Damascus hours after a “breakthrough” represented in the Western acceptance of Russian conditions on extending the Security Council resolution to deliver humanitarian aid across the border for only six months.

What are the problems of the Russian veto?
Boycotting the Constitutional Committee meetings has many complexities. First, it exposes the realities of the meetings, collides with the public discourse of Moscow and embarrasses Damascus, which does not seem to mind abandoning the international umbrella to discuss its constitution and what it sees as a sovereign matter issue.

Most importantly, the boycott contradicts the political process, as UN Security Council Resolution 2254 stipulated that reforming the Syrian constitution was a Syrian-led process and not a Russian matter. This was confirmed in writing by the work standards document completed by the Syrian parties in 2019.

Moreover, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, which was held in Sochi in early 2018, stipulated that reform must be discussed in Geneva. This was coupled with several statements from the “guarantors” of the Astana process, stressing that the work of the Constitutional Committee should be carried out “without external interference.”

What are the options?
An envoy of a Western country, who participated in the Geneva meetings, said after receiving a letter from Pedersen’s office about the cancellation: “When you attack another country, and targeting civilians becomes a cornerstone of military strategy, whether it is in Ukraine or Syria, political hypocrisy is a key feature embedded in your foreign policy.”

The decision meanwhile, came as a surprise to the opposition, which found in the Geneva Process a platform that gives it political significance and parity with Damascus.

A leader in the opposition said the government delegation has tied its participation to “fulfilling Russian demands.”

He continued: “We are facing a very deep crisis that will last for more than a few months, while the Constitutional Committee will not hold any meetings.”

“This fabricated crisis was not created by any Syrian side, but by a foreign party, Russia,” he added. “This is blatant foreign interference in the work of what is supposed to be a committee maintained and led by Syrians. Russia is not a party to the Constitutional Committee to decide whether they should travel or not.”

There is no doubt that the decision that Damascus conveyed to Geneva on behalf of Moscow will be discussed by the Astana “guarantors” - Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish and Iranian counterparts, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ebrahim Raisi - in Tehran on Tuesday.

It is true that Tehran, along with Ankara, is looking for an achievement in the Syrian arena. But the fate of the possible Turkish military operation in northern Syria will likely be the most pressing issue at hand. The officials will also likely prioritize the areas of “hostile cooperation” between Ankara and Moscow in Ukraine. Iran also wants to propose issues that concern its role and US President Joe Biden's recent visit to the Middle East.

It is known that the Constitutional Committee is neither a committee, nor working on the constitution. It is nothing but a pretext that allows “players” to act like there was a political process to justify military choices and social engineering, as well as prevent another real process from taking shape. And there are those who want a constitutional process without an international umbrella.

Russia is using Syria and its “political process” as an arena for controlling its partners, punishing its opponents and “testing” its rivals and the Constitutional Committee is small evidence of this.

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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)

For the past quarter century, Iran endured a bitter conflict between the ideological aspects of the “revolution” and the strategic view aimed at protecting the state and its interests in a changing world.

Despite hopes for radical change, attempts to achieve reform collided with resistance from the traditional centers of power, preventing real reconciliation between the contradiction in the principles of the “revolution” and the demands of national reforms, or at least achieving some form of sustainable agreement between these opposing movements.

Since 2000, Iran witnessed the election of five presidents with limited jurisdiction, and five parliamentary elections, which were dominated by either of the main reformist and conservative movements, amid the ongoing debate over the nature of rule, its agenda and priorities.

Since the 1979 revolution, the jurisdiction of the parliament and government has been fully under the control of the decision-making centers in the country, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the top of the pyramid. The supreme leader enjoys almost absolute power, making him above all state institutions.

Meanwhile, the role of the military and political institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Guardian Council, expanded as they maintained their role in protecting the ideological principles of the ruling system. The system is based on a constitution that is in turn based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. These institutions are the main tools for preserving the identity of the “Islamic Republic” and bolstering its position that is hostile to the West.

Some 45 years after its “Islamic Revolution”, Iran has yet to reconcile the contradictions between its principles and national interests. (Getty Images)

Khatami and shift in the conflict

The beginning of the new millennium in Iran coincided with a decisive moment in reformist President Mohammed Khatami’s term (1997-2005). The period was marked with the intensification of the confrontation between the reformists and conservatives. The latter sought to obstruct reforms pursued by Khatami, especially in civil freedoms and freedom of expression.

The non-elected institutions that are under Khamenei’s direct supervision, such as the Guardian Council and judiciary, played a decisive role in obstructing reform measures, creating challenges for the reformists in achieving their political and social agendas.

Khatami’s term in office witnessed a major shift in the clash between the supporters of the ideology of the revolution and those calling for achieving strategic interests. He believed that the reforms were a strategic need to secure the continuity of the system of rule and its ability to adapt to internal and external changes. His critics, however, believed that his approach threatened the very foundations of the Wilayat al-Faqih.

Iran worked on improving its relations with the West and boosting its national identity through the Dialogue Among Civilizations, but the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a blow to these efforts.

Iran saw in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighboring Iraq an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through supporting groups that were affiliated with Iran or were established within its territory. The nuclear file also undermined the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative and efforts to build trust with the West, thereby increasing Iran’s isolation and regional and international tensions.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards played a main role in the nuclear program and regional wars. (Khamenei’s official website)

IRGC and the regional role

The IRGC played a main role in issues related to the nuclear program, internal developments and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the end of Khatami’s term.

In Afghanistan, the IRGC supported the United States in ousting the Taliban from power. In Iraq, the IRGC’s Quds Force led armed Iraqi factions in bolstering Iranian influence that persist to this day. Under General Qassem Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force also expanded its operations in Lebanon, helping establish a network that ran parallel to Iranian diplomacy in regional politics.

Iran felt threatened by the US’ bolstered military presence in the region, leading it to expand its security and strategic plans, starting with the nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

In 2002, the discovery of secret nuclear facilities aroused suspicions among the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the possibility that it would pursue the production of a nuclear bomb. Amid the rising tensions, the West shifted its priorities towards Tehran to curbing its nuclear activities. Moreover, US officials, especially during President George W. Bush’s term, threatened on numerous occasions to use military force against Iran if it continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.

Iran has bolstered its influence in the Middle East, stoking tensions with regional powers. (AP)

Nuclear file and internal tensions

The nuclear file has been a source of tension inside and outside Iran ever since. On the domestic level, it sparked debate about the country’s national priorities. The reformists sought to maintain Tehran’s international relations and ease tensions, while the conservatives clung on to their ideological principles.

In 2003, Tehran declared that it was voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment as part of the Amad Plan agreement reached with the European troika. In return, it received a pledge that the file would not be referred to the UN Security Council and that economic ties would be established with Europe. That same year, Iran heavily promoted Khamenei’s fatwa that barred the production, storing or use of nuclear weapons.

The US, however, remained suspicious of Iran’s intentions. It believed that agreements were not enough and it accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program, leading it to impose sanctions on its banks and energy sector. During the term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it referred the program to the Security Council – a move that was welcomed by the international community. The move prompted Iran to adopt an aggressive policy against western powers.

Iran has never officially declared that it was developing nuclear weapons. In 2007, US intelligence released a report that said Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons development in 2003, helping to soften the American position against it.

Throughout Ahmedinejad’s eight years in office, tensions rose with the West over the nuclear program. Tehran raised its level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent while the president insisted on his country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In return, crippling sanctions were imposed on its nuclear program, oil exports and economy.

Khamenei meets with veterans from the Iraqi-Iranian war. (EPA)

Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’

On the foreign level, Iran aspired to bolster relations with Arab, African and Latin American countries. It also backed armed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas.

With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” revolts, Iran sought to consolidate its influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, stoking tensions with regional powers and Arab countries. Supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was also a top priority for Ahmedinejad before he was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani.

On the domestic level, Iran went through a huge crisis after Ahmedinejad won the 2009 elections. The wave of “Green Movement” demonstrations erupted in protest against the elections results between Ahmedinejad, and reformist candidates Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

After Ahmedinejad’s term ended, Iran tried to ease tensions with the West. It took part in nuclear negotiations aimed at managing tensions with the major powers. Two years of negotiations led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that suspended UN sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on its nuclear program.

The supreme leader played a pivotal role in the negotiations. He set red lines when it came to maintaining Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, lifting economic sanctions and refusing visits to military facilities by international inspectors.

Khamenei cautiously supported Rouhani’s negotiating team at the nuclear talks despite pressure from conservative movements. The negotiations struck a balance between ideology and strategic interests as Iran sought to maintain its “revolutionary” slogans, while adapting to international changes, confronting economic and security challenges and continuing to fund its regional activities to ensure that it remained a main player in the Middle East.

The IRGC continued to consolidate Iran’s influence in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Khamenei threatened to expel American forces from the region. The tensions alarmed the American administration leading then President Donald Trump to pull Washington out of the nuclear deal in 2018.

Qassem Soleimani. (Tasnim)

Patience in handling pressure

In confronting Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including preventing Iran from selling oil, Tehran adopted a policy of “walking on the edge of the abyss” and of “strategic patience.” Regional tensions also spiked with the IRGC seizing oil tankers after Tehran threatened to block oil shipping lanes. Trump consequently designated the IRGC as terrorist.

Trump would also order the killing of Quds Forces commander Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. The move took Iranian-American tensions to a whole new level and threatened to spark a direct war between the two countries.

In a leaked 2021 recording, then foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif called for striking a balance between foreign policy and the policy on the field, a reference to the Quds Force that leads the IRGC’s foreign operations. The recordings exposed an internal rift between the ideological and pragmatic movements in Iran, with the latter wanting to achieve interests, such as the lifting of sanctions.

Zarif defended his conviction that diplomatic work relies on the situation on the ground and vice versa, meaning diplomacy can grant “international legitimacy” to achievements on the field.

When US President Joe Biden came to office, Khamenei used his influence to support the IRGC and showed limited leniency in managing tensions through new nuclear negotiations. Biden tried to return to the nuclear pact with Tehran, but Iran’s unprecedented nuclear measures adopted by conservative late President Ebrahim Raisi and Russia’s war on Ukraine thwarted diplomacy.

18 December 2024, Iran, Tehran: Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during the Cabinet meeting in Tehran. (Iranian Presidency/dpa)

Raisi and the ‘revolutionary government’

Under Raisi, Tehran pursued diplomacy at the negotiating table with the West, but the talks never made it to the finish line.

His term in office was cut short by his death in a helicopter crash in May 2024. His time in power was marked by loyalty to the supreme leader’s view of forming a “revolutionary government” and limiting state power to conservatives.

Raisi effectively followed in the same footsteps as Ahmedinejad: Tehran sought rapprochement with regional forces, while hoping to circumvent sanctions and speed up its nuclear activities.

Raisi was succeeded by Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed reformists. He pledged to maintain the policy of turning to the east and bolstering relations with China and Russia. He also sought to lift sanctions on Iran by returning to nuclear negotiations.

On the regional level, Tehran’s “shadow war” with Israel came out to the open and the two sides traded direct blows. Following Raisi’s death, Iran continued to suffer more setbacks, notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas’ roles. These developments will weaken the IRGC’s regional role, but it could seek to compensate for its losses in other regions, even inside Iran itself.

Pezeshkian and internal reconciliation

Pezeshkian’s presidency is seen as an opportunity to achieve internal reconciliation in Iran at a critical time when the people are preoccupied with the issue of Khamenei’s successor. Iran is unlikely to introduce radical change to its relations with the West and Pezeshkian may be granted limited jurisdiction in the nuclear negotiations.

Soon after Trump’s re-election as president, Pezeshkian stressed the need to manage relations and the confrontation with the US. He said his government will follow the strategy of the ruling system.

Pezeshkian will likely receive the backing of the supreme leader and IRGC to reach a settlement that would ease pressure on Iran. This does not necessarily mean that Iran will be moving away from the edge of the abyss. On the contrary, it could reflect an attempt to widen the margin for maneuver amid the tensions with the West. Iran is expected to follow this approach in the near future or at least when the identity of the third supreme leader is revealed.