Why Does Russia Want to Remove the Syrian Political Process from Geneva?

Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
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Why Does Russia Want to Remove the Syrian Political Process from Geneva?

Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)

Damascus has informed United Nations envoy Geir Pedersen that it would not send its delegation to Geneva to participate in the ninth round of the Constitutional Committee on July 25, which means freezing the Syrian political process that is held under the auspices of the UN.

The actual reason is not related to Damascus’ objection to the Committee’s mechanism or the topic of “discussions” between the two delegations – namely the government delegation, and the other representing the opposition “negotiating committee.”

In fact, the decision came upon a recommendation from Moscow. It is also not related to Russia’s objection to the Syrian constitutional reform efforts and issues, such as sovereignty, foreign agendas, and “occupations”; rather, it concerns Switzerland’s position on the Ukrainian war and its break from neutrality.

In short, Moscow is not satisfied with Switzerland’s joining Western sanctions against Russia because of the Ukraine war.

What is the Russian solution?
Moscow is punishing Geneva - a major European capital for the United Nations and its institutions - and attempting to shake European unity because of Ukraine, at the lowest price, and not through Russia’s withdrawal from UN organizations or boycotting international meetings on the Syrian crisis.

The punishment came from Syria. Accordingly, Moscow asked Damascus to refrain from participating in the Constitutional Committee meetings in Geneva, and suggest Sochi, Moscow, Damascus, Algeria or Muscat as possible alternative hosts.

What prompted the issue>
At the conclusion of the meetings of the eighth round of the Constitutional Committee in May, Pedersen agreed with the heads of the two government and opposition delegations - Ahmed Al-Kuzbari and Hadi Al-Bahra respectively - to hold the next round after the Eid Al-Adha holiday, between July 25-29.

At that time, Russian presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentyev was reportedly not satisfied with the Swiss authorities’ handling of entry visas for the Russian delegation and the coldness of the reception.

What does Pedersen want?
Based on the agreement between the Syrians and the regional and international sponsors in the previous round in June, Pedersen sent written invitations to Al-Kuzbari, Al-Bahra and the civil society, asking them to present some ideas on the means to accelerate the work of the committee to achieve the goal stipulated in the reference standards and the basic elements of the internal regulations and to work quickly and continuously to achieve results and progress without external interference or time frames imposed from the outside.

Pedersen wants to present practical proposals to expedite constitutional discussions within three options: discussing more than one topic per day, tackling one chapter of the constitution in each round, submitting drafts and discussing one chapter of the constitution in each session, until all chapters are completed.

The atmosphere and diplomatic contacts remained positive, suggesting that the meetings will take place. Syrian officials said their delegation would participate in the meetings if “logistical problems for Russian friends” were resolved.

Indeed, the Swiss authorities facilitated the visa procedures for the Russian delegation. But suddenly, the decision to boycott was relayed to Geneva from Damascus hours after a “breakthrough” represented in the Western acceptance of Russian conditions on extending the Security Council resolution to deliver humanitarian aid across the border for only six months.

What are the problems of the Russian veto?
Boycotting the Constitutional Committee meetings has many complexities. First, it exposes the realities of the meetings, collides with the public discourse of Moscow and embarrasses Damascus, which does not seem to mind abandoning the international umbrella to discuss its constitution and what it sees as a sovereign matter issue.

Most importantly, the boycott contradicts the political process, as UN Security Council Resolution 2254 stipulated that reforming the Syrian constitution was a Syrian-led process and not a Russian matter. This was confirmed in writing by the work standards document completed by the Syrian parties in 2019.

Moreover, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, which was held in Sochi in early 2018, stipulated that reform must be discussed in Geneva. This was coupled with several statements from the “guarantors” of the Astana process, stressing that the work of the Constitutional Committee should be carried out “without external interference.”

What are the options?
An envoy of a Western country, who participated in the Geneva meetings, said after receiving a letter from Pedersen’s office about the cancellation: “When you attack another country, and targeting civilians becomes a cornerstone of military strategy, whether it is in Ukraine or Syria, political hypocrisy is a key feature embedded in your foreign policy.”

The decision meanwhile, came as a surprise to the opposition, which found in the Geneva Process a platform that gives it political significance and parity with Damascus.

A leader in the opposition said the government delegation has tied its participation to “fulfilling Russian demands.”

He continued: “We are facing a very deep crisis that will last for more than a few months, while the Constitutional Committee will not hold any meetings.”

“This fabricated crisis was not created by any Syrian side, but by a foreign party, Russia,” he added. “This is blatant foreign interference in the work of what is supposed to be a committee maintained and led by Syrians. Russia is not a party to the Constitutional Committee to decide whether they should travel or not.”

There is no doubt that the decision that Damascus conveyed to Geneva on behalf of Moscow will be discussed by the Astana “guarantors” - Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish and Iranian counterparts, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ebrahim Raisi - in Tehran on Tuesday.

It is true that Tehran, along with Ankara, is looking for an achievement in the Syrian arena. But the fate of the possible Turkish military operation in northern Syria will likely be the most pressing issue at hand. The officials will also likely prioritize the areas of “hostile cooperation” between Ankara and Moscow in Ukraine. Iran also wants to propose issues that concern its role and US President Joe Biden's recent visit to the Middle East.

It is known that the Constitutional Committee is neither a committee, nor working on the constitution. It is nothing but a pretext that allows “players” to act like there was a political process to justify military choices and social engineering, as well as prevent another real process from taking shape. And there are those who want a constitutional process without an international umbrella.

Russia is using Syria and its “political process” as an arena for controlling its partners, punishing its opponents and “testing” its rivals and the Constitutional Committee is small evidence of this.



Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
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Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo

Tehran has sought to tighten its grip over the Strait of Hormuz by charging tolls on vessels to ensure safe passage, in conjunction with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The following explains law governing toll collections and actions that countries opposed to tolls might take, according to Reuters.

WHAT IS THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ?

The Strait of Hormuz is ‌a waterway connecting the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, and located within Iran's and Oman's territorial waters. It is perhaps the world's most important energy shipping lane. About 20% of the world's oil passes through it.

The waterway is about 104 miles (167 km) long. Its width varies, and at its narrowest point provides 2-mile channels for inbound and outbound shipping, separated by a 2-mile buffer zone.

Iran effectively closed the strait following US-Israeli strikes on the country, and has demanded a right ⁠to collect tolls as a precondition to ending the war. The status of any toll collections so far could not immediately be confirmed.

WHAT LAW GOVERNS PASSAGE ON THE STRAIT?

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opens new tab, sometimes known as UNCLOS, was adopted in 1982 and has been in force since 1994.

Article 38 provides vessels a right of unimpeded "transit passage" through more than 100 straits worldwide, including the Strait of Hormuz.

The treaty allows a country bordering a strait to regulate passage within its "territorial sea," up to 12 nautical miles from its border, but shall permit "innocent passage."

Passage is innocent if it is not prejudicial to a country's peace, good order and security. Military action, serious pollution, spying and fishing are not permitted. The concept of innocent passage was key to a 1949 International Court ‌of ⁠Justice case concerning the Corfu Channel, along the coasts of Albania and Greece.

Approximately 170 countries and the European Union have ratified UNCLOS. Iran and the United States have not. This raises the question of whether the treaty's rules affording freedom of maritime navigation have become part of customary international law, or bind only ratifying countries.

Experts say UNCLOS has become or is generally viewed as customary international law. Some non-ratifying countries may ⁠argue that they need not follow the treaty because they persistently and consistently object. Iran has argued that it has made such objections. The United States disputes Iran's authority to charge tolls.

HOW CAN TOLLS BE CHALLENGED?

There is no formal mechanism to enforce UNCLOS. The International Tribunal for the Law ⁠of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany, which the treaty established, and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands could issue rulings but cannot enforce them.

Countries and businesses have other potential means to counteract tolls.

A willing state or coalition of states could ⁠try to enforce the treaty. The UN Security Council could pass a resolution opposing tolls.

Companies could redirect shipments away from the Strait of Hormuz, and have begun doing so. Countries could expand sanctions targeting financial transactions believed to benefit Iran's government, by sanctioning companies willing to pay tolls.


How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
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How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo

Washington: David Pierson

For much of the last two decades, China has maintained a delicate balance in its military relationship with Iran, offering often indirect assistance instead of arms sales.

That approach is now drawing renewed attention after US officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by US intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East.

Chinese arms sales to Iran exploded in the 1980s and have all but vanished in the last decade to comply with a United Nations embargo and US sanctions. Chinese support for Iran in recent years has instead come in the form of components that could be used in both civilian technologies as well as missiles and drones.

China has a major stake in the crisis in Iran. About a third of its total crude oil imports come from the Arabian Gulf.

Here is how China’s military support for Iran has evolved over the years:

The 1980s: The Boom Years

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 coincided with major market reforms in China when the leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, ordered state-owned companies to wean themselves off government support and instead seek commercial profit.

Chinese state-run defense companies were suddenly empowered to export their wares. That resulted in a deluge of Chinese missiles, fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles and assault rifles being sold to Iran starting in 1982 and peaking in 1987, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

At the same time, China sold even more arms to Iraq, resulting in a situation in which the two warring sides clashed with each other using the same Chinese weapons.

The Reagan administration opposed China’s arms sales to Iran, particularly Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles. Tehran used the missiles in attacks in Kuwaiti waters in 1987 that struck an American-owned tanker and an American-registered tanker.

The United States responded by curbing exports of some high-technology products to China. China denied selling arms directly to Iran, but said it would do more to prevent its military exports from reaching Iran through intermediaries.

The 1990s: Technology Transfers

Following the war, Iran set out to develop its own military-industrial base with the help of China. One of its key products was the Noor anti-ship cruise missile, which had been reverse-engineered through purchases of Chinese C-802 cruise missiles.

“China played a major role in supporting Iran’s military modernization for decades, especially in developing Iran’s missile capabilities,” said Brian Hart, a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Iran also received help from China in building missile-production facilities and even in constructing a missile test range east of Tehran, wrote Bates Gill, a longtime China expert, in the Middle East Review of International Affairs.

Under US pressure to curtail its sale of finished weapons, particularly missiles, to Iran, China began increasing exports of machine tools and components that could be used for both military and civilian purposes.

The 2000s to the Present: Dual-Use Technologies

In 2006, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China voted in favor of the resolution and largely pivoted away from new, formal arms contracts with Tehran.

The shift was as much about regional strategy as it was about international law. Starting in the mid-2010s, China began deepening its strategic relationships with Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Qatar.

China continued to supply Iran with dual-use technologies and materials that have helped it amass an arsenal of missiles and drones.

That included chemicals used to produce fuel for ballistic missiles and components for drones, such as radio frequency connectors and turbine blades.

But Mr. Hart said China was still “a critical form of support, given Iran’s reliance on ballistic missiles and drones to attack US and Israeli forces and other countries in the region.”

The US Treasury Department has sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong front companies it says were set up to source parts and ingredients for ballistic missiles and drones for Iran.

Suspicions are also growing that Iran is using its access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, an alternative to the US-owned Global Positioning System, for military purposes. Last month, a US congressional agency said BeiDou may have been used to direct Iran’s drone and missile strikes across the Middle East.

The New York Times


A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
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A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)

Sudan is entering a fourth year of war between the military and paramilitary forces.

The fighting has pushed many people into famine, caused a huge displacement crisis and left over 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties have been accused of committing atrocities like ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence against civilians.

Here's a look at the war by the numbers:

59,000 At least this many people have been killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, or ACLED. Aid groups say the true toll could be much higher as access to areas of fighting across the vast country remains limited.

4.5 million About this many people have fled the country to places like Egypt, South Sudan, Libya and Chad.

9 million About this many people remain displaced in Sudan.

19 million More than this many people face acute hunger, according to the World Food Program.

24% This is the amount that fuel prices have shot up in Sudan since conflict in the Middle East escalated.

354 This is the number of community kitchens that have closed over the last six months after providing a lifeline for millions of people, according to Islamic Relief.

Over 4,300 About this many children have been killed or maimed in the war, according to UNICEF.

8 million At least this many children are still out of school, according to UNICEF.

11% About this many schools are being used by warring sides or are shelters for displaced people, according to UNICEF.

63% This many of Sudan's health facilities are fully or partially functioning, according to World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

217 This is the number of verified attacks on health facilities since the war began, according to the WHO.

1,032 This was the number of civilians killed by air and drone strikes in 2025, according to ACLED, as a surge in drone strikes took a growing toll.