Why Does Russia Want to Remove the Syrian Political Process from Geneva?

Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
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Why Does Russia Want to Remove the Syrian Political Process from Geneva?

Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)
Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad meets with UN envoy Geir Pedersen in Damascus on May 22. (AFP)

Damascus has informed United Nations envoy Geir Pedersen that it would not send its delegation to Geneva to participate in the ninth round of the Constitutional Committee on July 25, which means freezing the Syrian political process that is held under the auspices of the UN.

The actual reason is not related to Damascus’ objection to the Committee’s mechanism or the topic of “discussions” between the two delegations – namely the government delegation, and the other representing the opposition “negotiating committee.”

In fact, the decision came upon a recommendation from Moscow. It is also not related to Russia’s objection to the Syrian constitutional reform efforts and issues, such as sovereignty, foreign agendas, and “occupations”; rather, it concerns Switzerland’s position on the Ukrainian war and its break from neutrality.

In short, Moscow is not satisfied with Switzerland’s joining Western sanctions against Russia because of the Ukraine war.

What is the Russian solution?
Moscow is punishing Geneva - a major European capital for the United Nations and its institutions - and attempting to shake European unity because of Ukraine, at the lowest price, and not through Russia’s withdrawal from UN organizations or boycotting international meetings on the Syrian crisis.

The punishment came from Syria. Accordingly, Moscow asked Damascus to refrain from participating in the Constitutional Committee meetings in Geneva, and suggest Sochi, Moscow, Damascus, Algeria or Muscat as possible alternative hosts.

What prompted the issue>
At the conclusion of the meetings of the eighth round of the Constitutional Committee in May, Pedersen agreed with the heads of the two government and opposition delegations - Ahmed Al-Kuzbari and Hadi Al-Bahra respectively - to hold the next round after the Eid Al-Adha holiday, between July 25-29.

At that time, Russian presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentyev was reportedly not satisfied with the Swiss authorities’ handling of entry visas for the Russian delegation and the coldness of the reception.

What does Pedersen want?
Based on the agreement between the Syrians and the regional and international sponsors in the previous round in June, Pedersen sent written invitations to Al-Kuzbari, Al-Bahra and the civil society, asking them to present some ideas on the means to accelerate the work of the committee to achieve the goal stipulated in the reference standards and the basic elements of the internal regulations and to work quickly and continuously to achieve results and progress without external interference or time frames imposed from the outside.

Pedersen wants to present practical proposals to expedite constitutional discussions within three options: discussing more than one topic per day, tackling one chapter of the constitution in each round, submitting drafts and discussing one chapter of the constitution in each session, until all chapters are completed.

The atmosphere and diplomatic contacts remained positive, suggesting that the meetings will take place. Syrian officials said their delegation would participate in the meetings if “logistical problems for Russian friends” were resolved.

Indeed, the Swiss authorities facilitated the visa procedures for the Russian delegation. But suddenly, the decision to boycott was relayed to Geneva from Damascus hours after a “breakthrough” represented in the Western acceptance of Russian conditions on extending the Security Council resolution to deliver humanitarian aid across the border for only six months.

What are the problems of the Russian veto?
Boycotting the Constitutional Committee meetings has many complexities. First, it exposes the realities of the meetings, collides with the public discourse of Moscow and embarrasses Damascus, which does not seem to mind abandoning the international umbrella to discuss its constitution and what it sees as a sovereign matter issue.

Most importantly, the boycott contradicts the political process, as UN Security Council Resolution 2254 stipulated that reforming the Syrian constitution was a Syrian-led process and not a Russian matter. This was confirmed in writing by the work standards document completed by the Syrian parties in 2019.

Moreover, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, which was held in Sochi in early 2018, stipulated that reform must be discussed in Geneva. This was coupled with several statements from the “guarantors” of the Astana process, stressing that the work of the Constitutional Committee should be carried out “without external interference.”

What are the options?
An envoy of a Western country, who participated in the Geneva meetings, said after receiving a letter from Pedersen’s office about the cancellation: “When you attack another country, and targeting civilians becomes a cornerstone of military strategy, whether it is in Ukraine or Syria, political hypocrisy is a key feature embedded in your foreign policy.”

The decision meanwhile, came as a surprise to the opposition, which found in the Geneva Process a platform that gives it political significance and parity with Damascus.

A leader in the opposition said the government delegation has tied its participation to “fulfilling Russian demands.”

He continued: “We are facing a very deep crisis that will last for more than a few months, while the Constitutional Committee will not hold any meetings.”

“This fabricated crisis was not created by any Syrian side, but by a foreign party, Russia,” he added. “This is blatant foreign interference in the work of what is supposed to be a committee maintained and led by Syrians. Russia is not a party to the Constitutional Committee to decide whether they should travel or not.”

There is no doubt that the decision that Damascus conveyed to Geneva on behalf of Moscow will be discussed by the Astana “guarantors” - Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish and Iranian counterparts, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ebrahim Raisi - in Tehran on Tuesday.

It is true that Tehran, along with Ankara, is looking for an achievement in the Syrian arena. But the fate of the possible Turkish military operation in northern Syria will likely be the most pressing issue at hand. The officials will also likely prioritize the areas of “hostile cooperation” between Ankara and Moscow in Ukraine. Iran also wants to propose issues that concern its role and US President Joe Biden's recent visit to the Middle East.

It is known that the Constitutional Committee is neither a committee, nor working on the constitution. It is nothing but a pretext that allows “players” to act like there was a political process to justify military choices and social engineering, as well as prevent another real process from taking shape. And there are those who want a constitutional process without an international umbrella.

Russia is using Syria and its “political process” as an arena for controlling its partners, punishing its opponents and “testing” its rivals and the Constitutional Committee is small evidence of this.



The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
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The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.

Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.

After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.

Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Arafat and Abbas

More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.

Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.

In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.

Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.

Weapons smuggled in undergarments

Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.

Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.

German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.

Black September

The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.

The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.

Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.

Several setbacks

In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.

Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.

Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.

Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.

The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Meeting at a Rome cafe

Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.

The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.

Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”

So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.

Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.

Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)

Scouting visits

Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.

In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.

Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.

Lebanese ‘wife’

Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.

Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.

Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)

Finishing touches

The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.

The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.

Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.

The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.

German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Night of the operation

Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.

Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.

The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)

Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.

‘Wrath of God’

Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.