Can Russia Revive the Adana Agreement between Syria and Turkey?

Two Syrian soldiers conduct a demining exercise near Damascus on June 19. (AFP)
Two Syrian soldiers conduct a demining exercise near Damascus on June 19. (AFP)
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Can Russia Revive the Adana Agreement between Syria and Turkey?

Two Syrian soldiers conduct a demining exercise near Damascus on June 19. (AFP)
Two Syrian soldiers conduct a demining exercise near Damascus on June 19. (AFP)

Whenever Turkey threatens to launch a military operation in northern Syria to establish a “safe zone,” Russia puts on the mediation table the revival of the Sochi Agreement on the east of the Euphrates, in preparation for the implementation of the Adana Agreement. The latter was signed by Ankara and Damascus in July 1998, establishing security cooperation between the two parties and allowing the Turkish army to pursue the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) deep into Syrian territory.

Since the Russian war in Ukraine, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has activated his old plan to establish a safe zone with a depth of 35 kilometers, trying to benefit from the improvement of Ankara’s negotiating position due to Washington and Moscow’s “need” for Turkey’s role.

America clearly announced its rejection of the military operation east of the Euphrates, while Moscow mediated between Damascus, Ankara and the Kurds, and deployed Syrian army forces in various areas in the north of the country to “deter” the Turkish army, ahead of the Russian-Turkish-Iranian summit in Tehran on Tuesday.

Ankara wants new incursions linking its military “enclaves” in northern Syria, namely the Euphrates Shield, north of Aleppo, which was established in 2016, the Olive Branch in Afrin in 2018, the Peace Spring, eEast of the Euphrates, formed at the end of 2019, and the Peace Shield, at the start of 2020.

Moscow proposes either activating the Adana Agreement or the full implementation of the Sochi Agreement of 2019, in addition to a military memorandum between Damascus and Qamishli in exchange for an agreement between Ankara and Washington. Below is a review of the most important agreements:

What are the terms of the Adana Agreement?

After Turkey threatened to attack Syria in mid-1998, late Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak mediated between the two parties, until a security agreement was concluded between Ankara and Damascus in the Turkish city of Adana. The text of the agreement and its annexes included, among others, the following items:

- As of now, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Abdullah Ocalan (detained in Turkey since the beginning of 1999), will not be in Syria, and will certainly not be allowed to enter Syria.
- PKK members abroad will not be allowed to enter Syria.
- As of now, PKK camps will not operate on Syrian soil, and will certainly not be allowed to become active.
- Many members of the PKK were arrested and referred to the court. The lists containing their names were prepared and submitted by Syria to the Turkish side.
- Syria, based on the principle of reciprocity, will not allow any activity launched from its territory that harms the security and stability of Turkey. Nor will Syria allow the supply of weapons, logistical materials, and financial and promotional support for PKK activities on its soil.
- Syria has classified the PKK as a terrorist organization, and has banned the activities of the party and its affiliated organizations on its territory, along with other terrorist organizations.
- Syria will not allow the PKK to establish camps or other facilities for training and shelter purposes or to conduct commercial activities on its soil.
- Syria will not allow members of the Kurdistan Workers Party to use its territory to cross to third countries.
- A direct telephone line is immediately operated between the higher security authorities of the two countries.
- The two parties appoint special security representatives in their diplomatic missions in Ankara and Damascus. Those are presented to the authorities of the host country by the heads of the mission.
- Annex No.3: As of now, the two parties consider that the border disputes between them have ended, and that neither of them has any claims or rights due in the territory of the other party.
- Annex No. 4: The Syrian side understands that its failure to adopt the security measures and duties stipulated in this agreement gives Turkey the right to implement all necessary security measures inside Syrian territory to a depth of five kilometers.

What does the Adana Agreement mean at the political and security levels?

• It gives the Turkish army the right to pursue the PKK at a depth of five km in northern Syria, according to Annex No. 4.
• Damascus relinquishes any claim to its rights in Iskenderun (Hatay Province), which Turkey annexed in 1939, according to Annex No. 3.
• The PKK, led by Abdullah Ocalan, is considered a “terrorist organization”, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.
• Ankara interprets the agreement as meaning that the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a “terrorist organization”, as an extension of the PKK.
• The agreement means the start of direct security contacts, knowing that the Director of Syrian National Security, Ali Mamlouk, has held several meetings with Turkish Intelligence chief Hakan Fidan.
• It also means re-operating the Turkish embassy in Damascus and the Syrian embassy in Ankara, noting that Damascus has a consulate in Istanbul, given that the agreement requires the appointment of a security liaison officer in each embassy.
• The agreement entails “indirect contacts” acknowledged by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, and Ankara’s recognition of the legitimacy of the Syrian government, as its required many procedures, including the formation of a joint committee and the operation of a hotline.
• The agreement offers an alternative to the Turkish-American understanding on the depth of the “buffer zone” of 32 kilometers in northeastern Syria, and opens the way for the implementation of the Sochi Agreement between Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin in October 2019, following former US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw his forces from the east of the Euphrates, which paved the way for a Turkish attack at the time.

What is the 2019 Sochi Agreement?

Erdogan and Putin have agreed on 10 points, including:

The determination to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and to disrupt separatist projects in Syrian territory.
• In this context, the status quo will be preserved in the current Operation Peace Spring area, which covers Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ain, at a depth of 32 kilometers.
• Both parties reaffirmed the importance of the Adana Agreement. Russia, for its part, will facilitate the implementation of this agreement under the current circumstances.
• The Russian military police and Syrian border guards will enter the Syrian side of the Syrian-Turkish border, outside the area of Operation Peace Spring, in order to facilitate the removal of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and their weapons.
• Turkey and Russia will conduct joint patrols west and east of the Operation Peace Spring area, at a depth of 10 km, with the exception of the city of Qamishli.
• All members of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and their weapons will be removed from Manbij and Tal Rifaat.

What about the US-Turkish agreement of 2019?

Prior to that, an agreement was signed between Erdogan and former US Vice President Mike Pence in October 2019, which consisted 13 items. Those included, among others:
• The United States and Turkey confirm their relationship as NATO partners, and the United States understands Turkey’s legitimate security concerns on its southern border.
• The two sides agreed on the need to maintain the safety of the area, in order to address Turkey’s national security concerns and seize heavy weapons from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units.
• The Turkish side temporarily stops Operation Peace Spring to allow the withdrawal of the People’s Protection Units from the Spring area. Operation Peace Spring will be halted upon completion of this withdrawal.
• Once Operation Peace Spring is stopped, the United States agrees not to continue imposing sanctions pursuant to the October 14, 2019 Executive Order banning property and suspending entry to certain persons contributing to the situation in Syria.

How did the Syrian army return to the east of the Euphrates?

In parallel with these Russian-Turkish-American agreements that followed Trump’s withdrawal from Turkey’s borders in northeastern Syria - which opened the way for Ankara’s incursion – a memorandum of understanding was reached between the Syrian Democratic Forces, the allies of Washington, and Damascus. Here are some of its points:

• The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which includes the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, agreed to enter the Syrian Arab Army and extend its control over the entire region, starting from Ain Diwar in the east, and up to Jarablus in the west, where the forces will be deployed from three axes:
1. Tabqa axis in the north towards Ain Issa and its countryside, and in the north, towards the Syrian-Turkish border at Tal Abyad and towards the west.
2. The Manbij axis towards Ain al-Arab on the Syrian-Turkish border, to the point of Tal Abyad and towards the west.
3. Al-Hasakah-Tal Tamer axis to Ras al-Ain and from it to the east to Qamishli and then to al-Malikiyah and towards the south.
4. The forces are deployed in the Manbij area, starting from Arima and along the Sajour River line, according to the previous agreement on the deployment of forces in Arima.

In this memorandum, “the (SDF) forces affirmed their readiness to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and under the flag of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to stand by the Syrian Arab Army in the face of Turkish threats to the Syrian territories, led by President Bashar al-Assad.”

However, Trump’s keeping his forces east of the Euphrates has led to the slow implementation of this memorandum. In the face of recent Turkish threats, Russia returned to push the SDF and Damascus to implement the 2019 memorandum.

Just as Russia implemented the “disengagement” agreement between Syria and Israel and deployed international forces in the Golan, it seeks to put the interim agreements into effect, leading to the reactivation of the Adana Agreement, which would pave the way for “legitimizing” the government and expanding its sovereignty in the country.

Russia had previously suggested this option during the preparations for the tripartite summit in Tehran, and will continue to push for its implementation.



What Lies Ahead for Ukraine’s Contested Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

A Russian service member stands guard at a checkpoint near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant before the arrival of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert mission in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict outside Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian-controlled Ukraine, June 15, 2023. (Reuters)
A Russian service member stands guard at a checkpoint near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant before the arrival of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert mission in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict outside Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian-controlled Ukraine, June 15, 2023. (Reuters)
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What Lies Ahead for Ukraine’s Contested Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant?

A Russian service member stands guard at a checkpoint near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant before the arrival of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert mission in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict outside Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian-controlled Ukraine, June 15, 2023. (Reuters)
A Russian service member stands guard at a checkpoint near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant before the arrival of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert mission in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict outside Enerhodar in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian-controlled Ukraine, June 15, 2023. (Reuters)

The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Europe's largest, is one of the main sticking points in US President Donald Trump's peace plan to end the nearly four-year war between Russia and Ukraine. The issue is one of 20 points laid out by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in a framework peace proposal.

Here are some of the issues regarding the facility:

WHAT ROLE MAY THE US PLAY?

Russia took control of the plant in March 2022 and announced plans to connect it to its power grid. Almost all countries consider that it belongs to Ukraine but Russia says it is owned by Russia and a unit of Russia's state-owned Rosatom nuclear corporation runs the plant.

Zelenskiy stated at the end of December that the US side had proposed joint trilateral operation of the nuclear power plant with an American chief manager.

Zelenskiy said the Ukrainian proposal envisages Ukrainian-American use of the plant, with the US itself determining how to use 50% of the energy produced.

Russia has considered joint Russian-US use of the plant, according to the Kommersant newspaper.

WHAT IS ITS CURRENT STATUS?

The plant is located in Enerhodar on the banks ‌of the Dnipro River and ‌the Kakhovka Reservoir, 550 km (342 miles) southeast of the capital Kyiv.

The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has ‌six ⁠Soviet-designed reactors. They were ‌all built in the 1980s, although the sixth only came online in the mid-1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has a total capacity of 5.7 gigawatts, according to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) database.

Four of the six reactors no longer use Russian nuclear fuel, having switched to fuel produced by then-US nuclear equipment supplier Westinghouse.

After Russia took control of the station, it shut down five of its six reactors and the last reactor ceased to produce electricity in September 2022. Rosatom said in 2025 that it was ready to return the US fuel to the United States.

According to the Russian management of the plant, all six reactors are in "cold shutdown."

Both Russia and Ukraine have accused each other of striking the nuclear plant and of severing power lines to the plant.

The plant's equipment is powered by ⁠electricity supplied from Ukraine. Over the past four years these supplies have been interrupted at least eleven times due to breaks in power lines, forcing the plant to switch to emergency diesel generators.

Emergency generators ‌on site can supply electricity to keep the reactors cool if external power lines are cut.

IAEA ‍Director General Rafael Grossi says that fighting a war around a nuclear ‍plant has put nuclear safety and security in constant jeopardy.

WHY DOES RUSSIA WANT ZAPORIZHZHIA PLANT?

Russia has been preparing to restart the station but ‍says that doing so will depend on the situation in the area. Rosatom chief Alexei Likhachev has not ruled out the supply of electricity produced there to parts of Ukraine.

Oleksandr Kharchenko, director of the Energy Research Center in Kyiv, said Moscow intended to use the plant to cover a significant energy deficit in Russia's south.

"That's why they are fighting so hard for this station," he said.

In December 2025, Russia's Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision issued a license for the operation of reactor No. 1, a key step towards restarting the reactor.

Ukraine's energy ministry called the move illegal and irresponsible, risking a nuclear accident.

WHY DOES UKRAINE NEED THE PLANT?

Russia has been pummeling Ukraine's energy infrastructure for months and some areas have had blackouts during winter.

In recent ⁠months, Russia has sharply increased both the scale and intensity of its attacks on Ukraine's energy sector, plunging entire regions into darkness.

Analysts say Ukraine's generation capacity deficit is about 4 gigawatts, or the equivalent of four Zaporizhzhia reactors.

Kharchenko says it would take Ukraine five to seven years to build the generating capacity to compensate for the loss of the Zaporizhzhia plant.

Kharchenko said that if Kyiv regained control of the plant, it would take at least two to three years to understand what condition it was in and another three years to restore the equipment and return it to full operations.

Both Ukrainian state nuclear operator Energoatom and Kharchenko said that Ukraine did not know the real condition of the nuclear power plant today.

WHAT ABOUT COOLING FUEL AT THE PLANT?

In the long term, there is the unresolved problem of the lack of water resources to cool the reactors after the vast Kakhovka hydro-electric dam was blown up in 2023, destroying the reservoir that supplied water to the plant.

Besides the reactors, there are also spent fuel pools at each reactor site used to cool down used nuclear fuel. Without water supply to the pools, the water evaporates and the temperatures increase, risking fire.

An emission of hydrogen from a spent fuel pool caused an explosion in Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster in ‌2011.

Energoatom said the level of the Zaporizhzhia power plant cooling pond had dropped by more than 15%, or 3 meters, since the destruction of the dam, and continued to fall.

Ukrainian officials previously said the available water reserves may be sufficient to operate one or, at most, two nuclear reactors.


Egypt, Trump Reaffirm Strategic Alliance in 2025 amid Regional Turmoil

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
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Egypt, Trump Reaffirm Strategic Alliance in 2025 amid Regional Turmoil

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)

After months of speculation over the trajectory of Egyptian-US relations, fueled by persistent talk of strain and an impending rift, a high-level meeting between President Donald Trump and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh reaffirmed the resilience of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Washington, even as the region remains in turmoil.

The meeting followed a turbulent period marked by Trump’s adoption of a proposal to relocate Gaza’s population, an idea firmly rejected by Sisi and one that prompted warnings of a diplomatic crisis between the two longtime allies.

The subsequent signing of a Gaza peace agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh sent a clear signal that, despite sharp disagreements over policy, the foundations of the bilateral relationship remain intact.

Early in Trump’s second term, media reports said Sisi had scrapped plans to visit Washington. As the year draws to a close, speculation has said that the visit may happen. Trump has acknowledged Sisi as a friend and said he would be happy to meet him as well.

Trump’s election victory late last year raised Egyptian hopes of strengthening the strategic partnership. Sisi voiced that expectation in a congratulatory post on X, stating that he looked forward to working together with Trump to achieve peace, preserve regional peace and stability, and strengthen the strategic partnership.

Those hopes were tested when Trump floated a plan to “clean out Gaza” and relocate its residents to Egypt and Jordan. Cairo rejected the idea outright, mobilized international opposition, unveiled an alternative plan for Gaza’s reconstruction and hosted an emergency summit on the issue in March.

Limited public engagement

David Butter, a research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, noted that the striking feature of Egypt-US ties over the past year has been their low public profile.

Aside from Trump’s appearance in Sharm el-Sheikh, there was not much happening in the open, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amr Hamzawy, an Egyptian political scientist and director of the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described the first year of Trump’s second term as difficult for bilateral relations.

He said it began with talk of displacement and a “Middle East Riviera” in Gaza, but Egyptian diplomacy succeeded in shifting the trajectory.

Trump’s peace plan, he said, ultimately signaled rejection of displacement and spoke of security and political tracks for Gaza and a broader political process for the Palestinian issue, though details remain unclear.

Hamzawy added that the year opened from a tough starting point that followed what he called President Joe Biden’s hesitant stance on Gaza, when displacement was first discussed.

After nearly a year of Egyptian political and diplomatic effort, he said, displacement dropped from Washington’s agenda, even if it remains a risk that cannot be ignored.

Historically, Egypt has been a pivotal state for US national security, given its geography, demographic weight and diplomatic role, according to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service.

Gaza, the main test

The Gaza war shaped Egyptian-US relations during Trump’s first year back in office. Washington backed Egyptian-Qatari mediation to halt the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio thanked Cairo after a truce was reached between Israel and Hamas in January.

When hostilities resumed, however, Egypt faced complex diplomatic choices with both Washington and Israel. It rejected Trump’s call to resettle Gaza’s population, while its reconstruction plan failed to gain US or Israeli acceptance.

Cairo also drew criticism from Trump for declining to join US strikes against Yemen’s Houthis, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) revealed.

Butter noted that ties with the Trump administration were strained over Gaza after Sisi canceled a Washington visit early in the year, following Trump’s “Middle East Riviera” remarks, which left contacts at a minimum.

He said Trump’s Sharm el-Sheikh visit, the signing of the Gaza agreement and the celebration of his plan’s success offered a chance to reset relations. Egypt, he added, has become indispensable to Trump’s administration in Gaza.

Hamzawy said Gaza dominated the first year of Trump’s term, giving Egypt a chance to restore its standing with US and European decision-makers as a key mediator. Cairo put its vision on the table, he said, shifting US thinking toward parallel security and political tracks and from talk of disarmament to limiting weapons.

Throughout the year, Egypt publicly counted on Trump to end the Gaza war. In July, Sisi urged him in a televised address to press for a halt, saying Trump was capable of doing so.

Analysts Daniel Byman and Jon Alterman wrote in Foreign Policy that Egypt is indispensable to international responses to the Gaza war, even if it remains a difficult partner for Washington and Israel. The conflict, they said, restored diplomatic focus on Egypt and strengthened its leverage.

Sara Kira, director of the European North African Center for Research, said relations in Trump’s second term differ from his first. The earlier term saw broad alignment and personal warmth from Trump, particularly on counterterrorism, she said. The second term has been marked by divergence.

That surfaced in April when Trump called for free passage for US commercial and military vessels through the Suez Canal in exchange for US efforts to protect the waterway.

Positive signals despite differences

Despite disagreements over Gaza, there were positive signs elsewhere. Early in the year, the US State Department froze new funding for most aid programs worldwide, exempting humanitarian food programs and military aid to Israel and Egypt.

Washington did not include Egypt on a travel ban list issued in June. Trump said Egypt was a country with which the United States dealt closely and that things there were under control. Egypt was also spared higher US tariffs. Cairo has repeatedly stressed the depth and resilience of the strategic relationship.

Kira said Egypt exerted maximum pressure to achieve peace and stop the Gaza war, eventually convincing Washington of its approach and reaching a peace agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh. She said Egypt acted pragmatically and astutely, reading Trump’s personality and US interests.

As talks on the second phase of the Gaza agreement stall, Egypt continues to rely on the Trump administration to advance its plan. Cairo remains in contact with Washington and is working with it to prepare a donor conference for Gaza’s reconstruction, which has yet to receive sufficient momentum from the Trump administration.

The dialogue extends beyond Gaza to Libya, Sudan, Lebanon and Iran, as well as water security, led by Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt fears could affect its Nile water share.

GERD

In mid-June, Trump stirred controversy in Egypt when he wrote on Truth Social that the United States had “stupidly” funded the dam Ethiopia built on the Blue Nile, triggering a severe diplomatic crisis with Egypt.

In August, the White House released a list of Trump’s foreign policy achievements, which included a purported agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia over the dam.

Trump has repeatedly spoken of his administration’s efforts to resolve the dispute, but those claims have yet to translate into concrete action.

Hamzawy said there is an opportunity for Washington to mediate and revive an agreement reached near the end of Trump’s first term.

Charles Dunne of the Arab Center Washington DC wrote recently that Trump’s stance may please Cairo but could also produce adverse outcomes if Washington does not assume a mediation role.

The United States hosted talks with the World Bank in 2020 during Trump’s first term, but they failed after Ethiopia refused to sign the draft agreement.

Military ties endure

Military cooperation continued largely as usual. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with about $90 billion in aid, with a sharp increase after 1979, which successive administrations have framed as an investment in regional stability, according to the CRS.

For more than a decade, Congress has imposed human rights conditions on part of Egypt’s aid.

Between fiscal years 2020 and 2023, the Biden administration and Congress withheld approximately $750 million in military funding. Trump’s technical annex to the proposed fiscal 2026 budget seeks $1.3 billion in military assistance for Egypt without conditions, the CRS said.

Hamzawy said the administration is far from imposing conditionality, noting that relations rest on mutual interests between a major power and a positively influential middle power.

Since the Gaza war, the Biden and Trump administrations have accelerated US arms sales to Egypt. The State Department notified Congress of military sales totaling $7.3 billion. In July, the Pentagon announced that the State Department had approved the sale of an advanced air defense missile system to Egypt, valued at approximately $4.67 billion. Egypt also hosted the Bright Star military exercises in September.

Kira said ties with Washington are driven by interests and that Cairo has positioned itself as a core regional player.

Hamzawy said Egypt occupies a central place in US Middle East thinking, as Washington needs a spectrum of allies, with Egypt at the heart of that network.


Why Metal Prices are Soaring to Record Highs

A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
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Why Metal Prices are Soaring to Record Highs

A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP

Precious and industrial metals are surging to record highs as the year ends, driven by economic and geopolitical uncertainty, robust industrial demand and, in some cases, tight supply.

Below AFP examines the reasons for the surge in demand.

- Safe havens -

Gold and silver are traditionally seen as safe-haven assets, and demand has soared amid mounting geopolitical tensions, from US President Donald Trump's tariffs onslaught to wars in Ukraine and Gaza, as well as recent pressure by Washington on Caracas.

Investors are also uneasy about rising public debt in major economies and the risk of a bubble in the artificial intelligence sector.

These uncertainties are driving up gold and silver, with other metals now starting to see the impact as investors seek to diversify their portfolios, explained John Plassard, an analyst at Cite Gestion Private Bank.

"Metal is once again becoming insurance rather than just a speculative asset," he told AFP.

- A weak dollar -

Traditional safe havens like the dollar and US Treasuries have become less attractive this year.

Uncertainty around Trump's presidency and the prospect of further Federal Reserve interest rate cuts, have weakened the dollar, reducing its appeal to investors.

As a result, many investors are turning to gold and silver.

Gold has climbed more than 70 percent this year and passed $4,500 an ounce for the first time on Wednesday, while silver reached a record high of $72 an ounce, with prices up about 2.5 times since January.

A weak dollar is also boosting industrial metals, since commodities priced in dollars become cheaper for buyers when the currency falls.

- Fresh demand -

Industrial demand has surged in recent months, driven by the rise of artificial intelligence and the energy transition.

Copper, used for solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicle batteries and data centers, has seen strong gains as a result.

Prices hit a record on Wednesday, topping $12,000 a ton, helped further by China, the world's largest copper consumer, announcing new measures to boost demand.

Aluminium, a cheaper alternative to copper, and silver are also benefiting from the AI boom and the shift to renewable energy.

Platinum and palladium, used in car catalytic converters, have also risen, reaching a record high and a three-year high respectively, after the European Union decided to allow sales of new internal combustion vehicles beyond 2035.

- Tight supply -

Copper prices have been lifted this year by fears of US tariffs, prompting companies to stockpile ahead of their introduction, with duties imposed on semi-finished products and potentially extending to refined copper.

Supply risks from disruptions at mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile and Indonesia have added to the price surge.

Physical markets for silver, platinum, and aluminium are also tight.

According to Ole Hansen, an analyst at Saxo Bank, thin holiday trading, which increases volatility, and investor fear of missing out have further amplified the rise at the end of the year.