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Can Russia Revive the Adana Agreement between Syria and Turkey?

Two Syrian soldiers conduct a demining exercise near Damascus on June 19. (AFP)
Two Syrian soldiers conduct a demining exercise near Damascus on June 19. (AFP)
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Can Russia Revive the Adana Agreement between Syria and Turkey?

Two Syrian soldiers conduct a demining exercise near Damascus on June 19. (AFP)
Two Syrian soldiers conduct a demining exercise near Damascus on June 19. (AFP)

Whenever Turkey threatens to launch a military operation in northern Syria to establish a “safe zone,” Russia puts on the mediation table the revival of the Sochi Agreement on the east of the Euphrates, in preparation for the implementation of the Adana Agreement. The latter was signed by Ankara and Damascus in July 1998, establishing security cooperation between the two parties and allowing the Turkish army to pursue the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) deep into Syrian territory.

Since the Russian war in Ukraine, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has activated his old plan to establish a safe zone with a depth of 35 kilometers, trying to benefit from the improvement of Ankara’s negotiating position due to Washington and Moscow’s “need” for Turkey’s role.

America clearly announced its rejection of the military operation east of the Euphrates, while Moscow mediated between Damascus, Ankara and the Kurds, and deployed Syrian army forces in various areas in the north of the country to “deter” the Turkish army, ahead of the Russian-Turkish-Iranian summit in Tehran on Tuesday.

Ankara wants new incursions linking its military “enclaves” in northern Syria, namely the Euphrates Shield, north of Aleppo, which was established in 2016, the Olive Branch in Afrin in 2018, the Peace Spring, eEast of the Euphrates, formed at the end of 2019, and the Peace Shield, at the start of 2020.

Moscow proposes either activating the Adana Agreement or the full implementation of the Sochi Agreement of 2019, in addition to a military memorandum between Damascus and Qamishli in exchange for an agreement between Ankara and Washington. Below is a review of the most important agreements:

What are the terms of the Adana Agreement?

After Turkey threatened to attack Syria in mid-1998, late Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak mediated between the two parties, until a security agreement was concluded between Ankara and Damascus in the Turkish city of Adana. The text of the agreement and its annexes included, among others, the following items:

- As of now, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Abdullah Ocalan (detained in Turkey since the beginning of 1999), will not be in Syria, and will certainly not be allowed to enter Syria.
- PKK members abroad will not be allowed to enter Syria.
- As of now, PKK camps will not operate on Syrian soil, and will certainly not be allowed to become active.
- Many members of the PKK were arrested and referred to the court. The lists containing their names were prepared and submitted by Syria to the Turkish side.
- Syria, based on the principle of reciprocity, will not allow any activity launched from its territory that harms the security and stability of Turkey. Nor will Syria allow the supply of weapons, logistical materials, and financial and promotional support for PKK activities on its soil.
- Syria has classified the PKK as a terrorist organization, and has banned the activities of the party and its affiliated organizations on its territory, along with other terrorist organizations.
- Syria will not allow the PKK to establish camps or other facilities for training and shelter purposes or to conduct commercial activities on its soil.
- Syria will not allow members of the Kurdistan Workers Party to use its territory to cross to third countries.
- A direct telephone line is immediately operated between the higher security authorities of the two countries.
- The two parties appoint special security representatives in their diplomatic missions in Ankara and Damascus. Those are presented to the authorities of the host country by the heads of the mission.
- Annex No.3: As of now, the two parties consider that the border disputes between them have ended, and that neither of them has any claims or rights due in the territory of the other party.
- Annex No. 4: The Syrian side understands that its failure to adopt the security measures and duties stipulated in this agreement gives Turkey the right to implement all necessary security measures inside Syrian territory to a depth of five kilometers.

What does the Adana Agreement mean at the political and security levels?

• It gives the Turkish army the right to pursue the PKK at a depth of five km in northern Syria, according to Annex No. 4.
• Damascus relinquishes any claim to its rights in Iskenderun (Hatay Province), which Turkey annexed in 1939, according to Annex No. 3.
• The PKK, led by Abdullah Ocalan, is considered a “terrorist organization”, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.
• Ankara interprets the agreement as meaning that the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a “terrorist organization”, as an extension of the PKK.
• The agreement means the start of direct security contacts, knowing that the Director of Syrian National Security, Ali Mamlouk, has held several meetings with Turkish Intelligence chief Hakan Fidan.
• It also means re-operating the Turkish embassy in Damascus and the Syrian embassy in Ankara, noting that Damascus has a consulate in Istanbul, given that the agreement requires the appointment of a security liaison officer in each embassy.
• The agreement entails “indirect contacts” acknowledged by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, and Ankara’s recognition of the legitimacy of the Syrian government, as its required many procedures, including the formation of a joint committee and the operation of a hotline.
• The agreement offers an alternative to the Turkish-American understanding on the depth of the “buffer zone” of 32 kilometers in northeastern Syria, and opens the way for the implementation of the Sochi Agreement between Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin in October 2019, following former US President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw his forces from the east of the Euphrates, which paved the way for a Turkish attack at the time.

What is the 2019 Sochi Agreement?

Erdogan and Putin have agreed on 10 points, including:

The determination to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and to disrupt separatist projects in Syrian territory.
• In this context, the status quo will be preserved in the current Operation Peace Spring area, which covers Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ain, at a depth of 32 kilometers.
• Both parties reaffirmed the importance of the Adana Agreement. Russia, for its part, will facilitate the implementation of this agreement under the current circumstances.
• The Russian military police and Syrian border guards will enter the Syrian side of the Syrian-Turkish border, outside the area of Operation Peace Spring, in order to facilitate the removal of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and their weapons.
• Turkey and Russia will conduct joint patrols west and east of the Operation Peace Spring area, at a depth of 10 km, with the exception of the city of Qamishli.
• All members of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and their weapons will be removed from Manbij and Tal Rifaat.

What about the US-Turkish agreement of 2019?

Prior to that, an agreement was signed between Erdogan and former US Vice President Mike Pence in October 2019, which consisted 13 items. Those included, among others:
• The United States and Turkey confirm their relationship as NATO partners, and the United States understands Turkey’s legitimate security concerns on its southern border.
• The two sides agreed on the need to maintain the safety of the area, in order to address Turkey’s national security concerns and seize heavy weapons from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units.
• The Turkish side temporarily stops Operation Peace Spring to allow the withdrawal of the People’s Protection Units from the Spring area. Operation Peace Spring will be halted upon completion of this withdrawal.
• Once Operation Peace Spring is stopped, the United States agrees not to continue imposing sanctions pursuant to the October 14, 2019 Executive Order banning property and suspending entry to certain persons contributing to the situation in Syria.

How did the Syrian army return to the east of the Euphrates?

In parallel with these Russian-Turkish-American agreements that followed Trump’s withdrawal from Turkey’s borders in northeastern Syria - which opened the way for Ankara’s incursion – a memorandum of understanding was reached between the Syrian Democratic Forces, the allies of Washington, and Damascus. Here are some of its points:

• The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which includes the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, agreed to enter the Syrian Arab Army and extend its control over the entire region, starting from Ain Diwar in the east, and up to Jarablus in the west, where the forces will be deployed from three axes:
1. Tabqa axis in the north towards Ain Issa and its countryside, and in the north, towards the Syrian-Turkish border at Tal Abyad and towards the west.
2. The Manbij axis towards Ain al-Arab on the Syrian-Turkish border, to the point of Tal Abyad and towards the west.
3. Al-Hasakah-Tal Tamer axis to Ras al-Ain and from it to the east to Qamishli and then to al-Malikiyah and towards the south.
4. The forces are deployed in the Manbij area, starting from Arima and along the Sajour River line, according to the previous agreement on the deployment of forces in Arima.

In this memorandum, “the (SDF) forces affirmed their readiness to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and under the flag of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to stand by the Syrian Arab Army in the face of Turkish threats to the Syrian territories, led by President Bashar al-Assad.”

However, Trump’s keeping his forces east of the Euphrates has led to the slow implementation of this memorandum. In the face of recent Turkish threats, Russia returned to push the SDF and Damascus to implement the 2019 memorandum.

Just as Russia implemented the “disengagement” agreement between Syria and Israel and deployed international forces in the Golan, it seeks to put the interim agreements into effect, leading to the reactivation of the Adana Agreement, which would pave the way for “legitimizing” the government and expanding its sovereignty in the country.

Russia had previously suggested this option during the preparations for the tripartite summit in Tehran, and will continue to push for its implementation.

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Jamal Mustafa: Saddam and Other Iraqi Officials Headed to the Gallows with Heads Held High

Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Jamal Mustafa: Saddam and Other Iraqi Officials Headed to the Gallows with Heads Held High

Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saddam Hussein’s entourage never expected that they would one day find themselves in jail. It never occurred to them that the American military machine would use all of its might to oust Saddam’s regime and overthrow the ruling party and army. They never believed that forces allied to Iran would assume positions of power in the new regime.

Times changed and Saddam, who controlled the fate of the nation and its people, found himself in prison where he counted the days until his execution. The man was unyielding until his last breath and his will remained unbroken.

The men who made up the Revolutionary Command Council or government soon found themselves in prison. They were interrogated by the Americans and Iraqis and a death sentence was always going to be their fate.

In the second installment of his interview to Asharq Al-Awsat, Dr. Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan, late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and second secretary, recalled the execution of his colleagues and relatives. He also recalled how he married Hala, the youngest of Saddam’s daughters, and how the late president acted around his family, away from state affairs.

Other officials who were held along with Saddam included “Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan, my uncle and member of the Revolutionary Command Council Ali Hussein al-Majid, my other uncle Abed Hassan al-Majid, head of the Revolutionary Command Council Awad al-Bandar, Saddam’s half-brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Hassan, Secretary Abed Hammoud and aide to the intelligence chief Farouk Hijazi,” said Mustafa.

He showed Asharq Al-Awsat a video that recently came to light of Khodair al-Khozaei, the former vice president during the American occupation. “In it, he said that he saw no justification for the death sentence against Abed Hammoud. Most dangerous of all, he confessed that he visited Iran and consulted with a judicial official, who encouraged him to sign the death sentence, which he did,” added Mustafa.

“The truth is that we sensed from the beginning that our trial was a means of revenge acting at Iran’s orders. One day, Abed Hammoud was informed that he was going to be moved to hospital and later that day the guards informed us that he was executed,” he continued.

“Mr. President (Saddam) expected to be executed. The truth is that his very existence, whether in jail or otherwise, was a source of concern for them. I can firmly attest that the members of the leadership bravely faced their death sentence. None of them showed any weakness or faltered,” he revealed.

He recalled the day they informed Barzan and Awad that they were going to be executed. “I was working out with al-Bandar when we received the news. I am not exaggerating when I say that he maintained his optimism even in that moment. They were executed the next day. Days later, I learned that Abed Hassan al-Majid, Farouk Hijazi and Hadi Hassan, an intelligence officer, were executed,” Mustafa said.

“Let me tell you what used to happen. One day, they came up with false charges that before the US occupation, I gave Mr. Khamis al-Khanjar (a Sunni politician) a sum of 250,000 dollars. Of course, the charge is baseless. They told me that I would remain in jail for life if I did not confess to the charge. I refused and told them that I enjoyed normal relations with Khanjar,” he went on to say.

“They later came up with a different scenario. They told me that they would take me to the Iraqi embassy in Jordan if I confessed to the charge and that I would late be released in Amman with a hefty sum of money. I told them that I would reject whatever they have to offer because I would not abandon my values to betray Khanjar, who was a friend,” he stated.

“They later accused me of complicity in the draining of the Mesopotamian Marshes, which I had nothing to do with,” he added.

Saddam Hussein with his daughter Hala in this undated photo. (Getty Images)

First call after Saddam’s execution

Mustafa recalled the first telephone call he had with his wife Hala and her mother, Sajida Khairallah Talfah, right after Saddam’s execution. “Five days after Mr. President’s martyrdom, I contacted my family. I spoke with my wife, and she was in very good spirits. She had very high faith and patience. I asked her about her mother, and she reassured me that she was also doing very well despite the pain,” he said.

“I pray that Gold Almighty will give her health and a long life. We have always derived our strength from her. My mother-in-law lost her two sons, Uday and Qusay, and then her husband. She had played a major role in supporting her husband from the beginning of his struggle. She always used to support him and stood by him throughout his career,” he remarked.

First meetings with Saddam

Mustafa recalled the early days of his meeting with Saddam. “They started when I began working for his special guard. That was when I first met him. Like most Iraqis and Arabs, I believed that he would be a difficult person, but the truth is that I saw him as a paternal figure,” he added. “When you work with him, you begin to develop a different opinion than the public impression. He was a very paternal figure.”

During their first meeting, they learned that they came from the same tribe and were distant cousins.

“I stayed by Mr. President’s side for around 20 years. I started off as part of his personal guard and he then tasked me with people’s affairs, meaning seeing to their needs and addressing their problems. He was very concerned with the people’s affairs and refused any one of them to be wronged. The truth is that many laws were amended or changed at the time following complaints from the people,” he revealed.

“There were two telephones at Mr. President’s office, and both were connected to my office. Whoever had a problem could call the president through the citizens’ line. I used to answer their calls and listen to their problems and set an appointment with the president. Sometimes I used to ask the caller to come in person with their request so that their problem could be tackled. Sometimes Mr. President would interject on the call to ask about the issue and would request to talk to the citizen on the line,” Mustafa said.

“He would listen to the person’s grievance and tell him to head to the dedicated office to tackle the issue. (...) So we used to receive hundreds of citizens every week to solve their problems. Mr. President was very concerned about these issues,” he stressed. “I have never met another person like him. He would listen, care and then come up with a solution.”

President’s son-in-law

Asharq Al-Awsat asked Mustafa about when he asked Hala to marry him. “It was in 1994. As is the tradition in Iraq, I headed with my uncles to Saddam’s family to ask her hand in marriage,” he said. “One of my uncles made the request to Mr. President on my behalf and he agreed and welcomed it.”

“A judge was summoned immediately for the ceremony, and we were married. We had lunch at the president’s house that same day. I first met Hala on September 12, and we were married on September 26. It was a short engagement in line with tradition.”

“Mr. President used to separate state affairs from his relationship with his family. His work was completely separate from family, which had nothing to do with political or state affairs. It never intervened in those issues. Mr. President was a man of state when he was doing his job, and a father when he came home. He treated his family as if he were its father – the perfect father. Every family wishes to have a father that can measure up to him because he looked after all of his children and all of his relatives,” Mustafa said.

“When he sat down to the dinner table, he himself used to serve his own food and ask his children about their day. He would serve them food and generally cared very much for them. The state is one thing and family is another. At the same time, he acted as a father to all Iraqis. He treated them fairly. This is Saddam Hussein,” stressed Mustafa. “He was always keen that Iraqis be treated justly and that none of them be wronged. He was also very firm with his children if they made any mistake.”

Saddam’s hobbies

Saddam was a “very traditional Arab man. He loved traditional Arab and Iraqi dishes. He himself used to cook his own version of the traditional Iraqi dish al-Habeet. (...) He also loved seafood and would cook the Masgouf fish dish himself,” Mustafa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

His hobbies included horseback riding, hunting, swimming and sharpshooting. “Occasionally, before heading to the front to fight against Iran, he would visit the al-Amarah region, where gazelle and geese are abundant, to hunt. As circumstances became more challenging, he limited himself to fishing, which he did regularly,” he added.

He was a skilled shooter from his youth. “Generally, growing up in a tribe, children are taught at a young age how to become a good shooter. This is part of our upbringing. He was also an avid reader. He was always reading something,” Mustafa said of Saddam.