Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword

What will happen if the United States decided to suddenly withdraw from northeastern Syria? What if Turkey carried out its threats and launched an attack in the north of the country?

What if a secret deal was made to hand over Deir Ezzor oil fields to Damascus in exchange for information from the latter about the missing US journalist Austin Tice?

In fact, Russia uses these scenarios to push opponents and belligerents to search for specific arrangements and to fill the American vacuum. Moscow is always trying to make a balance between the enemies. It uses Syria as a platform for negotiating goals on other issues in the region and the world. It has been doing this for years between Iran and Israel. It made some settlements in southern Syria, without reaching a final deal in the country. It doesn’t seek to stop the Iranian positioning and drones through the supply borders. It does not operate its missile systems against bombardment coming from Tel Aviv.

This equation has become known, although it is marred by several threats and limitations, the latest of which is the current tension between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid due to the latter’s statements about Russian “war crimes” in Ukraine and Moscow’s pressure on the Jewish Agency in Russia.

Therefore, the recent Israeli bombardment against Syrian targets and “Iranian drones” was a sign of Lapid’s determination to implement the “red lines.”

Since the direct intervention at the end of 2015, the Russian policy in Syria has been a “two-edged sword.” It promoted militarization between enemies and barely focused on politics. It reached compromises with foreign parties and disregarded the Syrian side. It used media and politics to cover the military option and the requirements of security proposals. In the three Syrian “states” under the “Russian umbrella,” arrangements were made between Washington and Moscow, Ankara and Moscow, Tel Aviv and Moscow, and between Tehran and Moscow.

There is also a fictional political line between the Syrian parties. It was tied in Geneva before Moscow decided to cut it off due to Switzerland’s stance in support of Ukraine.

What’s new about the “two-edged policy” is the secret Russian maneuver between Damascus and Ankara, and between Damascus and Qamishli. How?

Following a state of confusion and reluctance that prevailed over the former US administration, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden’s administration showed more stability in its military survival in northeastern Syria. But it is important to stop at three developments:

First, after the attack on Ukraine, the Russian army has tried to test its US counterpart, pushing Washington to bilateral political and military dialogues and seeking to break the isolation because of Ukraine, knowing that a military agreement has been regulating their relationship in Syria since 2017.

Second, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to take advantage of the growing importance of his role because of the “Ukraine swamp” to deal a severe blow to the Kurds in northern Syria.

Third, Biden promised the family of Tice to communicate directly with President Bashar al-Assad’s team in search of information about the journalist, who has been missing for nearly a decade.

Among the ideas that are currently circulated is handing over Deir Ezzor oil to Damascus as a negotiating start, taking into consideration that Trump’s envoys had offered, in the summer of 2019, military withdrawals from northeastern Syria in exchange for the release of Tice.

In these signs, Moscow found an opportunity. It organized private security talks between Damascus and Ankara, aimed at reaching arrangements and cooperation between the two parties against the PKK and terrorism in northern Syria.

One of the options that are actually on the table is the revival of the Adana Agreement, which was signed in 1998 and allowed the Turkish army to penetrate five kilometers into the Syrian depth to chase Kurdish fighters.

Undoubtedly, Syria has changed, so did the region and the world. Russian-led negotiations aim to search for a modified version of the agreement. There is no doubt that the tripartite summit in Tehran, which was marked by the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad, gave an additional impetus to the Ankara-Damascus line under Moscow’s cover.

What is remarkable and unsurprising is that Moscow is sponsoring in parallel another agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in which the first line of mediation is supposed to be against the SDF main component, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units.

Here, the Hmeimim base sponsored talks to implement a memorandum of understanding that was completed in October 2019 between the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, and the director of national security, Major General Ali Mamlouk. Back then, the SDF hesitated to implement all the terms of the memorandum after the US agreed to postpone the withdrawal and extend the stay.

Now, the SDF is ready to implement these provisions. Up to 574 Syrian soldiers have been deployed in various areas near Al-Malikiyah, the Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish triangle, Ain Al-Arab (Kobani), Ain Issa and Manbij in the countryside of Aleppo, with the aim to form a deterrent force against Turkish desires.

In parallel, Western capitals are considering the need to start developing a “Plan B” in case of a military withdrawal, to prevent the recurrence of the Afghanistan experience.

The West is also advising the SDF to search for agreements and arrangements with Damascus, “because we will leave sooner or later.” As for Damascus, information indicates that no political talks will be held imminently. Military arrangements are possible, but political concessions are out of the question.

It is true that negotiations between Damascus and Qamishli in 2018, revealed differences over the future of the SDF, the Autonomous Administration, the border crossings, the language and symbols; but so far, Damascus is still reluctant to accept the Russian solutions, which Moscow repeat on every occasion.

The US conducted exercises, alerts, landings and assassinations east of the Euphrates. Israel bombed Iranian drones near Damascus. Turkish planes bombarded Kurdish targets in northern Syria, while opposition drones targeted the Hmeimim base in the west of the country.

Russian planes bombed the “Turkish region” in the northwest of the country. All of this is taking place in Syria, hours after the tripartite summit in Tehran and the Turkish mediation between Ukraine and Russia to conclude a “grain deal,” and Moscow’s success in “burying” the intra-Syrian Geneva process.

Intricate elements further complicate the Syrian puzzle, maximizing the suffering and the illusions of Syrian fates.

In the Mazzeh 86 neighborhood, west of the Syrian capital Damascus, the names of many shops, grocery stores, and public squares still serve as a reminder of the era of ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his late father, Hafez al-Assad.

This is evident in landmarks like the “Al-Hafez Restaurant,” one of the prominent features of this area. Squares such as “Al-Areen,” “Officers,” and “Bride of the Mountain” evoke memories of the buildings surrounding them, which once housed influential officials and high-ranking officers in intelligence and security agencies. These individuals instilled fear in Syrians for five decades until their historic escape on the night of the regime’s collapse last month.

In this neighborhood, the effects of Israeli bombing are clearly visible, as it was targeted multiple times. Meanwhile, its narrow streets and alleys were strewn with military uniforms abandoned by leaders who fled before military operations arrived and liberated the area from their grip on December 8 of last year.

Here, stark contradictions come to light during a tour by Asharq Al-Awsat in a district that, until recently, was largely loyal to the former president. Muaz, a 42-year-old resident of the area, recounts how most officers and security personnel shed their military uniforms and discarded them in the streets on the night of Assad’s escape.

He said: “Many of them brought down their weapons and military ranks in the streets and fled to their hometowns along the Syrian coast.”

Administratively part of Damascus, Mazzeh 86 consists of concrete blocks randomly built between the Mazzeh Western Villas area, the Mazzeh Highway, and the well-known Sheikh Saad commercial district. Its ownership originally belonged to the residents of the Mazzeh area in Damascus. The region was once agricultural land and rocky mountain terrain. The peaks extending toward Mount Qasioun were previously seized by the Ministry of Defense, which instructed security and army personnel to build homes there without requiring property ownership documents.

Suleiman, a 30-year-old shop owner, who sells white meat and chicken, hails from the city of Jableh in the coastal province of Latakia. His father moved to this neighborhood in the 1970s to work as an army assistant.

Suleiman says he hears the sound of gunfire every evening, while General Security patrols roam the streets “searching for remnants of the former regime and wanted individuals who refuse to surrender their weapons. We fear reprisals and just want to live in peace.”

He mentioned that prices before December 8 were exorbitant and beyond the purchasing power of Syrians, with the price of a kilogram of chicken exceeding 60,000 Syrian pounds and a carton of eggs reaching 75,000.

“A single egg was sold for 2,500 pounds, which is far beyond the purchasing power of any employee in the public or private sector,” due to low salaries and the deteriorating living conditions across the country,” Suleiman added.

On the sides of the roads, pictures of the fugitive president and his father, Hafez al-Assad, were torn down, while military vehicles were parked, awaiting instructions.

Maram, 46, who previously worked as a civilian employee in the Ministry of Defense, says she is waiting for the resolution of employment statuses for workers in army institutions. She stated: “So far, there are no instructions regarding our situation. The army forces and security personnel have been given the opportunity for settlement, but there is no talk about us.”

The neighborhood, in its current form, dates back to the 1980s when Rifaat al-Assad, the younger brother of former President Hafez al-Assad, was allowed to construct the “Defense Palace,” which was referred to as “Brigade 86.” Its location is the same area now known as Mazzeh Jabal 86.

The area is divided into two parts: Mazzeh Madrasa (School) and Mazzeh Khazan (Tank). The first takes its name from the first school built and opened in the area, while the second is named after the water tank that supplies the entire Mazzeh region.

Two sources from the Mazzeh Municipality and the Mukhtar’s office estimate the neighborhood’s current population at approximately 200,000, down from over 300,000 before Assad’s fall. Most residents originate from Syria’s coastal regions, followed by those from interior provinces like Homs and Hama. There was also a portion of Kurds who had moved from the Jazira region in northeastern Syria to live there, but most returned to their areas due to the security grip and after the “Crisis Cell” bombing that killed senior security officials in mid-2012.

Along the main street connecting Al-Huda Square to Al-Sahla Pharmacy, torn images of President Hafez al-Assad are visible for the first time in this area in five decades. On balconies and walls, traces of Bashar al-Assad’s posters remain, bearing witness to his 24-year era.

Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword