Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword

 The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
TT
20

Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword

 The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)

What will happen if the United States decided to suddenly withdraw from northeastern Syria? What if Turkey carried out its threats and launched an attack in the north of the country?

What if a secret deal was made to hand over Deir Ezzor oil fields to Damascus in exchange for information from the latter about the missing US journalist Austin Tice?

In fact, Russia uses these scenarios to push opponents and belligerents to search for specific arrangements and to fill the American vacuum. Moscow is always trying to make a balance between the enemies. It uses Syria as a platform for negotiating goals on other issues in the region and the world. It has been doing this for years between Iran and Israel. It made some settlements in southern Syria, without reaching a final deal in the country. It doesn’t seek to stop the Iranian positioning and drones through the supply borders. It does not operate its missile systems against bombardment coming from Tel Aviv.

This equation has become known, although it is marred by several threats and limitations, the latest of which is the current tension between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid due to the latter’s statements about Russian “war crimes” in Ukraine and Moscow’s pressure on the Jewish Agency in Russia.

Therefore, the recent Israeli bombardment against Syrian targets and “Iranian drones” was a sign of Lapid’s determination to implement the “red lines.”

Since the direct intervention at the end of 2015, the Russian policy in Syria has been a “two-edged sword.” It promoted militarization between enemies and barely focused on politics. It reached compromises with foreign parties and disregarded the Syrian side. It used media and politics to cover the military option and the requirements of security proposals. In the three Syrian “states” under the “Russian umbrella,” arrangements were made between Washington and Moscow, Ankara and Moscow, Tel Aviv and Moscow, and between Tehran and Moscow.

There is also a fictional political line between the Syrian parties. It was tied in Geneva before Moscow decided to cut it off due to Switzerland’s stance in support of Ukraine.

What’s new about the “two-edged policy” is the secret Russian maneuver between Damascus and Ankara, and between Damascus and Qamishli. How?

Following a state of confusion and reluctance that prevailed over the former US administration, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden’s administration showed more stability in its military survival in northeastern Syria. But it is important to stop at three developments:

First, after the attack on Ukraine, the Russian army has tried to test its US counterpart, pushing Washington to bilateral political and military dialogues and seeking to break the isolation because of Ukraine, knowing that a military agreement has been regulating their relationship in Syria since 2017.

Second, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to take advantage of the growing importance of his role because of the “Ukraine swamp” to deal a severe blow to the Kurds in northern Syria.

Third, Biden promised the family of Tice to communicate directly with President Bashar al-Assad’s team in search of information about the journalist, who has been missing for nearly a decade.

Among the ideas that are currently circulated is handing over Deir Ezzor oil to Damascus as a negotiating start, taking into consideration that Trump’s envoys had offered, in the summer of 2019, military withdrawals from northeastern Syria in exchange for the release of Tice.

In these signs, Moscow found an opportunity. It organized private security talks between Damascus and Ankara, aimed at reaching arrangements and cooperation between the two parties against the PKK and terrorism in northern Syria.

One of the options that are actually on the table is the revival of the Adana Agreement, which was signed in 1998 and allowed the Turkish army to penetrate five kilometers into the Syrian depth to chase Kurdish fighters.

Undoubtedly, Syria has changed, so did the region and the world. Russian-led negotiations aim to search for a modified version of the agreement. There is no doubt that the tripartite summit in Tehran, which was marked by the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad, gave an additional impetus to the Ankara-Damascus line under Moscow’s cover.

What is remarkable and unsurprising is that Moscow is sponsoring in parallel another agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in which the first line of mediation is supposed to be against the SDF main component, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units.

Here, the Hmeimim base sponsored talks to implement a memorandum of understanding that was completed in October 2019 between the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, and the director of national security, Major General Ali Mamlouk. Back then, the SDF hesitated to implement all the terms of the memorandum after the US agreed to postpone the withdrawal and extend the stay.

Now, the SDF is ready to implement these provisions. Up to 574 Syrian soldiers have been deployed in various areas near Al-Malikiyah, the Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish triangle, Ain Al-Arab (Kobani), Ain Issa and Manbij in the countryside of Aleppo, with the aim to form a deterrent force against Turkish desires.

In parallel, Western capitals are considering the need to start developing a “Plan B” in case of a military withdrawal, to prevent the recurrence of the Afghanistan experience.

The West is also advising the SDF to search for agreements and arrangements with Damascus, “because we will leave sooner or later.” As for Damascus, information indicates that no political talks will be held imminently. Military arrangements are possible, but political concessions are out of the question.

It is true that negotiations between Damascus and Qamishli in 2018, revealed differences over the future of the SDF, the Autonomous Administration, the border crossings, the language and symbols; but so far, Damascus is still reluctant to accept the Russian solutions, which Moscow repeat on every occasion.

The US conducted exercises, alerts, landings and assassinations east of the Euphrates. Israel bombed Iranian drones near Damascus. Turkish planes bombarded Kurdish targets in northern Syria, while opposition drones targeted the Hmeimim base in the west of the country.

Russian planes bombed the “Turkish region” in the northwest of the country. All of this is taking place in Syria, hours after the tripartite summit in Tehran and the Turkish mediation between Ukraine and Russia to conclude a “grain deal,” and Moscow’s success in “burying” the intra-Syrian Geneva process.

Intricate elements further complicate the Syrian puzzle, maximizing the suffering and the illusions of Syrian fates.



Amr Moussa: Arafat Was Wily, Obsessed with Escaping Patronage

Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
TT
20

Amr Moussa: Arafat Was Wily, Obsessed with Escaping Patronage

Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo
Arafat welcomes Amr Moussa in 1993. AFP file photo

In the final episode of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Egyptian Foreign Minister and ex-Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa reflected on his encounters with some of the Arab world’s most prominent leaders, offering personal insights and candid recollections.

Moussa described the late Moroccan King Hassan II as “the embodiment of intelligence,” saying that conversing with the monarch required keen attention and careful reading between the lines.

“You’d state your opinion, and he would respond. His words were precise, and if you listened closely, you could discern whether he agreed or disagreed without him needing to say so explicitly,” Moussa said.

He recalled a moment of quiet diplomacy with King Hassan II over the invitation of the Sahrawi delegation to an Arab-African summit in Cairo.

“He told me very clearly, ‘I do not agree at all. Please inform the president that I am uncomfortable with this and do not wish to open unnecessary doors.’”

Moussa said he responded by explaining that Egypt would not be issuing the invitation itself - that would fall to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity - and that the Egyptian president would not officially receive the Sahrawi delegation.

“I told him this would be handled formally and with discretion,” Moussa recounted. “When I said the word ‘formally,’ he repeated it, and I said, ‘Is there anything more significant than formal protocol, Your Majesty?’ He laughed. He didn’t say yes or no, but I understood his position.”

Moussa added that King Hassan reiterated his discomfort but did not object to the arrangement Moussa had outlined.

Turning to other regional figures, Moussa described Jordan’s late King Hussein bin Talal as “a skilled captain navigating turbulent waters,” and characterized the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as “mercurial, a master of maneuvering to evade any form of guardianship.”

He expressed admiration for the diplomatic legacy of the late Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, and spoke appreciatively of the experience of Iraq’s former foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari.

Away from politics, Moussa shared a personal side, revealing his fondness for the poetry of Al-Mutanabbi and the music of Egyptian composer and singer Mohammed Abdel Wahab.

Moussa praised Jordan’s late King Hussein for his deft political navigation, and said his son, King Abdullah II, has inherited many of those skills in managing the kingdom through difficult times.

“I have great admiration for Jordan and deep affection for its people,” Moussa said.

“King Hussein had an exceptional ability to maneuver through enormous storms, sparing Jordan from many disasters and emerging relatively unscathed. It was a remarkable achievement.”

He said King Abdullah had inherited much of his father’s political instinct.

“I believe King Abdullah learned a lot from him and carries forward that legacy. From the time of King Hussein, Jordan has been a well-organized and orderly society.”

Acknowledging the political and economic challenges the country faces, Moussa noted, “Of course, there are political difficulties and issues like poverty just as in many of our countries but I’m speaking about governance. From the outside, Jordan appears to be managed with an extraordinary level of intelligence despite immense internal, regional, and geopolitical pressures.”

Arafat the Ultimate Wily

Asked whether he missed the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Moussa offered a complex reflection.

“I pray for his soul. He was an extraordinary figure - charismatic, cunning, and unpredictable,” he said. “In Egypt, we’d call someone like that wily - he’d say and not say, appear and disappear, agree and disagree, all at the same time.”

Moussa described Arafat as a mirror of the Palestinian struggle. “Palestinians had to do everything they could for their cause, and that often meant being unpredictable, agile - even cunning. Arafat embodied that.”

He added, “There’s no doubt he was a nationalist. He was never willing to be an agent, submissive, or beholden to any other power. That was one of his greatest traits and perhaps one of his greatest flaws.”

“Arafat didn’t see things in black and white or even in shades of gray. But politics is about handling complexity. Sometimes you need to be decisive and firm, and at other times flexible and adaptive. That’s what politics demands.”

Moussa described Arafat as a master political tactician whose elusive maneuvering often drew fierce criticism, especially in his absence.

“Yes, he faced harsh attacks,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat. “The insults often came when he wasn’t present, and he was aware of that.”

Moussa recalled a meeting in Cairo during preparations to resolve the Gaza file, a move that ultimately paved the way for Arafat’s return to Palestinian territory via Gaza.

“It was a positive step that should have been built upon,” he said.

“President [Hosni] Mubarak was very angry at the time. I think he even muttered something, not directly at Arafat, saying, ‘This is kids’ play.’”

Arafat, according to Moussa, was deeply distrustful of the Israelis. “And he was right to be,” he added. “Still, before taking any action, we had to study every angle to ensure things unfolded smoothly.”

Despite the progress, Arafat continued to hedge. “He signed, but with reservations. That frustrated President Mubarak,” Moussa said. “But I managed to convince him that the other side wasn’t exactly above suspicion either.”

Arafat’s position on the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait cost him dearly in the Arab world. “He had many enemies, especially after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. That created significant turmoil,” Moussa said.

He noted that insults were not part of traditional Arab diplomacy. “They became more common with the rise of military coups. Suddenly, accusations of treason became routine.”

The Tunis Summit: A Diplomatic Low Point

When asked about the most difficult Arab summit he attended, Moussa pointed to the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, which was postponed at the last minute amid mounting tensions.

“Every summit was difficult, but that one stands out,” he said. “It was a storm of disputes, and I found myself at the center of one.”

The controversy erupted after Moussa, then Secretary-General of the Arab League, agreed to have Arab literature featured as the guest of honor at the Frankfurt Book Fair.

“The request came to me through Ghassan Salamé. He explained the proposal in my office in Cairo. I told him: ‘Tell them I accept.’ As Secretary-General, I had the authority to do so.”

The decision was initially approved by Arab culture ministers. But once it reached foreign ministers, questions arose. “They asked: ‘Is the Secretary-General entitled to make such decisions?’ I told them yes. But if they disagreed, I would present it to the summit.”

The backlash was swift. “It became a major issue, one that escalated quickly. There were other contentious items as well,” Moussa said.

Faced with the mounting discord, then-Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali decided to postpone the summit just as some Arab leaders had already begun arriving.

“It wasn’t an outright cancellation but a deferral,” Moussa explained. “Ben Ali was right. The atmosphere was too tense, with unresolved disputes. It wouldn’t have been productive.”

Tunisian State Minister Habib Ben Yahia informed the delegation of the delay, which left many shocked.

“Later, President Ben Ali summoned me to his office,” Moussa recalled. “He asked for my opinion. I told him I understood the decision, but we had to set a new date. It was late March. I suggested May. He agreed.”

Around the same time, Moussa saw a statement from an Egyptian official offering to host the summit if Tunisia could not. “I told President Ben Ali I would look into the matter and get back to him,” he said.

Moussa has recounted a high-stakes meeting with President Mubarak following the sudden postponement of the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, describing the diplomatic balancing act that followed.

Moussa said that before leaving Tunis for Cairo, he contacted presidential chief of staff Zakaria Azmi and requested an immediate meeting with Mubarak upon arrival. “I was told the president would see me the next morning at 9 a.m.,” he said.

On arrival at the presidential palace, he was informed by a staff member that Mubarak was meeting with Prince Saud and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher.

“I asked him to inform the president I had arrived. He came back and said, ‘The president says to come in.’”

Inside the room, Prince Saud was seated to Mubarak’s right, with Maher next to him. Moussa took the chair facing the president.

“Mubarak asked me directly, ‘What are you going to do about this, Amr?’” Moussa recalled. “I told him, ‘Mr. President, the situation was indeed complicated. Perhaps the decision (to postpone) wasn’t ideal, but there were real difficulties.’”

He explained that the summit had been Tunisia’s turn to host and that he had already spoken with Ben Ali. “I told him we must agree on a new date - May - and that it must be held in Tunis. I said this message should come from you directly.”

Mubarak, Moussa said, responded positively: “You’re right. I feel reassured by this.”

Moussa said Saudi Arabia’s late foreign minister, Prince Saud, had a look of “relief and joy” when Egypt backed holding the 2004 Arab League summit in Tunis, following a postponement that had stirred diplomatic tensions.

“It was as if mercy had descended upon him,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Prince Saud was visibly pleased. As secretary-general, I insisted the summit must take place in Tunis. In fact, Prince Saud had come to Cairo for the same reason. He feared that relocating the summit would spark a crisis between Egypt and Tunisia, or even with the Maghreb.”

He added, “I returned to Tunis the following day and informed President Ben Ali that the summit would indeed be held there the next month. We then sat together discussing our mutual admiration for Mohamed Abdel Wahab. He was a great fan and had collected all his recordings.”

On the Fate of Arab Leaders

Asked how he felt when reflecting on the downfall of Arab rulers such as Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Moussa said:

“May God have mercy on them. They made grave mistakes and failed to see the momentum that was building. That momentum was evident in the discourse around a ‘new Middle East.’ If good governance had existed in those countries, the people would have protected their leaders. But what happened showed the deep need for change.”

Praise for Arab Diplomacy

Moussa also spoke highly of several Arab foreign ministers he worked with, saying many were “exceptional professionals who conducted themselves with integrity.”

He singled out Prince Saud as “an extraordinary figure - wise, respected, and trusted deeply by King Abdullah. The king would rely on his assessments and act accordingly.”

“We had a strong mutual respect,” he added. “His support was critical in rallying Arab momentum behind the Palestinian cause, Arab League reform, and the League’s renewed dynamism. He defended our positions - including when I led Arab reconciliation efforts in Beirut. European diplomats would tell me how Prince Saud described me as a unified Arab voice. He stood by me at the UN and attended regional summits - from Latin America to the Arab world - whenever I called on him.”

Moussa also praised Zebari, Iraq’s former foreign minister, calling him “a Kurdish minister who often sounded more Arab than many Arabs.”

“He clearly articulated Arab interests and was always ready to step in diplomatically to defuse tensions - whether between ministers or between ministers and the secretary-general. He was a thoroughly positive presence,” Moussa said.

He also acknowledged the contributions of Tunisia's Habib Ben Yahia, Kuwait's Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Qatar's Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, Oman's Yusuf bin Alawi, and Jordan's Nasser Judeh and Ayman Safadi, noting their professionalism and dedication to Arab unity.

Moussa recalls working with dozens of Arab foreign ministers over the years, singling out those who left a lasting impression. Among them was Tunisia’s Habib Ben Yahia, who also served as defense minister. “A well-balanced figure and a strong advocate for the Arab position,” Moussa said.

But one man, he noted, stood apart: Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Kuwait’s former foreign minister and prime minister, who later became Emir. “He had a unique ability to read the room. Before tensions escalated, he would call for consultations or suspend a meeting, preventing crises before they erupted. Without his timely interventions, some meetings would have ended in chaos,” Moussa said. “His leadership as Emir was undeniably impactful.”

Another key figure was Qatar’s Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. “You could write pages about his intelligence and agility,” said Moussa. “He knew how to secure gains for Qatar, but also understood when to share benefits to avoid backlash. He was very smart.”

Moussa said he and Hamad maintained a candid relationship. “He would say openly: I’ll support this, but not that. There was honesty, not empty talk. Saud Al Faisal appreciated dealing with him as well. The three of us - me, Saud, and Hamad - spoke frankly.”

From Oman, Yousuf bin Alawi stood out for his quiet but disruptive style. “He would remain silent during discussions, then intervene at the end to overturn consensus if he didn’t agree. I could often predict when he’d shut something down,” said Moussa. “We were aware of his capabilities.”

On Jordan, Moussa said the kingdom produced several sharp, effective foreign ministers. “Abdel Ilah Al-Khatib was one of the good ones, followed by Nasser Judeh. The current minister, Ayman Safadi, is excellent - clear, reliable, and valuable in Arab diplomacy.”

The Arab Peace Initiative

Asked whether it was difficult to pass the Arab Peace Initiative at the 2002 Beirut Summit, Moussa replied, “Not at all. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia backed it. It was hard to reject anything he supported.”

He recalled how Libya’s then-foreign minister, Ali Treki, was instructed to oppose the initiative. “But King Abdullah summoned him and said: There is no objection. Treki responded: Understood. He was a clever man. Rather than oppose it outright, we allowed it to pass unanimously, then expressed our reservations separately. That’s how diplomacy works.”

On Global Diplomacy

Moussa also reflected on his ties with international counterparts. “I had many friends. Hubert Védrine of France comes to mind immediately. We worked together often. James Baker had stature and presence, though I could criticize him too. Britain’s Jack Straw was important.

Germany’s Green Party foreign minister also played a key role. Some had real weight and strong political theories.”

Of Russia’s long-serving foreign minister, Moussa said: “I’ve known Sergei Lavrov for years, and he remains approachable. He is perhaps less reserved than many of his Western counterparts, warm and skilled at building relationships. He is among the world’s most important foreign ministers.”

He also spoke about his interactions with Henry Kissinger.

“We spoke often, especially about the Palestinian issue. In his later years, he was still listening, processing thoughts, even if less involved in the Middle East. He would hear perspectives from Egyptians and others critical of Israel’s conduct and America’s unconditional support. He understood that, though he wasn’t deeply engaged in his final 10 to 15 years.”

From Literature to Music: A Personal Side

Moussa reflected on the books and music that shaped him. “As a boy, I loved reading. A Tale of Two Cities taught us about life and language. Teachers were cultured and aimed to raise our standards. I also read How to Stop Worrying and Start Living, a translated self-help book. I came to believe worry is actually a useful habit. If you don’t worry, you’ll stumble.”

Asked about poetry, Moussa didn’t hesitate. “Al-Mutanabbi, of course. I still read his work. Also Ahmed Shawqi, and to a lesser extent Nizar Qabbani. Al-Mutanabbi was always relevant. Former Libyan foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham never traveled without his Diwan (collection). When he was troubled, he’d read aloud from it. And Jean Obeid from Lebanon was deeply versed in Arabic literature—we had long, enriching conversations. It was a joy to listen to or recite Al-Mutanabbi.”

Moussa also shared his enduring love for classic Arabic music. “I adored Mohamed Abdel Wahab’s songs from an early age, especially his historical, non-commercial works. Magnificent. I also listen to Umm Kulthum, Fairuz, and folk legends like Sabah Fakhri. That’s real Arab artistry, music with meaning. Abdel Wahab and Umm Kulthum excelled at that, while Qabbani specialized in love. But when it came to national pride, faith, philosophy, and memory, those two giants delivered.”

On Egypt, the Presidency, and Regret

Does he hold any grudges against Egypt? “Not at all. My disappointment is for Egypt, not with it. The country could have been in a vastly different place, if not for 70 years without good governance.”

Did losing the 2012 presidential election leave a scar? “Not in the slightest,” Moussa said. “In fact, I may have thanked God. Before the vote, I realized the Muslim Brotherhood would win, but withdrawing wasn’t an option. When I lost, I held a press conference attended by 100 foreign journalists. Imagine how many would’ve come had I won. I congratulated the victors and called for democracy to prevail.”

He contrasted his response with that of other candidates. “Some went to Tahrir Square and claimed the results were false. That was not my approach. I offered my best wishes and hoped democracy would guide Egypt forward. I hold no bitterness, at least none that I can recall.”