Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword

 The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
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Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword

 The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)

What will happen if the United States decided to suddenly withdraw from northeastern Syria? What if Turkey carried out its threats and launched an attack in the north of the country?

What if a secret deal was made to hand over Deir Ezzor oil fields to Damascus in exchange for information from the latter about the missing US journalist Austin Tice?

In fact, Russia uses these scenarios to push opponents and belligerents to search for specific arrangements and to fill the American vacuum. Moscow is always trying to make a balance between the enemies. It uses Syria as a platform for negotiating goals on other issues in the region and the world. It has been doing this for years between Iran and Israel. It made some settlements in southern Syria, without reaching a final deal in the country. It doesn’t seek to stop the Iranian positioning and drones through the supply borders. It does not operate its missile systems against bombardment coming from Tel Aviv.

This equation has become known, although it is marred by several threats and limitations, the latest of which is the current tension between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid due to the latter’s statements about Russian “war crimes” in Ukraine and Moscow’s pressure on the Jewish Agency in Russia.

Therefore, the recent Israeli bombardment against Syrian targets and “Iranian drones” was a sign of Lapid’s determination to implement the “red lines.”

Since the direct intervention at the end of 2015, the Russian policy in Syria has been a “two-edged sword.” It promoted militarization between enemies and barely focused on politics. It reached compromises with foreign parties and disregarded the Syrian side. It used media and politics to cover the military option and the requirements of security proposals. In the three Syrian “states” under the “Russian umbrella,” arrangements were made between Washington and Moscow, Ankara and Moscow, Tel Aviv and Moscow, and between Tehran and Moscow.

There is also a fictional political line between the Syrian parties. It was tied in Geneva before Moscow decided to cut it off due to Switzerland’s stance in support of Ukraine.

What’s new about the “two-edged policy” is the secret Russian maneuver between Damascus and Ankara, and between Damascus and Qamishli. How?

Following a state of confusion and reluctance that prevailed over the former US administration, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden’s administration showed more stability in its military survival in northeastern Syria. But it is important to stop at three developments:

First, after the attack on Ukraine, the Russian army has tried to test its US counterpart, pushing Washington to bilateral political and military dialogues and seeking to break the isolation because of Ukraine, knowing that a military agreement has been regulating their relationship in Syria since 2017.

Second, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to take advantage of the growing importance of his role because of the “Ukraine swamp” to deal a severe blow to the Kurds in northern Syria.

Third, Biden promised the family of Tice to communicate directly with President Bashar al-Assad’s team in search of information about the journalist, who has been missing for nearly a decade.

Among the ideas that are currently circulated is handing over Deir Ezzor oil to Damascus as a negotiating start, taking into consideration that Trump’s envoys had offered, in the summer of 2019, military withdrawals from northeastern Syria in exchange for the release of Tice.

In these signs, Moscow found an opportunity. It organized private security talks between Damascus and Ankara, aimed at reaching arrangements and cooperation between the two parties against the PKK and terrorism in northern Syria.

One of the options that are actually on the table is the revival of the Adana Agreement, which was signed in 1998 and allowed the Turkish army to penetrate five kilometers into the Syrian depth to chase Kurdish fighters.

Undoubtedly, Syria has changed, so did the region and the world. Russian-led negotiations aim to search for a modified version of the agreement. There is no doubt that the tripartite summit in Tehran, which was marked by the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad, gave an additional impetus to the Ankara-Damascus line under Moscow’s cover.

What is remarkable and unsurprising is that Moscow is sponsoring in parallel another agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in which the first line of mediation is supposed to be against the SDF main component, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units.

Here, the Hmeimim base sponsored talks to implement a memorandum of understanding that was completed in October 2019 between the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, and the director of national security, Major General Ali Mamlouk. Back then, the SDF hesitated to implement all the terms of the memorandum after the US agreed to postpone the withdrawal and extend the stay.

Now, the SDF is ready to implement these provisions. Up to 574 Syrian soldiers have been deployed in various areas near Al-Malikiyah, the Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish triangle, Ain Al-Arab (Kobani), Ain Issa and Manbij in the countryside of Aleppo, with the aim to form a deterrent force against Turkish desires.

In parallel, Western capitals are considering the need to start developing a “Plan B” in case of a military withdrawal, to prevent the recurrence of the Afghanistan experience.

The West is also advising the SDF to search for agreements and arrangements with Damascus, “because we will leave sooner or later.” As for Damascus, information indicates that no political talks will be held imminently. Military arrangements are possible, but political concessions are out of the question.

It is true that negotiations between Damascus and Qamishli in 2018, revealed differences over the future of the SDF, the Autonomous Administration, the border crossings, the language and symbols; but so far, Damascus is still reluctant to accept the Russian solutions, which Moscow repeat on every occasion.

The US conducted exercises, alerts, landings and assassinations east of the Euphrates. Israel bombed Iranian drones near Damascus. Turkish planes bombarded Kurdish targets in northern Syria, while opposition drones targeted the Hmeimim base in the west of the country.

Russian planes bombed the “Turkish region” in the northwest of the country. All of this is taking place in Syria, hours after the tripartite summit in Tehran and the Turkish mediation between Ukraine and Russia to conclude a “grain deal,” and Moscow’s success in “burying” the intra-Syrian Geneva process.

Intricate elements further complicate the Syrian puzzle, maximizing the suffering and the illusions of Syrian fates.



Hezbollah’s ‘Statelet’ in Syria’s Qusayr Under Israeli Fire

Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)
Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)
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Hezbollah’s ‘Statelet’ in Syria’s Qusayr Under Israeli Fire

Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)
Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)

Israel has expanded its strikes against Hezbollah in Syria by targeting the al-Qusayr region in Homs.

Israel intensified its campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in September and has in the process struck legal and illegal borders between Lebanon and Syria that are used to smuggle weapons to the Iran-backed party. Now, it has expanded its operations to areas of Hezbollah influence inside Syria itself.

Qusayr is located around 20 kms from the Lebanese border. Israeli strikes have destroyed several bridges in the area, including one stretching over the Assi River that is a vital connection between Qusayr and several towns in Homs’ eastern and western countrysides.

Israel has also hit main and side roads and Syrian regime checkpoints in the area.

The Israeli army announced that the latest attacks targeted roads that connect the Syrian side of the border to Lebanon and that are used to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah.

Qusayr is strategic position for Hezbollah. The Iran-backed party joined the fight alongside the Syrian regime against opposition factions in the early years of the Syrian conflict, which began in 2011. Hezbollah confirmed its involvement in Syria in 2013.

Hezbollah waged its earliest battles in Syria against the “Free Syrian Army” in Qusayr. After two months of fighting, the party captured the region in mid-June 2013. By then, it was completely destroyed and its population fled to Lebanon.

A source from the Syrian opposition said Hezbollah has turned Qusayr and its countryside to its own “statelet”.

It is now the backbone of its military power and the party has the final say in the area even though regime forces are deployed there, it told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Qusayr is critical for Hezbollah because of its close proximity to the Lebanese border,” it added.

Several of Qusayr’s residents have since returned to their homes. But the source clarified that only regime loyalists and people whom Hezbollah “approves” of have returned.

The region has become militarized by Hezbollah. It houses training centers for the party and Shiite militias loyal to Iran whose fighters are trained by Hezbollah, continued the source.

Since Israel intensified its attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the party moved the majority of its fighters to Qusayr, where the party also stores large amounts of its weapons, it went on to say.

In 2016, Shiite Hezbollah staged a large military parade at the al-Dabaa airport in Qusayr that was seen as a message to the displaced residents, who are predominantly Sunni, that their return home will be impossible, stressed the source.

Even though the regime has deployed its forces in Qusayr, Hezbollah ultimately holds the greatest sway in the area.

Qusayr is therefore of paramount importance to Hezbollah, which will be in no way willing to cede control of.

Lebanese military expert Brig. Gen Saeed Al-Qazah told Asharq Al-Awsat that Qusayr is a “fundamental logistic position for Hezbollah.”

He explained that it is where the party builds its rockets and drones that are delivered from Iran. It is also where the party builds the launchpads for firing its Katyusha and grad rockets.

Qazah added that Qusayr is also significant for its proximity to Lebanon’s al-Hermel city and northeastern Bekaa region where Hezbollah enjoys popular support and where its arms deliveries pass through on their way to the South.

Qazah noted that Israel has not limited its strikes in Qusayr to bridges and main and side roads, but it has also hit trucks headed to Lebanon, stressing that Israel has its eyes focused deep inside Syria, not just the border.