Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword

 The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
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Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword

 The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)

What will happen if the United States decided to suddenly withdraw from northeastern Syria? What if Turkey carried out its threats and launched an attack in the north of the country?

What if a secret deal was made to hand over Deir Ezzor oil fields to Damascus in exchange for information from the latter about the missing US journalist Austin Tice?

In fact, Russia uses these scenarios to push opponents and belligerents to search for specific arrangements and to fill the American vacuum. Moscow is always trying to make a balance between the enemies. It uses Syria as a platform for negotiating goals on other issues in the region and the world. It has been doing this for years between Iran and Israel. It made some settlements in southern Syria, without reaching a final deal in the country. It doesn’t seek to stop the Iranian positioning and drones through the supply borders. It does not operate its missile systems against bombardment coming from Tel Aviv.

This equation has become known, although it is marred by several threats and limitations, the latest of which is the current tension between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid due to the latter’s statements about Russian “war crimes” in Ukraine and Moscow’s pressure on the Jewish Agency in Russia.

Therefore, the recent Israeli bombardment against Syrian targets and “Iranian drones” was a sign of Lapid’s determination to implement the “red lines.”

Since the direct intervention at the end of 2015, the Russian policy in Syria has been a “two-edged sword.” It promoted militarization between enemies and barely focused on politics. It reached compromises with foreign parties and disregarded the Syrian side. It used media and politics to cover the military option and the requirements of security proposals. In the three Syrian “states” under the “Russian umbrella,” arrangements were made between Washington and Moscow, Ankara and Moscow, Tel Aviv and Moscow, and between Tehran and Moscow.

There is also a fictional political line between the Syrian parties. It was tied in Geneva before Moscow decided to cut it off due to Switzerland’s stance in support of Ukraine.

What’s new about the “two-edged policy” is the secret Russian maneuver between Damascus and Ankara, and between Damascus and Qamishli. How?

Following a state of confusion and reluctance that prevailed over the former US administration, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden’s administration showed more stability in its military survival in northeastern Syria. But it is important to stop at three developments:

First, after the attack on Ukraine, the Russian army has tried to test its US counterpart, pushing Washington to bilateral political and military dialogues and seeking to break the isolation because of Ukraine, knowing that a military agreement has been regulating their relationship in Syria since 2017.

Second, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to take advantage of the growing importance of his role because of the “Ukraine swamp” to deal a severe blow to the Kurds in northern Syria.

Third, Biden promised the family of Tice to communicate directly with President Bashar al-Assad’s team in search of information about the journalist, who has been missing for nearly a decade.

Among the ideas that are currently circulated is handing over Deir Ezzor oil to Damascus as a negotiating start, taking into consideration that Trump’s envoys had offered, in the summer of 2019, military withdrawals from northeastern Syria in exchange for the release of Tice.

In these signs, Moscow found an opportunity. It organized private security talks between Damascus and Ankara, aimed at reaching arrangements and cooperation between the two parties against the PKK and terrorism in northern Syria.

One of the options that are actually on the table is the revival of the Adana Agreement, which was signed in 1998 and allowed the Turkish army to penetrate five kilometers into the Syrian depth to chase Kurdish fighters.

Undoubtedly, Syria has changed, so did the region and the world. Russian-led negotiations aim to search for a modified version of the agreement. There is no doubt that the tripartite summit in Tehran, which was marked by the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad, gave an additional impetus to the Ankara-Damascus line under Moscow’s cover.

What is remarkable and unsurprising is that Moscow is sponsoring in parallel another agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in which the first line of mediation is supposed to be against the SDF main component, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units.

Here, the Hmeimim base sponsored talks to implement a memorandum of understanding that was completed in October 2019 between the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, and the director of national security, Major General Ali Mamlouk. Back then, the SDF hesitated to implement all the terms of the memorandum after the US agreed to postpone the withdrawal and extend the stay.

Now, the SDF is ready to implement these provisions. Up to 574 Syrian soldiers have been deployed in various areas near Al-Malikiyah, the Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish triangle, Ain Al-Arab (Kobani), Ain Issa and Manbij in the countryside of Aleppo, with the aim to form a deterrent force against Turkish desires.

In parallel, Western capitals are considering the need to start developing a “Plan B” in case of a military withdrawal, to prevent the recurrence of the Afghanistan experience.

The West is also advising the SDF to search for agreements and arrangements with Damascus, “because we will leave sooner or later.” As for Damascus, information indicates that no political talks will be held imminently. Military arrangements are possible, but political concessions are out of the question.

It is true that negotiations between Damascus and Qamishli in 2018, revealed differences over the future of the SDF, the Autonomous Administration, the border crossings, the language and symbols; but so far, Damascus is still reluctant to accept the Russian solutions, which Moscow repeat on every occasion.

The US conducted exercises, alerts, landings and assassinations east of the Euphrates. Israel bombed Iranian drones near Damascus. Turkish planes bombarded Kurdish targets in northern Syria, while opposition drones targeted the Hmeimim base in the west of the country.

Russian planes bombed the “Turkish region” in the northwest of the country. All of this is taking place in Syria, hours after the tripartite summit in Tehran and the Turkish mediation between Ukraine and Russia to conclude a “grain deal,” and Moscow’s success in “burying” the intra-Syrian Geneva process.

Intricate elements further complicate the Syrian puzzle, maximizing the suffering and the illusions of Syrian fates.



What Do ‘Expert Level’ Talks Signal for the Progress of the Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations? 

US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi, left, meet at a hotel in Vienna, July 9, 2015. (Carlos Barria/Pool Photo via AP, File)
US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi, left, meet at a hotel in Vienna, July 9, 2015. (Carlos Barria/Pool Photo via AP, File)
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What Do ‘Expert Level’ Talks Signal for the Progress of the Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations? 

US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi, left, meet at a hotel in Vienna, July 9, 2015. (Carlos Barria/Pool Photo via AP, File)
US Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi, left, meet at a hotel in Vienna, July 9, 2015. (Carlos Barria/Pool Photo via AP, File)

Negotiations between Iran and the United States over Tehran's rapidly advancing nuclear program will move Wednesday to what's known as the “expert level” — a sign analysts say shows that the talks are moving forward rapidly.

However, experts not involved in the talks who spoke with The Associated Press warn that this doesn't necessarily signal a deal is imminent. Instead, it means that the talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff haven't broken down at what likely is the top-level trade — Tehran limiting its atomic program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions.

“Agreeing to technical talks suggests both sides are expressing pragmatic, realistic objectives for the negotiations and want to explore the details,” said Kelsey Davenport, the director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association who long has studied Iran's nuclear program.

“If Witkoff was making maximalist demands during his talks with Araghchi, such as dismantlement of the enrichment program, Iran would have no incentive to meet at the technical level.”

That technical level, however, remains filled with possible landmines. Just how much enrichment by Iran would be comfortable for the United States? What about Tehran's ballistic missile program, which US President Donald Trump first cited in pulling America unilaterally out of the accord in 2018? Which sanctions could be lifted and which would be remain in place on Tehran?

“The most important determinant of expert talks’ value lies in whether there is a political commitment to do something and experts just need to figure out what,” said Richard Nephew, an adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who worked on Iran sanctions while at the US State Department during negotiations over what became the 2015 nuclear deal.

“If the experts also have to discuss big concepts, without political agreement, it can just result in spun wheels.”

Experts and the 2015 nuclear deal

The 2015 nuclear deal saw senior experts involved in both sides of the deal. For the US under President Barack Obama, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz reached an understanding working with Ali Akbar Salehi, then the leader of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Both men's technical background proved key to nailing down the specifics of the deal.

Under the 2015 agreement, Iran agreed to enrich uranium only to 3.67% purity and keep a stockpile of only 300 kilograms (661 pounds). Today, Iran enriches some uranium up to 60% purity — a short, technical step away from weapons-grade levels of 90%. The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency put Iran's overall uranium stockpile in February at 8,294.4 kilograms (18,286 pounds).

The deal also limited the types of centrifuges Iran could spin, further slowing Tehran's ability to rush for a bomb, if it chose to do so. It also set out the provisions of how and when sanctions would be lifted, as well as time limits for the accord itself.

Reaching limits, relief and timelines require the knowledge of experts, analysts say.

“A nonproliferation agreement is meaningless if it cannot be effectively implemented and verified,” Davenport said. “The United States needs a strong technical team to negotiate the detailed restrictions and intrusive monitoring that will be necessary to ensure any move by Iran toward nuclear weapons is quickly detected and there is sufficient time to respond.”

It remains unclear who the two sides will be sending for those negotiations.

Hiccups already heard in these negotiations

Both the Americans and the Iranians have been tightlipped over exactly what's been discussed so far, though both sides have expressed optimism about the pace. However, there has been one noticeable dispute stemming from comments Witkoff made in a television interview, suggesting Tehran could be able to enrich up to 3.67% purity. However, analysts noted that was the level set by the 2015 deal under Obama.

Witkoff hours later issued a statement suggesting that comparison struck a nerve: “A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal.”

“Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program,” Witkoff added.

Araghchi responded by warning that Iran must be able to enrich.

"The core issue of enrichment itself is not negotiable,” he said.

Despite that, experts who spoke to the AP said they remained positive about the talks' trajectory so far.

“Although still early stages, I’m encouraged so far,” said Alan Eyre, a former US diplomat once involved in past nuclear negotiations with Tehran. “The pace of negotiations — to include starting expert level meetings this Wednesday — is good.”

He added that so far, there didn't appear to be any “mutually exclusive red lines” for the talks as well — signaling there likely wasn't immediately any roadblocks to reaching a deal.

Nephew similarly described reaching the expert level as a “positive sign.” However, he cautioned that the hard work potentially was just beginning for the negotiations.

“They imply the need to get into real details, to discuss concepts that senior (officials) might not understand and to answer questions. I also think too much can be read into them starting,” Nephew said. “Expert talks can sometimes be a fudge for seniors to avoid working on tough issues — ‘let’s have experts discuss it while we move on to other things’ — or to sidestep big political decisions."

Corey Hinderstein, the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former US government nuclear expert, described herself as feeling “cautious optimism” over the expert talks beginning.

“Heads of delegation are responsible for setting strategic goals and defining success,” she said. “But if there is a deal to be made, the technical experts are the ones who will get it done.”