Assad, Erdogan...and Putin’s ‘Goblet of Normalization’

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during their meeting in Sochi (AFP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during their meeting in Sochi (AFP)
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Assad, Erdogan...and Putin’s ‘Goblet of Normalization’

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during their meeting in Sochi (AFP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during their meeting in Sochi (AFP)

It is quite known that Russian President Vladimir Putin is pushing his Syrian and Turkish counterparts to drink from the goblet of “normalization.” This desire is as old as Russia's military intervention in Syria seven years ago.

But what is new is that conditions have become more favorable for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to shift from attending security meetings in Moscow and Tehran to normalizing political ties between Ankara and Damascus.

The “deposit” lodged by Putin in Erdogan’s pocket a few days ago at their meeting in the Black Sea city of Sochi proposed that instead of Turkey launching a new military operation in northern Syria, the Turkish president would call Assad and hold negotiations to meet Turkish security demands.

It is noteworthy that several meetings were held between the head of Syria’s National Security Bureau Ali Mamlouk and his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan. Some of the meetings were publicly held in Moscow at the start of 2020. Other meetings, especially those convened to discuss developing a new version of the 1998 Adana Agreement, were held in secret.

In fact, developing the Adana Agreement and security cooperation against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) requires political normalization and the opening of diplomatic channels.

Putin's key is for Erdogan to communicate directly with Assad with the blessing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. However, each of the three presidents sees this move from a different angle. Here there are losses and there are risks.

The Russian president is ready for this step because it weakens the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) allied to the US, Britain, and France. These are the countries that are fighting Russia in Ukraine.

Moreover, such a move would strengthen the Russian role in Syria and give legitimacy to the regime in Damascus. It would do so by neutralizing the Turkish role in support of the Syrian opposition.

If successful, the normalization of ties between Damascus and Ankara would turn a key page of the last decade.

For Putin, such a step increases the chances of his “arch-friend” and “hostile partner” in many arenas, Erdogan, to win the elections in the middle of next year.

However, this expected “gift” from Putin completely contradicts the desire of Assad, who does not want a new presidential term for Erdogan, who has been giving military and political support to the Syrian opposition for the last decade.

For Assad, normalizing ties with Turkey could constitute an embarrassment that is difficult to navigate among his allies in Damascus and abroad –especially that Turkey continues to occupy large swathes of land in northern Syria that are twice the size of Lebanon.

Also, Erdogan has been the target subject of media campaigns, accusations, and criticisms by Syrian authorities.

Khamenei, the third partner in the Astana process and the control of Syrian territory, has complicated calculations as well.

Tehran wants to support Assad and weaken US allies and does not want Turkish incursions. It also agrees with Damascus and Ankara in rejecting Kurdish entities.

Indeed, the three countries coordinated against Iraqi Kurdistan in the 90s. But Iran also has rivalries with Turkey and Russia in Syria and elsewhere.

For his part, Erdogan wants to neutralize the Syrian refugee issue and to deal a blow to Syria’s Kurds before upcoming elections.

He also does not mind security and political coordination with Damascus to keep Kurds away.

However, he finds it embarrassing to switch stances on Assad and Damascus. For years, Erdogan had raised the ceiling of his stances and support for the opposition.

Most likely, Putin is pushing the relationship between Assad and Erdogan to new stages.

The first stage was after the protests in early 2011, when meetings were held to search for a political settlement to the Syrian crisis.

The second stage witnessed maximum hostility in the Turkish president’s rhetoric about Assad stepping down.

The third stage saw Erdogan’s focus shift from “regime change” in Syria to making deals with Putin for disbanding the Kurdish entity in northern Syria. Subsequently, Turkey spread its forces in several Syrian enclaves.

The fourth and newest stage includes political dealings under Putin's umbrella. Erdogan would deal with Assad as president. In turn, Assad would accept Erdogan as an interlocutor.

This may come as a shock or surprise to some. But it is okay to recall the fluctuations of the Damascus-Ankara line over the decades as there have been many upheavals in the Syrian-Turkish-Kurdish triangle.

In mid-1998, Turkey massed its army on Syria’s borders and demanded the expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.

Afterwards, the Adana Agreement, which established security cooperation against the PKK, was signed.

When Syrian President Hafez al-Assad died, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s participation in the funeral inaugurated the transition to a new political dimension and the intensification of cooperation against the PKK.

After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, relations gradually moved towards more cooperation and more visits and meetings between Assad and Erdogan.

This led to a “strategic partnership,” “eliminating borders,” and a tacit recognition of the annexation of Iskenderun (Hatay).

Indeed, Erdogan was among the few leaders who maintained a relationship with Assad after the US isolated Damascus over the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.

Moreover, Erdogan mediated between Assad and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Erdogan talking about Putin asking him to contact Assad, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu recently recalling a “quick chat” he had with his Syrian counterpart last year, and Damascus holding back on its condemnation of Turkey are all factors likely signaling a new beginning whereby Assad and Erdogan drink from Putin’s “goblet of normalization.”



Israel Wary of Egypt's 'Military Infrastructure' in Sinai: Peace Treaty at Risk?

Egyptian army chief Ahmed Khalifa inspects troops near Israel's border late last year. (Military spokesman)
Egyptian army chief Ahmed Khalifa inspects troops near Israel's border late last year. (Military spokesman)
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Israel Wary of Egypt's 'Military Infrastructure' in Sinai: Peace Treaty at Risk?

Egyptian army chief Ahmed Khalifa inspects troops near Israel's border late last year. (Military spokesman)
Egyptian army chief Ahmed Khalifa inspects troops near Israel's border late last year. (Military spokesman)

Israel has voiced growing concerns over Egypt’s military presence in the Sinai Peninsula, fearing a potential escalation between the two sides amid the ongoing Gaza war.

Israeli media reports said Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has asked both Washington and Cairo to dismantle what it describes as a “military infrastructure” established by the Egyptian army in Sinai.

However, an informed Egyptian source and experts cited by Asharq Al-Awsat insisted that Egypt has not violated its peace treaty with Israel. They argued that Cairo’s military movements are a response to Israeli breaches of the agreement.

Israel’s Israel Hayom newspaper, citing a senior Israeli security official, reported that Egypt’s military buildup in Sinai constitutes a “major violation” of the security annex of the peace treaty.

The official said the issue is a top priority for Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, stressing that Israel “will not accept this situation” amid what it views as Egypt’s growing military footprint in the peninsula.

The official added that the issue goes beyond the deployment of Egyptian forces in Sinai exceeding the quotas set under the military annex of the Camp David Accords.

The real concern, he said, lies in Egypt’s continued military buildup in the peninsula, which Israel views as an irreversible step.

Moreover, he stressed that while Israel is not seeking to amend its peace treaty with Egypt or redeploy troops along the border, it believes the current situation requires urgent action to prevent a potential escalation.

Egypt-Israel relations have not seen such tensions since the outbreak of the Gaza war, particularly after Israel violated a ceasefire agreement with Hamas brokered primarily by Egypt. Israeli forces resumed airstrikes on Gaza last month and failed to fulfill their commitments to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor and Palestinian border crossings.

A senior Egyptian source dismissed Israel’s accusations, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that “these repeated Israeli pretexts ignore the fact that Israeli forces have violated the peace treaty, seizing control of areas where Egypt objects to their presence without the necessary coordination with Cairo.”

Egypt has the right to take all necessary measures to safeguard its national security against any threats, emphasized the source.

“Nevertheless, Cairo remains fully committed to the peace treaty and has no intention of aggression against any party,” it added.

Israeli forces seized control of the Gaza-Egypt border, including the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing, in May 2024. Israel has accused Egypt of not doing enough to stop weapons smuggling into Gaza through border tunnels—an allegation Cairo has denied.

Under the terms of the ceasefire agreement with Hamas, which Israel later broke, Israeli forces were supposed to begin withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor on March 1, completing the pullout within eight days. However, Israel failed to do so and instead resumed airstrikes on Gaza.

Israel also announced the creation of an administration aimed at facilitating the “voluntary departure” of Gaza residents, a move Cairo strongly rejected and formally condemned.

Egypt has insisted that Palestinians must remain in their homeland and has put forward a reconstruction plan for Gaza and called for the implementation of the two-state solution. The plan was endorsed at an emergency Arab summit three weeks ago.

Media reports have indicated that Egypt responded to Israel’s control of the Gaza border by increasing its military presence near the frontier—an act that some Israeli officials claim violates the peace treaty and threatens Israel’s security.

Former Egyptian intelligence official Gen. Mohammed Rashad told Asharq Al-Awsat that Israel itself violated the peace treaty by seizing the Philadelphi Corridor, controlling border crossings, and blocking aid to Gaza while seeking to forcibly displace Palestinians into Egypt.

“Every Israeli action along Gaza’s border with Egypt constitutes hostile behavior against Egypt’s national security,” said Rashad, who previously headed the Israeli military affairs division in Egypt’s intelligence service.

“Egypt cannot sit idly by in the face of such threats and must prepare for all possible scenarios.”

The Philadelphi Corridor is a strategically sensitive buffer zone, serving as a narrow 14-kilometer passage between Egypt, Israel, and Gaza, stretching from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the Kerem Shalom crossing in the south.

Military expert General Samir Farag insisted that Egypt has not violated the peace treaty or its security annex in over 40 years, arguing that Israel has repeatedly breached the agreement and is attempting to shift blame onto Cairo.

“Israel is doing this to distract from its internal problems, including public discontent over its ballooning defense budget,” Farag told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“It also wants to deflect attention from Egypt’s reconstruction plan for Gaza and leverage its claims to pressure the United States for more military aid by portraying Egypt as a threat.”

Farag emphasized that Egypt’s actions are solely aimed at protecting its national security, adding: “There is no clause in the peace treaty that prevents a country from defending itself.”

“The so-called ‘military infrastructure’ Israel refers to consists of roads and development projects in Sinai.”

“The US has satellite surveillance over the region—if Egypt had violated the treaty, Washington would have flagged it. Moreover, security coordination between Egypt and Israel continues daily,” he explained.

Egypt and Israel signed their landmark peace treaty on March 25, 1979, committing to resolving disputes peacefully and prohibiting the use or threat of force. The agreement also established military deployment guidelines and a joint security coordination committee.

Meanwhile, US Republican Party member Tom Harb told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington has received intelligence from multiple sources indicating that Egypt has amassed a significant military force in Sinai.

Israel considers this a breach of the peace treaty, which designates Sinai as a demilitarized zone to prevent surprises like the 1973 war, Harb said.

While the US fully supports Israel’s concerns, it also wants to prevent further escalation, as that would destabilize the region, he added.

Ultimately, Egypt must clarify whether its troop movements are aimed at threatening Israel or preventing Palestinians from crossing into Egyptian territory, he stated.