Mamlouk-Fidan Talks: Mutual Demands, Russian Solutions

Syrians mark Russian Flag Day in Damascus, Syria, Monday, Aug. 22, 2022. Posters show Syrian President Bashar Assad. (AP Photo/Omar Sanadiki)
Syrians mark Russian Flag Day in Damascus, Syria, Monday, Aug. 22, 2022. Posters show Syrian President Bashar Assad. (AP Photo/Omar Sanadiki)
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Mamlouk-Fidan Talks: Mutual Demands, Russian Solutions

Syrians mark Russian Flag Day in Damascus, Syria, Monday, Aug. 22, 2022. Posters show Syrian President Bashar Assad. (AP Photo/Omar Sanadiki)
Syrians mark Russian Flag Day in Damascus, Syria, Monday, Aug. 22, 2022. Posters show Syrian President Bashar Assad. (AP Photo/Omar Sanadiki)

The security talks led by the Director of the Syrian National Security Office, Major General Ali Mamlouk, and the Director of Turkish Intelligence, Hakan Fidan, in Moscow highlighted a continuous gap between the two parties on the one hand, and the increasing Russian desire to find a solution to it.

Damascus demands a “timetable” for withdrawal, especially since Türkiye controls Syrian areas that are twice the size of Lebanon. Ankara, for its part, adheres to “safe areas” in northern Syria, while Russia seeks to bridge the gap based on the interests of the two sides, namely “coordination against the Kurds and separatist movements.”

Meanwhile, President Bashar al-Assad signed a decree appointing Deputy Foreign Minister Bashar al-Jaafari ambassador to Moscow. Russian authorities decided to expedite diplomatic approval, which opens the door to strengthening Russian mediation. It also allows Deputy Minister Ayman Susan to assume his position, or Imad Mustafa to return to the post of deputy minister to Faisal Al-Miqdad.

Security tours and diplomatic contacts

Following several secret security meetings at different levels in the countryside of Latakia, Tehran and Moscow, and the continuation of the work of the Syrian Consulate in Istanbul, Moscow sponsored in early 2020 a public meeting between Mamlouk and Fidan, which was announced by the two countries’ official news agencies.

The two sides reiterated their positions, as Mamlouk demanded that Ankara abide by the 2018 Sochi agreements between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian Vladimir Putin, in addition to opening the Aleppo-Latakia road, and completing withdrawals from Syrian territory. On the other hand, Fidan demanded cooperation against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and the search for a political settlement.

Practically speaking, the meeting did not result in a major breakthrough. As if Assad and Erdogan just wanted to give the impression that they were not against Putin’s mediation. Since then, both the Syrian and Turkish sides have followed their own tracks and priorities.

The Russian war in Ukraine stirred the Syrian stalemate. Erdogan, better positioned as he was needed by Moscow and Washington, wanted to launch a new military operation in northern Syria. Indeed, he prepared his army and loyal factions, and set the date for the incursion at the end of July. The Turkish president sought to coordinate with the Iranian spiritual guide, Ali Khamenei, and the Russian president during the Tehran summit on July 19.

According to sources who attended the summit, the Russian and Iranian sides clearly told Erdogan that they were against the military operation, and that they preferred the Turkish leader to talk with Assad and to focus on “unifying ranks against the US-backed separatist movements in northeastern Syria.”

Accordingly, Putin and Khamenei considered that they “succeeded in persuading Erdogan to deal with Assad” and that the tripartite summit was “a sign of Assad’s victory.”

Mamlouk-Fidan... Two friends?

Putin succeeded in persuading Assad and Erdogan to dispatch Mamlouk and Fidan, who know each other well, to Moscow, which hosted a round of secret talks between them in July, partly led by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

According to Russian, Western and Arab sources, Mamlouk and Fidan presented a long list of extreme demands.

What about the demands?

The Syrian demands included: respecting Syrian sovereignty, setting a timetable for the Turkish withdrawal from Syrian territory, halting support for separatist groups, and returning Idlib, which has been under the control of Turkish-backed factions since 2015. Moreover, the Syrian side called for restoring control of the Bab al-Hawa crossing between Türkiye and Idlib, and opening the M4 road that extends from the borders of the Mediterranean in the west, to Iraq in the east, and which is controlled by Syrian, Turkish and Kurdish forces.
Syria also demanded help in countering western sanctions (as Türkiye does with sanctions against Russia), in addition to its return to the Arab League, assistance in reconstruction efforts and the recovery of natural resources, including oil, gas and agriculture east of the Euphrates.

As for Türkiye, which considers that Damascus is incapable of fighting the Kurds alone, its demands include: serious action against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its Syrian wing - the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), cooperation between the security services in the two countries, and negotiations with the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition to reach a political settlement. It also called for the return of Syrian refugees, the establishment of safe zones in Aleppo and other areas in northern Syria at a depth of 30 km, and assistance and facilitation of the work of the Syrian Constitutional Committee.

Moscow continues to oppose a meeting of the Syrian Constitutional Committee in Geneva. Despite the visit of the UN envoy Geir Pedersen to Russia, information indicate that the committee would not convene in the coming months. One of the options is to hold the talks in Astana, noting that Erdogan had suggested in Tehran that it be organized in a city that is home to a UN headquarters.

Meanwhile, the Western representatives will organize a coordination meeting onTuesday in Geneva, at the request of US Envoy Ethan Goldrich, to “coordinate Arab and Western positions opposing Arab normalization with Damascus, and to confirm that Geneva is a natural place for the work of the Constitutional Committee.”

An Iranian incursion...and Russian solutions

Iran tried to enter the security mediation line between Syria and Türkiye – a move that did not please some parties in Damascus and Moscow. But Russia maintained its mediation, reiterating this stance during Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s talks with his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Miqdad. The latter expressed doubts about Fidan’s ability to influence Erdogan.

First, Russia believes that it succeeded in stopping Türkiye’s plans to launch a military operation, and in changing the Turkish and Syrian discourse. Moscow is confident that the Turkish withdrawal “will happen, but it is not an urgent matter”, and that the current meeting point is “working against the Kurds and separatist movements.”

An official said: “If the situation remains the same for two or three years, it will be difficult for Syria to regain its unity.”

The Russian mediator is currently working on an “action plan” based on the two sides’ demands and common points. The priorities include providing security guarantees to Ankara and operational arrangements for Damascus in Idlib and the Aleppo-Latakia road.

One of the solutions is for the Syrian and Turkish sides to work on copying a new draft of the 1998 Adana Agreement, which established security cooperation between them against the PKK.

Another mediation with Washington

Parallel to Moscow’s mediation between Ankara and Damascus, another mediation is led by Lebanese Intelligence chief Abbas Ibrahim and others between Damascus and Washington regarding the fate of US Journalist Austin Tice, who disappeared in Syria ten years ago.

Ibrahim had previously intervened during President Donald Trump’s administration, and also under Joe Biden. However, Damascus’ response did not change: There will be no negotiation over Tice before the US withdrawal, the dismantling of the Al-Tanf base, and the lifting of sanctions. The only new development is Syria’s decision to publicly announce its demands, stating that it had not detained Tice, without specifying whether the journalist was alive or not.

In the summer of 2019, Damascus asked the visiting US envoys for the American forces’ withdrawal, the dismantling of the Al-Tanf base, and the halting of support to the opposition, in addition to the lifting of sanctions, because it did not want to help Trump succeed in the elections. But Syrian authorities made sure to inform Moscow and Tehran of those negotiations.

Today, Damascus is keen to publicly inform Moscow and Tehran of its demands from America, because the Syrian priority is to please the two capitals and to search for common lines with Ankara, especially after the Western-American confrontation in Ukraine.

There are indications that the normalization process between Damascus and Ankara has started, and that Moscow is working on framing its phases, speed and content, whether through a quick transition to the political framework, or by staying within the security framework and searching for common realistic goals.



Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
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Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)

Journalists sometimes hear shocking statements—ones they lock away in their memory, fearing their repercussions. Some are too violent, too damaging, or too costly to repeat. Others risk swift denial from those who made them.

That was the case in late January 1987, when Kuwait hosted the fifth Islamic Summit.

Among the leaders in attendance were Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat.

I had requested an interview with Arafat, and he agreed to meet. After an exchange of pleasantries, he delivered a series of startling remarks.

“What’s happening in Beirut?” he asked.

“You know the country is grappling with the aftermath of the war of the camps,” I replied.

“No, Ghassan,” he shot back. “This is not the ‘war of the camps.’ The real name is the ‘war on the camps.’ It was personally ordered by Hafez al-Assad. Regrettably, the Amal Movement, led by Nabih Berri, is carrying out the decision, aided—unfortunately—by the Lebanese Army’s Sixth Brigade.”

Arafat must have noticed my surprise at his bluntness, because he raised his voice in anger.

“Assad is trying to finish what Ariel Sharon started in the 1982 invasion but failed to achieve. This is a continuation of Sharon’s mission to eliminate the PLO,” he charged.

Veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Assad: A Souk Al-Hamidiya merchant

I pointed out that his accusations were grave, targeting Syria’s head of state. His frustration only grew.

“Assad is not Syria’s president,” Arafat fumed.

“He is a merchant from Souk al-Hamidiya. If only he focused on reclaiming the Golan instead of blocking Palestinian independence to please America and Israel. Mark my words: time will prove me right. Hafez al-Assad does not recognize Palestine, nor Lebanon. He loathes Iraq under the guise of hating Saddam Hussein.”

Stunned, I listened as he went on.

“What they call an ‘uprising’ within Fatah is a conspiracy orchestrated by Assad and funded by [Libyan leader Moammar] al-Gaddafi. Assad’s only dream is to turn the Palestinian cause into a bargaining chip and to dominate Lebanon.”

As Arafat’s anger subsided, our conversation shifted to other topics.

A few days ago, I met with veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan—a man who carries the collective memory of two cities. Born in Tripoli, he has also witnessed Beirut’s political twists and turns, having been a close associate of Kamal Jumblatt and his son, Walid, as well as former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and his son, Saad.

He maintained ties with Arafat and participated in meetings with Assad and other Arab leaders. His recollections are rich with pivotal moments, particularly from his time as deputy leader of the National Movement, a coalition of leftist and nationalist forces led by Kamal Jumblatt.

Rocky start: Assad and Arafat’s strained relationship

Arafat’s relationship with Damascus was troubled from the outset. After a bloody internal dispute within Fatah, he was briefly detained in Syria, where the defense minister at the time was Hafez al-Assad.

Following the violent clashes between Palestinian factions and the Jordanian army in 1970, Assad came to view the presence of armed Palestinian groups as a source of chaos. This belief shaped his stance toward Arafat and the Palestinian resistance movement for years to come.

Assad grew uneasy when Palestinian factions relocated to Beirut and forged a broad alliance with Lebanon’s leftist parties and nationalist forces. He closely monitored Arafat’s rise as the dominant player on the Lebanese scene.

Despite Syria’s attempts to control the Palestinian file, Damascus struggled to rein in Fatah’s overwhelming influence and Arafat’s growing stature. His power extended to Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, where he effectively held decision-making authority.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sultan recalled: “Hafez al-Assad never truly respected the idea of Palestinian resistance. I heard it from him directly and from those around him. His prevailing view was that there was no real resistance—just armed groups operating in coordination with intelligence agencies. The divide between Assad and Arafat was clear from the start.”

Sultan recounted an episode that underscored the deep divide between Assad and Arafat.

“One day, Assad told Arafat that Palestine did not exist—it was simply southern Syria. Arafat fired back, saying there was no such thing as Syria, only northern Palestine. There was an attempt to mask the exchange with humor, but the reality was that Assad genuinely viewed the issue through this lens,” Sultan said.

He explained that several Arab regimes sought to control the Palestinian cause, hoping to benefit from it without bearing its consequences.

“From the Baathist perspective, both in Baghdad and Damascus, there was a belief that the issue was too significant for the PLO to unilaterally determine its fate.”

Crackdown on Palestinian media

Sultan recalled a particularly tense moment in the PLO’s relationship with the Syrian regime.

“The organization operated a radio station in Syria. One day, it aired a segment quoting Arafat, including the phrase ‘There is water in my mouth’—a cryptic remark hinting at unspoken grievances. Syrian authorities responded swiftly, sending bulldozers to demolish the station and arresting several staff members.”

That night, Palestinian officials approached Sultan, urging him to speak with Kamal Jumblatt.

“Jumblatt suggested we arrange a meeting with Assad. It was Ramadan, so I contacted Hikmat al-Shihabi, then head of Syrian intelligence and our liaison,” recalled Sultan.

As the meeting neared sunset, Jumblatt sat across from Assad, with Sultan seated beside the Syrian president. The discussion quickly turned hostile toward Arafat.

“The conversation was filled with insults. Phrases like ‘We’ll bring him in’—implying they’d arrest him—and ‘We’ll flip him over’—a reference to how prisoners were beaten—were thrown around. Jumblatt, always polite and measured, stopped eating. Sensing his discomfort, Assad turned to me and asked me to intervene.”

Sultan responded: “Mr. President, the Palestinian fighters are not our schoolmates. We are committed to the Palestinian cause, and today, the PLO and Arafat represent that cause. These men have endured extreme hardships.”

Assad listened and then conceded: “Abu Rashid is right. Consider it settled, Kamal Bey.” The detainees were subsequently released.

A meeting between Kamal Jumblatt and Arafat attended by Toufic Sultan, George Hawi, Mohsen Ibrahim, and Yasser Abed Rabbo. (Courtesy of Toufic Sultan)

Deep-seated mutual hatred

Asked whether the animosity between Assad and Arafat was evident at the time, Sultan did not hesitate.

“Of course. It was well known,” he said. “One way to ingratiate oneself with Assad was to openly attack Arafat.”

He recalled a meeting with Walid Jumblatt, Assem Kanso—the head of Lebanon’s Baath Party—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“When Arafat’s name came up, Khaddam abruptly declared, ‘Yasser Arafat is an Israeli spy.’ I remained silent. He turned to me and asked for my opinion. I simply said, ‘I heard you.’”

Khaddam pressed further: “What do you think?”

Sultan replied: “I respect your opinion, and this is your office. But if you want my honest view, it won’t please you.”

The atmosphere surrounding Assad was particularly hostile toward Fatah. Syrian authorities used every means at their disposal to infiltrate the group.

After years of effort, they succeeded in orchestrating major defections, the most notable led by Abu Saleh, Abu Musa, and Abu Khaled al-Omleh. Damascus provided these factions with logistical support, training camps, and other resources.

“Syria had the power to shrink or amplify political movements,” remembered Sultan.

Despite knowing that geography gave Assad a strategic advantage, Arafat was not an easy adversary.

He countered Syria’s animosity with his trademark defiance—flashing the victory sign and invoking phrases like “the Palestinian bloodbath” and “the longest Arab-Israeli war.”

These references underscored the resilience of Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies during Israel’s 1982 siege of Beirut, led by then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.

At the time, many believed that Arafat’s relentless emphasis on “independent Palestinian decision-making” was aimed more at Assad than at any other party.

Damascus, in turn, saw Arafat as dismissive of the sacrifices made by the Syrian army during Israel’s invasion of Beirut.

Syrian officials also suspected that he was waiting for an opportunity to join peace negotiations with Israel—an option that had eluded him after he failed to follow in the footsteps of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the late 1970s.