Mamlouk-Fidan Talks: Mutual Demands, Russian Solutions

The security talks led by the Director of the Syrian National Security Office, Major General Ali Mamlouk, and the Director of Turkish Intelligence, Hakan Fidan, in Moscow highlighted a continuous gap between the two parties on the one hand, and the increasing Russian desire to find a solution to it.

Damascus demands a “timetable” for withdrawal, especially since Türkiye controls Syrian areas that are twice the size of Lebanon. Ankara, for its part, adheres to “safe areas” in northern Syria, while Russia seeks to bridge the gap based on the interests of the two sides, namely “coordination against the Kurds and separatist movements.”

Meanwhile, President Bashar al-Assad signed a decree appointing Deputy Foreign Minister Bashar al-Jaafari ambassador to Moscow. Russian authorities decided to expedite diplomatic approval, which opens the door to strengthening Russian mediation. It also allows Deputy Minister Ayman Susan to assume his position, or Imad Mustafa to return to the post of deputy minister to Faisal Al-Miqdad.

Security tours and diplomatic contacts

Following several secret security meetings at different levels in the countryside of Latakia, Tehran and Moscow, and the continuation of the work of the Syrian Consulate in Istanbul, Moscow sponsored in early 2020 a public meeting between Mamlouk and Fidan, which was announced by the two countries’ official news agencies.

The two sides reiterated their positions, as Mamlouk demanded that Ankara abide by the 2018 Sochi agreements between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian Vladimir Putin, in addition to opening the Aleppo-Latakia road, and completing withdrawals from Syrian territory. On the other hand, Fidan demanded cooperation against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and the search for a political settlement.

Practically speaking, the meeting did not result in a major breakthrough. As if Assad and Erdogan just wanted to give the impression that they were not against Putin’s mediation. Since then, both the Syrian and Turkish sides have followed their own tracks and priorities.

The Russian war in Ukraine stirred the Syrian stalemate. Erdogan, better positioned as he was needed by Moscow and Washington, wanted to launch a new military operation in northern Syria. Indeed, he prepared his army and loyal factions, and set the date for the incursion at the end of July. The Turkish president sought to coordinate with the Iranian spiritual guide, Ali Khamenei, and the Russian president during the Tehran summit on July 19.

According to sources who attended the summit, the Russian and Iranian sides clearly told Erdogan that they were against the military operation, and that they preferred the Turkish leader to talk with Assad and to focus on “unifying ranks against the US-backed separatist movements in northeastern Syria.”

Accordingly, Putin and Khamenei considered that they “succeeded in persuading Erdogan to deal with Assad” and that the tripartite summit was “a sign of Assad’s victory.”

Mamlouk-Fidan... Two friends?

Putin succeeded in persuading Assad and Erdogan to dispatch Mamlouk and Fidan, who know each other well, to Moscow, which hosted a round of secret talks between them in July, partly led by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

According to Russian, Western and Arab sources, Mamlouk and Fidan presented a long list of extreme demands.

What about the demands?

The Syrian demands included: respecting Syrian sovereignty, setting a timetable for the Turkish withdrawal from Syrian territory, halting support for separatist groups, and returning Idlib, which has been under the control of Turkish-backed factions since 2015. Moreover, the Syrian side called for restoring control of the Bab al-Hawa crossing between Türkiye and Idlib, and opening the M4 road that extends from the borders of the Mediterranean in the west, to Iraq in the east, and which is controlled by Syrian, Turkish and Kurdish forces.
Syria also demanded help in countering western sanctions (as Türkiye does with sanctions against Russia), in addition to its return to the Arab League, assistance in reconstruction efforts and the recovery of natural resources, including oil, gas and agriculture east of the Euphrates.

As for Türkiye, which considers that Damascus is incapable of fighting the Kurds alone, its demands include: serious action against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its Syrian wing - the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), cooperation between the security services in the two countries, and negotiations with the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition to reach a political settlement. It also called for the return of Syrian refugees, the establishment of safe zones in Aleppo and other areas in northern Syria at a depth of 30 km, and assistance and facilitation of the work of the Syrian Constitutional Committee.

Moscow continues to oppose a meeting of the Syrian Constitutional Committee in Geneva. Despite the visit of the UN envoy Geir Pedersen to Russia, information indicate that the committee would not convene in the coming months. One of the options is to hold the talks in Astana, noting that Erdogan had suggested in Tehran that it be organized in a city that is home to a UN headquarters.

Meanwhile, the Western representatives will organize a coordination meeting onTuesday in Geneva, at the request of US Envoy Ethan Goldrich, to “coordinate Arab and Western positions opposing Arab normalization with Damascus, and to confirm that Geneva is a natural place for the work of the Constitutional Committee.”

An Iranian incursion...and Russian solutions

Iran tried to enter the security mediation line between Syria and Türkiye – a move that did not please some parties in Damascus and Moscow. But Russia maintained its mediation, reiterating this stance during Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s talks with his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Miqdad. The latter expressed doubts about Fidan’s ability to influence Erdogan.

First, Russia believes that it succeeded in stopping Türkiye’s plans to launch a military operation, and in changing the Turkish and Syrian discourse. Moscow is confident that the Turkish withdrawal “will happen, but it is not an urgent matter”, and that the current meeting point is “working against the Kurds and separatist movements.”

An official said: “If the situation remains the same for two or three years, it will be difficult for Syria to regain its unity.”

The Russian mediator is currently working on an “action plan” based on the two sides’ demands and common points. The priorities include providing security guarantees to Ankara and operational arrangements for Damascus in Idlib and the Aleppo-Latakia road.

One of the solutions is for the Syrian and Turkish sides to work on copying a new draft of the 1998 Adana Agreement, which established security cooperation between them against the PKK.

Another mediation with Washington

Parallel to Moscow’s mediation between Ankara and Damascus, another mediation is led by Lebanese Intelligence chief Abbas Ibrahim and others between Damascus and Washington regarding the fate of US Journalist Austin Tice, who disappeared in Syria ten years ago.

Ibrahim had previously intervened during President Donald Trump’s administration, and also under Joe Biden. However, Damascus’ response did not change: There will be no negotiation over Tice before the US withdrawal, the dismantling of the Al-Tanf base, and the lifting of sanctions. The only new development is Syria’s decision to publicly announce its demands, stating that it had not detained Tice, without specifying whether the journalist was alive or not.

In the summer of 2019, Damascus asked the visiting US envoys for the American forces’ withdrawal, the dismantling of the Al-Tanf base, and the halting of support to the opposition, in addition to the lifting of sanctions, because it did not want to help Trump succeed in the elections. But Syrian authorities made sure to inform Moscow and Tehran of those negotiations.

Today, Damascus is keen to publicly inform Moscow and Tehran of its demands from America, because the Syrian priority is to please the two capitals and to search for common lines with Ankara, especially after the Western-American confrontation in Ukraine.

There are indications that the normalization process between Damascus and Ankara has started, and that Moscow is working on framing its phases, speed and content, whether through a quick transition to the political framework, or by staying within the security framework and searching for common realistic goals.

While world conflicts dominate headlines, Sudan’s deepening catastrophe is unfolding largely out of sight; a brutal war that has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions, and flattened entire cities and regions.

More than a year into the conflict, some observers question whether the international community has grown weary of Sudan’s seemingly endless cycles of violence. The country has endured nearly seven decades of civil war, and what is happening now is not an exception, but the latest chapter in a bloody history of rebellion and collapse.

The first of Sudan’s modern wars began even before the country gained independence from Britain. In 1955, army officer Joseph Lagu led the southern “Anyanya” rebellion, named after a venomous snake, launching a guerrilla war that would last until 1972.

A peace agreement brokered by the World Council of Churches and Ethiopia’s late Emperor Haile Selassie ended that conflict with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord.

But peace proved short-lived. In 1983, then-president Jaafar Nimeiry reignited tensions by announcing the imposition of Islamic Sharia law, known as the “September Laws.” The move prompted the rise of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, and a renewed southern insurgency that raged for more than two decades, outliving Nimeiry’s regime.

Under Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in a 1989 military coup, the war took on an Islamist tone. His government declared “jihad” and mobilized civilians in support of the fight, but failed to secure a decisive victory.

The conflict eventually gave way to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, better known as the Naivasha Agreement, which was brokered in Kenya and granted South Sudan the right to self-determination.

In 2011, more than 95% of South Sudanese voted to break away from Sudan, giving birth to the world’s newest country, the Republic of South Sudan. The secession marked the culmination of decades of war, which began with demands for a federal system and ended in full-scale conflict. The cost: over 2 million lives lost, and a once-unified nation split in two.

But even before South Sudan’s independence became reality, another brutal conflict had erupted in Sudan’s western Darfur region in 2003. Armed rebel groups from the region took up arms against the central government, accusing it of marginalization and neglect. What followed was a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign that drew global condemnation and triggered a major humanitarian crisis.

As violence escalated, the United Nations deployed one of its largest-ever peacekeeping missions, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in a bid to stem the bloodshed.

Despite multiple peace deals, including the Juba Agreement signed in October 2020 following the ousting of long-time Islamist ruler, Bashir, fighting never truly ceased.

The Darfur war alone left more than 300,000 people dead and millions displaced. The International Criminal Court charged Bashir and several top officials, including Ahmed Haroun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Alongside the southern conflict, yet another war erupted in 2011, this time in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile region. The fighting was led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N), a group composed largely of northern fighters who had sided with the South during the earlier civil war under John Garang.

The conflict broke out following contested elections marred by allegations of fraud, and Khartoum’s refusal to implement key provisions of the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, particularly those related to “popular consultations” in the two regions. More than a decade later, war still grips both areas, with no lasting resolution in sight.

Then came April 15, 2023. A fresh war exploded, this time in the heart of the capital, Khartoum, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces against the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Now entering its third year, the conflict shows no signs of abating.

According to international reports, the war has killed more than 150,000 people and displaced around 13 million, the largest internal displacement crisis on the planet. Over 3 million Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries.

Large swathes of the capital lie in ruins, and entire states have been devastated. With Khartoum no longer viable as a seat of power, the government and military leadership have relocated to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

Unlike previous wars, Sudan’s current conflict has no real audience. Global pressure on the warring factions has been minimal. Media coverage is sparse. And despite warnings from the United Nations describing the crisis as “the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe,” Sudan's descent into chaos remains largely ignored by the international community.

Mamlouk-Fidan Talks: Mutual Demands, Russian Solutions