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Will Arab Disputes Postpone Algeria Summit?

Tensions between Arab Maghreb countries and debater over Syria’s reinstatement are main hurdles

Leaders at the Arab League summit in Tunisia in 2019. (Egyptian presidency)
Leaders at the Arab League summit in Tunisia in 2019. (Egyptian presidency)
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Will Arab Disputes Postpone Algeria Summit?

Leaders at the Arab League summit in Tunisia in 2019. (Egyptian presidency)
Leaders at the Arab League summit in Tunisia in 2019. (Egyptian presidency)

Disputes between Arab countries and differences over the reinstatement of Syria are threatening to postpone the upcoming Arab League summit, scheduled for Algeria in November.

Algeria has been preparing to host the 31st summit since 2019. It will be the first in-person summit for Arab leaders since the coronavirus pandemic.

President Abdelmadjid Tebboune stressed earlier this month that the summit will be a success “because it seeks Arab reconciliation after years of division and fragmentation.”

Syria’s return?

Algeria politician and lawyer Mohammed Adam Mokrani noted, however, that Syria’s return to the Arab fold will be among the main hurdles at the summit.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, he said that Algeria has for months been supporting Syria’s return seeing as it is founding member of the Arab League.

Syria was suspended in wake of its regime’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protests that broke out in 2011.

Syria’s return has not been advocated by all Arab countries. Mokrani suggested the issue could be put up to a vote during the summit so that it would not remain as a sticking point or a reason to postpone the meeting.

Moroccan former MP Adil Benhamza described the situation in the Arab world as “extremely divided”.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the pandemic was used as an excuse to postpone summits in the past, but it can no longer be used to justify repeated delays.

Several other issues could prompt the delay, among them the dispute over Syria’s return, he added.

Dr. Hassan Abou Taleb, of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said it would be “very difficult” to hold the summit given the “major disputes over how to handle Syria and Algeria’s efforts to end the boycott against it.”

There is no Arab consensus over this issue and leaders appear unwilling to even discuss it at the summit, he noted.

Hussein Haridy, Egyptian former Assistant Foreign Minister for Asia, Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Affairs, said it was “difficult to predict” whether the summit will be held on time.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that numerous developments have taken place in the Middle East since the last regular summit was held, so the Algeria meeting must be held to allow Arab leaders to agree on how to address them.

“Failure to hold the summit on schedule will send an unwanted message to regional and international powers that Arab leaders lack the joint will to address regional and international developments and pressing financial and political affairs,” he warned.

However, he said that Algiers’ insistence on reinstating Syria’s membership “in spite of the opposition of influential Arab powers” may ultimately lead to the postponement of the summit.

On the official level, Arab League Assistant Secretary General Hossam Zaki had last month stated that no specific time can be set regarding Syria’s return to the organization.

Its return is not imminent, but it is not far either, he said.

An Arab diplomatic source said this position has not changed.

Speaking on condition of anonymity to Asharq Al-Awsat, the source confirmed that preparations are still underway to hold the summit on schedule in spite of Arab disagreements.

Maghreb tensions

Another sticking point at the summit is the tensions between Morocco, Algeria and recently Tunisia.

Rabat and Algiers had severed relations in wake of the dispute over the Western Sahara.

Over the weekend, Morocco summoned its ambassador to Tunis after Tunisian President Kaies Saied received Polisario Front movement chief Brahim Ghali.

Morocco said Tunisia's decision to invite Brahim Ghali to a Japanese development summit for Africa that Tunis is hosting this weekend was “a grave and unprecedented act that deeply hurts the feelings of the Moroccan people”.

Tunisia, in response to Morocco's decision, announced it was recalling its ambassador to Rabat for consultation.

Tunisia's ministry of foreign affairs said in a statement early on Saturday that the country maintains its complete “neutrality over Western Sahara issue in compliance with international legitimacy”.

In a terse foreign ministry statement, Morocco said it would no longer take part in the Africa summit. It also accused Tunisia of having recently “multiplied negative positions” against Morocco, and said its decision to host Ghali “confirms its hostility in a blatant way”.

Abou Taleb said relations between the Maghreb countries are “very strained”, posing a challenge for plans to hold any Arab summit.

The tensions may lead to countries even lowering their level of representation or calling for the delay of the meeting altogether, he added.

“The Arab region is boiling with tensions and crises, casting doubts that the summit will be held as scheduled,” he stated.

Mokrani and Benhamza speculated that Morocco may even skip the summit given its dispute with Algeria.

The diplomatic source stressed that Algeria was determined to hold the summit and would not allow disputes to hinder it even if it had to make concessions over Syria’s reinstatement.

Algeria wants to use the summit to demonstrate its “strong return to the international and regional scene. It may therefore abandon its demand over Syria to avoid being held responsible for the failure of the summit,” he explained.

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Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
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Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat

Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)

Journalists sometimes hear shocking statements—ones they lock away in their memory, fearing their repercussions. Some are too violent, too damaging, or too costly to repeat. Others risk swift denial from those who made them.

That was the case in late January 1987, when Kuwait hosted the fifth Islamic Summit.

Among the leaders in attendance were Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat.

I had requested an interview with Arafat, and he agreed to meet. After an exchange of pleasantries, he delivered a series of startling remarks.

“What’s happening in Beirut?” he asked.

“You know the country is grappling with the aftermath of the war of the camps,” I replied.

“No, Ghassan,” he shot back. “This is not the ‘war of the camps.’ The real name is the ‘war on the camps.’ It was personally ordered by Hafez al-Assad. Regrettably, the Amal Movement, led by Nabih Berri, is carrying out the decision, aided—unfortunately—by the Lebanese Army’s Sixth Brigade.”

Arafat must have noticed my surprise at his bluntness, because he raised his voice in anger.

“Assad is trying to finish what Ariel Sharon started in the 1982 invasion but failed to achieve. This is a continuation of Sharon’s mission to eliminate the PLO,” he charged.

Veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Assad: A Souk Al-Hamidiya merchant

I pointed out that his accusations were grave, targeting Syria’s head of state. His frustration only grew.

“Assad is not Syria’s president,” Arafat fumed.

“He is a merchant from Souk al-Hamidiya. If only he focused on reclaiming the Golan instead of blocking Palestinian independence to please America and Israel. Mark my words: time will prove me right. Hafez al-Assad does not recognize Palestine, nor Lebanon. He loathes Iraq under the guise of hating Saddam Hussein.”

Stunned, I listened as he went on.

“What they call an ‘uprising’ within Fatah is a conspiracy orchestrated by Assad and funded by [Libyan leader Moammar] al-Gaddafi. Assad’s only dream is to turn the Palestinian cause into a bargaining chip and to dominate Lebanon.”

As Arafat’s anger subsided, our conversation shifted to other topics.

A few days ago, I met with veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan—a man who carries the collective memory of two cities. Born in Tripoli, he has also witnessed Beirut’s political twists and turns, having been a close associate of Kamal Jumblatt and his son, Walid, as well as former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and his son, Saad.

He maintained ties with Arafat and participated in meetings with Assad and other Arab leaders. His recollections are rich with pivotal moments, particularly from his time as deputy leader of the National Movement, a coalition of leftist and nationalist forces led by Kamal Jumblatt.

Rocky start: Assad and Arafat’s strained relationship

Arafat’s relationship with Damascus was troubled from the outset. After a bloody internal dispute within Fatah, he was briefly detained in Syria, where the defense minister at the time was Hafez al-Assad.

Following the violent clashes between Palestinian factions and the Jordanian army in 1970, Assad came to view the presence of armed Palestinian groups as a source of chaos. This belief shaped his stance toward Arafat and the Palestinian resistance movement for years to come.

Assad grew uneasy when Palestinian factions relocated to Beirut and forged a broad alliance with Lebanon’s leftist parties and nationalist forces. He closely monitored Arafat’s rise as the dominant player on the Lebanese scene.

Despite Syria’s attempts to control the Palestinian file, Damascus struggled to rein in Fatah’s overwhelming influence and Arafat’s growing stature. His power extended to Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, where he effectively held decision-making authority.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sultan recalled: “Hafez al-Assad never truly respected the idea of Palestinian resistance. I heard it from him directly and from those around him. His prevailing view was that there was no real resistance—just armed groups operating in coordination with intelligence agencies. The divide between Assad and Arafat was clear from the start.”

Sultan recounted an episode that underscored the deep divide between Assad and Arafat.

“One day, Assad told Arafat that Palestine did not exist—it was simply southern Syria. Arafat fired back, saying there was no such thing as Syria, only northern Palestine. There was an attempt to mask the exchange with humor, but the reality was that Assad genuinely viewed the issue through this lens,” Sultan said.

He explained that several Arab regimes sought to control the Palestinian cause, hoping to benefit from it without bearing its consequences.

“From the Baathist perspective, both in Baghdad and Damascus, there was a belief that the issue was too significant for the PLO to unilaterally determine its fate.”

Crackdown on Palestinian media

Sultan recalled a particularly tense moment in the PLO’s relationship with the Syrian regime.

“The organization operated a radio station in Syria. One day, it aired a segment quoting Arafat, including the phrase ‘There is water in my mouth’—a cryptic remark hinting at unspoken grievances. Syrian authorities responded swiftly, sending bulldozers to demolish the station and arresting several staff members.”

That night, Palestinian officials approached Sultan, urging him to speak with Kamal Jumblatt.

“Jumblatt suggested we arrange a meeting with Assad. It was Ramadan, so I contacted Hikmat al-Shihabi, then head of Syrian intelligence and our liaison,” recalled Sultan.

As the meeting neared sunset, Jumblatt sat across from Assad, with Sultan seated beside the Syrian president. The discussion quickly turned hostile toward Arafat.

“The conversation was filled with insults. Phrases like ‘We’ll bring him in’—implying they’d arrest him—and ‘We’ll flip him over’—a reference to how prisoners were beaten—were thrown around. Jumblatt, always polite and measured, stopped eating. Sensing his discomfort, Assad turned to me and asked me to intervene.”

Sultan responded: “Mr. President, the Palestinian fighters are not our schoolmates. We are committed to the Palestinian cause, and today, the PLO and Arafat represent that cause. These men have endured extreme hardships.”

Assad listened and then conceded: “Abu Rashid is right. Consider it settled, Kamal Bey.” The detainees were subsequently released.

A meeting between Kamal Jumblatt and Arafat attended by Toufic Sultan, George Hawi, Mohsen Ibrahim, and Yasser Abed Rabbo. (Courtesy of Toufic Sultan)

Deep-seated mutual hatred

Asked whether the animosity between Assad and Arafat was evident at the time, Sultan did not hesitate.

“Of course. It was well known,” he said. “One way to ingratiate oneself with Assad was to openly attack Arafat.”

He recalled a meeting with Walid Jumblatt, Assem Kanso—the head of Lebanon’s Baath Party—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“When Arafat’s name came up, Khaddam abruptly declared, ‘Yasser Arafat is an Israeli spy.’ I remained silent. He turned to me and asked for my opinion. I simply said, ‘I heard you.’”

Khaddam pressed further: “What do you think?”

Sultan replied: “I respect your opinion, and this is your office. But if you want my honest view, it won’t please you.”

The atmosphere surrounding Assad was particularly hostile toward Fatah. Syrian authorities used every means at their disposal to infiltrate the group.

After years of effort, they succeeded in orchestrating major defections, the most notable led by Abu Saleh, Abu Musa, and Abu Khaled al-Omleh. Damascus provided these factions with logistical support, training camps, and other resources.

“Syria had the power to shrink or amplify political movements,” remembered Sultan.

Despite knowing that geography gave Assad a strategic advantage, Arafat was not an easy adversary.

He countered Syria’s animosity with his trademark defiance—flashing the victory sign and invoking phrases like “the Palestinian bloodbath” and “the longest Arab-Israeli war.”

These references underscored the resilience of Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies during Israel’s 1982 siege of Beirut, led by then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.

At the time, many believed that Arafat’s relentless emphasis on “independent Palestinian decision-making” was aimed more at Assad than at any other party.

Damascus, in turn, saw Arafat as dismissive of the sacrifices made by the Syrian army during Israel’s invasion of Beirut.

Syrian officials also suspected that he was waiting for an opportunity to join peace negotiations with Israel—an option that had eluded him after he failed to follow in the footsteps of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the late 1970s.