Iran Guards, Lebanese Hezbollah, Sadr Rivals Discussed Confronting him with Arms

Supporters of Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr protest at the Green Zone, in Baghdad, Iraq August 29, 2022. (Reuters)
Supporters of Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr protest at the Green Zone, in Baghdad, Iraq August 29, 2022. (Reuters)
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Iran Guards, Lebanese Hezbollah, Sadr Rivals Discussed Confronting him with Arms

Supporters of Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr protest at the Green Zone, in Baghdad, Iraq August 29, 2022. (Reuters)
Supporters of Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr protest at the Green Zone, in Baghdad, Iraq August 29, 2022. (Reuters)

Four leaders of Iraqi Shiite factions met with two members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hezbollah party at a house in Baghdad in mid-August.

Just outside, in the heavily fortified Green Zone, supporters of influential Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr were collecting thousands of signatures for a “legal petition” demanding that the judiciary dissolve the parliament.

The meeting tackled the possible scenarios should an armed clash erupt with Sadr.

List of targets
A source informed on the proceedings of the talks said the gatherers reviewed a list of dozens of political and military targets related to the Sadrist movement. Among them were arms depots of the Saraya al-Salam, the armed wing of the movement.

The gatherers had hoped that attacking any of these targets would force Sadr to end his “rebellion” against the state, which he started by allowing his loyalists to storm parliament.

At the meeting, the Iran Guards representative expressed eagerness to “prepare” for a confrontation with Sadr, but he requested that it actually “serve” the interests of the pro-Iran Coordination Framework in “defending the system and legitimacy.”

The Hezbollah representative asked about the repercussions such a confrontation would have on Iraq and whether the situation would unravel further.

Hours later, the gatherers received a brief message from an Iranian official at Tehran’s embassy in Iraq, warning them against going ahead with the plans they shared with the IRGC.

A week later, the gatherers at the meeting would learn that one of the participants had divulged their plans of a confrontation to Sadrists.

On August 20, Sadr would for the first time speak of a plot to kill him. Since then, the cleric and his spokesman would always underscore the term “peaceful revolution” during their statements.

A leading Sadrist, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the Framework has tried to lure the Sadrists into a bloody confrontation

Intra-Iranian division

Meanwhile, four politicians from Framework parties spoke of division inside the IRGC, circles at the Tehran embassy and the intelligence ministry over how to deal with the situation in Iraq.

One of the politicians, a member of Hadi al-Ameri's Badr organization, said Sadr managed to exploit this division in prolonging his “revolt against the system.” The Iranians, meanwhile, tested various means to address the Shiite disputes.

Tehran has resorted to its various means to influence the two main sides of the divide, but the IRGC often obstructed “possibilities drawn up by diplomats at the embassy or by the intelligence agency.”

An Iraqi politician revealed that Iraqi groups have expressed their concern over Iran’s “hesitation” in coming up with a unified stance on how to handle Sadr.

He also revealed that hardline factions had adamantly refused the idea of negotiating with the cleric.

Fickle positions

Members of Shiite armed factions spoke of how Iranian officials have had “fickle and changeable ideas” since the October parliamentary elections in Iraq.

They debated abandoning the “hawks of the Framework and negotiating with Sadr to see where his coup would lead.” They wondered whether they should instead continue to protect the Framework and push it to end Sadr’s political future.

They soon found out that they were dealing with different parties that had contradictory positions on how to manage Iraq.

A faction member, who had fought alongside the Iranians against ISIS in Syria and Iraq’s Tikrit, said the Shiite factions have been “improvising” ever since the killing of Iran’s Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani, in a US drone strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

It appears that the Iranians, who have been calling on their Iraqi allies for more patience, do not have a “secret recipe” to resolve the deep dispute between the Shiites, especially since Sadr is seemingly improvising his “revolution” against the Iraqi system that is sponsored by Tehran.

Al-Sistani
Sadr’s actions have laid bare the Iranian divisions. A Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) official warned that the tensions between the pro-Iran factions and the Sadrists may lead to a “street war.”

He said members of armed factions expect that the eruption of clashes between the Framework and Sadrists may lead to similar fighting witnessed in Beirut during Lebanon’s 1975-90 civil war.

Asharq Al-Awsat had spoken with this official in March, two days after the Sadrist movement announced the formation of an alliance with the Sunnis and Kurds to form a new government.

He noted that the Iraqi factions, since their defeat of ISIS, had entrenched themselves in Iraqi institutions and the private sector. Sadr’s actions were threatening to strip them of their vast interests, he warned.

So, negotiations over the formation of a new government at the time would have gone beyond that scope and posed a serious threat to Shiite interests in Iraq, he explained.

Political activists have ruled out the possibility of the eruption of all-out war between the Shiites given how close their bonds are in the community. But Iraqi politicians believe that nearly a year of high tensions is enough to force both sides of the divide to turn to arms.

Asharq Al-Awsat asked five political figures from the Sadrist movement and Framework about the possibility of clashes. They said they were confident that the Religious Authority, Ali al-Sistani, had a decisive stance in store to avert the worst.

Financial and regional interests
Before the Sadr MPs resigned from parliament, main members of the Framework were discussing the fate of their interests should the cleric succeed in upending the Shiite equation in Iraq.

Framework member Hadi al-Ameri was in favor of a more measured approach and refused to escalate the situation when former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Qais Khazali advocated the formation of a government of Framework members that excludes Sadr.

Associates close to Ameri said he believed that this was a “swift way to put an end to the Framework.”

Maliki and his allies boast vast economic interests that they share with Iraqi businessmen and government officials. They believe that these interests will be threatened by Sadr’s political ambitions.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke with businessmen who run major activities in seven Iraqi cities. Some of these activities are tied to influential armed factions and cover hotels, hospitals, residential compounds, malls, farms and others.

“The ball is now in Sadr’s court. Everyone is on alert to protect these interests in any way,” he stressed.

Another businessman revealed that Shiite factions have acquired major investment contracts that would provide Iranians profits in hard currency.

A local investor said Lebanese figures are a “vital” part of the economic activity controlled by the factions, most notably in running tourist companies, malls and hotels.

A member of the Framework said investors active along the network stretching from Tehran to Baghdad to Beirut are worried that the situation in Iraq would deteriorate. This has prompted internal and regional powers to intervene to resolve the political crisis.

He added that he has received hundreds of calls from businessmen and mediators, who are close to the Framework, to inquire about the safety of their interests in the market.

Hezbollah mediation and Maliki’s PhD

Before Sadr’s supporters stormed parliament, a leading member of the Lebanese Hezbollah party had paid a visit to Iraq’s Najaf to mediate between the Framework and Sadrists.

Two Iraqi and Lebanese sources said the party can manage a “temporary settlement until elections, demanded by Sadr, are held.”

The mediation calls for the formation of an interim government that would rule with “enough” powers for two years. Neither the Sadrists nor Maliki would be part of the cabinet.

In return, Hezbollah would offer Maliki a political “lifeline” and allow him to spend a brief break in Beirut’s southern suburbs – a party stronghold – so that he can earn a doctorate in the Arabic language.

He could use his time to deliver lectures to party members and academics to keep him relevant to the political scene.

Sources confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that Sadr did not meet with the Hezbollah official. A mediator did, however, deliver the cleric’s firm rejection of the party’s mediation because it allows Maliki to take part in the upcoming elections.

The Hezbollah initiative stirred a heated debate within the framework because the grouping refuses to offer such concessions to Sadr.

Informed sources revealed that the Hezbollah official received a clear message from a Shiite faction that “it was better not to visit Iraq at this time.”

The Iraqi file has since been handed by Hezbollah over to a figure close to the IRGC.



Back to Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon?

Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
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Back to Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon?

Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)

A month into Israel's war against Hezbollah, invading Israeli troops are gradually advancing in south Lebanon, raising fears for the area's fate following the last Israeli occupation that lasted nearly two decades.

Since war erupted last month, Israeli officials have said Israel intends to establish a "security zone" inside Lebanon.

More recently, Defense Minister Israel Katz said the military "will establish itself in a security zone inside Lebanon ... and will maintain security control over the entire area up to the Litani" river, around 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the border.

What is happening on the ground and how far could Israel go?

- What's happening in south Lebanon? -

The Israeli military previously issued unprecedented evacuation orders for swathes of the country's south, where Iran-backed Hezbollah holds sway.

An Israeli military source told AFP that four army divisions are currently deployed across the country's northern border.

A Western military source in south Lebanon said "the Israelis are advancing one axis at a time" and destroying border villages as they go.

The source told AFP on condition of anonymity that Israeli forces had taken the strategic town of Khiam, located along the eastern stretch of the shared border.

Hezbollah, which drew Lebanon into the Middle East war last month with rocket fire towards Israel, has been claiming repeated attacks on Israeli troops in south Lebanon, where Israel's military says 10 soldiers have been killed in combat.

The Iran-backed group is not halting Israeli troops' advance "but is seeking symbolic victories such as the destruction of Merkava tanks", the Western military source said.

David Wood, senior Lebanon analyst at the International Crisis Group, told AFP that as Israel pushes further inside Lebanon, "it is entering a style of warfare that might actually suit Hezbollah better, in this sort of guerrilla hit-and-run style of fighting".

Lebanon's army has announced troop "repositioning and redeployment" in parts of the south where Israel is advancing.

A Lebanese military source said Israeli soldiers have advanced up to 10 kilometers (six miles) in some places, and Lebanon's army, which has limited means, fears it will be targeted or encircled.

Israeli fire has killed one on-duty Lebanese soldier.

United Nations peacekeepers deployed in south Lebanon have been powerless to stop the fighting, with three of their troops also killed.

- What does Israel want? -

Katz has said Israel would control south Lebanon up to the Litani, and vowed that hundreds of thousands of south Lebanon residents will not return until northern Israel's security is guaranteed.

Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa this week denounced "a clear intention to impose a new occupation of Lebanese territory".

UN aid chief Tom Fletcher has warned that south Lebanon could become another occupied territory in the Middle East.

But Eyal Zisser, a Lebanon expert at Tel Aviv University, cautioned against taking Katz's announcements at face value.

"He's good at making statements, but you always have to check first of all if it is in full agreement" with what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says, he told AFP's Jerusalem bureau.

Netanyahu has ordered troops to "further expand" a so-called security zone in south Lebanon "to definitively neutralize the threat of invasion (by Hezbollah) and to keep anti-tank missile fire away from the border".

Military analyst and retired Lebanese army general Khalil Helou told AFP that Hezbollah has "recruited people from southern towns" for decades, giving the group "local power" that Israel fears could be further exploited if southerners return.

- New occupation? -

Israel has previously tried to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

Following a first invasion in 1978, Israeli troops returned four years later, entering Lebanon all the way to Beirut to drive out Palestinian fighters.

Hezbollah was born in response to the 1982 invasion.

Israel withdrew gradually but kept an area up to 20 kilometers deep inside Lebanese territory until 2000, when it pulled out under persistent pressure from Hezbollah.

Lebanese are increasingly concerned about a return to a similar scenario.

In its last war with Hezbollah and even after a November 2024 ceasefire, Israeli troops damaged or destroyed swathes of border villages and towns through strikes, controlled demolitions and the wrecking of agricultural areas.

Zisser said Israel maintaining control of the area south of the Litani was technically feasible.

"But you need to make a decision and you need to decide how to do it, (whether) to occupy the entire territory and establish yourself there" or not, he said.

Wood meanwhile cautioned that an occupation would create "new security threats" for Israel.

"If Israel denies people the right to return to their ancestral homes, then armed resistance groups will emerge or will continue to take up this struggle," he said.


Al-Tanf Crossing Opens Iraqi Energy Lifeline to Counter Hormuz Disruption

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
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Al-Tanf Crossing Opens Iraqi Energy Lifeline to Counter Hormuz Disruption

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)

In a step reflecting a strategic shift in regional energy routes, Baghdad has officially begun exporting crude oil via Syria, in an effort to bypass the paralysis that has affected traditional maritime trade corridors. The move, which Damascus described as a return to its role as a “transit compass” and a vital platform for global energy, comes amid sweeping geopolitical shifts in the region that are imposing a new economic reality based on overland integration between the two countries.

The first convoys of Iraqi fuel tankers set off through the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed border crossing, heading toward the Baniyas refinery on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, marking the effective launch of a new phase of economic cooperation. The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that the cargo of 299 fuel tankers will later be loaded for export.

The Al-Tanf crossing had been closed since 2015, when ISIS took control of it. In 2016, US-backed forces established a military base in Al-Tanf. Syrian forces took control of the base last month, paving the way for the crossing to reopen.

"Transit Compass"

With the first convoys entering Syrian territory through the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed crossing en route to Baniyas, Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed Al-Bashir wrote on X: “From the Syrian-Iraqi border to the maritime carriers in Baniyas... Syria is returning as a transit compass and a strategic export platform for global energy.” He said the step “enhances national interests and advances Arab economic integration toward broader horizons.”

The General Authority for Land and Sea Ports said the move represents “an important milestone in developing economic cooperation between the two countries by activating trade and energy routes, enhancing opportunities for economic integration, and supporting trade flows in the coming phase,” stressing its readiness to provide all necessary facilitation and ensure efficient procedures.

Mazen Alloush, director of public relations at the authority, announced Tuesday via Facebook the reopening of the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed crossing, confirming the entry of the first Iraqi oil tanker convoys toward the Baniyas terminal.

In parallel, a delegation from the authority conducted a field tour to assess readiness at the Al-Yarubiyah–Rabia crossing ahead of plans to resume operations in early May, while also reviewing the status of the Semalka–Fishkhabour crossing as part of procedures to integrate it into the authority’s operational system. Passenger traffic has resumed at the Al-Bukamal–Al-Qaim crossing.

Alongside the reopening of Al-Waleed, Syrian government efforts are focused on activating Al-Yarubiyah–Rabia in early May and completing procedures at Semalka–Fishkhabour to strengthen the broader cross-border connectivity network.

For his part, the Iraqi subdistrict head of Al-Waleed, Mujahid Mardhi Al-Dulaimi, told the Iraqi News Agency (INA) that the crossing has entered a trial reopening phase with crude oil tankers beginning to move between Iraq and Syria. He said more than 150 tankers are currently waiting to enter Syrian territory, expecting daily traffic to reach at least 500 tankers.

Oil cooperation between Syria and Iraq has the backing of President Donald Trump’s administration. US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said last week at the Atlantic Council that Syria could be “the solution” to the energy crisis stemming from the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting the potential development of pipeline networks, including from Iraq.

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)

"Syria a Vital Option"

The move gains added significance amid escalating regional tensions and intensifying confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, which has resulted in direct threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of global energy supplies pass.

In this context, economic expert Dr. Fadi Ayash said Iraq, as a major oil producer, has found in Syria a vital and available option to sustain export flows, especially given the difficulty of secure maritime exports. He said the current direction aims to raise tanker traffic to between 500 and 700 per day at a minimum.

Amid drone attacks and shelling targeting the Syrian side of the border since the outbreak of the unprecedented regional war- including a drone strike last Saturday launched from Iraq on the Al-Tanf base in southeastern Syria, questions arise about the sustainability of keeping crossings open and continuing Iraqi oil exports through Syrian territory under these security conditions.

Ayash said: “There is no doubt that Iraq is among the Gulf countries most affected by the current war, given that it is a major oil producer and exporter heavily dependent on export revenues. It therefore had to look for alternatives to sustain exports, and Syria was a viable option. However, sustainability depends on balancing financial and oil needs- especially with continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz- against on-the-ground security challenges in active conflict zones.”

Iraq is seeking to increase exports through Syria to between 600 and 700 trucks per day, making it a vital and mutually agreed option. According to Ayash, this represents “a practical application of spatial economics as a temporary solution to sustain exports, allowing time and resources to revive the pipeline linking Iraq and Syria to the Baniyas oil terminal on the Mediterranean. Pipeline exports are more efficient, less costly, and more secure, particularly as border areas are subject to intermittent security tensions and shelling, posing direct risks to trucks and crews.”

Iraq had reduced oil production by about 80 percent, to 800,000 barrels, due to shipping difficulties.

Operations Despite Risks

Despite the risks, initial convoys have begun moving, indicating an effort to proceed despite regional conditions. Ayash said continuation depends primarily on the ability of security forces in both countries to secure tanker routes, as well as the availability of financial, technical, and logistical resources needed to rehabilitate pipelines and pumping stations in both Iraq and Syria.

Economic Returns for Syria

According to current estimates and agreements under implementation, exporting Iraqi oil through Syrian territory is expected to generate direct and indirect financial and technical benefits for Syria. Transit fees alone could reach between $150 million and $200 million annually if operations run at high capacity.

The Syrian treasury would also benefit from port fees, storage and unloading charges, and road service revenues for trucks. Operating between 600 and 700 trucks daily would drive significant spending on fuel, maintenance, and road fees, stimulating economic activity along transit routes.

Ayash added that the arrangement could allow Syria to obtain shares of oil or derivatives at preferential prices or as part of transit compensation, easing its energy import bill. These revenues, he said, are vital under current conditions, contributing to economic recovery and foreign currency inflows, although final returns depend on export volumes and border security stability, which remains essential for sustaining exports through the Syrian route.


Securing Iran’s Enriched Uranium by Force Would Be Risky and Complex, Experts Say

 This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)
This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)
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Securing Iran’s Enriched Uranium by Force Would Be Risky and Complex, Experts Say

 This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)
This image from an Airbus Defense and Space's Pléiades Neo satellite shows a truck in the upper left-hand corner that analysts believe was carrying highly enriched uranium to a tunnel in the compound of the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, in Isfahan, Iran, June 9, 2025. (Airbus Defense and Space© via AP)

Should the US decide to send in military forces to secure Iran’s uranium stockpile, it would be a complex, risky and lengthy operation, fraught with radiation and chemical dangers, according to experts and former government officials.

US President Donald Trump has offered shifting reasons for the war in Iran but has consistently said a primary objective is ensuring the country will "never have a nuclear weapon." Less clear is how far he is willing to go to seize Iran’s nuclear material.

Given the risks of inserting as many as 1,000 specially trained forces into a war zone to remove the stockpile, another option would be a negotiated settlement with Iran that would allow the material to be surrendered and secured without using force.

Iran has 440.9 kilograms (972 pounds) of uranium that is enriched up to 60% purity, a short, technical step from weapons-grade levels of 90%, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog agency.

That stockpile could allow Iran to build as many as 10 nuclear bombs, should it decide to weaponize its program, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told The Associated Press last year. He added it doesn’t mean Iran has such a weapon.

Iran long has insisted its program is peaceful, but the IAEA and Western nations say Tehran had an organized nuclear weapons program up until 2003.

Nuclear material is probably stored in tunnels

IAEA inspectors have not been able to verify the near weapons-grade uranium since June 2025, when Israeli and American strikes greatly weakened Iran’s air defenses, military leadership and nuclear program. The lack of inspections has made it difficult to know exactly where it is located.

Grossi has said that the IAEA believes a stockpile of roughly 200 kilograms (about 440 pounds) of highly enriched uranium is stored in tunnels at Iran’s nuclear complex outside of Isfahan. The site was mainly known for producing the uranium gas that is fed into centrifuges to be spun and purified.

Additional quantities are believed to be at the Natanz nuclear site and lesser amounts may be stored at a facility in Fordo, he has said.

It's unclear whether additional quantities could be elsewhere.

US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard told a House hearing March 19 that the US intelligence community has "high confidence" that it knows the location of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpiles.

Radiation and chemical risks

Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium fits into canisters each weighing about 50 kilograms (110 pounds) when full. The material is in the form of uranium hexafluoride gas. Estimates on the number of canisters range from 26 to about twice that number, depending on how full each cylinder is.

The canisters carrying the highly enriched uranium are "pretty robust" and are designed for storage and transport, said David Albright, a former nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq and founder of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security in Washington.

But he warned that "safety issues become paramount" should the canisters be damaged — for example, due to airstrikes — allowing moisture to get inside.

In such a scenario, there would be a hazard from fluorine, a highly toxic chemical that is corrosive to skin, eyes and lungs. Anyone entering the tunnels seeking to retrieve the canisters "would have to wear hazmat suits," Albright said.

It also would be necessary to maintain distance between the various canisters in order to avoid a self-sustaining critical nuclear reaction that would lead to "a large amount of radiation," he said.

To avoid such a radiological accident, the canisters would have to be placed in containers that create space between them during transport, he said.

Albright said that the preferred option for dealing with the uranium would be to remove it from Iran in special military planes and then "downblend" it — mix it with lower-enriched materials to bring it to levels suitable for civilian use.

Downblending the material inside Iran probably is not feasible, given that the infrastructure needed for the process may not be intact due to the war, he added.

Darya Dolzikova, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, agreed.

Downblending the material inside Iran is "probably not the most likely option just because it’s a very complicated and long process that requires specialized equipment," she said.

Risks for ground forces

Securing Iran's nuclear material with ground troops would be a "very complex and high-risk military operation," said Christine E. Wormuth, who was secretary of the Army under former US President Joe Biden.

That's because the material is probably at multiple sites and the undertaking would "probably take casualties," added Wormuth, now president and CEO of the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative.

The scale and scope of an operation at Isfahan alone would easily require 1,000 military personnel, she said.

Given that tunnel entrances are probably buried under rubble, it would be necessary for helicopters to fly in heavy equipment, such as excavators, and US forces might even have to build an airstrip nearby to land all the equipment and troops, Wormuth said.

She said special forces, including perhaps the 75th Ranger Regiment, would have to work "in tandem" with nuclear experts who would look underground for the canisters, adding that the special forces would likely set up a security perimeter in case of potential attacks.

Wormuth said the Nuclear Disablement Teams under the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Command would be one possible unit that could be employed in such an operation.

"The Iranians have thought this through, I’m sure, and are going to try to make it as difficult as possible to do this in an expeditious way," she said. "So I would imagine it will be a pretty painstaking effort to go underground, get oriented, try to discern ... which ones are the real canisters, which ones may be decoys, to try to avoid booby traps."

A negotiated solution

The best option would be "to have an agreement with the (Iranian) government to remove all of that material," said Scott Roecker, former director of the Office of Nuclear Material Removal at the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous agency within the US Department of Energy.

A similar mission occurred in 1994 when the US, in partnership with the government of Kazakhstan, secretly transported 600 kilograms (about 1,322 pounds) of weapons-grade uranium from the former Soviet republic in an operation dubbed "Project Sapphire." The material was left over from the USSR's nuclear program.

Roecker, now vice president for the Nuclear Materials Security Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, said the Department of Energy's Mobile Packaging Unit was built from the experience in Kazakhstan. It has safely removed nuclear material from several countries, including from Georgia in 1998 and from Iraq in 2004, 2007 and 2008.

The unit consists of technical experts and specialized equipment that can be deployed anywhere to safely remove nuclear material, and Roecker said it would be ideally positioned to remove the uranium under a negotiated deal with Iran. Tehran remains suspicious of Washington, which under Trump withdrew from a nuclear agreement and has twice attacked during high-level negotiations.

Under a negotiated solution, IAEA inspectors also could be part of a mission. "We are considering these options, of course," the IAEA's Grossi said March 22 on CBS' "Face the Nation" when asked about such a scenario.

Iran has "a contractual obligation to allow inspectors in," he added. "Of course, there’s common sense. Nothing can happen while bombs are falling."